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FOREWORD FOR THE LARRAMENDI BOOK  
 
The bust of Larramendi, Don Ignacio to all of us, is located in the hall of the 
main building of MAPFRE's corporate headquarters in Majadahonda. As we come in 
each day, it is the first thing all of us, who work in this company, see every day, He is 
not only there as a matter of recognition, which is also the case, but because a large 
part of what today is the largest Spanish insurance company in the world is due to him, 
as the company’s re-founder. But regardless of the bust, everyone in this company, 
whatever our place of work, knows and admires the work of the man who was our 
chief executive for several decades. 
And I am not just referring to the person who laid the foundations of MAPFRE's 
management model, which we still consider to be differential, but also to the origin of 
the firm ethical and social values that today are our sign of identity and which largely 
explain the steps taken over the last 65 years by the company. 
Reading this book conveys with great verisimilitude how MAPFRE's life is linked 
to the thinking and personal action of Ignacio H. de Larramendi, a forerunner who had 
the ability to anticipate decisions for the company that later not only hit the mark, but 
also became sector practices led by the company.  
Following the evolution of Larramendi's thinking, we can also draw a parallel 
with the evolution of Spain and, of course, of the consolidation, growth, expansion and 
strength of the company. 
Now, that we live in a society of the moment and immediacy, it is surprising to 
find companies that last more than 5 or 10 years. That is why it is especially valuable to 
discover well-established, global companies with enormous economic strength and 
financial soundness that are 80 years old or more, as is our case. None of this would 
have been possible if we had only evolved with a much-needed financial profit in mind. 
There has to be something more, a profound sign of identity that accompanies and 
guides all this business development, especially when this vocation for global presence 
leads you to share your know-how in distant geographical environments, with different 
people, cultures and assets that must be understood and respected if you want to be 
accepted. 
In the 1960s, once the company had stabilised, Don Ignacio was already talking 
about the importance of trust as an essential concept not only for insurance, but also 
for what today is considered the management of the company. We can also find very 
valuable reflections in his articles from that decade, such as that “the company has a 
dual function: an instrument of economic service to the community, and a group of 
people to which its components are linked, even more than any other institution”. 
Read with today's eyes, MAPFRE's social commitment began to take shape in the 
insurance company three decades before Spain began to “talk” about Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and the link between professionals and their employer's project, 
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which is what today allows us to have one of the highest percentages of “pride in 
belonging to the company” in the business community.  
I cannot avoid another message he left us in the early 1980s in a conference 
given in Valencia. Then, in that Spain in turmoil, which had just begun its commitment 
to democracy, Larramendi already said that “the company, which enjoys economic 
and, therefore, social power, cannot be satisfied with an objective of profit, or even of 
creation of wealth, but has other obligations as a result of its transcendence and public 
responsibility”. This commitment, verbalised more than 30 years ago, could be put on 
the lips of any business leader today since, in fact, it is what most companies are 
saying now.  
Larramendi was commissioned to revive a company at a critical moment in its 
history, and not only did he limit himself to successfully dealing with this great 
company, but he also refounded that mutual society of agricultural owners, giving it a 
raison d'être, a solid economic and ethical basis that served as the foundation for the 
powerful international expansion that followed and which allows us to understand 
everything that the company and its professionals have achieved throughout our 
history.  
I, like Don Ignacio, also came to the insurance sector by chance and, like him 
and many thousands of us, have dedicated my whole life to this project, which I have 
had the honour of presiding over for almost a decade. All of us who have followed him 
have reinterpreted his professional heritage, transmitted in his writings, his reflections 
and his actions, and we will try to ensure that the new generations preserve everything 
that has brought us here, the cultural pillars of this group, which continues to amaze 
locals and foreigners alike. 
My generation were not able to meet Larramendi in person. When we started 
working he was leaving. Beyond the anecdote of some casual encounter in the lift or in 
the corridors of our then small headquarters of the Mutual Society in Las Rozas, all we 
received from him were the reflections of the elders, who did not hesitate to include 
his thoughts, directly or indirectly, in their reflections.  It was never dogma, but it was 
always a guide. Thus we were professionally educated in the freedom of opinion, the 
obligation to contribute and the need to build. The leader of that time, possibly 
omnipotent, was humble enough to let the others, even the youngest and most 
inexperienced, draw our own vision of the future of the company, in things great and 
small. I always remember the comment of some veteran who said “once you've 
decided on something, even Don Ignacio won't change it”. Trust in people, a principle 
that is still one of the fundamental pillars of our business development.  
I sincerely invite you to read this book, which in addition to better 
understanding one of the most relevant figures in Spanish insurance in the 20th 
century and the evolution of MAPFRE, also allows you to better understand the history 
of Spain, especially concerning its main economic decisions. In addition, the author has 
intelligently presented the figure of Don Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, a visionary 
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who was before his time by promoting business growth solidly committed to the social 
development of the environment. A company that for many decades has perceived in 
an exemplary manner that economic profitability had to be necessarily and 
indissolubly linked to social profitability, for the benefit of the whole society and its 
different stakeholders.  We have not been the only ones in this endeavour, 




Chairman of MAPFRE 
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FOREWORD BY LUIS H. DE LARRAMENDI  
 
When my father, Don Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano, died 20 years 
ago, the institution he had created, the “Fundación Hernando de Larramendi”, quickly 
and unanimously took the decision to change its name and adopt that of “Fundación 
Ignacio Larramendi”, a name by which he was known not only in the insurance world, 
but also among his many friends and acquaintances in Spain and around the world. 
While he was alive, that Foundation, which he had founded with his generous 
decision—and that of his wife, my mother, Lourdes Martínez, who succeeded him as 
President—to place at the service of society the vast majority of what was his family's 
heritage (what could have been the inheritance of his children, mine and my brothers 
and sisters), focused on activities of general interest, charity, the protection of the 
cultural heritage of the Ibero-American world, and historical research. 
After his death, and after that of my mother, when I took over the presidency, I 
thought it appropriate to propose—and the Foundation's board of trustees unanimously 
agreed—that one of the activities to be carried out should be a very necessary one: to 
honour the memory of the founders, making their professional career and example 
known, thereby seeking to ensure that their principles could serve as a stimulus to 
arouse in others the generosity and effort in working for the common good, which is so 
necessary to bring together an increasingly individualistic and selfish society. 
And because numbers are magical, we agreed that by focusing efforts on the 
occasion of the 100th anniversary of my father's birth, on 18 June 1921, this would allow 
for a greater impact. 
We thought that it was not only a matter of justice, but also a necessity so that 
all the vectors that had made Ignacio Larramendi a very unique and outstanding figure 
could be revealed, in such a way that it would allow us to complement both the vision 
we had of him in his Foundation, which was more personal and familiar, and the memory 
that was maintained in the insurance world, specifically in that great corporation, 
Mapfre, which without his impulse and effort would not have become what it is today,  
as well as that which may exist in many other areas of his activity. 
And for this purpose, an objective, rigorous look that may not have that previous 
knowledge of the Mapfre universe, or of the Fundación Ignacio Larramendi itself and his 
family, could be the most appropriate way to analyse his works, study his innumerable 
writings and collect testimonies of his life, placing all of this in the sociological, economic 
context of the moment in which they were produced, so that a different vision of his 
impeccable trajectory of service to society and the common good could be illustrated 
Mapfre, through its chairman, Antonio Huertas, who signs another prologue to 
this book, enthusiastically welcomed the initiative, which has finally given rise to the 
work that these lines introduce. 
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This required the signing of an agreement between the two supporting 
institutions, the Fundación Mapfre and the Fundación Ignacio Larramendi, and a 
prestigious university institution, the Fundación Universitaria San Pablo CEU, so that the 
latter, through the professor of applied economics, Mr. Javier Morillas, and a team of 
brilliant researchers, such as Gonzalo Sánchez-Magallón Rezusta, Manuel M. Molina 
López, Mercedes Rubio Andrés, José Manuel Muñoz Puigcervery, and Manuel R. Tejeiro 
Koller, could undertake the task. 
In parallel and in permanent contact with this team of researchers, an own essay 
has been prepared, from a different perspective to the rest of the authors, by the very 
famous Professor José Andrés Gallego and which is integrated in the work. He had the 
chance to know and work closely, side by side with Don Ignacio Larramendi in that 
extraordinary cultural initiative, undoubtedly encyclopaedic, which involved the 
publication of 256 monographs on the discovery and civilization of America, all prepared 
for the occasion by excellent scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. 
My father wrote a lot, in various records:  reports to boards, professional notes, 
articles on the world of insurance and on a thousand other things, publications on the 
Social Doctrine of the Church, history conferences, political essays, books on the 
improvement of public administration, and a host of other subjects, which are now, for 
the first time referenced almost in their entirety (because it is certain that not all have 
been preserved...) thus allowing us to have an exact idea of the variety of his interests, 
the effort of his work, and the ambition of his projects, all of which are accessible on the 
website of our Foundation, www.larramendi.es. 
It is not only this book that will see the light on the occasion of the centenary of 
Ignacio Larramendi’s birth, since other aspects of his life and work are also being rescued 
and re-analysed at the same time in the course of the commemoration, both from a 
family perspective as well as from that of his contributions to culture, history, the study 
of the Social Doctrine of the Church, regenerative medicine of accidents, and even the 
live commemoration of the voyage of Christopher Columbus in 1492. 
It is not possible to understand Ignacio Larramendi's successful business, cultural 
and historical work without drawing attention to his wife, Lourdes Martínez, my mother, 
who was extraordinarily intelligent, hard-working, collaborative in everything, and a 
very efficient family and professional manager. And as an example, I would like to 
mention that heavy Underwood typewriter, with keys that looked like hammerstones, 
which my mother used to transcribe my father's writings, like that early book “Tres 
claves de la vida inglesa” (Three Key Aspects of English Life), where her work was not 
limited to typing, since she corrected, suggested and advised on its content, 
complementing it, while directing and managing Editorial Cálamo that they both 
founded soon after their marriage, with headquarters in their own home, that rented 
flat in calle General Oráa 26 where they lived throughout their marriage, and that 
because it was rented had to be abandoned in 2015, after my mother’s death. 
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This magnificent book produced under the direction of Javier Morillas is—with 
some nuances in the case of José Andrés Gallego's contribution, due to his personal 
relationship with Ignacio Larramendi—a book based on the documentary analysis of his 
huge written work, and the testimony of almost a hundred people who knew him, whose 
vision about my father was recorded on video from the beginning of 2017, through the 
invaluable help of Pino Paniagua, who not only prepared the recordings, but also acted 
as interviewer, and also collected a large part of those original thought pills that appear 
in this book under the title of “Larramendi’s Pearls of Wisdom” 
If “So by their fruits you will get knowledge of them”, as the Gospels say 
(Matthew 7.15-20), it is clear that his life was fruitful, both regarding family—his nine 
children—and in the professional sphere—the legacy left to that Mapfre that without 
his help would not be what it is today—and also in his contribution to the world of 
culture, to dignifying public life with his suggestions for better management practices 
for the regeneration of the administration of the State, and putting into practice the 
principles of the Social Doctrine of the Church, through corporate social responsibility 
and the continuous search for and promotion of the common good in its most authentic 
sense. 
This commemoration of the centenary aims to give all this greater visibility to 
enlighten and illustrate to others so that they can, following his example and his work, 
contribute to the improvement of society, in Spain and other countries, in the shadow 
of the ethical and moral principles he defended and practised. 
If Isaac Newton said that he was able to discover gravity because he stood “on 
the shoulders of giants”, referring to all those scientists who had preceded him and on 
whose discoveries he was able to base his own, I would like nothing more than for this 
book, and all the commemoration activities of his centenary, to help my father's 
undoubtedly gigantic figure to enable others, looking to him, to take steps forward 
towards a fairer, more caring and more ethical society, for which he fought. 
 
LUIS HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI MARTÍNEZ 
Chairman of the Fundación Ignacio Larramendi 
 





ENTREPRENEURSHIP, ETHICAL DRIVE AND LEADERSHIP: IGNACIO 
HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI IN MAPFRE AND ITS FOUNDATIONS 
 
“By doing a lot from MAPFRE, I’ve been able to do something for Spain. My thanks are infinite”.1 
















1Hernando de Larramendi, Ignacio (1990): Farewell speech at the General Meeting of MAPFRE Mutualidad, 15-6-1990. Madrid, 
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                                            “From early on I wanted more than just a decent, proper company, I wanted to create an 
institution with an entrepreneurial nature but that wasn’t exclusively dominated by profit. One of my 
satisfactions is that today MAPFRE is considered to be providing a public service despite its private nature.”  
                                                                                                                                                 Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi 2. 
 
CHAPTER I. LARRAMENDI FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE 
FOUNDATION OF MAPFRE TO THE CREATION OF THE EURO  
 





                                   “I witnessed the proclamation of the Republic . . . I remember the burning of the convents 
that I saw from a balcony of my house and it left an impression on me  . . . time went by with my studies and 
concerns  . . . and in 1934 there was an uprising of the socialist party against the constituted government, the 
famous October revolution, mainly in Asturias. It was when the Civil War began. Subsequently, there was no 
peace, and the massacres of 18 July were prepared. It hadn’t been possible to avoid it, those who thought they 
could do it were mowed down.” 
                                                                                                                                          Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi3.   
 
2Cfr. Hernando de Larramendi, Ignacio (2000). Así se hizo MAPFRE. Editorial Actas. Madrid. p. 135. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 80-81. 
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Chapter I. Larramendi from the Great Depression and the establishment of MAPFRE  




A YOUNG MAN AND A FLEDGLING INSURANCE COMPANY IN THE MIDST OF THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION. 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi Montiano, had just turned 10 years old when 
the “Agrupación de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España” was created in August 
1931. At this time, it could have been thought that it was going to be one more of the 
various entities that arose in the context of that still basically rural Spanish economy. 
In this field and for centuries, sectoral organisations had been created in Spain 
that were certainly thriving. Amongst the most significant were the “Asociación 
General de Ganaderos”, created in 1836, heir of the centuries old “Honrado Concejo 
de la Mesta” of 1273; the “Asociación General de Agricultores”, created in 1881. Or 
that of “Fomento del Trabajo Nacional”, of 1889, after successive extensions and 
absorptions from the former “Real Compañía de Hilados y Tejidos de Algodón”, 
established in 1771. Additionally, there was the “Confederación Nacional Católica 
Agraria” that emerged in 1917 through the aggregation of previous Catholic 
agricultural organisations. Others, such as the Bloque Agrario, or La Liga Nacional de 
Campesinos. 
Derived from those, more specific activities had to be undertaken in a 
complementary way, such as the obligation to insure workers against the risk of 
occupational accidents that was spreading throughout Europe, within the framework 
of the incipient agreements of the International Labour Organisation, ILO, established 
in 1919. Conventional public limited companies weren’t interested in the field of 
agricultural insurance, given the recurrent subsistence crises, the structural changes 
underway and the resulting conflict in rural areas. This led to the creation of “mutual 
societies”, such as the “Mutualidad de la Agrupación de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas 
de España”, MAPFRE, on 16 May 1933. 
 
For Hernando de Larramendi, the Republican labour legislation derived only 
from the logical social evolution and the application of international agreements, “in 
the Republic the legislation on accidents at work was useful  . . . (although)  . . . the 
Agrarian Reform and other contemporary measures were sectarian. I don’t believe that 
any constructive action for the future came from them. They mainly served for a policy 
of resentment. 4 
The first three decades of the twentieth century were a period of intensive 
growth for the Spanish economy. It came from a long wave of expansion in which, to 
be precise, if in 1900 the Spanish per-capita income was 41.2 per cent that of the 
United Kingdom, in 1930 it was 52 per cent. A clear period of real convergence was 
taking place with the leader of the industrialising process in the world; although the 
distances were increasing with respect to other followers such as Germany -which 
went from 59.1 per cent of English income to 70.8 per cent in the same period-, France 
 
4Ibidem, pp. 119-120. 
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-which went from 63.2 per cent to 87.4 per cent-, and Italy -which jumped from 41.9 
per cent to 60.1 per cent-, and which were experiencing higher growth rates than 
Spain and England. It was no consolation to note the greater relative distance that 
Spain continued to gain over other countries such as Portugal, whose per-capita 
income in 1900 was 25.4 per cent of British income and in 1930 was just 26.3 per cent, 
barely reaching half of the Spanish income.5 
But, if we analyse the period between 1913 and 1929, the international 
comparison is even more eloquent in terms of the remarkable evolution of the real per 
capita product in Spain. With an average annual growth rate of 1.8 per cent, equal to 
the growth of Italy; only surpassed by France by just one tenth, 1.9; and well above the 
United Kingdom, which was growing at 0.3 per cent annually, and also Germany, 
where growth was 0.9 per cent; and even the United States, which grew at an average 
annual rate of 1.7 per cent during this period.6  
However, in certain sectors of Spanish society a hyper-criticism rooted in the 
Generation of ‘98 had taken hold, incapable of assessing the positive aspects of its 
general evolution, within the global context itself, which is what did end up being 
really negative. Thus, on 26 October 1929, one could see the following in the main 
Spanish publication of the time in the economic and insurance field: 
“There has been a violent, sharp decline in the Wall Street market, after which a fierce struggle has arisen between 
bulls and bears, which gives the market a most irregular appearance, [...] even as the decline prevails”.7 
Notices that would follow periodically in the weeks that followed: 
“The Wall Street market has experienced one of the biggest crises in its history [...] it hasn’t been possible to control 
the situation created by the excesses of unbridled speculation that has been dragging on for several months. Despite 
the warnings [...] the speculative fever continued until a few days ago, it became clear from the tension on the 
money market that a crisis was looming [...] Sell orders were pouring in by the millions from all sides, and [...] a large 
and continuous decline couldn’t be contained, [...] which ended in general panic. In that situation the market opened 
on Monday, and the Banking pool, overwhelmed by the sell orders, had to stop intervening [...], and then disaster 
struck. On Monday and Tuesday, prices were falling by 28 and 30 points; bankruptcies were piling up, and losses 
were running into billions [...] on Tuesday the fall was even greater [...]. The disaster was enormous, and had 
repercussions more or less [...] throughout the world, especially in Amsterdam and Brussels [...] Paris also suffered 
on Monday and Tuesday from the repercussions of the New York crash....”8 
 
Possibly the knowledge of this situation in the world and in the United States 
also influenced Primo de Rivera's decision to put an end to the Civic-Military Directory, 
which Ignacio's parents lived through with prevention, and which, by resigning before 
the King, made the return of constitutional liberties possible. Although the full effects 




5 García Delgado, J. L. et al. (2019): Lecciones de economía española, Civitas-Thomson Reuters. Pamplona. See also Maluquer de 
Motes, Jordi (2016): España en la economía mundial: Series largas para la economía española (1850 - 2015). Instituto de Estudios 
Económicos. Madrid.  
6 Morillas, J. (2019): De Isabel II a Felipe VI. El Economista, más de 165 años de la economía de España. Planeta-Deusto. Barcelona. 
7 El Economista, 26 October 1929. Madrid. 
8 “El crack de la Bolsa de Nueva York”. El Economista. 2 November 1929 Madrid. 
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“Due [...] to liquidations to avoid debts to the Banks, there has been another new and sharp decline in the Wall 
Street market, with huge quantities of paper being sold out of the estimates, which have come at lower rates than 
ever before”.9 
 
Thus, in January 1930, General Dámaso Berenguer was appointed chairman of 
the Council of Ministers as the person in charge of returning to the constitutional path, 
and after decreeing an amnesty he publicly undertook on 18 February to respect the 
expression of popular sovereignty.  
 
Further complicating matters was the military uprising in Jaca on 12 December 
1930 after a so-called revolutionary committee of the Pact of San Sebastian was 
formed. In enmity with the King, including General Queipo de Llano, as well as the 
commander Ramón Franco, three days later they tried another unsuccessful military 
movement, seizing the Cuatro Vientos airfield. The objective of holding legislative 
elections in January 1931 was aborted and Admiral Aznar was appointed as the new 
President.  
 
Significantly, on 11 March 1931 the leader of the Regionalist League of 
Catalonia, Francesc Cambó, published an article in which, in the face of the political 
turmoil of the time, he warned “once again, that the Republic can’t mean for Spain 
anything other than chaos, anarchy and communism”.10 In fact, King Alfonso XIII 
thought of proposing Cambó, who was well aware of the international economic 
situation and the disastrous consequences it could have for Spain, as chairman of the 
Council of Ministers. However, Cambó regretted declining the offer because of the 
serious illness for which he had to be treated urgently. The new government set a plan 
to first hold municipal elections on 12 April, then provincial elections on 3 May and 
general elections in June. Once the first elections were held, the constitutionalist 
parties won with 40,324 councillors, compared to the 36,282 of the Republican-
socialist group, although with a distribution that fed a sense of frustration amongst the 
former. 
 
Meanwhile, extremely alarming news continued to arrive from the other side of 
the Atlantic, adding to the political instability and disturbing consequences and 
information already affecting Europe's neighbours:  
 
“I got up at five in the morning and headed to the pier (San Francisco, USA). At the gates of Spreckles Sugar, there 
would be approximately 1,000 men. Everyone was well aware that there were only three or four jobs. A man came 
out accompanied by two little Pinkerton detectives and said, I need two men as watchmen and two to go into the 
hole. The thousand men fought like a pack of Alaskan dogs to get in, but only four of us made it”.11 
 
The normal thing in Spain would have been to continue with the two following 
electoral calls, and even more considering the recurrent counterweights and 
corrections of vote that the electorate exercises before such calls in each area. 
However, when the government met, it wasn’t happy about the setback of winning 
only 10 mayorships in large cities compared to the 37 it lost. It recommended that the 
 
9“Bolsa de Nueva York”, published in its “Revista de Bolsas” by El Economista, 16-11-1929.  
10 Vid., Morillas, J. (2019). “Francesc Cambó y Ángel Herrera, en el Centenario del jubileo de Covadonga”, 19-1-2019, in 
www.eldebatedehoy.es. 
11 Testimony on unemployment and the great depression of 1929 in America collected by the San Francisco correspondent of El 
Economista, 1931, No. 5,283, p. 24.  
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King leave Spain. Only the two ministers with competence and greater economic 
knowledge of what was coming —the Galician Gabino Bugallal, Minister of Economy, 
and the Minister of Development, the Murcian Juan de la Cierva —were opposed. Even 
General Sanjurjo, then in charge of the Civil Guard, declined his institutional 
responsibilities only to attempt a self-rectification a year later with an impossible 
“putsch” from Seville. 
 
Thus, surprisingly, barely four months after the military and anti-constitutional 
insurrection of Jaca, the beneficiaries of the Pact of San Sebastian moved to the 
Council of Ministers. Without any electoral or constitutional support, nor any 
economic argumentation. It isn’t strange that some of them, from Paris, didn’t even 
believe it. An astonished Azorín would say that “a writer, a scholar and a novelist”, 
Ortega, Marañón and Pérez de Ayala, with their influence on public opinion had been 
“the midwives of the Republic”. However, in the “literary”, “journalistic” and not at all 
economic training of the intellectuals “of the plazuela”, as Ortega said, there was no 
statistical mastery of economics. Moreover, their self-acknowledged ignorance of the 
subject did little to improve national self-esteem 30 years after the loss of the overseas 
empire. 
 
“At the advent of the dictatorship, many sensible, impartial people, were worried [...] about what might happen 
when it fell [...] (and there is) a general political disturbance [...] (that) [...] having a significant impact on the 
economic and financial life of the country, precisely at a time when a general economic crisis is making its effects felt 
in many nations and in important markets, with the natural repercussions on our country and on our stock markets 
[...] and in this abnormal financial and economic situation, which many peoples are suffering, 1931 begins without 
the most shrewd spirit being able to foresee in what direction the economic and financial life of the country would 
develop or the contingencies that may hinder, or the circumstances that may favour the situation of our Economy 
and our Treasury. 
 
If logic governed our destinies, there would be no reason to feel exceptional worries in relation to the year that was 
beginning, because the impression, or even the affirmation, that the general mass of the country, the one that truly 
works and produces, is alien to the anxieties of a minority always prone to disorder incompatible with the true 
national interests, isn’t risky [...] The orientation of the money market has also been rather unfavourable for the 
peseta in this first week [...]”.12 
 
As was foreseeable with the sudden advent of the change of regime in 1931, 
and the day after the departure of Alfonso XIII from Spain, there was the biggest stock 
market fall that had ever occurred in its history in peacetime. According to Larramendi 
“After the fall of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, the revolutionary wave that had 
shaken Europe since the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917 roared again and 
didn’t cease to do so until 18 July 1936”.13  
The economic climate began to radically change. The new “provisional 
government” even changed the flag, replacing the traditional red and yellow, which 
hadn’t changed even during the First Republic. Hernando de Larramendi himself tells: 
”My first memories are of the last period of the Dictatorship. When it ended in 1929 
there was sadness in my house, I didn't know why, but the problems that were to come 
were foreseen . . . . I also remember the bar Chiquito, because I witnessed the 
proclamation of the Republic there, seeing trucks passing by with people shouting, 
 
12 “Mercados de dinero”, in El Economista, 3-1-1931, p. 13. 
13  Cfr. Hernando de Larramendi, Ignacio (2000). Así se hizo MAPFRE. Editorial Actas. Madrid. p. 54. 
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“Death to the King” . . . . A few weeks later I remember the burning of convents, which I 
saw from the balcony of my house and this had an impact on me”.14 
The international scene was also buzzing: 
“The world is in turmoil [...France, Germany, Italy, the Ibero-American Republics...] In England a mining strike in 
Wales, workers' strike, industrial crisis, Egyptian and Indian nationalism [...] the decomposition of the English 
parties, a phenomenon that occurs in almost all the countries of the world, has been preventing strong governments 
from forming, which can undertake solutions . . . and we hope that this situation, so detrimental to the country, 
won’t continue for long. ( . . . In Russia...)...news of discussions, revolts and bloody events continue which, as they 
pass through the sieve of interested parties against or in favour of the Soviet regime, should be put in quarantine”.15 
It is, therefore, in this conflictive economic and political environment that this 
child Ignacio grew up, who seems so restless and shrewd, together with an unknown 
Mutualidad Agraria. “The agrarian reform”, he’d later write, “had hardly any specific, 
useful consequences for the nation; in the same way that one might ask what effect the 
disentailment of Mendizábal had, except to enrich a few and to create a corrupt middle 
class, as usually happens with measures that don’t seek the general interest, but come 
from some kind of revenge, even if it is historical. Some laws of General Franco have 
been more effective for the future and led the Spanish countryside to a structure 
different from that of that time.”16 
It was an agricultural environment with almost no mechanisation, largely 
subsistence, with low productivity in large farms, poor communication infrastructure 
for marketing and promotion of the activity, dispersed plots, water shortages and lack 
of irrigation, so demanded by Joaquín Costa. To make matters worse, anarchist 
extremism especially threatened the security in rural areas.  
For Larramendi: “ . . . the 1933 elections came, in which the CEDA won, and in 
1934 there was an uprising by the Socialist Party against the established Government, 
the famous October Revolution, mainly in Asturias. That was when the Civil War began. 
From this point on, there was no peace, and the massacres of 18 July were prepared. It 
hadn’t been possible to prevent it, those who thought they could do it were crushed. I 
believe that Spain was an important target for the Soviet strategy, which relied on 
naive betrayals. The objective was also anti-religious . . . “.17 
For Stanley Payne, “In recent years there had been much talk of what has been 
called 'historical memory', although what is usually indicated by this term has nothing 
to do with either memory or history. True memory is an individual recollection of 
people who have lived and gone through a particular experience. It isn’t a question of 
slogans or political inventions”.18 In any case, the atmosphere in those years had that 
markedly anti-Christian, anarchist component which, although present in the Russian 
Soviet Revolution of 1917, was no longer on the social agenda of Western European 
countries and which, in Larramendi's eyes, didn’t cease to worsen: 
 
14  Ibidem, p. 80. 
15“De Rusia y otros países”, in El Economista, 3-1-1931, p. 18. This specialised publication was established in 1854, it was the 
absolute leader in the economic, banking and insurance world at that time. 
16 HdL, Así..., p. 120. 
17 Ibidem, p. 81. 
18Payne, Stanley (2010): Prologue to Requetés, de las trincheras al olvido, by Pablo Larraz Andía and Víctor Sierra-Sesúmaga. La 
Esfera de los Libros. p. 11. 
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After the 1936 elections, as a continuation of the October revolution, which in 
reality began the war, a relentless fight was being prepared, with murders and 
persecutions due to religious beliefs, as in Huesca, in whose Barbastro diocese 87 per 
cent of the priests distributed in countless parishes were killed by the anarchists during 
July 1936; a clear genocide that wants to be forgotten with officially financed films, 
which exalt those who acted in this way. The so-called right-wing conspiracy was 
largely an attempt to defend themselves from the purpose of extending Soviet 
influence in the southern nation of Europe. This wasn’t possible, just as the peaceful 
occupation of our peninsula wasn’t possible for Napoleon.19  
 
                                “The world normally tends to move towards institutionalism, as a its own logical evolution, but 
nineteenth-century Spain absolutely cut off this possibility with the disentailment tensions, which weren’t only 
ecclesiastical but also municipal and associative, against which the Carlists reacted, representing a large part of 
the Spanish people, where useful institutions were destroyed for their interests, even if at some point they were 
out-dated”. 
                                                                                                                                                 Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi20 
The Traditionalist inheritance in the forging of a rebel.  
The oral, family memory of the turbulent nineteenth century was kept 
extraordinarily alive in many Spanish families. Larramendi himself recalled years later 
his paternal grandfather, Mariano, a doctor, from a family “of modest farmers”, born in 
Riaza, Segovia, and “of Carlist origin with partisan forefathers who participated in the 
“party” of the priest Merino in the war of independence and in the first Carlist war, . . . 
hardly had any political ties and in any case wasn’t a Carlist. My father was told this by 
his grandfather, who had been told it by his own grandfather and told it to him as a 
child”.21 His grandmother Luisa Larramendi, in turn, was the daughter of a man from 
Alava who had settled modestly in Madrid after the first of those wars.  
Therefore, the great family influence came from his father, Luis Hernando de 
Larramendi Ruiz (1882-1957), whom he always remembered would take communion 
every day and who had joined together his two surnames. He said of him that “he 
taught me to love Spain and to put my personal interests second to it”.22 He was a 
lawyer who in 1904 began his public life in San Sebastian as director of El Correo de 
Guipúzcoa, a traditionalist newspaper. At the age of 24 he settled as a lawyer in 
Madrid where he defended Aquilino Martínez, a typographer in the printing press of 
the well-known anarchist José Nakens. The two were prosecuted after the thwarted 
regicide of Mateo Morral in 1906, and he and Ferrer Guardia were sentenced; but the 
highly suspicious Aquilino Martínez, ably defended by Luis Hernando de Larramendi, 
was acquitted, with Larramendi acquiring a notable popularity and consideration in the 
revolutionary anarchist world. Carlism then “identified the integration of the working 
classes into the social structure as a traditionalist objective, to compensate for the 
 
19 Cfr. H de L, o.c. pp. 32-34. 
20Cfr. H de L, o.c. p. 141.  
21Cfr. H. de L., I. o.c. pp. 35-36. 
22Cfr. H d L, I. “Anotaciones de política socio-independiente”. The book is dedicated to his father. 
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fractures introduced by the revolutionaries . . . always within the social doctrine of the 
Church”.23 
They were legacies of the nineteenth century, which had left deep marks on 
Spanish society and its families. The six years of the Spanish-French war 1808 - 1814, 
marked a significant part of our later economic evolution. Due to its catastrophic 
consequences, an unprecedented anti-Napoleonic “total war” since the 8th century, 
and in a shorter period of time. They provoked a great agrarian crisis leaving a 
devastated country with extraordinary economic losses in the form of plundering, 
confiscation of livestock, crops, church treasures and destruction of all the pioneering 
factories of the eighteenth-century Spanish industrialisation. Like Larramendi's great-
great-grandfather, up to 50,000 young men had become partisan fighters; like Ramón 
Santillán who, abandoning his law studies and enlisted in that same party as Cura 
Merino, would years later become Governor of the Bank of Spain and important 
Minister of Finance in 1841. On a population of barely 11 million inhabitants, it’s 
estimated24 there were between 200,000 and 250,000 deaths amongst civilians and 
military in combat and due to immediate consequences; plus, equal mortality due to 
derived causes such as cholera, typhus, dysentery, or lack of food. An equal number of 
French soldiers and 50,000 English. The “cultivated area and rents fell by almost 50 per 
cent between 1808 and 1812 and never recovered to pre-war levels”.25 Thus, the 
calculated maximum of those between 400,000 and 500,000 Spaniards who died, five 
per cent of the population, is much higher than those estimated for the same causes—
also between 400,000 and 500,000—during 1936-39, for a Spain of 24.8 million 
inhabitants, more than twice as many. 
This was because unlike in Italy, Austria and other places where only the regular 
army fought and power was settled in a decisive battle or by capturing the court, here 
“partisans sprang up in every province, in every county, in every nook and cranny”, as 
William Wordsworth described it.26 An authentic and costly “war of resistance”, rather 
than “of independence”, since the institutional continuity persisted with the Central 
Board and the Regency in the name of the King, Ferdinand VII, as expressed in the 
“Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy” promulgated in Cadiz.27 
 
The disablement of roads, bridges, factories, warehouses, or castles had been 
generally undertaken by the invading army but also by the Spanish-English allies in 
their dynamics of occupation and recovery. That “damned war of Spain”, as Napoleon 
would call it, left an impoverished country that was witnessed by so many foreign 
travellers who, during the century, described that miserable situation. Hence, from the 
seven collapsed bridges that crossed the Cinca, Aragon's second-largest river after the 
Ebro, none had been able to be rebuilt 15 years later due to lack of means. 
 
23 Cfr. H dL o.c. , p. 50. 
24Various Authors (2009): Historia de España contemporánea. Paredes, Javier (dir.) Sello Editorial.  Barcelona. 
25 Prados de la Escosura, Leandro (2018): “The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History?” EHES Working Papers in 
Economic History, No. 130, April 2018. Prados has updated the consequences of that great economic trauma. 
26 The subsequent de-structuring of the country is reflected in the fact that 30 years later, in 1844, one of the justifications for the 
creation of the Civil Guard is “to put an end to the insecurity that lurked on the roads after the War of Independence”, according 
to Margarita Robles, Minister of Defence, “Proximity at the service of the citizen”, 175 years of the Civil Guard, La Razón, 6-10-
2019. 
27 Cortes de Cádiz (1812): Constitución Política de la Monarquía Española, 19 March 1812. Special edition Quorum Editores. 
Consortium for the Commemoration of the Bicentenary of the Constitution, 1812 - 2012. Cádiz, 2009. 
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When in 1820 Ferdinand VII had to swear in the Constitution, the Cortes 
wanted it to be done with mantle and crown in order to give the act the greatest 
possible solemnity, but the King, however, no longer had them because the French had 
taken them away.28 The so-called Immaculada de Soult”, the one by Murillo, which 
that Mariscal took, wouldn’t be returned to Spain from the Louvre until 1941 General 
Castaños himself, a national hero, received his salary with a six month delay and civil 
servants up to three years delay. 
 
In an attempt to alleviate this poverty, individual distributions of uncultivated 
lands had been approved, of own and common lands of the Town Councils, by 
separate decree laws of 1813 regarding their division into private property and 
enclosures of estates. A large number of municipal properties had passed into private 
hands; many town councils, under pressure of financial needs, sold off part of their 
assets. Although Ferdinand VII annulled that legislation by returning land to the 
common people, burdened by the repayment of the Debt, several of its provisions 
came to allow their sale and new enclosures. During the liberal triennium it was 
decided that half of the barren lands and own lands would be auctioned to pay the 
debt and the other half would be distributed in lots of equal value amongst the 
veterans of the six years of war and non-property-owning neighbours. However, many 
of the poor neighbours were opposed to the sale of the council lands, not being able to 
compete with the wealthiest people of the town in the purchase of these lands, which 
they could at least use. Ferdinand VII legalised the occupations and enclosures made 
by President Bardají Azara and the triennium. Even after 1823 there were illegal 
occupations that he himself came to recognise, although with the kind reminder that 
they wouldn’t be repeated. There were also the large number of entailed estates 
which, as in the United Kingdom and other European countries, allowed for some 
significant accumulation of capital for agricultural investment and improvement. 
However, in Spain there was little incentive to improve farm yields and introduce 
useful improvements to crops; landowners because of the lack of demand and limited 
market for their products that would allow them to recoup their investments; and 
tenants because they didn’t own the property. 
 
All these pending problems reflected 29  objective difficulties marked by 
inherited poverty and the slow process of recovery of intergenerational savings. With a 
broken traditional rural society and a new bourgeoisie struggling to develop an 
incipient capitalism, this generated a political division intermingled with a succession 
dispute. 
 Ferdinand VII's younger brother, Charles, was called to succeed him as Head of 
State according to the secular Salic Law -from the Salian Germans- compiled in the 5th 
century in Latin regulating the monarchic succession in Europe in favour of males. 
Although in Spain -also in England- the so-called Law of Succession, based on the 
 
28Vid. Comellas García-Llera, José Luis (2009): “El sexenio de plena soberanía real (1814-1820)”, in Historia de España 
contemporánea, J. Paredes (coord.), pp. 99-100. Both the mantle and the crown were taken for a few hours from an image of San 
Fernando. 
29García Sanz, A. (1985): “Crisis de la agricultura tradicional y revolución liberal”, in “Historia de la España contemporánea, 
Barcelona. 
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Seven-Part Code of Alfonso X, had prevailed; with attempts of modification such as 
those of Charles IV, which Fernando VII finally sanctioned on his deathbed, under 
pressure from his entourage. So, in the absence of a son, the new-born Isabella was 
declared heir to the throne, which led to an uprising that, under the trilemma “God, 
Country, King”, took root in the rural areas of the North, East, and other areas of 
Castile and Andalusia starting at the end of 1833, the so-called first Carlist war. They 
were convinced that the majority of the population shared their traditional 
sentiments, and that it was enough to connect the different points of Spain with Carlist 
contingents from North to South and East to West by means of mobile columns, 
although -as they would later argue- they were betrayed. Hernando de Larramendi's 
great-great-grandfather had participated in it, as did tens of thousands of Spaniards 
who passed on orally to their offspring those ideals, of which Ignacio's own father felt 
especially proud. Because that succession dispute and the principles and values 
derived from it, would one hundred years later, vitally mark the forging of his 
multifaceted personality. 
The “embrace of Vergara” in 1839 between generals Maroto and Espartero, 
who had fought together in America, put an end to the war,30 recognising the 
traditional Basque fueros  and integrating the most possibilist Carlism. The pretender 
would abdicate in 1845 in favour of his son granting, as a moral compensation, 69 
noble titles to his most prominent and ruined followers. He ended up in exile in 
Trieste, then part of Austria, where he died and in 1855 would be buried in the Chapel 
of St. Charles in the Cathedral: “Modest in fortune, constant in adversity, but of 
remarkable piety” reads his tombstone in Latin.31 
A Carlist mystique was thus created. Of upright, fallen, and mythologised 
idealists, like the already hero Zumalacárregui. Or an elusive and romantic “Tiger of 
Maestrazgo”, Ramón Cabrera, from a middle-class family from Tortosa, who was 
guided towards ecclesiastical studies by his young, widowed mother, he enlisted in the 
Baron of Herbés' party. When the latter was assassinated by the liberals, he’d soon 
show his military and leadership skills. 
There was then a wedding project between the son of the pretender, Carlos 
Luis de Borbón Braganza, and the child queen Isabel, sponsored amongst others by 
Jaime Balmes and Donoso Cortés. After the failure of the project, a second Carlist 
attempt was made in 1846 in the form of isolated groups in the north-east. Carlos Luis 
was imprisoned for attempted insurrection, abdicating his claim, but later renouncing 
it when his brother Juan, Count of Montizon and new pretender successor had already 
recognised his first cousin Isabel II. It was a frustrated “attempt” at war; Cabrera went 
into exile in England and an amnesty was decreed for 1,400 Carlists who returned to 
Spain, whilst others remained in exile. Carlos Luis, called Count of Montemolin died in 
 
30Pirala, Antonio (1943): Historia de la guerra civil y de los partidos liberal y carlista. 2nd edition extended with the history of 
Espartero's regency. Editorial Católica Española. Seville. In addition to the economic and human losses was the cost of outside 
interference. The death toll is confusing. According to Pirala, the entire Spanish army had 21,784 dead during the first Carlist war, 
whilst the foreign troops who came to support one of the sides and were normally used as shock troops, had between 4,000 and 
5,000 dead. Other authors have given figures of as many as 60,000 Carlists who fell in the first war alone, compared to 65,000 
supporters of Isabel and 7,700 and 2,500 French and English allies respectively. Vid. also Bullón de Mendoza, A. (1987): “La 
intervención extranjera en la primera guerra carlista”, in APORTES, No. 6. September   
31Vid. González Llano, Luis Mª et al. (2004): “Notas para el recuerdo de un paseo por las calles y los archivos del Trieste Carlista”, in 
Aportes. Revista de Historia contemporánea, No. 54, Year XIX- 1-2004, pp. 84-93. 
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Trieste. Many of the Carlist veterans would later fight in the African War of 1859 - 
1860. Some would even join the Civil Guard. In the meantime Cabrera, named Count of 
Morella and Marquis of Ter, married the rich young Englishwoman Marianne C. 
Richards in England in 1851. His eldest son would later join the Spanish diplomatic 
corps.32  
The early words of Senator Barroeta-Aldamar in 1864 may have been 
somewhat prophetic: “You see looming on the horizon, towards the noon part of the 
day, a bloody and monstrous spectre. For that spectre is the revolution, with its 
trappings of socialism, of which we have already seen some of its spawn before now. If 
that spectre becomes a body, that spectre advances, be sure that the Queen, the good 
men, the society that is to be destroyed, one of the nuclei of resistance will be 
concentrated in the Basque Provinces”.33   
Spain wasn’t and hadn’t ceased to be on the fringes of the destabilisation and 
revolts that followed the Napoleonic aggressions in Europe and the subsequent 
legitimist struggles. Amongst others, the dethronements in 1830 of Charles X and then 
of Louis Philippe I in neighbouring France; even revolutions such as those of the Paris 
Commune of 1848, which established a second republic that also failed. Again, too, 
influenced by the French events, in 1868 the dethronement of Isabel II was to take 
place, giving way to an uncertain Regency of the Kingdom, looking for a new King.  
This is when the son of the Count of Montizón, Carlos María de Borbón y 
Austria-Este, made use of this to vindicate himself as belonging to both the Houses of 
Bourbon, Austria and the Carlist House. Now the so-called Duke of Madrid, in addition 
to religious and traditional demands, would add popular discontent against the 
disorders and anti-clericalism of the Sexenio, the enthronement of a foreign dynasty—
the Savoy—and the First Republic. Deputies such as Nocedal, since his youth a member 
of the Progressive Party, also adhere to Carlism.  
José Miguel Azaola wrote about how this “second” great attempt took place, 
especially in the north of Spain: “Faced with the accentuated liberalism of the Regimes 
that followed the Revolution of 68; faced with the freedom of worship that was written 
into the Constitution the following year; faced with the institution of civil marriage; 
faced with Freemasonry in power, the new pretender raised the banner of Catholic 
unity, and a good number of moderate supporters of Isabel, having lost all hope of 
seeing their queen on the throne again, swelled the ranks of the followers of Don 
Carlos. For rural Vasconia, the monarchy of Amadeo I (the son of the “Pope's jailer”, 
Victor Manuel) was a devil’s spawn, and the First Republic was an infernal 
abomination. To make a pact with them, even in exchange for the broadest autonomy, 
would be tantamount to rushing into eternal fire. Before them only one attitude was 
licit: the Crusade. First, the “rights of God” and then, but only then, the “fueros”. The 
 
32 Vi., Urcelay Alonso, Javier (2000): “La historia autógrafa del hijo de Ramón Cabrera redactada por su hijo”.  APORTES Magazine 
No. 43. Year XV, 2/2000, pp. 49-60. Ed. Actas. 
33 Vid. Talón, Vicente (1988): “Memoria de la guerra de Euzkadi de 1936”. Volume I, “From Peace to War”, p. 17. Editorial Plaza y 
Janés. Three volumes. Barcelona. 
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thesis that this new uprising had, above all, a foralist nature (in the sense of 
“autonomist” or “particularist”) doesn’t stand up to criticism”.34  
This “second” Carlist attempt35 managed to mobilise up to 90,000 men, in the 
same areas of the North, East, and interior of the peninsula, against 300,000 soldiers of 
the regular army. However, the enthronement of Alfonso XII in 1874 soon left them 
with no options. The mythical “Duke of Maestrazgo” had already resigned in 1870 as 
“Political and Military Chief” of Carlism because he believed “there were no reasonable 
conditions to achieve victory by force of arms” and he didn’t want to expose the 
country to another internal rift. Thus, he recognised King Alfonso XII by accepting the 
Constitution of 1876. The pretender would end up, like his predecessors, in exile in 
Trieste and without resources to pay his troops, trying to morally compensate his most 
suffering followers by granting 102 noble titles, later recognised by Franco after the 
1948 Law.36 In the cathedral of Trieste called “the Carlist Escorial” rest the remains of 
the pretenders, wives, children and relatives. Next to them, in the Cemetery of Santa 
Ana, remain the amazing graves of the most faithful Spanish exiles and their families, 
advisers, doctors, secretaries and personal assistants. From then on, Carlism would 
become a political party, affected by successive splits.  
Ignacio's father would write that “...exonerated, outlawed, confiscated, in 
prisons, fought against, shot, murdered, persecuted, betrayed, slandered, silenced, and 
sold for more than a century, left for dead a hundred times, only Carlism has never died 
because it’s . . . the unfading tradition of eternal Spain”37, putting the number of fallen 
who supported traditionalism at 80,000 up to 1936. For Ignacio, the Carlist Wars were 
“a consequence of the reaction of a deep-rooted civil society in some regions of 
Spain, who defended their freedom and their “fueros” against the liberal Madrid lords, 
the yuppies of the time, who wanted to “turn the country upside down”, as has recently 
been the case. They were convinced of their superiority, they believed themselves to be 
more modern and more scientific, just as Marxist scientism was admired a short time 
ago”.38 
In any case, and following the abrupt arrival of the Republic, with its abnormal 
constitutional rupture, change of flag, its objectively sectarian Constitution and its 
continuous attacks on religion, the Church, the Monarchy, and the most traditional 
principles, it was foreseeable that the “red berets” would resurface everywhere. So 
much so that they were forced to return to the usual flag, refusing to fight under the 
improvised tricolour. Especially in the same areas, but now also in many other areas of 
Spain that were to nourish the Tercios de requetés, incorporating old and new fighters 
from the most diverse corners. Also the young Hernando de Larramendi. The Carlist 
hero's own grandson, Ramón Cabrera Gil, who had served as a Regular Officer in the 
African campaign under the command of González Tablas, placed himself at Franco's 
 
34 Quoted by Talón, Vicente (1988): “Memoria de la guerra de Euzkadi de 1936”, Volume I. “De la Paz a la Guerra”, “Un pueblo 
contra la revolución”, pp. 23-24. Editorial Plaza y Janés. Three volumes. Barcelona.  
35 During 1873-74 they even took towns like Cantavieja in Teruel, Olot in Gerona and others in Cuenca. The internal disputes ended 
up making a dent in the Carlist ranks. 
36The previous pretender, Carlos Luis, had granted five other titles. Since 1955, due to the historical-artistic value of the Santa Ana 
Cemetery, the Spanish Government has paid for its maintenance.  Vid. o.c. González Llano, (2004). 
37Hernando de Larramendi Ruiz, Luis, in “Boletín de los estudiantes carlistas”, clandestine multi-copy 1-11-1942. 
38Hernando de Larramendi, Ignacio (1990). “Carlismo y nacionalismo”, in El Debate de Hoy, 28-5-2019. Unpublished text, p. 2. 
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disposal. In fact, after 18 July he joined the military intelligence service from 
Switzerland and died in 1938. 
 
This is how Dolores Ibarruri herself describes the situation in “El único camino”: 
“The descendants of the old Carlists lived in Navarre, organised and framed in groups 
of requetés with an iron discipline, with religious fanaticism and untouchable 
hierarchies. Everything was almost the same as in 1876. The only thing that had 
changed was the weaponry. In 1936, the Navarrese requetés were armed not with the 
old rifles and pistols buried at the end of the Carlist war but with modern Mausers and 
machine guns. This military organisation, half Carlist and half fascist, constantly 
conducted exercises and shooting practices, military parades and manoeuvres, which 
the authorities tolerated . . . “39  
 
Juan E. Delmas of Basque origin would say of his fellow Basque countrymen 
“Love for the homeland, for religion, for independence, for the old customs, for 
tradition itself, to which one is deeply attached, constitute the essence of his life and 
actions. Do not ask the Basque people for the immediate introduction of reforms to 
their way of being and living, however good they may be, because they won’t accept 
them”.40  
To all this, Jaime41, only son of the “Duke of Madrid”, married to Nieves de 
Braganza -daughter of Miguel I of Portugal- died in 1931 without children, after 
creating the “Order of Prohibited Legitimacy”, “the only distinction considered worthy 
of wearing with pride” according to Ramón María del Valle Inclán. His nephew and 
successor, Alfonso Carlos de Borbón y Austria, 78 years old, would lead Carlism from 
1931 to 29 September 1936, presiding over the “Supreme Military Junta” that 
participated in the preparations for the uprising by providing a large number of 
weapons. When he died childless, run over by a military truck, he was buried in the 
Castle of Puchheim, Austria, thus ending the direct dynastic line of Carlism. His 
personal lawyer would be Ignacio's father himself, Luis Hernando de Larramendi Ruiz, 
who drew up the so-called Regency Document of 23-1-1936, much to the displeasure 
of those who thought that the rights converged on Don Juan de Borbón. Hence, whilst 
the dynastic differences were being resolved, a “pretender regent” was appointed in 
the person of a nephew from his sister Nieves' branch, Javier de Borbón-Parma, who 
had also participated in the preparation of the Rising with Sanjurjo and Mola. 
“The Carlist uprising in the north,” wrote the pro-nationalist Arturo Campión, 
“was a reaction of an eminently national character, provoked by revolutionary politics; 
something similar to the retching of a stomach that has ingested poisonous substances 
and struggles to expel them”.42 Whereas according to Salvador de Madariaga “for the 
Carlist it was important to keep the whole of Spain under the undisputed authority of 
the King and the Church”.43 The prestigious magazine “Revue des Deux Mondes” noted 
with regards to the Basque Nationalist Party itself: “Several weeks before the outbreak 
 
39 Vid. Ibarruri, Dolores, (1963): El único camino. Ed. Lenguas Extranjeras. Moscow. Quoted by Talón, Vicente (1988): “Memoria de 
la guerra de Euzkadi de 1936”,  Volume I. “De la Paz a la Guerra”, p. 49. Editorial Plaza y Janés. Three volumes. Barcelona.  
40 Vid, Vicente Talón, o.c. p. 22. Volume I.   
 41Jaime had also declared himself successor to the throne of France. 
42 Quoted by Vicente Talón, p. 24. Volume I “La guerra civil en Euzkadi”   
43 Quoted by Vicente Talón, p. 25. . Volume I “La guerra civil en Euzkadi” 
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of the Civil War, from June 1936, when sacrilegious fires, plundering and murders were 
multiplying, the leaders of the PNV met to decide on the attitude they should adopt in 
the event that they should take up arms. They decided that if the state of anarchy gave 
rise to a purely military insurrection, to an uprising, the Basque nationalists wouldn’t 
support that reaction; that if, on the contrary, it wasn’t only the military, but the whole 
population, who in a burst of patriotism, rose up against the anti-patriarchy, then they 
would join common cause with the Basque traditionalists and with the Spanish national 
movement”.44  
In the middle of the Civil War, Larramendi's father would publicly slap the 
director -later Head of the Civil House of the Head of State- of the newspaper “La Voz 
de España” in the Café Madrid in San Sebastián for adding an article praising Franco, 
from whom he always kept his distance. For Stanley Payne “When Generalissimo 
Franco insisted on the absolute necessity of achieving a close political unity to win the 
war, the Carlists accepted their political subordination in the single party”.45 This 
wasn’t the case with Larramendi's father who, with the 1937 Decree of Unification 
between Traditionalism and the Falange, abandoned all political activity. He 
understood it as that “wisdom accumulated by the efforts of preceding generations, 
...and with them the veneration of their parents and their parents' parents and their 
ancestors, whose blood preserves so many assets that  . . . oblige them to the duty and 
honour of deserving, by their own love and self-sacrifice, to be worthy of the 
admiration of future generations”.46 
Ignacio's mother, Maria Montiano Uriarte, also had a powerful influence on his 
personality. She was the daughter of a doctor from Bilbao of whom he always said that 
“she was very important to me. She was a pure Basque who knew up to 240 surnames 
of that origin, with a great fondness for genealogy...she looked like a painting by 
Zubiarre (...);  . . . as the mother of the Graco family, she saw how two of her sons, aged 
16 and 17, volunteered for the war, without shedding a tear”.47 It was then that he met 
the other great woman in his life, his wife, Lourdes Martínez Gutiérrez, “almost a child 
watching the young requetés parade with her friends in the summer of 1937 . . . in 
Fuenterrabía where she lived”. Of those months and at the age of 16—his younger 
brother had enlisted even before him—he remembered how . . . “we stood guard in 
the dungeons of the prison in Irún, where those of the international brigades were, . . . 
there was no danger, . . . what they wanted was to go”.48 
The young Ignacio would later be incorporated into the company of Tolosa of 
the Tercio de San Miguel, where he found his friend José María Querejeta as a second 
lieutenant: “The company was established by Carlists from San Sebastian who went to 
Pamplona under the command of Elías Querejeta, a mythical figure..., an industrial 
engineer, brother of José María, cousin of his namesake Elías Querejeta, the film 
director. I always remember him with admiration . . . I was lucky (during the war) as in 
 
44 Quoted by Vicente Talón, p. 39. Volume I “La guerra civil en Euzkadi”. 
45Payne, Stanley (2010): Prologue to Requetés, de las trincheras al olvido, by Pablo Larraz Andía and Víctor Sierra-Sesúmaga. La 
Esfera de los Libros. p. 11. 
 
46Hernando de Larramendi Ruiz, Luis, in “Boletín de los estudiantes carlistas”, clandestine multi-copy 1-11-1942.   
47 Cfr. HdL, Así…o.c. p. 38. 
48 Ibidem, p. 84 
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almost all the activities of my life . . . the first time I went into direct fire I was next to 
one of my old comrades from Tolosa. When we were in very barren landscape, he bent 
down to tie his boots slowly. I was afraid but he and all the others were not . . . . (at the 
end)...we arrived in Barcelona the day after the entry of the national troops . . . and we 
continued to the border in very long marches . . . . The situation of an army in defeat 
was unforgettable, corpses in the ditches, abandoned machinery, rifles on the ground . 
. . . At 17 years old, I was almost a witness to one of the great dramas of the war”.49 
The war had also been tragic for the Mutual Society. Almost all its 
representatives had been killed: 32; except for the few who remained or were able to 
switch to the national side.50 In Badajoz the first representative there was in the 
province in 1935, Federico Manresa, a fervent Catholic, was always remembered. 
Although in August 1936 the lawyer and poet of the Generation of 1927 José María 
Hinojosa, who introduced surrealist poetry in Spain, co-director in 1929 of the 
magazine “Litoral”, member of the Traditionalist Communion and friend of García 
Lorca would also be “paraded” in Malaga.51 On the other side in Valencia we 
remember Rafael Sornosa, whose father was in the insurance company since 1933. He 
was a general in the Republican army and MAPFRE agent until his death in 1998, with 
his son Rafael continuing his work, who would provide very efficient services in 
Castellón, and his daughter Concepción. Four of the sons of Cándido Martín, an 
important member of the Mutual Society in Valladolid, also died at the front, and 
another, Dionisio Martín Sanz—later chairman of MAPFRE in 1955—was seriously 
wounded. 
For Payne “the Carlists embodied the cause of Spain's dynastic, religious, and 
institutional traditionalism for more than a century, but they didn’t come forth in 1936 
for reasons of no political affiliation or sectarianism. They stood for a highly national, 
religious and core value cause. They knew how to subordinate their own political 
interests to those of the common cause. The very term Glorious National Movement 
was coined by the Carlists much earlier, in 1869.../.. ... A great testimony of courage 
and self-sacrifice in one of the greatest crises in the history of Spain”.52 
Despite everything, both the young Ignacio and that modest Mutua Agricola of 
1933, would survive such a drama and that economic crisis of the 1930s, of a 
magnitude unknown until then. It was one whose great depression led to that bloody 




49Ibidem, pp. 87-88. 
50 Ibidem, pp. 496-562-591. 
51He would be shot with his father, his brother, and Luis Altolaguirre, brother of the writer Manuel Altolaguirre, along with 46 
other detainees at the walls of the cemetery of San Rafael on 22 August, by militiamen after a “saca” of the Provincial Prison of 
Malaga. 
52Payne, Stanley (2010): Prologue to Requetés, de las trincheras al olvido, by Pablo Larraz Andía and Víctor Sierra-Sesúmaga. La 
Esfera de los Libros. p. 11-12. 
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                            “The problems of Spain and the world are confusing. It is necessary to go into them with humility, 
approaching the truth without dogma or monopoly . . . . I would like to help a great reconciliation...”. 
                                                                                                                                            Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi 53.   
 
LARRAMENDI: A BEFORE AND AFTER IN THE EVOLUTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
INSURANCE SECTOR IN SPAIN. 
The insurance sector, in its long and irregular history in Spain, had already gone 
through some turbulent years. In the independent Regnum Hispaniae formed after the 
fall of Rome from 476, the previous intense maritime trade had been complicated by 
the political breakdown and long civil war in Italica and Frankish occupation of Gaul. 
The stammering, rudimentary insurance mechanisms that had been developed up to 
that time came to a halt in the midst of economic impoverishment, although they 
persisted in that Isidorian “Mater Spania” within the institutional, natural, and legal 
“continuum” of authority, which flourished with capital in the Hispano-Gothic civitas 
Regia of Toledo. With an elective monarchy, then regulated in 633, maintaining the 
transport and a lucrative commercial activity and exports, improving and enlarging the 
old Hispanic-Roman roads and ports. 
Beyond Narbonne, however, chaos and robbery reigned on the roads of Europe 
for overland trade. Despite the insecurity unleashed in the Mare Nostrum, maritime 
trade was almost the only possible trade, the uncertain end of which was still being 
minimised with crude insurance protocols. In this sense many of the thousands of 
ships tried to be insured by means of different types of contracts, which with vessels of 
oil, wines, fruits, and other numerous products were exported mainly to the port of 
Ostia, from Gades, Malaca, Abdera, Carthago Nova, Dianium, Valentia, Saguntum, 
Tarraco, Barcina, Emporion, or Pollentia in the current Majorca. 
However, from the 8th century onwards, commercial navigation in the 
Mediterranean went into a tailspin again with the invasion and subsequent 
Mohammedan piracy. It isn’t strange that the oldest maritime insurance policy found 
corresponded to a shipment that undertook the Genoa-Mallorca route in 1347. Nor 
that the 1435 Ordinances of Barcelona —the former Barcina —compiled the provisions 
on insurance, later collected in the first code of maritime law in the book of the 
Consulate of the Sea of the same city in 1494. Soon after, the Bilbao Ordinances were 
drawn up in 1520 and, in 1536, the most important Ordinances of the Consulate of 
Burgos, from where many of the insurance policies of the fleets that sailed the “Route 
to the Indies” would also be insured.  
With the greater dynamism and risks involved in transatlantic trade, the 
Consulate of Seville—together with the northern Consulate of Burgos—took the lead 
 
53Vid., Anotaciones de política socioindependiente, 1977. 
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in Spain, establishing a series of provisions relating to insurance from 1543, almost half 
of which were included in its Ordinances of 1556. From Seville, in 1717, Philip V moved 
the Casa de Contratación (House of Trade) to Cadiz, making it “the capital of Spanish 
insurance”54 even creating joint-stock companies. With Charles III, from 1765, the 
freedom of maritime trade was opened in Spain with Barcelona also entering into the 
overseas trade.  
Another collapse would come to the world of insurance in Europe in the early 
nineteenth century. In Spain, the long crisis already analysed didn’t allow the new 
Code of Commerce of 1829 to bring about the advance of the insurance sector, which 
remained small in size and mainly of a mutual nature.  
With Isabella II no longer being under legal age, the successive tax reforms by 
the minister Alejandro Mon from 1837, president of the Government in 1864, and by 
Ramón Santillán would take place. Until Bravo Murillo, after a succession between 
1820 and 1851 of up to 38 prime ministers or presidents as opposed to their 12 
equivalents in England, attempts were made at occasional and discontinuous reforms, 
with the emergence of various insurance companies in Spain. Although weighed down 
by political instability as opposed to the English institutional predictability that 
Larramendi would value so much, as a strong business leader to develop sustained 
long-term strategies.  
However, the “Barcelonesa de Seguros” for the maritime sector emerged in 
1838, and “General Española de Seguros” in 1841, with headquarters in Madrid, 
presided over by Luis María Pastor, a lawyer and prestigious free trader. Moreover, the 
“Catalana General de Seguros”, or “La Ibérica” in 1845 and 1846 respectively with 
headquarters in Barcelona, were also dedicated to marine insurance, although they 
later moved on to agricultural insurance. Pastor's company, “La Española”, from the 
beginning offered rates based on mortality tables corresponding to seven European 
countries, becoming a pioneer in scientific life insurance, with actuarial criteria already 
introduced in England.  Pastor, who would become Minister of Finance in 1853, 
together with the later Nobel Prize winner José Echegaray and others, moved from “El 
Economista”—which he had managed—to create the “Gaceta Economista”, also a 
body in the insurance world, subtitled “Periódico Político, de Comercio, de Navegación 
Mercantil y de Seguros”. Evidencing such continuity, it includes a list of “Redactores y 
Colaboradores (Editors and Associates)”. Amongst these Laureano Figuerola, Cipriano 
Montesinos, Segismundo Moret, Antonio Alcalá-Galiano, Francisco Canalejas, Emilio 
Castelar, Sagasta, and up to 42 more members,55 many of them prestigious Civil 
Engineers, the most familiar at that time with economic-mathematical calculation for 
actuarial analysis. Other publications also began to deal with insurance issues such as 
the illustrated magazine “Banca, Ferrocarriles, Industria y Seguros”, or the “Gaceta de 
los Caminos de Hierro”56with interest and involvement in the sector itself. 
 
54Tortella, G., Manzano, A., García Ruiz, J. L. (2015): “Breve Historia del Seguro en España”, in Actuarios, No. 37, Autumn 2015, p. 
33 
55 Vid. “Gaceta Economista”. Periódico Político, de Comercio, de Navegación Mercantil y de Seguros No. 33, Year II, Monday 7-1-
1861, p. 1. Its editorial office and administration is located at C/ Barquillo, nos. 4 and 6. Madrid. 
56 The “Gaceta de los Caminos de Hierro” related to the illustrated magazine “Banca, Ferrocarriles, Industria y Seguros”, would 
dedicate a necrology to the pastor's death in 1872 (p. 634). 
27 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter I. Larramendi from the Great Depression and the establishment of MAPFRE  
to the creation of the euro 
 
 
In any case, the period of stability and growth that Bravo Murillo's government 
would open up during the second half of the century was clear. This would be the 
framework in which “La Unión” and “La Peninsular” would also stand out, appearing in 
1857 and 1860, respectively. This, being created by the economist Pascual Madoz, was 
oriented towards insurance in construction and the insurance known as “substitution 
of fifths”, collaborating with those who sought to obtain lucrative extra money for 
joining the military service and even as a means of personal promotion, and those who 
tried to avoid it. Madoz had presided over the Statistical Commission of 1843 and 
institutionalised, as Minister of Finance with President Narváez, the General Statistical 
Commission of the Kingdom in 1856 “to measure public wealth”, knowing that good 
statistical sources were needed for the actuarial calculations required by the insurance 
sector. He states, “Without statistics it can’t be known whether a nation is rich or poor, 
since wealth and misery also have their deceptive appearances, whether it’s 
enlightened or ignorant, whether it’s happy or unhappy, whether it’s powerful or weak, 
and whether it’s virtuous or corrupt. Without statistics, it isn't possible to ascertain 
whether communications accept improvement, whether uncultivated territories are 
susceptible to cultivation, whether the population can be increased, the known mines 
benefitted, and perhaps others discovered, which the soil of the earth contains. In 
short, statistics is the balance of power of nations . . . “.57 “La Peninsular” ended up 
becoming the first large construction company in Spain. 
Soon after, in 1864, in addition to the “Catalana de Seguros de Incendios”, “El 
Fénix Español” stands out, created by the Pereire family of Jewish descent expelled 
from Spain in the fifteenth century, owner of the Crédito Mobiliario Español—later 
Banco Español de Crédito—incorporated in 1856. It merged with “La Unión” in 1879, 
creating “La Unión y el Fénix Español” specialising in fire and international reinsurance; 
with branches in Paris, Belgium, Holland and Portugal, and direct insurance activities in 
these countries since 1883, it became the pioneering Spanish company in the truly 
internationalised insurance sector, although with mainly foreign capital.  
In 1880 “La Previsión” Life Insurance was created by Antonio López, named 
Marquis of Comillas due to his entrepreneurial activity, even suffering a serious 
setback when he managed to insure Alfonso XII himself, who died prematurely in 
1885. However, the second Marquis of Comillas, his son Claudio, continued to expand 
it by merging it with the Banco Vitalicio de Cataluña, created in 1881, constituting in 
1897 the Banco Vitalicio de España, with significant advertising investment. Specifically 
in El Economista, which from 1886 included amongst its recipients and subscribers 
“Insurance Companies”, as well as banks, the Treasury, Industry, railways, and other 
significant economic agents. The very environment of stability and growth experienced 
during the decades following the Restoration attracted French and English companies 
to Madrid, Barcelona, Malaga, and Bilbao.  
Through the Salamancan businessman Isidoro García Barrado, the new owner 
of “El Economista”, American investors also arrived, who from 1886 and during the 
following decades were important advertisers and promoters of the world of 
insurance. As “La Equitativa. Sociedad Americana de Seguros Mutuos de Vida”, 
 
57Madoz, Pascual (1848): Diccionario Geográfico, histórico y Estadístico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar. INE. Madrid.   
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established in 1859 and domiciled in New York with Juan Angel Rosillo as CEO of its 
branch for Spain and Portugal; with headquarters in Madrid it had been authorised in 
Spain since 1882.58 From 13 February 1886 onwards, the Sociedad Anónima de 
Seguros “El Trabajo”, presided by Arturo Soria and whose administrator was the Count 
of Nieva del Tajo, also competed in advertising, advertising regularly with a half page. 
It was presented as the “First class insurance from one peseta upwards, against 
accidents due to accidents caused by carriages and trams, fires, oil burns, gas 
explosions, steam-driven machines, falling scaffolding”59, and any person from Spain or 
abroad could be insured. 
 
Soon after, another American company “The New York Life Insurance 
Company” established in 1845, was added to the market. It was advertised as an entity 
without shareholders, like a mutual company, where only the policyholders were the 
owners of its Guarantee Fund, as well as of the profits. Its insured capital in 1884 was 
318 million pesetas, and its Guarantee Fund at 1-1-1885 was more than 307 million 
pesetas. Based in Madrid, it sold life and death insurance, dowries, capital for widows 
and minors; to guarantee debts, loans, and commercial operations, annuities, and 
pensions. Its director was Dwight T. Reed, former secretary and chargé d'affaires of the 
U.S. Embassy in Spain. 
 
“La Unión y el Fénix Español” and the Banco Vitalicio de Cataluña would also 
continue to gain market share as an insurance company, whose number of policies up 
to 31-12-1884 was 2,563, rising to 3,878 just 12 months later,60 an increase of more 
than 51 per cent. At the height of 1914, the percentage of premiums over GDP in Spain 
was approximately 0.53 per cent, falling in subsequent years to 0.46 per cent in 1919,61 
more because of the rise in GDP than the fall in premiums.  
In Barcelona, an entrepreneurial figure similar to Hernando de Larramendi, 
Francisco Moragas (1868-1935), creator of the Caixa de Pensiones para la Vejez and 
other social works, linking Insurance and Savings, would stand out. Moragas was also a 
Catholic admirer of the social, economic, and commercial evolution of England, as an 
example of an advanced country. “The Ministers of Finance disappear as soon as 
they’re appointed and end at the precise moment when they begin their studies on the 
economic situation of Spain . . . and thus, by force, without reflection or studies of any 
kind and in complete divorce with the country, this current is created from the 
individual to the State, which shows not a normal circulation, but the suffering of a real 
bloodletting . . . the life of the nation can’t be at the mercy of the merchants of politics. 
Public finance is the essence of national life”.62     
In any case, the 19 foreign companies established between 1864 and 1883 is 
significant compared to the 15 Spanish companies created between the first of these 
dates and 1899. In 1920, “La Unión y el Fénix Español” was the sector leader, backed 
by Banesto, followed by “La Catalana de Seguros” and “Banco Vitalicio” with 17.3, 11.9 
 
58 From No. 1 of El Economista, 3rd era, 9-1-1886, the advertisement of “La Equitativa” covered the entire back cover. 
59Ibidem. 
60 Vid., El Economista, 27-2-1886. 
61Vid. Tortella, p. 35. This fall should be qualified by pointing out the increase in GDP in Spain in previous years. 
62 CABANA, Francésc (2018): Francesc Moragas i Farret, el fundador de “la Caixa”. Foreword by Isidro Fainé. Fundación Bancaria 
“la Caixa”, Palma. p. 91  
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and 9.5 million policies, respectively. Barely a decade later, Spanish companies already 
held a market share of more than 65 per cent. A general rise in the insurance sector in 
correspondence with the economic stability that the institutional continuity of the 
Restoration had guaranteed, which was to consolidate a rising cycle of economic 
growth that, with its ups and downs and the Carlist fragmentation, would last until 
1931, as we have seen. Significantly, from this date onwards, Spanish insurance 
companies began to lose market share, contracting with foreign insurers, as a result of 
the lack of confidence in the immediate economic evolution; a trend that increased 
after the armed anti-constitutional revolution against the Republic itself in October 
1934.   
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                      “. . . the basic idea of the need for intermediary societies between the political power and the citizen, 
which defend the latter from the excesses of the former. This is the knot of traditionalist politics as it has always 
been, and will continue to be in all nations even in the 21st century, where, relying on the institutions and 
circumstances of each country, man will have to defend himself from the increasingly omnipotent and absolute 
power of the State”. 
                                                                                                                                                 Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi63 
THE MAN OF ACTION AND THOUGHT IN THE WORLD OF INSURANCE. FROM THE ECONOMY 
GEARED TOWARDS THE STABILIZATION PLAN. 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi resumed his studies in 1939. Traditionalism 
had fragmented itself again, many of its members joining the new regime, seeing their 
principles represented in it; others “accepting it as a lesser evil against the common 
enemy” as Payne says,64 or hoping that one of its aspirants would end up enthroned in 
Franco's new “Regency”, a kingdom without a King. 
Others, like Ignacio's father and his family, didn’t recognise “at any time the 
legitimacy of Franco's government, nor did we admit any direct or indirect favour from 
him”.65 It seems that he even went so far as to reject the Justice portfolio that was 
offered to him through intermediaries. One of his last political actions was to take part 
in the meeting of the National Carlist War Junta at the Insúa Palace in February 1937, 
under the presidency of the so-called pretender regent Javier de Borbón-Parma. 
After finishing his law studies in 1941 and working for a year in his father's law 
firm, he decided to prepare for and pass the official examinations for Public service in 
1944, obtaining the post of Inspector of the Higher Corps of the Directorate General of 
Insurance. Hence his participation in the International Congress of the World of 
Insurance in Santander in 1947, which was important for his future international 
activity. The CEO, Joaquín Ruiz, had managed to overcome the major insurance 
problems after the war, which had already been raised at the successive meetings of 
the insurance companies, from the one in Seville at the beginning of 1937 to the one in 
San Sebastián in May of the same year by Jesús Huerta Peña, executive director of 
“Seguros España” and the first great Spanish qualified actuary. The latter had written a 
proposal stating that “he couldn’t imagine leaving the victims of the communist 
revolution and the war without protection . . . and that if compensation had been paid 
for the damages of the revolution of October 1934, it should also be paid now.66 This 
was the case only with life policies. In May 1940 Minister Larraz had created an 
“Insurance Compensation Consortium” to settle outstanding payments, especially 
those more complex ones referring to claims for “events of the Spanish war of 
liberation or execution of capital punishment, injuries, homicide, or murder derived 
from the revolution” also paying indemnities for the so-called serial murders that 
 
63Vid., HdL., Así . . . p. 58. 
64Payne, Stanley (2010): Prologue to Requetés, de las trincheras al olvido, by Pablo Larraz Andía and Víctor Sierra-Sesúmaga. La 
Esfera de los Libros. p. 11. 
65H d L. o.c., p. 34. Of his father he highlighted “his permanent struggle against any kind of injustice”; admiring how “he filled me 
with useful ideas for society”. On his religiosity, “I don’t remember a single day of his life, except for illness, when he didn’t go to 
Communion”. (p. 26) 
66Tortella, Gabriel y García Ruiz, José Luis (2015): “Breve Historia del seguro en España”, in Actuarios, No. 37. Autumn 2015, p.37. 
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affected both national and foreign companies, sharing the cost between companies 
and insured. 
The progressive analysis and study of all these and other circumstances brought 
to light what we consider to be the first six facets of Larramendi's multifaceted 
enterprising personality after the forging of his “all-purpose”67 character in the severe 
years of campaigning: 
1. His vocation and search for the international environment would become 
permanent. On the occasion of the International Congress convened by the 
Directorate General of Insurance, leading figures from the world of insurance were 
invited to share what was being done inside and outside Spain in the difficult post-war 
period. It was a success because it was the first international meeting of those years in 
Spain. This helped him to make contact with important players in the sector from 
different countries, which he’d use to his advantage in the future. 
2. Also a man of thought. In addition to his already clearly proven qualities as a 
man of action, he’d begin to show his intellectual restlessness. In fact, after finishing 
his degree, he studied and passed the subjects in a PhD with flying colours. From that 
period there are several publications such as the book “Los riesgos catastróficos en los 
seguros personales” for which he received the Medalla de Plata del Seguro (Silver 
Medal for Insurance), the first of many prizes and awards he’d receive throughout his 
life, including the Medalla de Oro del Seguro Gold Medal for Insurance). In our opinion, 
it would be that intellectual restlessness of a man of thought, but pragmatic, which 
would soon lead him to attend national and foreign congresses and meetings related 
to the sector. The desire to write and publish a good number of articles in magazines 
such as Assicurazioni, of Rome, or in that of the Reinsurance Institute of Brazil, an 
activity that, together with that of lecturer, would accompany him all his life. On the 
generalisation of powers to the Autonomous Communities he wrote in 1990 that 
“With our Carlist criteria the current problem would have been better approached, 
exacerbated during the transition, in which for not recognising a historical differential 
fact, a “coffee for all” formula” was sought, with egalitarian criteria that offended 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, more than what other communities were grateful 
for .... When you think it’s convenient to “give in” you have to do so with generosity 
and give more than what is indispensable, to end the complaints for good; I’ve 
successfully tested this “operating method”. Instead, after the initial egalitarianism, 
what was promised hasn’t been fulfilled, seeing its danger, facilitating a dynamic of 
requests, in which the one who doesn’t have the maximum is considered humiliated. In 
the transition, by offering 10, with historical difference, permanent stability would have 
achieved, and now 50 is offered and it seems insufficient”.68  
3. Continuous dual training. Although officially the regime promoted French, 
his obsession with English in education was permanent and he was a staunch defender 
of its learning and perfect bilingualism. He would promote it for all its associates, 
 
 67Great businessmen thus shaped would be José Manuel Lara himself, of Grupo Planeta, or before him José Salamanca and so 
many others. 
68Hernando de Larramendi Montiano, Ignacio (1990). “Carlismo y nacionalismo”. El Debate de Hoy, 28-5-2019. Unpublished text, 
p. 1. 
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thinking both in internationalisation and in the expansion of his customer portfolio 
amongst foreign companies present in Spain. For such an apprenticeship, the Canning 
School in London would become the centre of reference for MAPFRE's executives and 
associates. He himself decided to improve his knowledge of the British market and his 
own English, so in 1947 he went to London for an eight-month stay, supported by his 
Directorate General.  There he worked without remuneration at, amongst others, C. E. 
Heath, then a leading broker at Lloyd's.  
The dynamic of continuous training applied to himself and this kind of 
advanced “dual training” within the company, which was also self-imposed, would be 
extended to all his subordinates. Also worth mentioning is the admiration and special 
relations maintained with the Mondragon Cooperative and its applied training systems 
of the “Industrial School” created by the priest José María Arizmendiarrieta. The latter 
created it with a document signed in the office of Larramendi's uncle, Mariano 
Montiano Uriarte. He would maintain a great friendship with Arizmendiarrieta through 
the MAPFRE representative in Guipúzcoa, José Iribarren, who would manage the 
Cooperative's insurance until it created its own insurance company. A “growing 
number of Mondragons and civil society institutions”, he said, is what he would have 
tried to multiply had he had political power. In other words, “institutions” that would 
bring “spirit” to a free and competitive business market and to many public services. In 
his opinion, governments should favour a kind of “entrepreneurial institutionalism” 
and “not wild liberalism or brutal collectivism”.69  
4. The British political system: Tradition and Modernity During that time, as 
well as in later stays, he took the opportunity to link that ideological “institutionalism” 
with his intellectual concern by preparing his book “Tres claves de la vida inglesa”. He 
ended up seeing in England almost a practical materialisation of his political thought, 
all the more relevant insofar as those years 1945 - 1951 coincided with the Labour 
government of Clement Attlee: “England”, he writes, “possesses qualities which have 
contributed to her importance in the world concert and for which the study of her 
politico-social institutions provide a special interest since she coordinates the private 
with the public so that society freely exercises a series of roles, of transcendent 
common importance that many have believed to be inherent in the state sphere. Their 
evolution and organic growth isn’t the product of chance, nor of temperamental or 
psychological causes independent of directed human action, but the logical 
consequence of facts which elsewhere have been disregarded and destroyed. It is the 
only country whose political-social system is linked to that which gave rise to what is 
called medieval civilisation, with its sense of the public, of the collective, the use of 
tradition as the most perfect instrument of political creation . . . . While much of the 
continent, undermined by the French Revolution, considered them as reactionary, 
backwards, . . . the foundations on which it rests have impalpable powers such as 
dynamic aristocracy, educational selection, the crown, tradition, the organic expression 
of public opinion, the strength of commercial and labour corporatism, the organisation 
of justice, in short, everything that has a direct and effective impact on public life”.70 
 
69HdL,  o.c. pp. 140-141. 
70 Hernando de Larramendi, I (1952):Tres claves de la vida inglesa, Editorial Cálamo. Madrid, p. 16. 
33 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter I. Larramendi from the Great Depression and the establishment of MAPFRE  
to the creation of the euro 
 
 
Larramendi expressed the quintessence of his traditionalism by praising the British 
political system. Due to its gradual historical evolution and the way in which it had 
managed to wade through the revolutions and siren songs that had weighed down the 
other countries of Europe, starting with overcoming the French Revolution in the 
eighteenth century and its “Enlightenment”, as Jovellanos used to say. England had 
taken advantage of the victory at Waterloo, also marking its economic hegemony in 
Europe and opening its great period of nineteenth-century expansion outside the 
continent. Its elite then knew how to ignore events such as those derived from the 
Paris Commune and the Communist Manifesto of Marx, who even welcomed him in its 
British Library and at its Highgate cemetery. English society was also able to leap over 
the Bolshevik Revolution, face the Great Depression, Nazism, the Second World War, 
Stalinism and then the Cold War. Knowing how to maintain and adapt the “traditional” 
institutions of the old regime, without trauma or harsh “disentailments”, always taking 
advantage of the best of what already existed so as to project it into the future. What 
we see pulsating in his thoughts is his honest identification with a country that, in spite 
of everything, presents remarkable similarities and closeness to Spain in Western 
Europe, from where both have contributed to create and connect the world we know 
today. Although Spain, for Larramendi, did at least know how to get rid of 
Robespierre's mobs, of the absurd first great European Civil War 1914 to 1918, and 
even of the “Soviet claw”, in this case at a much higher price as was that of our own 
Civil War, for a demographically and economically more vulnerable country. 
As a consequence, on the socio-political level, according to Larramendi, the key 
lay in the need to have intermediate societies between the political power and the 
citizen that protect the latter from the excesses of the former; and that, relying on the 
“intermediate institutions” —as Vázquez de Mella pointed out —and the 
circumstances of each country, they can defend themselves from the increasingly 
omnipotent and absolute power of the State. While being aware that “institutional 
continuity”, such as that which has characterised English history, won’t be possible 
everywhere. In fact, only in the United Kingdom does he see that social life is full of 
citizen institutions “against the de facto dictatorship of the official”, which can be 
considered autonomous pragmatic structures, including those of a business nature. For 
Larramendi, the ideal would always be the combination of “Tradition and Modernity”, 
not only in the political aspect, but in all aspects of his life, both personal, family, 
professional, business, and institutional.         
5. Know how to rectify and recognise the mistake. At this time, Larramendi 
also admired Lloyd's as “the symbol of the spirit of economic adventure, of the efficacy 
of well-ordered free competition and an example of the transformation of the 
commercial spirit...”71 . He would later admit that he was wrong to praise the greatness 
of Lloyd's, which he believed to be “a gentleman's institution and then turned out not 
to be, because someone had taken advantage of its nineteenth-century heritage to 
defraud those who invested in it. It was one of the disappointments of my life”.72 In the 
same way, the system of trial and error in business dynamics wouldn’t make him 
hesitate to rectify, honestly and quickly, if he had to correct a wrong decision. 
 
71 Cfr., o.c. “Tres claves…”, p. 21. 
72 Cfr.., HdL, o.c. p. 96. 
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6. Publisher with values. On his return to Spain in 1951 he started a small 
publishing venture: “Cálamo”, based in his own house, in which Vicente Marrero from 
the Canary Islands participated, publishing four books. The last of these, somewhat 
provocative for the regime, was entitled “El poder entrañable. Picasso y el toro”, by 
Marrero, which would have notable success, being republished several times and 
translated into several languages. Also a text that his father had tried to publish in the 
early 1940s entitled “El sistema tradicional”, but which the regime had forbidden. He 
published it in 1952 under the new title of “Cristiandad, Tradición y Realeza”, bringing 
together the three works he considered the most important of the “Traditionalist 
Political Doctrine” of the twentieth century: a) that of Vázquez de Mella, b) “El Estado 
Nuevo” by Víctor Pradera and c) the “Tratado de Derecho Político” by Enrique Gil 
Robles. He came to consider the publication of this book73 as one of the great 
satisfactions of his life. This was despite the fact that his father had been a fierce 
political adversary of Vázquez de Mella, and hadn’t supported the son of the Carlist Gil 
Robles in the CEDA, although he always respected them. He thus indissolubly linked his 
vocation as a publisher to that of transmitter of thought and values. 
                                                     *                     *                     * 
He also played an important role at that time in the configuration and 
promotion of the public insurance company MUSINI, helping his colleague from the 
Directorate General of Insurance, Ernesto Caballero, who had been entrusted with its 
creation at Franco's initiative. The latter apparently considered that excessive and 
abusive insurance commissions were being paid by large companies without 
justification. When the State Attorney Faustino Sainz was appointed chairman but with 
Caballero as CEO of MUSINI, Larramendi had the opportunity to analyse the situation 
of other insurance markets, large policies, and the way to improve them. What 
Larramendi didn’t see was that MAPFRE would end up buying and absorbing MUSINI 
within the privatising dynamics of SEPI, Sociedad Española de Participaciones 
Industriales, in 2003.  
However, his work in the public sector still didn’t satisfy him. In 1952 he 
accepted an offer from Royal Insurance, which he joined despite being offered the 
same salary. Two years later, the Law for the Regulation of the Insurance Market was 
passed, with great divergence of criteria between the government and the insurance 
companies themselves. It is also then that Larramendi, after two years as Head of the 
Madrid office of the Royal, thought that the company’s strategy might be wrong; 
amongst others, with working only in fire insurance in Spain. So at the beginning of 
1955 he ended his leave of absence and returned to the Directorate General of 
Insurance, where, by the way, his annual salary was already 25 per cent higher than 
that of the Royal Insurance. This hadn’t been a great business but the experience 
would later enable him to join MAPFRE. 
It so happened that the newly elected chairman of that “Mutualidad Agrícola 
de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España”, Dionisio Martin Sanz, had placed an 
 
73 The book would be republished in 2011 by the Fundación Ignacio Larramendi..  
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advertisement in the newspaper looking for a manager. He went for it. After the 
corresponding selection and personal interview, he began his life in what was then 
known simply as Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas. In 1955, it was ranked 36th in the 
ranking of insurance companies in Spain in terms of income, and was practically 
insolvent. 
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                      “I don’t believe in the dogmatism of mutualisation, but I do believe in the desirability of collective 
ownership that can’t be changed by “market force”. It isn't a guarantee of permanence but is instead a brake, an 
anchor in pure capitalist struggles, especially in the current “super-active” period of globalisation. The insurance 
association movement has been important in all countries, and although some circumstances are changing its 
permanence in national hands, at least in Spain, this principle continues. I am proud to have preserved this 
character in MAPFRE, which has allowed it to create a “national power” in the area of such importance as 
insurance, and I think that if it’s changed in any way it will be gratuitously prejudicial to its collective and national 
interests”.  
                                                                                                                                                  Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi74 
 
MAPFRE's new spirit: leadership and entrepreneurship in the 1950s of the Spanish 
economy. 
It was on 2 September 1955 that Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi took over 
the de facto management of the Mutual Society, after his leave of absence from the 
Administration had been published in the Official State Gazette the previous day.  The 
economic framework is that of a country with a strong inflationary component, 
especially negative for the insurance world, and which will progressively worsen from 
that year onwards, reaching 11.7 per cent in the following years 1955-58.  
The inflation of our economy came from a permanent deficit in the public 
sector, which Minister Larraz had already warned about in 1941. A deficit that was 
financed through the pledging of public debt. In other words, the banks took the debt 
issued by the State with the possibility of obtaining or pledging credits from the Bank 
of Spain, thus causing an increase in monetary circulation and the corresponding 
inflation. A second reason for this was the continuous wage increases encouraged by 
Falangism from Girón's Ministry of Labour, without corresponding productivity 
increases. A third cause would be the inelasticity of the supply of agricultural products 
with weak productive restructuring.  
The re-industrialising wave of those years is almost entirely framed by a 
managed economy, still in full autarchy and trying to get out of an economic isolation, 
which would extend until 1959. A framework in which the Head of State concentrates 
all the levers of power, defined as “an authoritarian, but not fascist regime”75; 
centralising both political and economic decisions, trying to maximise time and 
decision-making capacity. A decade that can’t be considered as lost for the Spanish 
economy. 
  Moreover, as early as 1955, the nationalisation of the Seguro de Accidentes de 
Trabajo was considered imminent, since it was said that Franco wanted a 
“decommercialisation” of work accident insurance, as Larramendi had been 
demanding in his writings. All types of commissions had been prohibited in that area 
and it was considered necessary to put an end to commissions from public or related 
companies, which were used as a means of irregular remuneration for their managers 
 
74HdL, I. o.c. p. 147. 
75 Vid. González, Manuel J. (1979). La economía política del franquismo. Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. 
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without any justification whatsoever. Most of the insurance companies didn’t believe 
it, but Larramendi prepared the Mutual Society for such a situation, which in the end 
came about through the Law of 21-4-1966. This, however, caused a small loss in 1968, 
which was the only one during the 35 years of his mandate, because of his network of 
representatives still working in Agricultural Accident and Workplace Accidents who 
had to be compensated. 
As a result of the losses, the insurance industry began a general reduction in 
costs; however, Larramendi, acting against the tide, decided to intensify expansion for 
the future, which is considered to be the beginning of the old Mutual Society’s great 
growth.  
Meanwhile, the regime's attempt to maximise overall economic growth, whilst 
generating inflationary pressures, had also resulted in a productive apparatus that 
wasn’t very competitive in international markets. This was also influenced by the lack 
of many basic industrial inputs for certain sectors, preventing their normal 
development and slowing down the general development of the country, despite 
having already surpassed pre-war levels. These are the years that Larramendi calls 
“survival” for the Mutual Society. The import substitution policy had shown its 
limitations. The trade balance ended up showing a rickety export capacity, whilst 
import barriers were also the cause of the lack of industrial competitiveness. If we add 
to this a rigid and strict nationalist legislation in the face of foreign investors and the 
lack of a realistic exchange rate, we can explain the strangulation of the foreign sector 
caused by the change of course brought about by the Stabilisation Plan of 1959.   
The balance sheet of the Mutual Society for 1954 showed a loss of 1,700,000 
pesetas, plus 300,000 uncollectable pesetas and another million and a half pesetas in 
arrears from other years, also uncollectable. A real loss, therefore, of between 2 
million and 3.5 million pesetas. The company's policy of public health insurance since 
1945 had led to losses running into the millions and a serious crisis. The employees 
didn’t believe that it was possible to overcome this, and the “baby face” of the new 
manager didn’t help to change their minds either.  
Here, we return to the business action linked to the specific people who 
develop it. They aren’t “the masses”. They’re people. Usually a similar type of people. 
It is man and his circumstance in the world and the specific environment from which 
he emerges, and in which he has chosen to live. Because here again, unique facets of 
Larramendi's personality will begin to show themselves, a classic revolutionary of 
situations. 
1. Lead by example. After becoming aware of the financial reality of the 
company, he proceeded to reduce his salary by 40 per cent, compared to the 250,000 
pesetas a year he had agreed on, which took him three years to recover. This would be 
another of his characteristic traits: always lead by example in the company. 
Larramendi had found himself with more than 200 people on the payroll when less 
than half were needed. However, he continued to adopt “rescue” measures and 
efficiency improvements, whilst dismissing 11 doctors and two state attorneys, all of 
whom were on the payroll for no more than an hour a day. Little by little, with rigour 
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and exemplary action, he began to earn the respect of all employees. When the 
historic chauffeur of MAPFRE's management retired in 1967, he decided not to replace 
him, even though the company could afford it. So, he said he'd stay much closer to the 
people by using taxi, bus, or subway for the rest of his life. He added an additional 
benefit to this situation: when visiting each of the delegations, he was taken by the 
person in charge of each of delegation to the different offices, which allowed him a 
better knowledge of the people who managed them. It was his “poor formula” of the 
“company plane”, “avoiding the status of supremacy for vanity's sake”.76 In this way he 
visited all the territories and got to know all the employees. He even attributes a large 
part of MAPFRE's success to this kind of behaviour that was only used in the sector by 
“Assurances Generales” and which he later found was used by Sam Walton, the 
founder of Wal-Mart, who became the richest man in the world. Santiago Gayarre 
tells77 how, even on his business trips in the 1980s and staying at the Hotel San Felipe 
in Puerto de la Cruz, Tenerife, he didn’t want to have breakfast at the hotel because it 
was a few pesetas more expensive than having it in an adjoining bar. Gayarre, later the 
CEO of MAPFRE, in 1990 said of him that “it was easy to follow his teachings because 
of his character as a charismatic leader, not authoritarian and of great 'HUMANITY' 
with capital letters”. Thus Larramendi applied the traditional “Ad exemplum Rex...”. In 
other words, “The whole kingdom is governed according to the example set by the 
King”. 
2.Make a virtue out of necessity. One of the first problems Larramendi had to 
face in 1955 was that of reinsurance, due to the serious problem created by the 
deterioration of the Mutual Society and the progressive cancellation and 
abandonment by the reinsurers of its risks. Here, too, the reaction was offensive, just 
as it had been with the venture intended to publish his father's book. Instead of 
seeking out new cover for those willing to take on losses, the aim was to reduce the 
reliance on self-insurance, forcing the resurgent mutual company to improve its 
efficiency. This also marked the beginning of the brilliant MAPFRE Reinsurance, once 
the company was cleaned up and the tables were turned. The first person in charge of 
this branch would be Luis Reyes, a lawyer who had been exiled from Uruguay possibly 
due to his sympathy with the Tupamaros, later having in Andrés Jiménez one of his 
most brilliant chairmen. 
3. Intuition as marketing. Concurrently, and only with his own sensitivity and 
imagination, without marketing and advertising teams, he wanted to start changing 
the image of the old “Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas”. He began to discreetly propose 
and regularise the use of the acronym “MAPFRE”, which was then an enigmatic 
“company name” for the general public, instead of the restrictive “Mutua de Seguros 
Agrícolas” which had been in use. He always boasted that he had never had an image 
consultant, which, due to the company's weak cash flow, he wouldn’t have been able 
to hire then either: “Some people used to say to me “If you had an image consultant, 
how far you would go!..” MAPFRE has an extraordinary image throughout the world 
without the need to use the assets of the mutual members or shareholders with 
cosmetic measures with a short-term effect . . . . It's a name given by the people, not 
 
76HdL, Así…, p. 278 
 77In-depth interview at his home, 14-2-2019 
39 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter I. Larramendi from the Great Depression and the establishment of MAPFRE  
to the creation of the euro 
 
 
the product of image studies”.78 This image update, with the simple generic of its 
acronym, was a brand success that would later also serve for international expansion. 
Once again he had used, as he would always do, his sense of modernity within 
tradition. 
4. Honour the word that is given, with an obsession for legality. When he 
arrived at the Mutual Society, it had a basic problem that Larramendi began to call 
“political debt”, a consequence of the claims of the Instituto Nacional de Previsión 
(National Welfare Institute), INP, and of all the Pharmaceutical Associations. The 
company didn’t have the funds to appear in court, so he met with the Director of the 
INP and explained the real situation and the immediate danger of a suspension of 
payments and dissolution of the company if they didn’t desist from their lawsuit. Thus 
it was agreed to sell all the properties and pay 50 per cent of the annual surplus of the 
Mutual Society until the settlement was achieved, and the lawsuit was therefore 
withdrawn. Keeping one's word, in years when, due to the scarce executive efficiency 
of our legislation in terms of payments, with bad debts and too frequent “back and 
forth” of bills of exchange and unpaid bills, honouring and meeting the commitments 
of payment would be another important note of his personality. This came at a time 
when double accounting and “secret slush funds” were a widespread practice in both 
small and large companies, perhaps until the tax reform of Fuentes Quintana and 
Fernández Ordóñez, and without taking this into account which meant statistical 
comparisons aren’t entirely accurate. Especially because in MAPFRE there was never 
this “Secret Accounting”.  
As a consequence of such self-imposed standards of excellence, it also had the 
“virtue” of endowing a regular part of the surpluses to reserves. With a business 
behaviour that we would call healthy growth with profitability. As a consequence of  
his “obsession with legality and taxation”,79 both in terms of contracting and tax 
payments, he soon set up an external Accounts Auditing Department, which has been 
progressively strengthened. Arthur Andersen was hired for this purpose, whose report 
for 1972 left him “disappointed” because in his “limited” opinion despite its “very high 
fee” of 1,500,000 pesetas at the time, although “it is undoubtedly a guarantee and a 
reassurance for this Directorate General”.80 Still in 1983 it was one of the first business 
groups in Spain to present an external global audit, with Arthur&Young, a consolidated 
report and the first to do so in the insurance sector.81 In any case, an advance of what 
today we would call “compliance” that is updated and as demanded by law. Also in 
this, in accordance with his personality, Larramendi applied to himself the famous 
Canon 75 of St. Isidore of the year 633, “Rex eris si recte facias . . . “, “King you are if 
you act righteously, otherwise you won’t be”.   
5. Knowing how to freely incorporate and integrate. He started doing this with 
the original agreement he reached with the Pharmaceutical Associations, asking their 
 
78HdL, Así…, p. 153. 
79 Personal conversations and in-depth interviews with Sebastián Homet Duprá, (10-12-2018) and Santiago Gayarre, Andrés 
Jiménez (14-2-2019) 
80 MAPFRE. “Reports presented by Mr. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano as Managing Director and Chief Executive 
Officer to the Board of Directors (1972-1985)”. Internal typed publication. Exhibition of 23-7-1973. Ed. MAPFRE, Mutualidad de 
Seguros, Madrid, 1985. 
81  MAPFRE, Reports to the Board, o.c. 25-4-198, p. 5.  
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chairman to join the Board of Directors of the Mutual Society to monitor its income, 
improving the relationship and trust. This way of helping the company grow, derived 
from the need to find a solution to a problem by raising it, or expanding it by 
“integrating”, was going to be a constant. This was the case in Spain with the Canary 
Islands insurance company Guanarteme, or in Asia with the Macao Insurance 
Company. In this case it entered with 4 per cent of the capital in 1982 together with 
the main Portuguese insurance companies and banks, being the only non-Portuguese 
entity accepted in the world. Also that year the office in Mexico was opened and soon 
the ones in Lisbon, Sao Paulo, Manila, Hong-Kong, Singapore, and Caracas and Bogota 
would follow. Larramendi went so far as to compare the process to that of the 
Japanese “zaitbazus”, encouraging a coordination, at first also informal, of the MAPFRE 
system “perhaps more effective than with some formal bodies”.82 
The insurance market in Spain was then very rigid and oligopolistic. Also 
competitive but “at the expense of policyholders, as they were more concerned with 
protecting themselves than offering their policyholders a service that could improve on 
that of their peers”.83 Larramendi was always against this oligopoly situation. In fact, in 
1949, in his lecture at the School of Insurance in Barcelona, he already expressed his 
views on what should be done. He defended freedom of competition and rates, 
abolishing compulsory rates, which he had maintained since he was in the Treasury 
Department's own inspectorate. All this didn’t win him great professional affection 
from his colleagues, and even less so in the corresponding vertical union.  
6. Prohibition of kinship. For hiring amongst employees and executives, the 
prohibition of kinship was established as a statutory rule. This implied the express 
elimination of a nepotism that no company had an official record of in those years and 
allowed, amongst other objectives, for the fact that no employee had their internal 
professional career limited except by their own ability and decision. It was, at the same 
time, considered that after the death or retirement of an outstanding person due to 
their example and vital dedication to the company, the existence of a certain 
continuity in some other member of another generation of their family wasn’t 
excluded. It was a kind of stimulus to strengthen the esprit de corps in the company 
and the professional and business memory itself, provided that it was to MAPFRE's 
benefit. The same applied to the historical directors, which would contribute to 
strengthening the cohesion and continuity of the best values and references of the 
company. 
7. Good selection of young people with potential. The attention to young 
people through personal interviews and public advertisements in the press—as he 
himself had been selected—and then training them in the company, was another 
success from the beginning of the Larramendi era. Although at the beginning he 
counted on the important Navarre delegation of Tudela, which played a significant role 
in the recruitment of executives. Some even joked that you could only join MAPFRE “if 
you were a Carlist or from Tudela”.84 
 
82 Ibid., Report for 1983. 
83HdL. Thus… p. 253. 
84 Ibidem, p. 600. 
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It was about recruiting young university students with potential, even without 
finishing their studies, but whom he managed to turn into great business leaders, 
guided by motives that weren’t strictly selfish. In this way he was able to surround 
himself with a team of people who were surprisingly competent. Although some later 
flew on their own to other fields, such as Blas Calzada, later chairman, amongst other 
entities, of the National Securities Market Commission; or the later Professor Antonio 
Torrero Mañas, an agricultural insurance administrator when he was studying his 
degree, and later important for the development of MAPFRE's financial activity and in 
the Central de Obras y Crédito, which was transformed into Corporación MAPFRE. 
Others undertook their entire careers in the company, such as Larramendi's successors 
in the executive management, Julio Castelo, or José Manuel Martínez. The former 
joined the company in 1972, becoming chairman in 1990 until his retirement in 2001. 
Castelo, also an exponent of the insurer's successful selection and training processes, 
joined the company when he was 20 years old, studying law and retiring after four 
decades in the company, also as chairman in 2012, after succeeding the former.  
“Every office boy has a marshal's baton in his backpack” Larramendi used to 
say. So it was amongst others like Andrés Jiménez, recruited by Larramendi himself “in 
1966, a 14-year-old in shorts. People always worked with targets. People and merit 
were of the utmost importance” we were reminded,85 by who was the chairman of 
MAPFRE Reaseguro: “Don Ignacio was a person who offered a future, even though we 
saw the giants of the sector at the time, such as La Unión and Banesto's Fénix, and the 
rest of the tough competition”. Continuous training and internal promotion, also for 
MAPFRE's Board Members and chairmen in other countries, such as Santiago Gayarre 
from Navarre in Argentina; or in powerful sectors, as in the case of Homet Duprá from 
Barcelona, later the chairman of MAPFRE Vida, who was hired when he hadn’t finished 
his studies as an actuary, “at a time that required buses, rail travel and bad inns”. Some 
also because of his inspiration and personal confidence, such as the young Carlist 
students Benito Tamayo—who would end up being the head of Banco Hispano-
Americano—Antonio Briones, and other university colleagues to sell life insurance, a 
branch that he managed. He also required them to write about two handwritten pages 
to learn more about their sense of logic and then an interview in which he observed 
other factors. At the end of his life he said that in no case was he wrong and that his 
system proved to be much better than that of the competition, some with complex 
structures dedicated to “human resources”. In fact, in 1985, he stated in his report to 
the Board that “in the future, bringing in outsiders will have to be considered a 
structural defect....  no other entity of any kind in Spain is in a position to select high 
quality personnel from hundreds of different locations”.86  
_______________________________________________ 
    CHAIRMEN AND DIRECTORS: MAPFRE’S EXECUTIVE LEADERS SINCE 1933 
Enrique Granda Calderón de Robles87 (Chairman 16-5-1933) 
 
85Personal interview at home, 17-1-2019. 
86 Vid MAPFRE, Reports to the Board, o.c.. 19-4-1985, p. 11. 
87 Granda, with his prestige and ascendancy in the rural world, shouldn’t be denied the merit of having been the significant 
promoter and first chairman of the entity, although he soon had to be substituted due to health problems, as well as A. Rebuelta, 
after taking over the chairmanship from 15-6-1949 to 27-2-1955. His son would occupy it from 1972 to 1990. The Mutual Society 
didn’t stabilise its executive management until the arrival of Larramendi in 1955, as we can see with the alternation of partially 
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Andrés Rebuelta Melgarejo (Chairman, 1933-1937) 
Isidro de Gregorio (Director. 1933-1937) 
Alfonso Pidal Chico de Guzmán (Temporary Chairman. 1937-1938) 
Andrés Rebuelta Melgarejo (Chairman, 1938-1942) 
Isidro de Gregorio (Director. 1938-1949) 
Mariano Rodríguez de Torres (Chairman, 1942-1943) 
Custodio Miguel-Romero Gil de Zúñiga (Chairman, 1944+) 
Mariano Rodríguez de Torres (Chairman, 1944-1949) 
Andrés Rebuelta Melgarejo (Chairman, 1949-1955) 
José Mª Unceta (Director. 1949-1955) 
Fernando Romero Carvajal (Chairman, 27-2-1955 to 30-9-1955) 
Dionisio Martín Sanz (Chairman, 30-9-1955 to 1972) 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi (Director and CEO, 1955-1990) 
José Antonio Rebuelta (Chairman, 1972-1990)   
Julio Castelo Matrán (Chairman, 1990 - 2001) 
Santiago Gayarre (General Manager. 1990 - 2001) 
José Manuel Martínez Martínez (Chairman, 2001 - 2012)  
Antonio Huerta Mejías (Chairman and CEO, 2012.- 
_________________________________________________________ 
Note: own compilation. The executive management between 1955 and 1990 was Larramendi's, later distributing his power. 
 
8. “Brutal concern for quality”. The search for quality was “always” part of the 
obsession and the seal that Larramendi stamped on the insurance company since his 
arrival in 1955. He wanted its slogans “MAPFRE Quality” and “MAPFRE is quality” to be 
permanent seals of the future applied to all the services provided. Specialisation was 
always an obsession.  
9. Great modesty with compliments. From the beginning of his professional 
career he showed great detachment and humility towards the awards and distinctions 
he received. He said he accepted them because his family liked that it be thought he 
was worthy of them, and because they honoured MAPFRE. This was the case with the 
last ones he received, the Order of Isabella the Catholic in 1995, or the Order of Civil 
Merit in 1998, amongst others. Also, on at least two occasions and without his 
knowledge, he was nominated for the Prince of Asturias Awards. One promoted by the 
John Carter Brown Library, and another later by Emilio Botín, chairman of Banco 
Santander. 
10. The meaning of “Public Service”.  Even if it was a private entity, Larramendi 
considered that the sense of public service was obligatory for all companies that 
manage large assets. His argument was based on the considerations of Vázquez de 
Mella and Víctor Pradera whose critique of capitalism based solely on the market and 
profit was radical, being doomed to failure, just as Marxism was. The entire network of 
foundations that he created, which ended up coming together in Fundación MAPFRE, 
all followed this direction. In the mid-1970s, this foundation sponsored scholarships 
and research prizes, organised symposiums on Industrial Hygiene, Traumatology or 
Rehabilitation, whilst financing the training and apprenticeship of 17 handicapped 
scholarship holders.88 In this sense, MAPFRE was able to overcome its precarious initial 
 
executive chairman who shared their power with the executives. In 1985 Manuel Ocón was appointed CEO and Castelo CEO. The 
latter, after Larramendi's final retirement, would be appointed as the chairman, Gayarre as the managing director and Luis Leguina 
as the CEO, with J.A. Rebuelta becoming the chairman of the Control Committee. 
88 MAPFRE, Reports to the Board, o.c. 11-1-1978, p. 17. 
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situation in the 1950s, consolidate itself during the 1960s and grow during the 1970s, 
overcoming the crisis of 1977-78 to expand globally in the 1980s: “seeking service in 
institutional relations and considering the social sense as a basic element of its action. 
If my successors forget this, it will be difficult for MAPFRE to be what it could be in the 
future”.89 
11. Early concern for the environment. This was reflected in the creation of 
Instituto de Seguridad MAPFRE, as an Environmental ITSEMAP reinforced in 1983 with 
its own funds, which he considered “one of the most effective and important creations 
for the future of MAPFRE”.90 With powerful research and testing facilities in Ávila, such 
as the Instituto Tecnológico de Seguridad MAPFRE, and later considering a change of 
name to “MAPFRE Ambiental” from a commercial and market perspective, due to the 
explanations that the name “Institute” required. He understood that it gave it less 
strength as a real company, proposing to extend its consultancy division to engineering 
and to extend the laboratory division beyond industrial pollution to the physical 
environment.  
12. Entrepreneurial spirit with personal detachment. At the end of the 1950s, 
he opposed the possibility of converting the Mutual Society into a public limited 
company, even though the figure that would have corresponded to him was 10 per 
cent of its net assets. However, he thought that a company with an “institutional 
spirit” encouraged the support of employees, associates, customers, and the public in 
general, with an ideal that everyone can be proud of. He never bragged or was 
concerned about, nor did he want to spend company resources on his safety. As he 
said, he also never “wanted the pomp and status of bodyguards guarding my life, 
which on the other hand I’ve always been able to do on my own and without dodging 
the risk on many occasions”.91 
13. Larramendi is difficult to understand without his sense of Ethics and 
Equity based on Christian humanism. These two basic considerations of his life's work 
were also what earned MAPFRE the respect and admiration of all those who were part 
of the insurer or collaborated with it, as well as its policyholders. This humanism 
constitutes, as will also become clear in the following pages, one of the fundamental 
personal and public traits shown by Larramendi and which he tried to impregnate from 
the beginning in all his business and individual activity. 
                                      *                                 *                               * 
The reality is that everything seemed possible thanks to the power delegated to 
him by Dionisio Martín Sanz, who looked after his many other political and business 
interests. It was thanks, too, to the absolute power that he came to have since 1972. 
Therefore, with few exceptions, the reality is that the lines of action for MAPFRE's 
development and future already bear the imprint of what we could call the 
“Larramendi spirit”. In other words, Larramendi transmitted for the future what we 
could call a new “MAPFRE spirit”.   
 
89 H- de L., I. (1990): “Farewell speech”, General Meeting of MAPFRE Mutualidad, 15-6-1990. 
90HdL, Así… p. 110 
91O.c., Farewell Address. 
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                         “Insurance is a complex institution, reflecting the changing realities of life, and can’t be limited by 
unalterable formulas subject to theoretical principles or doctrines. Its growing complexity and the diversity of its 
operational manifestations are a consequence of the new society and human relations, to whose development it 
must permanently adapt if it is to fulfil the role that justifies its existence. When a new risk appears following a 
social change, insurance must offer a formula, not always a complete solution, to help people, either personally 
or in their natural groups, to deal effectively with the impact that this new risk has on their assets. Risk is the 
basis of insurance and justifies its existence. This seems an elementary reflection, but it’s  useful to repeat it, 
because those who are involved in the insurance business run the risk of ending up believing that what is 
important are the insurance structures and their assets, their business interests or those of their employees. 
When a market and its leaders are influenced by this sentiment, insurance is diminished, it ceases to be a social 
institution to protect man and becomes an instrument of speculation or a simple modus vivendi.  
                                                                        I. Hernando de Larramendi. “Seguro y catástrofe. Su definición jurídica”92 
ETHICS, AESTHETICS, AND VALUES OF HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI IN MAPFRE AND ITS 
FOUNDATIONS: BASES FOR THE FUTURE FIRST LARGE SPANISH MULTINATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY.  
 
During the three decades following the enactment of the Insurance Market 
Law, there were no regulations to implement it. Amongst its aims was to effectively 
regulate a market where more than 800 companies were operating for the distribution 
of a small market. It was in the context of the negotiations for accession to the 
European Communities that the opportunity was taken to regulate it by means of the 
Private Insurance Law of 1984. 
By then, the fundamental foundations that were going to finish projecting 
MAPFRE into the future had been laid. They were all a reflection of the characteristics 
identified and established by “Don Ignacio” and which had shaped a new way of 
managing and leading MAPFRE, together with those that became evident later on. 
1. MAPFRE's strategic purchase of real estate with offices at street level. In 
1955 the only important real property was a building of flats and premises in Jerez de 
la Frontera, which was also the only significant asset saved from the seizures and 
payments agreed by Larramendi with the Association of Pharmacists and other 
creditors. As soon as he could, however, he began to acquire real estate and would 
immediately install the offices on the ground floor. This plan was already a success. 
Then creating and installing the so called “Loss Adjustment and Quick Payment 
Centres”, called in internal jargon “PPR”, to better serve the customer by providing 
speed, an own, very professionalised service in the procedures, and preferring a 
payment without many delays, or disputes in court, which in addition to improving the 
image and relationship with the insured ended up saving time, legal and management 
costs. For the acquisitions, the young economist Torrero Mañas had been entrusted 
with a real estate management studies department, which in 1969, as a real estate 
investment department, became AGECO, Sociedad de Asesoramiento y Gestión 
Económica, an important part of the insurance company in financial matters. The 
 
92Hernando de Larramendi Montiano, Ignacio. “Seguro y catástrofe. Su definición jurídica”. Madrid. p. 38 
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construction of Torre MAPFRE in Barcelona, with its landscaped roofs, low energy 
consumption and great respect for the environment, is an emblematic building of 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi's legacy in the real estate sector. From a meagre 
million pesetas of real-estate assets in 1955, it had risen to 80,000 million pesetas in 
1990. 
2. Limitation of investments and macro-salaries for executives and directors
of MAPFRE and its foundations. The review and limitation by the members of the 
Mutual Society of their shareholdings in the companies in which MAPFRE participated 
was a relevant decision as soon as the authority of “Don Ignacio” was established. It 
was a matter of separating interests and forcing a concentration of effort on the 
insurer and then also on its foundations. In time the situation wouldn’t be the same as 
MAPFRE became a holding company of listed companies. Everything had to be 
declared to the Institutional Control Committee and “macro-remuneration”, which was 
always criticised in the British and American business world as disproportionate and 
unethical, was avoided at all times. 
3. Global Presence The old Mutualidad Agraria de Seguros had never
considered leaving the rural environment and even less abroad. Everything had 
changed with Larramendi and his vocation to move in the global environment with his 
expansive and “explosive” character, as described by the former Minister of Labour 
Fernando Suárez González.93 This began as soon as he was able to guarantee the 
survival of the company, restarting his travels abroad, with MAPFRE's future expansion 
in mind, either as an attendee or speaker at international congresses, and convening 
companies from other countries in Spain. Such as the 1961 meeting on “Hailstorm 
Insurance” at the Hospedería del Valle de los Caídos with the presence of all the 
Agricultural Insurance Mutual Societies in Spain and the main specialised insurance 
companies in the world. He would soon become a member of the International 
Hailstones Committee of Europe, based in Switzerland. The results of these activities 
were subsequently incorporated into the European Insurance Committee, in processes 
that in some way also constituted small steps and precedents in the construction of 
the European Union as far as the insurance sector was concerned. He also frequently 
participated in all kinds of events abroad, including Europe and the United States, with 
the “International Insurance Seminar”, the “International Association of Mutual 
Insurance Companies”, in the “International Association of Insurance Law”, AIDA, 
created in 1960 in Luxembourg, later SEAIDA; in the “Association for Productivity in 
Insurance”, created in France in 1961; also, from 1964 in Eurofinas, the European 
Association of Financial Companies in Stockholm, constituting the Spanish Association 
of Financing Companies, or in the International Association of Mutual Companies, 
AISAM. His participation in the Pan-American Congress of Insurance Law in Buenos 
Aires in 1969 was also important, with a speech on “Insurance and Inflation”, always 
paving the way for MAPFRE's presence. 
 .  
93 Personal conversation about Larramendi's personality held with Fernando Suárez González at the Courses of La Granda, 
Asturias, on 7 - 9 August 2019. 
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1921. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi Montiano born on 18-6-1921. 
1931. The Agrupación de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España was created in August. The International 
Confederation of Catholic Patrons (ICPC) was established in Italy. 
1933. The Mutualidad Agraria de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España was created, 6-5-1933.  
1934. Revolutionary general strike and anti-constitutional October uprising against the Republic. 
1936. The war began.  He enlisted in the Requeté. 
1939. He restarted his studies. 
1941. He finished his law studies. 
1944. He passed the public examination for Inspector of the Senior Corps of the Directorate General of Insurance. 
1947. He participated in the organisation of the International Insurance Congress in Santander. 
1947. He began the first of his three stays in London. 
1948. Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI: the Union of Catholic Associations and Patronages, UNIAPAC, is re-adapted. 
1950. He married Lourdes Martínez Gutiérrez (1924 - 2015) on 5-10-1950, with whom he'd have nine children.   
1951. He took the last of three trips to England, where he delved into the world of insurance. He created the 
Cálamo publishing house. 
1952. He took a leave of absence from the Administration. He started at the Royal Insurance Company, in Spain. He 
edited “Cristiandad, Tradición y Realeza”, which was written by his father in 1937 and banned by Franco's regime.  
He published his “Tres claves de la vida inglesa”. 
1955. He returned to the Directorate-General for Insurance. He joined the Mutualidad Agraria de Propietarios de 
Fincas Rústicas de España, 2-9-1955, thirty-sixth in the Spanish insurance rankings. 
1957. His father, Luis Hernando de Larramendi Ruiz, faithful to the Traditionalist Communion, died on 27-12-1957. 
1966. He established MAPFRE Mutualidad Patronal de Accidentes de Trabajo. He acquired the IBM 360/30 
computer. 
1970. New structural reform of MAPFRE whose group is composed of MAPFRE Mutualidad, Aseguradora de 
Automóviles, MAPFRE Industrial, and MAPFRE Vida. 
1972. “Dionisio Martín Sanz” crisis, who left the chairmanship. 
1973. MAPFRE, the eight-largest insurance group in Spain. 
1974. MAPFRE, Spain's fifth-largest insurance group. Internationalisation in Belgium is started. 
1975. He created Fundación MAPFRE, which would eventually bring together his other creations: Fundación Cultural 
MAPFRE Vida, Fundación MAPFRE América, Fundación MAPFRE Estudios y Fundación MAPFRE Medicina. 
1976. He published “Anotaciones de sociopolítica independiente”. MAPFRE, Spain's 2nd largest insurance group. His 
mother María Montiano (b. 1886) died. 
1978. Elected chairman of Acción Social Empresarial, ASE. 
1981. Corporación MAPFRE, controlled by MAPFRE Mutualidad, becomes a holding company, owning the rest of the 
insurance companies. He was elected as the chairman of UNIAPAC Europe. 
1982. He created MAPFRE-Re. 
1983. MAPFRE, Spain's largest insurance group. The MAPFRE 85 system was approved, giving the three entities 
autonomous management but with a nexus in the Mutual Society.  
1984. Internationalisation continued: Mexico and Colombia. 
1985. He chaired the Control Committee. The MAPFRE “Policyholder Ombudsman” was created. He closed the 
Ibero-American Conference on Crop Insurance in Panama, creating the “Asociación Latinoamericana de 
Aseguradores Agropecuarios” (ALASA). He delegated organisational responsibilities in MAPFRE whilst maintaining 
control.  
1987. He received the Gold Medal for Spanish Insurance. 
1988. The new “MAPFRE 92 System Plan” was implemented. The corporation assumed ownership of the remainder.  
1990. He planned the creation of Banco MAPFRE. The great futuristic and ecological project to build Torre MAPFRE 
in Barcelona.  
1990. He took early retirement in order to devote himself to writing and his founding activities with the RSCl. 
1992. He published “Utopía de la nueva América”. 
1995. He published “Crisis de Sociedad” and “Reflexiones para el Siglo XXI”,  
1996. He published “Panorama para una “Reforma de Estado”. He received the Gold Medal of the International 
Insurance Seminar Founders Award in the United States. He received the Order of Isabella the Catholic. 
1998. He published “Bienestar solidario (cementerio de nuevas intenciones)”. He was awarded the Grand Cross of 
the Order of Civil Merit. 
2000. He published “Así se hizo MAPFRE”, the profits of which were donated to Cáritas. 
2001. He died in Madrid on 7-9-2001. 
2002. He posthumously received the Medal of Merit in Work in Spain. 
2004. He was posthumously awarded the Order of Grand Officer of the Civil Merit of Portugal. 
2005. His name was posthumously inscribed in the Insurance Hall of Fame, which lists approximately 130 of the 
greatest insurers of all time: www.insurancehalloffame.org 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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4. Milestones in R&D investment. Several technological milestones can be said 
to show the evolution of MAPFRE as well as that of the insurance sector in Spain. The 
first major investment, in 1960, almost still in the survival phase, was the acquisition of 
a Bull punching machine, which made it possible to reduce mechanical work, thereby 
improving efficiency and productivity, especially in the territorial offices. The second 
impact was the following year, when SDOMSA was created to boost computerisation 
and putting the company at the forefront in terms of management, whose head, Blas 
Calzada, would later help draft the Moncloa Pacts and serve as the chairman of the 
Madrid Stock Exchange. The third great innovative milestone in the sector came in 
1966 with Larramendi's purchase of the first IBM 360/30 computer, several years 
ahead of the competition. MAPFRE was also the first entity in Europe to have a fully 
integrated concept of the benefits of using microfiches with its Microfilm Utilisation 
Plan.94 He saw the world of email coming: ...I must refer to the challenge that the 
adequate use of the means provided by computers and office automation represents 
for our future. The future success of any company and especially of any insurance 
company, even more so if it aspires to an international presence, largely depends upon 
the success of its IT policy. MAPFRE has long understood this . . . . We are 
simultaneously interconnecting our growing text and telex processing equipment in 
order to achieve an integrated system with different forms of e-mail. If we are 
successful in all this, we will have taken a great step towards improving our 
competitive position and turning CORPORACION MAPFRE into an internationally 
established entity....”95 
5. Innovative support for the legal community. An investment milestone, 
albeit in a different sense, was the technological advancement promoted by MAPFRE, 
which led to the creation of Colex Data. Its origin was in an external database, which 
began as a collection of case law files on four significant subjects: Civil, Criminal, 
Labour and Contentious-Administrative Law. However, with MAPFRE's drive and 
muscle it ultimately offered lawyers, law firms and the legal community in general a 
simple, timely and easy-to-use product in the innovative CD-ROM format. It was a 
different modality to on line which, at the time, had transmission problems and many 
law firms lacked such a capability. An excellent panel of judges, prosecutors, 
magistrates, state lawyers and specialists, notaries and registrars was available for this 
purpose. In 1989 it reached a turnover of 110 million pesetas, of which 40 million were 
texts from the collection of jurisprudence and the remaining 70 million came from the 
46 texts published. In 1990 it reached a profit of 13 million pesetas. Also published 
were the answers to the examinations of judges and prosecutors. The development of 
computer applications then generated a new dynamic in the legal field, publishing CD 
Rom's with quarterly updates that allowed customers direct access to the legal bases 
from their own offices. Having fulfilled its mission, the company was sold in 1996 when 
its turnover reached 331 million pesetas. Thanks to Larramendi's own idealistic and, at 
the same time, pragmatic vision, Colex Data had promoted a new way of practising 
law. 
 
94“Reports presented by Mr. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano as Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer to the 
Board of Directors (1972-1985)”. Internal typed publication. Exhibition of 31-10-1972. Ed. MAPFRE, Mutualidad de Seguros, 
Madrid, p. 10 
95 IHdL, in a speech given to the General Meeting of Mutual members. 10983. 
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6. Innovative also in the small and the “micro-enterprise”. The  “counting” 
method was initiated in Spain in the loss adjustments specifically for hail, rationalising 
the damages in a determined area. Larramendi used this as an example of the need to 
avoid any fraud or chumminess in the quantification of damages, trying to objectify 
both the small and the large. In hail he started to do it by throwing a hoop over the 
damaged surface and counting the damaged ears of corn inside it; if there was no 
agreement, it was thrown again until an objective average was reached for all parties. 
The consideration of “micro-enterprise” is also significant in the context of the small, 
almost 20 years ahead of the European Commission96 where it recognised, also with 
reference to the United States, its specific relevance even if it is composed of less than 
10 people: I don’t know if I’ve expressed the importance of small businesses in social 
life properly. In any case, I would like to add that it will also be a key element, as it 
already is in the United States,  . . . micro-enterprises, . . . “.97 Today micro-enterprises 
carry out more than 12 per cent of all exports in Spain, and more than 15 per cent in 
countries such as Denmark, the United Kingdom or Austria. 
7. Always regardless of criteria and action. We have found Larramendi's 
independence reflected in many aspects and situations. One of them was the 
continuous clashes with the officialism of the Sindicato Vertical del Seguro (Vertical 
Insurance Union), from whom he always kept his distance. When the latter was 
dissolved, it was replaced by UNESPA, but it continued to clash due to the oligopolistic 
and competition-limiting mentality of this employers' association, to such an extent 
that he left it in 1980.  
8. Knowing how to “laissez-faire, without jealousy”. Granting great autonomy 
to his subordinates was another key to his leadership success. Without seeking 
monopolies of power that would have limited effective action. It was an application of 
his principle of subsidiarity. He combined it with a permanent monitoring of 
productivity in the company, initially measured as the ratio between premiums and 
the number of people in the entity,98 a measurement that was later perfected. In 
practice, Larramendi's leadership differed from what was used—for example—at La 
Catalana de Seguros, which was also on the verge of disappearing until the arrival of 
Jesús Serra. He managed to recover it, although with a very centralised management 
controlled by his family nucleus, obtaining a notable fortune, measurable by the 
percentage of his stake in the company, estimated at the end of the 1990s at around 
one hundred billion pesetas; but with much more limited expansion in spite of his 
historical advantage at the outset. Larramendi, however, maintained a net worth of 
less than the annual income of any executive of an equivalent company, disassociating 
his family from the ownership. MAPFRE has gone farther, with greater wealth and 
capitalisation, with José María Serra himself, Jesús' son and current chairman, leaving 
evidence of his admiration for Larramendi.99 
 
96Commission of the European Communities (2001): Draft Recommendation on the Definition of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, Brussels, European Commission, pp. 5-7. 
97 IHdL, “La empresa como motor de recuperación económica” conference. Assembly of Acción Social Empresarial. Madrid, 17 
December 1983. 
 98The first of the Reports on the subject between 1971 and 1972 estimated a productivity improvement of 15 per cent. Vid. 
“Reports submitted . . .”, 31-10-1972. 
99 Vid. José M. Serra recorded interview about I. Hernando de Larramendi, from the Fundación MAPFRE Archive, documentary 
collection. 
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9. Training also for third parties. Training for third parties became an equally 
fundamental aspect from the beginning of Larramendi's mandate, starting with the 
employees but also developing a pedagogy towards the outside of the entity. Thus the 
technical training courses for loss adjusters, through manuals and videos, with courses 
for accident insurance loss adjusters, or bodywork and painting for teachers of 
Vocational Training of the Ministry of Education and Science; courses for 
reconstructions of traffic accidents for workshops outside the insurance company, Civil 
Guard, municipal and regional police or for the disabled. Courses also abroad and in 
Portuguese, English, or French. Everything was complemented by a network of repair 
shops owned by the insurance company, publication of manuals with monographic 
studies for the different makes and models of cars, including industrial vehicles and 
motorcycles, with a publishing capacity that would reach 20 manuals a year. In this 
sense, the Centro de Experimentación y Seguridad Vial MAPFRE, CESVIMAP, ended up 
being a real laboratory and research centre, with repair time scales for each job and 
for each type of damage.  
10. The creation of the Policyholder Ombudsman. The so-called Policyholder 
Ombudsman was created at the behest of Larramendi in 1985 following his study of 
the possible precedents existing in this respect in Spain. He found, before other 
countries, two figures that serve as a reference. The “Justicia Mayor de Aragón”, as an 
institution that tried to be a counterpoint to the absolute power of the Monarchy, and 
which, even in an imperfect way, he understood to be based on a sense of collective 
justice and a desire for a balanced organisation of society. The other was the “Trials of 
Residence” in Castile, which was later extended to America, to avoid administrative 
abuses by public officials and the viceroys themselves. It was also applied to the 
“oidors”, all of whom were mandatory, always assuming a reminder that in the end 
they would be examined and judged for their actions. Thus, in 1986, he convened the 
First International Meeting of Policyholder Ombudsmen to analyse the situation in 
other countries and incorporated this figure into MAPFRE's Articles of Association. 
There were no specific insurance ombudsmen in the United States, Canada, Australia, 
or New Zealand at that time, although there were in the United Kingdom and Nordic 
countries. In Spain, the innovative initiative of Larramendi, who was later visited from 
Italy to see how it worked,100 ended up influencing Spanish insurance legislation, since, 
as the Director General of Insurance, José María García Alonso, acknowledged, it was 
an important step forward. As a result of Larramendi's initiative, the BBV, Savings 
Banks and other entities also tried to create similar figures. The first person in charge 
would be the Professor of Labour Law, former Vice-Chairman of the Government and 
former Minister of Labour, Fernando Suárez. This person, during more than 15 years, 
arbitrating more than 6,000 claims, stated that he hadn’t received a single indication 
from Larramendi on any specific claim, which fits in with the system of transparency 
that had been generated.101  
11. The creation of “Editorial MAPFRE”. As we have pointed out, publishing 
and intellectual work was an early vocation for Larramendi. Editorial MAPFRE soon 
served to publish different collections and industrial production of books, magazines, 
and different types of texts. Amongst them, the famous “Colección MAPFRE 1492” 
 
100 Statements by Fernando Suárez. Interview in “Trebol”, 1990. No. 18-2. 
101 Personal conversation with Fernando Suárez at the Summer Courses of La Granda, Asturias, August 2018 
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made up of 245 volumes on the occasion of the Fifth Centenary of the Discovery of 
America, which would have such a great influence on the popularisation and 
knowledge of MAPFRE amongst the general public in Ibero-America as well as 
specialists, and which also contributed to the pioneering expansion of the insurance 
company in the new continent. An expansion that began very reflexively  and with an 
intellectual action that started precisely from Editorial MAPFRE under Julio Castelo, 
later Larramendi's successor as MAPFRE's top executive. 
12. Pioneer in road safety campaigns. Mortality and all the damage and social 
costs of all kinds resulting from traffic accidents were an early priority for Larramendi 
of what he called “road insecurity”, promoted and paid for either by the Mutual 
Society, by the Foundation or by CESVIMAP itself. Campaigns and studies on the 
influence of alcohol, tobacco, drugs, caffeine, or the lighting of roundabouts at night 
have been the subject of subsequent campaigns by Fundación MAPFRE, which even 
today continues to award grants on road safety. Since 1996, the Instituto MAPFRE para 
la Seguridad Vial, as the social work of Fundación MAPFRE, has centralised everything 
aimed at this purpose.  
13. The creation of the “Bibliographic Documentation Centre”. Larramendi 
created a “Bibliographic Documentation Centre” that concentrated and created a very 
complete collection concerning the insurance sector. It continues to operate in the 
small palace at Paseo de Recoletos 23, in Madrid, bought during the Larramendi era by 
MAPFRE itself at the behest of Rafael Galagarra. This is where you'll find, amongst 
other things, all the MAPFRE documents and bibliography which, to a large extent, 
have also served for the preparation of this and many other studies and research 
works.  
14. Supporter of 0.7 per cent. Larramendi was a fervent supporter of donating 
not 0.7 per cent of GNP to poor countries, but 1 per cent. He considered it part of the 
“social responsibility” of the nations that have achieved the wealth that Spain has 
today”.102 In this respect, he had an initiative in 1987 which, in our experience, is very 
typical of companies in the United States, given that it isn't known to what extent 
social causes and international cooperation have real support in society beyond 
theoretical support. For this, he proposed that executives, employees, and delegates 
make voluntary contributions to CARITAS, as the Mutual Society and Larramendi 
himself had been doing for some time. In North America it’s usual that the company 
gives an amount equal to the amount donated by all its employees, which also serves 
to measure the popularity or sincerity of support for a particular cause. Larramendi 
describes it as “the least pleasant experience of my time at MAPFRE”. The “cold 
reception” that the proposal received led to the fact that at his farewell “in memory of 
his service to MAPFRE, a regular contribution is made to CARITAS, which I consider to 
be the institution that brings aid more directly and responsibly, and with less 
intermediate costs, to the truly needy and marginalised . . . These are for the most part 
the consequence of the rich, arrogant, unsupportive and hedonistic society that is being 
created in today's Spain . . . not wanting to remember those who suffer . . . “ .103  
 
102 H. de L., I. (1998): Speech at the awarding of the Cross of the Order of Civil Merit, 9-9-1998. 
103 H. of L. I. Farewell speech, o.c. 16-6-1990 
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15.  Promoter of “Corporate Social Responsibility” and patronage: Larramendi 
was an early promoter and a true patron in what today we call “Corporate Social 
Responsibility”. Thus he created a series of non-profit “Foundations” for different 
purposes. One of those foundations over which he presided in 1975 with ambitious 
objectives is the “Fundación MAPFRE”, with a still modest insurance company, the 
result of his innate passion for altruistic contribution to society. In the end, he would 
see it as a holding company that absorbed almost all the specific foundations that he 
created over time, depending on the circumstances. In the same way that he chaired 
it, the executive chairmen of the MAPFRE group continue to do so.  
- One of these foundations was Fundación MAPFRE America, created in 1988, 
especially dedicated to this continent. It was one of Larramendi's most beloved 
creations. He would devote part of his activity to it after retiring in 1990, creating the 
Instituto Histórico Tavera within it that same year. This was the forerunner of the 
Fundación Histórica Tavera, which was established in 1996 to promote activities 
related to historical and genealogical studies, which he so much appreciated (like his 
mother), by vindicating the figure of his ancestor Manuel Montiano, governor of La 
Florida, a contemporary of his also admired prime minister José Patiño. He did so 
conscious of the need for a better understanding of the evolution of Spain not only in 
its historical aspects but also in its socio-economic and cultural aspects, even within 
the political complexity of certain periods. In this sense we have undertaken to draw 
up, also as a result of this work, a chart—to be published in due course—referring to 
the bulky, and not always placid, chronological list—unlike in the United Kingdom—of 
prime ministers, government presidents, or equivalent—starting with Patiño, one of 
the great statesmen of our history, and up to 1931—making possible a greater 
understanding of our common past according to its specific protagonists in each 
situation, as Larramendi always wanted.104 
He argued that “The Spanish monarchy since 1492 documented everything; our 
wealth of this kind is by far more important than that of any other nation in the world, 
but today it isn't adequately cared for”. That is why he asked the Ministry of Education 
and Culture to regularly incorporate, every two years, during the first decade of the 
21st century, some 50 “archivists with a historical speciality” from the Faculty of 
Archivists to give a boost to the work of accessibility, knowledge, and preservation of 
this documentation. He also sees it “as a path of hope for the dozens of History and 
Humanities graduates who find themselves without a professional horizon and who 
deserve it”105 
The expectation was also to collaborate in a project of the Ministry of Culture 
to bring together the Nobility Section of the National Historical Archive at the Hospital 
del Cardenal Tavera and, with the help of the Instituto Histórico Tavera, to incorporate 
family archives, making use of what it called DOCUMAP with the idea of creating a 
Genealogical and Population Research Centre in the future.  
 
104 Of his admired Montiano ancestors are Manuel, Governor of La Florida, and Manuel's nephew, Agustín Montiano, Secretary of 
State with Felipe V and creator and first director of the same Academy of History. Patiño was “Universal Secretary”, named by  
Felipe V Secretary of War and State, accumulating later those of Treasury and Commerce. 
105H. de L., I. Speech at the ceremony for the awarding of the Cross of the Order of Civil Merit, 9-9-1998. 
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- Likewise, his “MAPFRE Estudios” initially considered it to be a basic element 
for converting it “into an academic institution that in 2000 will provide a useful 
educational service to Spanish society as a whole”.106 In fact, he taught the Insurance 
Degree directed by Antonio Guardiola, as well as numerous courses of Integral Security 
and International Management. Normally it was intended to be the hub of other 
MAPFRE entities linked to institutional purposes, but that weren’t foundations, such as 
“CESVIMAP”, “ITSEMAP Ambiental” or “ITSEMAP Fuego” with its research laboratory. 
The latter two were the most promising and the most cutting-edge and forward-
looking. Also “RELECMAP”, “SERVIMAP”, and “SERMAP” with the idea of providing the 
insurer with technical knowledge and “know-how”, which until then was only available 
to large reinsurers, in order to acquire the competitive advantage that MAPFRE later 
achieved. The idea of “Don Ignacio”, according to Santiago Curbera,107 in strengthening 
all these companies was to create something more integral than a mere international 
insurance group but to manage risks by levels according to the different groups of 
customers. In other words, it wasn’t just a question of selling policies but of offering 
risk control programmes based on the most specific knowledge of the risks, offering 
specific services and cover with the greatest possible transparency. 
- The “Fundación MAPFRE Medicina”, created in 1989, was also included in 
Larramendi's original design as a “basic piece of the foundational policy of the future”. 
However, it was no longer possible for him to take part in its launching as he opted to 
bring forth his retirement by a year, which he later regretted, without it later having 
the route Larramendi had intended. Like the Fundación Cultural MAPFRE Vida, also 
created in 1989, it would eventually become part of Fundación MAPFRE. 
     “The problems of Spain and the world are confusing. It is necessary to go into them with 
humility, approaching the truth without dogma or monopoly.... Not only professional parties should express what 
they believe is best for the country, but so should anyone who has something to say or experience to 
communicate..... My contribution, the result of dozens of years of analysing facts and situations, is far from a 
partisan intention and obligation, which seeks to clarify aspects that are incompatible with the direct struggle for 
power, that create enemies and don’t serve to win supporters. However, intentions aren’t enough. Spain won’t 
get through this difficult period with books or words. It needs example, selfless personal sacrifice of those who 
feel a special vocation for it, and hard work, at the cost of material advantages of all the people. ...”  
  Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi108, 1976 
UNIAPAC in Larramendi's life and professional career. 
We have already pointed out how Christian humanism tried to become the 
keystone of his personal, business, and foundational actions. In this respect, the 
incorporation of the Mutual Society with Larramendi into UNIAPAC, the International 
Union of Catholic Associations and Employers' Associations, was important. This had 
been created in 1931 at the International Conference of Christian Patrons as a result of 
the Encyclical Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI. In 1948 the name UNIAPAC was 
adopted, and groups of businessmen joined, especially from Holland, Germany, 
106H de L, I. (1990): Comments to the Board of MAPFRE Mutualidad de Seguros on 16-6-1990. It was the last Board Meeting in 
which Larramendi took part. 
107 Vid., Santiago Curbera. Fundación MAPFRE's documentary collection. Personal recorded interview with S. Curbera. 
108 I. HdL, (1976): Anotaciones de sociopolítica independiente. Ed. Plaza&Janés. 
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France, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Nordic countries but also from Ibero-
America. The relationships and strong integration in this International Union of 
Christian Business Leaders also provided Larramendi with the possibility of sharing and 
extending his business principles based on the Social Doctrine of the Church, which 
integrated his principles of subsidiarity and corporate social responsibility.  
In fact, the possibility of meeting, sharing, and getting to know a whole network 
of people of faith better, with whom he ended up getting on perfectly, also gave him 
great confidence in terms of the advice and agreements to introduce his foundations 
and MAPFRE's extension abroad, especially in Hispano-America. The Spanish section of 
UNIAPAC called “Acción Social Patronal”, and since 1966 “Acción Social Empresarial”, 
A.S.E., had been created in 1951 with Santiago Corral as its first chairman, and 
contributed to awakening social conscience in Spain with the organisation of 
conferences and seminars on socio-economic issues.  
In UNIAPAC and ASE it was thought that “the only possible link to give efficiency 
and reality to the union between the European peoples is the Christian conception of 
man”.109 ASE had outstanding leaders from the business world, including Carlos Botín, 
Pablo Garnica, Javier Benjumea, Oriol Urquijo, Aguirre Gonzalo, or Noguera Roig, from 
Banco de Valencia and founder of Banco de la Exportación, who would become the 
second chairman of ASE.  In June 1959, the UNIAPAC European Conference held 
between Knocke and Brussels focused on the social aspects of continental cooperation 
embodied in the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC, the European Economic 
Community, EEC, and the Free Trade Area project on the basis that it was this Christian 
vision that could give a satisfactory channel to the communitarian ideal. Larramendi 
would actively participate in the international meetings of UNIAPAC, based in The 
Hague, which in turn would become a breeding ground for contacts, relations, and 
staff for the global MAPFRE. At the same time ASE was extraordinarily strengthened by 
Larramendi's capacity and example of Catholic business activism. 
In the Europeanist impulse of the foundational community institutions came 
together the personalities of a clearly Christian nature who played a leading role in the 
founding of what is today the European Union, Adenauer, Schuman, De Gasperi, or De 
Gaulle. They linked up with the Spanish government, through traditionalist 
personalities such as Esteban Bilbao, or from the Catholic Association of Propagandists, 
with Christian Democrat tendencies, such as Ruiz-Jiménez from the Ministry of 
Education, between 1953 and 1956, Martín Artajo, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
between 1945 and 1957, his successor Castiella, or Navarro Rubio and Alberto 
Ullastres, from the economic sphere. Along with many others110 who would play 
important roles in the progressive opening of the regime and the great agreements 
with the international institutions that made possible the successful political process of 
transition after Franco's death.     
Precisely “Democracy and responsibility” would be the theme chosen by the 
members of ASE, to organise the corresponding 26th Social Week of 1967, held in 
 
109 Andrés-Gallego, J., y Barba D., (2002): Acción Social Empresarial. 50 años de empresariado cristiano en España. Ed. ASE. Madrid. 
110 Although of a clearly Statist mentality, we should include here the strongly integrating Catholic Falangist sectors committed to 
the recovery of Ortega and Unamuno for national Spain, such as Dionisio Ridruejo or university rectors such as Laín Entralgo and 
Tovar, representatives of this tendency, or Fernando Suárez himself.  
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Malaga. Future personalities who weren’t well known to the general public at the 
time, such as Landelino Lavilla, José Jiménez Blanco and Luis Sánchez Agesta as well as 
Joaquín Ruiz-Jiménez himself, Catholic trade unionists such as Julián Gómez del 
Castillo, or the Minister of Finance Mariano Navarro Rubio, would take part in it. His 
conclusions left little room for doubt:  
“All members of the political community have the right and the duty to 
participate in public life and to have the means to take an active part in it ..... (... )...  
The just aspirations of many Spaniards for progress in . . . the rights of the individual, 
namely the right of free assembly, of free association, of expressing one's opinions and 
of professing one's religion publicly and privately, are to be commended.... (...) new 
political structures that allow, without any discrimination, to participate in the 
establishment of the basic laws of the State, in the management and control of public 
business . . . and in the election of its leaders”.111   
  _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ACCIÓN SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL. LIST OF CHAIRMEN 
 .  
 Santiago Corral Pérez  (1951-1965) 
 José Antonio Noguera de Roig (1965-1969) 
 Manuel Mendoza Gimeno (1969-1971) 
 Martín González del Valle (1971-1976) 
 Fernando Bianchi (1976-1978) 
 Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi (1978-1983) 
 Eugenio Marín García Mansilla (1983-1989) 
 Alfredo Jiménez Cassina (1989-1990) 
 Carlos Álvarez Jiménez (1990- 2013) 
 Luis Hernando de Larramendi Martínez (2013- 
Source: Own compilation. 
The National Commission of ASE was part of the National Board of Catholic 
Action, along with various sectoral, youth, women’s, and scouting entities; also the 
Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica HOAC, and the Juventud Obrera Católica, JOC. 
The broad Catholic Action movement was still a powerful organisation with extensive 
reach in Spanish society during the 1960s through to the late 1970s. However, from its 
membership of 500,000 in 1966, it plummeted. The JOC, for example, went from 
87,000 members to 800 in 1979. Between 1964 and 1978, 95 per cent of its members 
left Catholic Action. 
Already at the 7th Conference of Catholic Action held in June 1966 in the Valley 
of the Fallen, the ecclesiastical hierarchy clearly saw the drift of some apostolic 
workers' movements such as HOAC and JOC, towards positions close to the so-called 
liberation theology and “Christians for socialism”. This unleashed a reorganisation 
process and rupture in Catholic Action as the criterion was maintained that Catholics 
couldn’t collaborate with Marxist parties according to the papal magisterium. 
Nevertheless, the Centre for Social Studies of the Valley of the Fallen continued to 
organise numerous meetings and seminars such as the one organised by ASE on “The 
reform of the company: experiences and prospects” from 2 to 7 November 1970, 
111 Informaciones Sociales, I.S., ASE publication, April 1967, pp. 11-14. 
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which would continue to take place until 1982, when the Centre for Studies was 
suspended.  
For ASE, the 1960s and 1970s in Spain hadn’t only produced a spectacular 
“economic miracle” but also a change in the field of associations and social relations: 
“our society has materialised. There is an eagerness, in all social classes, to enjoy 
material goods, comfort, ostentation of visible signs of wealth and wellbeing”.112 It was 
at the ASE Assembly of 1978 when Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi would be elected 
as its new chairman “taking into account the moment we are living and the response 
that ASE must give in it”.113 The sixth chairman of the entity had already attracted the 
attention of the General Assembly for years due to his open-mindedness. He had 
contacts with UNIAPAC, where here he coincided with Domingo Sugranyes, secretary 
general of this international organisation since 1974. In him he found one of his great 
associates, becoming a member of the Board of Directors of Corporación MAPFRE and 
Managing Director of MAPFRE. 
The new chairmanship of ASE meant a wake-up call for this organisation in the 
different provinces and regions of Spain. It was especially so in Portugal for the UCIDT 
association, the Portuguese branch of UNIAPAC, following the meeting held in the 
Algarve from 24 to 27 January 1980. Leading personalities participated in ASE meetings 
and study groups. From prestigious economists such as Fuentes Quintana, Juan 
Velarde or Manuel Lagares -later appointed Director of MAPFRE-, and politicians of 
different tendencies such as Carlos Bustelo, those from the PNV such as Mikel 
Unzueta, jurists such as Andrés Ollero, or foreign personalities such as Guido Brunner, 
or former ministers such as Fernando Suárez, later Policyholder Ombudsman. The 
revitalisation was also palpable in other parts of the world, as in the Colombian 
UNIAPAC with the presence of Andrés Restrepo. Larramendi would later also be 
elected chairman of “UNIAPAC Europe” at its 16th World Congress held in Abidjan, 
Ivory Coast, from 1 to 5 March 1981. In 1996, and supported by Larramendi, Domingo 
Sugranyes, already at that time CEO of MAPFRE, was elected chairman of UNIAPAC 
worldwide in Lille. Also from ASE incorporated as Directors were figures such as 
Jiménez Cassina, CEO of Land Rover-Santana and the chairman of ANFAC. From the 
ASE of that time the “Asociación para el Estudio de la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia 
(Association for the Study of the Social Doctrine of the Church)”, AEDOS, was also 
created, which with works of a more academic nature was run by Fernando Fernández 
Rodríguez. 
For ASE, the long presidency of Felipe González couldn’t be explained without 
the Catholic substratum existing in Spanish society, and of which most of the leaders of 
the Sevillian PSOE formed part. A large proportion of his 1982 voters were Catholics, 
82 out of a hundred, still in 1996, of whom 31 per cent were practising.114 The editorial 
of its publication “Acción Empresarial”, was very explanatory in this respect: “The 
socialist envoy proposing public moralization of the country, as an important part of its 
 
112 Concluding remarks by Fernando Guerrero, Member of ASE on “Public morality in today's Spanish society”, the theme chosen 
for the round table held in the Valley of the Fallen, 1975. Vid., Acción Empresarial, V, no. 58, November 1975, pp. 16-23. 
11322nd Extraordinary General Assembly of Acción Social Empresarial, Madrid, 17-10-1978. In “General Assemblies” ASE, 1975-
1978, p. 3. Madrid.  
114 With the exception of Alfonso Guerra, González himself had taken an active part in the activities of the JOC, in 1961-62, in 
connection with the political actions of Manuel Giménez Fernández's Christian Democratic Left. See Ramón Jaúregui, “Cristianos y 
socialismo”, El País, 14-5-1998. 
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programme, was received with satisfaction.... The socialist moralization programme 
was received as a hopeful challenge, when the PSOE came to power supported by it. 
Christians suddenly realised that socialism was taking a place that others had cowardly 
abandoned”.115 
In the specific field of entrepreneurship, Cardinal Antonio Rouco Varela himself 
recalled Larramendi's words during ASE's pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela in 
1982 at the offering to the Apostle: “We want, he said, to know how to put our ethical 
obligations and human commitment before economic results. In short, we want you to 
help us so that our companies may be elements at the service of man and not that men 
may be mere instruments for the purposes of our economic action. As Christians who 
are aware that we have to give evangelical witness before others, we also ask for your 
help so that we and our Association, Acción Social Empresarial, may be able to radiate 
before others the example of a behaviour according to God's designs for our world.”116 
These coordinates were maintained transversally, as one of the main public 
features shown by Larramendi. His legacy is the result of a personality and a life and 
business trajectory that reflects deep moral convictions. Not of something theoretical 
and superficial with regards to the company he managed, but of an action also 
“concerned with the fairness of prices and services and within ethics that are practised 
and whose application is demanded”.117 
In his own farewell speech “Don Ignacio” makes it clear: “You all know my 
background, Christian and specifically Carlist. In my 35 years at MAPFRE, I’ve tried to 
create a company inspired by Christian principles, which has nothing to do with making 
ideological politics or discriminating against those who think differently, which has 
never been done at MAPFRE. MAPFRE has been, in everything that has depended on 
me, a company that has arisen from the application of those principles . . . . I’ve 
demonstrated with facts that with those principles it is possible to comply and perhaps 
that only with them is it possible to have a permanent success. In any case, without 
what I’ve just said MAPFRE and my performance in it can’t be understood. MAPFRE's 
future is great . . . . In 2000, MAPFRE will be a great institution in the world . . . and to a 
large extent this will happen because we have always remembered the principles I’ve 
just explained”.118  
 
115 Acción Empresarial. Editorial, No. 114, April-June 1983, p. 2. 
116 Hernando de Larramendi, I. (1982): collected by J. Andrés-Gallego in Acción Social Empresarial. 50 años de empresariado 
cristiano en España. Ed. ASE, Madrid. 2002. p. 17. 
117H. de L., I. (1990): “Farewell speech”. General Meeting of MAPFRE Mutualidad, 15-6-1990. 
118 H. of L. I. Farewell speech, o.c. 15-6-1990. 
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                           “The sense of perfection, inherent in man, is transmitted by him to the institutions he creates”. 
                                                                                                                          Ignacio  Hernando de Larramendi, 1947119                      
DIGIBIS and the Fundación Ignacio Larramendi.  
The great creation of DIGIBIS deserves special mention, as does the 
continuation of the work of personal patronage through the “Fundación Hernando de 
Larramendi”, outside MAPFRE. He created it as a non-profit organisation in 1986, in 
homage and memory of his father, who believed that, despite his strong 
independence, he hadn’t received the satisfaction and recognition he deserved during 
his lifetime. It changed its name to the current “Fundación Ignacio Larramendi”, as 
decided by his wife and nine children, after the death of the patron-founder in 2001.  
Within his intellectual activism and, at the same time, practical activism “Don 
Ignacio” had started and promoted an innovative and pioneering task related to the 
digitization of archives in an area he had called DIGIMAP, which is today DIGIBIS, 
digitising a million pages, including those of the manuscript collections of the Naval 
Museum or those of the Dukes of the Infantado. This has continued for 30 years in 
different archives of public and private entities, and recently it has encompassed the 
personal archive of the former Prime Minister Felipe González. 
When Fundación MAPFRE America merged with Fundación MAPFRE in 1997, 
DIGIBIS was left outside the MAPFRE group and today it is the most innovative and 
important digitization company in Spain, with international projection and the most 
advanced and cutting-edge technology in the field. This foundation also participates in 
the audio-visual and cinematographic field by producing documentaries, and with its 
stake in the funding of television series highlighting singular aspects related to our 
history and the history of Carlism in collaboration with academic and university 
institutions. As in the chapters of the series “Mitos al descubierto. 75 años de la guerra 
civil”, by Tele-Madrid, or “Gruneisen, primer corresponsal de guerra”,120 presented to 
the Goya Awards, in collaboration with the CEU Institute of Historical Studies, and in 
2020 screened by Televisión Española. Additionally, its participation in documentaries 
on persecuted Christians in Syria, Iraq and other countries in Africa and Asia, the ninth 
of which was presented on 25 May 2020 in Madrid.  
DIGIBIS highlights the original creation of its Virtual Polymath Library, i.e., the 
great multifaceted creators, whose works marked a turning point in the various fields 
of science, literature, economics, philosophy, thought, exploration, and others. This 
allows direct access to hundreds of Spanish, Portuguese, and Ibero-American 
multidisciplinary thinkers. With ebooks published in ePub, Mobi and pdf formats and 
free to download. A work of compilation, arrangement, study, and dissemination of 
authors of the Visigothic Hispania, of the translators of the School of Translators of 
 
119 Cfr. I. HdL, “El riesgo catastrófico en los seguros personales”. Publications of the Insurance Compensation Consortiums, 1947 p. 
19. 
120 It is worth highlighting the measured, efficient production costs with which the FIL always acts -following Larramendi's 
philosophy- resorting to friends and free environments. In this case with “extras” such as the undersigned and other university 
professors, taking advantage of dependencies ceded by the Real Gran Peña de Madrid in some shots. The same in the chapters 
due to the journalist Fernando de Haro in his “austere” travels through different countries in conflict for the documentaries on the 
situation of Christians. 
58 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter I. Larramendi from the Great Depression and the establishment of MAPFRE  
to the creation of the euro 
 
 
Toledo, of the School of Salamanca, Cervantes, José de Ancheta, Andrés Bello, 
Fernando Pessoa, Menéndez Pelayo or Ramón y Cajal.  
One of the latest is a study about the multifaceted deputy of the Cortes de 
Cádiz Antonio de Capmany Surís (1742-1813), conducted, like others, by researchers of 
the Spanish National Research Council, CSIC, in this case José Checa Beltrán. Along 
these lines, the aforementioned Thematic Virtual Libraries of Spanish Polymaths and 
Authors, with almost 1,000 of them, are one of the most important, original, and 
exceptional cultural projects and achievements currently being carried out in Spain. 
Additionally, the Fundación Ignacio de Larramendi, in its work of patronage, 
and with the support of DIGIBIS has created the Heritage Hub Virtual Library, the result 
of a European consortium that aims to show how schoolchildren see European 
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CHAPTER II. IGNACIO LARRAMENDI’S PEOPLE MANAGEMENT STYLE  
 
PhD Mercedes Rubio Andrés 
PhD Gonzalo Sanz-Magallón Rezusta 
 
 
“The amount of the work capacity of each person in the service of the company is said to be its main asset. I think 
it is the only important asset. Under these conditions, ethics and social equity aren’t the only reasons that 
demand a satisfactory policy with the staff, but an absolute necessity for their livelihood”.121 




121 IHL (1965): “Reforma de la empresa”, Lecture given at the course on “Reforma de la empresa”, organised by Acción Social 
Patronal de Madrid, on 26-27 January 1965. 
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OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The work carried out by various historians on Larramendi's management of 
MAPFRE attributes the extraordinary success of the insurance company to him and his 
team as well as the undoubted leadership he exercised in the company.122 However, to 
date there has been no research intended to analyse his leadership style and delve 
into the real keys to his business success, which is the main objective of this chapter. 
This chapter begins with a brief presentation of the evolution of theories and 
practices in people management from the beginning of the twentieth century to the 
present day, as a preliminary step to the study of people management at Larramendi’s 
MAPFRE. To do so, we shall identify his values, which marked his leadership style as 
well as the most innovative aspects and best practices in terms of recruitment, 
selection, integration, training, performance, and remuneration management. The 
objective is to determine to what extent the management style and human resources 
management was pioneering with respect to the practices of the time, and contributed 
to MAPFRE achieving its objectives in the period 1955-1990. 
The methodology used to prepare the chapter is based on a review of the 
existing literature by various authors on MAPFRE and Larramendi, on the one hand, 
and on the strategic elements of people management in companies, on the other. 
Obviously, we have also analysed Larramendi's numerous publications, lectures, notes 
and reports, which offer the keys to his way of thinking and acting in economic and 
business matters, and their evolution. 
In turn, through interviews conducted by Fundación Ignacio Larramendi in 2017 
with a number of executives and associates, information has been obtained on the 
characteristics of the human resources management in the Larramendi era and the 
opinion of different people who worked under his management.  
A final line of analysis has focused on the study of the insurance company's 
collective agreements, which provide objective information on  remuneration 
management, working hours, training, and other relevant aspects comparing MAPFRE 
with other companies in the sector, which will enable us to ascertain their differential 
characteristics. 
Within this framework, the main hypothesis to be compared in this chapter is 
whether Larramendi's people-management style was coherent with his principles and 
values, which, as shall be seen, should place the person and his dignity at the centre of 
the company's actions. Additionally, an analysis shall be made of whether MAPFRE's 
human resources management, in terms of recruitment, training, professional 
development and remuneration, were key elements in explaining the success achieved 
by the insurer, and to what extent these practices were differentiating and pioneering.  
 
122 See Tortella et al. (2008), Pons (2000), Caruana de las Cagigas (2009), Caruana de las Cagigas (2014) and Caruana de las Cagigas 
(2019). 
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HUMAN VALUES AND BUSINESS LEADERSHIP 
 
The knowledge of how to manage and lead people is a consequence of the 
principles and values of the people who exercise the mission of making business 
decisions. Hence the importance of highlighting those values and qualities that a good 
executive should have because of their impact on human resources management. 
“From amongst the literature that analyses the characteristics required to be an 
executive or business leader, we are now interested in presenting the proposals of 
Barceló Matutano (1972) and Fernández Aguado (1999), as they are, to a certain 
extent, complementary. 
For Barceló Matutano, the leader must have the following characteristics, by way 
of a decalogue:123 
1. Fair and impartial 
2. Wholesome and unwavering. 
3. Responsible and effective in action, judgement, and decision. 
4. Transmitter and organiser. Delegates as much as possible. 
5. Communicative and accessible. 
6. Flexible and adaptable. Takes advantage of opportunities. 
7. Positive and optimistic. 
8. Motivating and tolerant. Knows how to listen, encourage, motivate, and teach. 
9. Creative and innovative. Intuitive. Imaginative. Decentralised. 
10. Prospective and forward-looking. 
In turn, Fernández Aguado lists the following:124 
1. Desire to achieve goals, often difficult. So-called “n” factor from “need for 
achievement”. This is a trait that differentiates people between “businessmen” 
and “followers” or “disciples”. 
2. Self-confidence. This ability is complemented by a relentless dedication to 
work. 
3. Ability to take controlled risks. 
4. Organisational capacity. 
5. Must be creative. Show a permanent initiative. 
6. Be able to tolerate ambiguity. Be able to respond appropriately to complex 
situations. 
7. Optimism. Necessary to transmit enthusiasm, a weapon for the correct 
motivation. 
8. The leader must have integrity. 
9. The desire for training. The fourth stage in the assimilation of training should 
be: a) unconsciously incompetent; b) consciously incompetent; c) consciously 
competent; d) unconsciously competent. In this last stage the person is in a 
position to carry out their work effectively without being aware of it, and 
without the excessive slowness of the third stage. 
 
123 Barceló Matutano G. (1972): El dirigente del futuro, APD, Madrid. 
124 Fernández Aguado (1999): Dirigir personas en la empresa, Pirámide, pp. 38 y ss.  
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10. Management skills, aimed at improving productivity. 
11. Market orientation must predominate over managerial orientation. 
12. Detect business opportunities. 
13. Global vision. 
14. It is desirable for the leader to have a desire to “make a mark”. 
15. Respect for others. 
16. Ability to overcome: not to be discouraged in the face of difficulties. 
17. Intuition, although serious and rigorous work sufficiently, and sometimes more 
than enough, makes up for the lack of intuition. 
The true leader of an organisation will get the submission of the people around 
him through auctoritas(authority), as a term different from potestas (power), because 
the authority means that some people place their trust in others, regardless of the 
position or office they hold, because of their intelligence, dedication, ability to work, or 
any other virtue that the leader has or has achieved.  
Potestas (power), on the other hand, comes from holding an office that implies the 
ability to make decisions about others, whether they like it or not.  The quality of an 
executive's authority is measured by the amount of power he exercises to get the 
people under him to do what is expected. If there is power and little authority, there 
will be no choice but to submit, but the atmosphere will be unpleasant.125 
On the other hand, leaders perform the function of Managing in terms of deciding, 
but it is also educating in its double meaning of, on the one hand, “to take outwards 
(educere)” and, on the other hand, “to lead, guide, accompany (conducere)”, trying to 
change people's behaviour in order to improve it, respecting in all cases the freedom 
of others, which implies that this behaviour is based on human values to improve 
coexistence and work in the organisation. This requires the executive to have a personality 
rich in human values but also a balanced, harmonious personality because one can’t teach 
what you don’t know and, above all, what you don’t practice.126  
The values described, which the executive possesses, underpin the leadership 
style, so depending on these we can distinguish between the authoritarian or 
autocratic, which is sometimes presented under paternalistic tints, and the democratic 
and laissez-faire.127 Autocratic leaders make decisions without consultation, expecting 
employees to go along with them; however, democratic leaders involve employees in 
decision making; and finally, laissez-faire leaders simply let employees decide for 
themselves.  
Finally, it is interesting to analyse the implications of the CEO's values on the 
corporate culture and the results achieved. In this sense, the academic literature 
proposes three major systems128: 
1. First, we find CEOs who primarily value self-management, freedom of thought 
and independence, creativity and show a greater propensity to face challenges 
 
125 Fernández Aguado (1999): Dirigir personas en la empresa, Pirámide, pp. 2225-226. 
126 Gómez Fernández, J.M (1999): Recursos Humanos: Fundamentos del comportamiento humano en la empresa. Editorial 
Encuentro, Madrid. 
127 Lewin con R.Lippit y R.K.White, (1938,1939) 
128 Ver Berson Y.,  Oreg S. y Dvir T. (2008): “CEO Values, Organizational Culture and Firm Outcomes”. 
64 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter II Ignacio Larramendi’s people-management style 
 
 
and take risks. These people tend to introduce a culture of entrepreneurship 
and opportunity-seeking into their companies, which translates into high 
growth. 
2. A second type of leader is characterised by placing a higher value on aspects 
such as security, order, stability, and predictability. These leaders focus on 
establishing clear and explicit rules and procedures, resulting in bureaucratic-
like business cultures, and often have performance characterised by high 
organisational efficiency, but low employee satisfaction. 
3. Thirdly, the benevolent CEO is highly empathetic and has a priority to promote 
the wellbeing of the people around them by attending to the needs of 
employees and encouraging cooperative and supportive attitudes. The result 
will be a high rate of job satisfaction amongst the staff. 
 
Illustration 1: Leader's values, corporate culture, and results. 
 
Source: adapted from Berson et. al (2008). 
 
OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT THEORIES UP TO THE PRESENT DAY 
 
In order to subsequently characterise the managerial style that Larramendi 
introduced in MAPFRE, it is useful to explain the historical evolution of the trends in 
company organisation systems according to the different theories or schools, which 
analyse how roles and tasks are distributed amongst employees, how one 
remuneration system or another is used, what work methods are employed, how 
hierarchical relationships are established, or how work is managed in individuals or in 
teams.  
Around the beginning of the twentieth century, Taylorism emerged, the first 
theory that used scientific research as an instrument for the study of human problems 
in the business organisation, and that focused mainly on the work method, on the time 
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needed to perform tasks and on specialisation.129 From this theory derived the study of 
jobs to find improvements in productivity, the standardisation of processes, the hiring 
of specialist workers in a position or designing incentive systems based on production. 
The aim was to banish all irrational elements in the preparation and configuration of 
the work.130  
This theory gave rise to the Instructional Management technique, which is 
nowadays considered only suitable for repetitive situations of low complexity such as 
simple assembly lines. 
Although the system proposed by Taylor achieved higher levels of 
standardisation and productivity, these came at the cost of unsatisfactory quality of 
production and high levels of conflict. The fact is that the foundations of Taylorism 
contain important gaps such as a negative anthropology, due to the appreciation that 
workers will tend to be carried away by the law of minimum effort and the 
consideration that man functions according to the Paulovian model of stimulus-
response; denial of initiative for workers and reductionism of the motivational process 
to chrematistic considerations; visceral rejection of teamwork and radical separation 
between the design and practical execution of a job, leaving the former to executives 
and the latter to employees.131 
The School of Human Relations, led by Elton Mayo, 132emerged in the 1930s as 
a reaction to the Taylorist system. This approach considered that the Industrial 
Revolution had alienated workers and proposed a recovery of the centrality of the 
person in the productive process. Thanks to the experiments conducted133 on the 
behaviour of individuals and groups, it was found that in order to increase productivity 
the salary and incentive scheme was less important than pressure, acceptance, and job 
security.134 Hence, it was proposed that it was necessary to give satisfaction to workers 
and promote their interrelationship in order to increase productivity.  
In 1954 Peter Drucker published his fundamental work, considered as the first 
proposal of Management by Objectives (MBO)135, which has had a great influence until 
today. Drucker focused on how to manage “knowledge workers”, who don’t accept the 
degree of control of manual workers. The five basic functions of the executive are:136 
1) setting objectives jointly between executives and subordinates; 2) organising; 3) 
motivating; 4) measuring the achievement of objectives; and 5) communicating in a 
multidirectional way. For all this to work, it is necessary to contribute to the personal 
development of the people who work in the company, since a well-trained, motivated 
worker is the essential element for success.  
In this brief overview of the theories that influenced the leaders and 
management styles of companies in Spain, it is necessary to include the influences 
 
129 Valero Matas, J (2008): Recursos humanos, ed. Tecnos 
130 Martínez Martínez, M.A. (1990a): Organización I: Conceptos generales y escuelas. Los clásicos: Taylor, Fayol y Weber. Instituto 
de Dirección y Organización de Empresas, No. 78 
131 Fernández Aguado (1999): Dirigir personas en la empresa, Pirámide, p. 56. 
132 Mayo, E. (1933): The human problems of an Industrial Civilization, Nueva York, The Macmillan Co. 
 133Elton Mayo's Hawthorne Experiments (1924-1930) are interesting to explain the importance of the group in organisations. 
134 Robbins, S. P. (1998) Fundamentos del comportamiento organizacional, Prentice Hall, Mexico, 5th Edition 
135 Drucker P.F. (1954): The Practice of Management, Heron Books, London 
136 García Ruiz (2003): Grandes creadores en la historia del Management, Ariel, Madrid, pp. 63-64. 
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derived from the recommendations of different encyclicals, mainly from Pope Leo 
XXIII, and the consequent appearance of the so-called Social Doctrine of the Church. In 
this context, different theoretical contributions emerged, including that of the Jesuit 
Martín Brugarola (1945),137 which set out ethical criteria to be adopted by the 
businessman. Thus, although this doctrine admits the lawfulness of the businessman's 
desire for profit, it warns about the pernicious effects this has if the desire becomes 
immoderate or excessive and the “vices of capitalism” appear.138 Alongside these 
theoretical contributions, arose business initiatives of a markedly social nature, 
including the foundation in 1904 of the Caja de Pensiones para la Vejez y de Ahorros, 
the origin of today's Caixabank, by Francesc Moragas,139 and the work of the priest 
José María Arizmendiarrieta, founder of the Mondragón Cooperative in the 1950s.  
Amongst the recent proposals in Management Theory, the emergence of 
Management by Values (MBV), which links with the concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), and puts it into practice as a way to motivate employees, is of 
extraordinary interest for this study. The term MBV is due to two ESADE professors, 
García and Dolan (1997), 140but also, and in parallel, to Blanchard and O'Connor (1997), 
who coined it the same year in their book “Managing by Values” 141.  
For Fernández Aguado, “MBV is one more step in the search for effective 
means to improve organisations that is on the rise, perhaps because it is increasingly 
commonly accepted that the failure of many companies is due to having forgotten the 
radical importance of the values that underpinned it”.142 Amongst the different 
definitions of the MBV values we are interested in two proposed by Salvador García:143 
“MBV is a humanist project (the person at the centre) to make explicit the final and instrumental values to be 
shared by the whole organisation, in order to generate cohesion, enthusiasm and full sense for the action of 
high business performance and the generation of strategic competitive advantage”. 
“MBV is a source of competitive advantage for the company, consisting of doing things very well with people 
from the perspective of a balance of economic, ethical and emotional values; understanding people as 
owners, employees, customers, suppliers, partners and citizens in general. In short, it is all about building 
harmony and trust between all the people who make up the company's stakeholders”. 
The fundamental objectives of the MBV are144: 1) placing core values as a 
reference point for strategy; 2) a more satisfactory and efficient behaviour of 
employees amongst themselves and with management, which will increase 
profitability; and 3) collaborating in increasing the weight of ethics in business entities. 
Values can be defined as the stable belief that one behaviour and goal of 
existence is personally and/or socially preferable to an opposite, different one. The 
values will contribute to the appropriate use of technical skills. Because not everything 
that can be done must be done.145 
 
137 Martín Brugarola (1945): La cristianización de las empresas, Ediciones Fax, Madrid 
138 García Ruiz (2003): Grandes creadores en la historia del Management, Ariel, Madrid, p.167. 
139 See Moreno C.M. et. al. (2019): “Francesc Moragas y la fundación de la Caja de Pensiones para la Vejez y de Ahorros: un 
ejercicio de responsabilidad social corporativa”, Cuadernos de la Cátedra CaixaBank de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa, No. 40; 
Cabana F. (2019): Francesc Moragas el fundador de la Caixa, Fundación Bancaria La Caixa. 
140 García S y Dolan S (1997): La dirección por valores. El cambio más allá de la dirección por objetivos, McGraw-Hill. 
141 Blanchard K. y O´Connor M. (1997): Managing by Values, Berret-Koehler Publishers Inc., San Francisco. 
142 Fernández Aguado, J. (2001): Dirección por valores, Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas, p.11. 
143 García, S. (2011): “La dirección por valores”, Fundació IL3-UB. 
144 Fernández Aguado, J. (2001): Dirección por valores, Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas, p.14. 
145 Fernández Aguado, J. (2001): Dirección por valores, Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas, p.15. 
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The essential conditions for setting up a MBV are:146 
1. They must be coherent values. 
2. They must be explicitly communicated. Employees can’t be asked to be mind 
readers. 
3. Credible. Values should be challenging but achievable.  
4. Assumed by the executives. 
5. Integrated into the normal operations of the organisation. 
6. Incentives will enhance the specified values. 
7. Line executives, and—as already mentioned above—not only the Senior 
Management, must assume and defend them. 
 
From the perspective of people's motivation, MBV tries to strengthen the so-
called motivational factors, as opposed to the hygiene ones. Hygiene factors are those 
which, if absent or inadequate, produce dissatisfaction in people.147 These are factors 
related to company policies, in terms of how supervision and control are exercised, 
working conditions and salaries.148 On the other hand, the factors that achieve 
satisfaction or motivational factors refer to achievement and recognition, the type of 
work, responsibility, professional recognition and the possibility of a professional 
career. Since hygiene factors don’t lead to satisfaction, motivational factors are 
needed for satisfaction to be achieved. There is also a higher motivation than the 
previous ones, called transcendent motivation, where the purpose is constituted by 
the ethical dimension and involves looking out for the betterment of others. 
By way of recapitulation, we can identify the emergence and rise of 
Management by Instructions around 1920, Management by Objectives around 1960, 
and Management by Values in the 21st century. This evolution is justified by the 
growing need for companies to give greater professional autonomy and responsibility 
to employees, to improve quality and achieve customer orientation and to evolve in 
labour relations from the figure of the boss to that of the “facilitator” of the 
performance of his subordinates, as shown in the following illustration: 
Illustration 2: Evolution of three ways of managing a company: by instructions, by 
objectives and by values. 
 
146 Miguel Ángel Alcalá: “De la dirección por valores a la dirección por hábitos”.  
147 Herzberg, F. (1966). Work and the nature of man. Oxford, England: World. 
148 Martínez Martínez (1990b): Organización II: Psicología y sociología. op.cit 
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Source: adapted by García y Dolan (1997). 
 
 
“The most important asset of any company are the men who compose it, from the first to the last”.  
Larramendi, 1983 “concordia social y riesgo empresarial” 
 
THE LEADERSHIP OF IGNACIO DE LARRAMENDI 
 
This section will deal with IHL's management style, how he dealt with his 
associates, the principles (dignity of people, meritocracy, etc.) that inspired his 
management and that explain his extraordinary leadership.  
 
Main traits in his personality   
The 76 interviews conducted by the Fundación Larramendi during 2017 with 
people who knew and dealt with him in the context of MAPFRE, its foundations, or 
family environment, allow us to characterise his personality. Although every opinion 
always involves a degree of subjectivity, the fact of having a large number of 
interviews gives it sufficient rigour, and even more so if we take into account that a 
large part of the opinions are based on empirical data and verifiable actions. 
Alberto Elzaburu provides an initial synthetic vision of great interest: “his values 
are summed up in the principles of Christianity”. In turn, the former chairman of 
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MAPFRE between 2001 and 2012, José Manuel Martínez, highlights his “ability to 
spread optimism and his status as a great motivator”. In our opinion, the 
characterisation made by his eldest son, Luis, is the most complete, and to a certain 
extent, incorporates those made by most of the interviewees. The personality traits 
pointed out by Luis Larramendi were: “infinite curiosity, vision of the future, honesty, 
capacity for work, sociability, ability to make true friends, loyalty to others, 
consistency, self-confidence, boldness and commitment”.  
Other traits mentioned repeatedly by the rest of the interviewees were: 
independence, humility, tolerance, transparency, optimistic, “traditionalist and 
revolutionary”, humanity, generosity, kindness, austerity, imaginative, spirit of service, 
excellent communicator, impatient, born organiser, patriot, innovator, rebel, skilled 
negotiator. 
If we compare these traits with the ideal characteristics that leaders should 
have according to business management theorists and which were analysed above, it 
can be concluded that Larramendi had innate qualities and a scale of values that were 
certainly adequate to become a leader.  
The following is an analysis of some of the traits attributed to Larramendi by those 
interviewed, most of which were reflected in MAPFRE. 
a) Humanity- The associates and employees of “Don Ignacio” were surprised 
because he knew all the employees personally, and he remembered and was 
continuously interested in their personal and family circumstances, etc. 
Another remarkable fact is that he treated everyone equally, regardless of their 
professional category in the company. One goal he stated in his writings was to 
enable people to develop their full potential by giving opportunities to all 
employees, especially young people. “Larramendi knew how to turn young men 
into men because he gave them a lot of responsibility and delegated a lot” 
(Juan Antonio Labat, former MAPFRE executive); “his greatest achievement was 
to make a deeply human and deeply profitable company” (Daniel Restrepo, 
MAPFRE foundations executive).  
 
b) Honesty. The associates of this executive agree that honesty presided over all 
his actions. There is no doubt that throughout his professional career he had 
countless opportunities to have significantly improved his income and/or do 
private business, but he never wanted to take advantage of this. “Years later, 
after doing my summer internship at the MAPFRE office in Alicante as an office 
boy, I found out that it was my father who paid for my salary out of his own 
pocket, as he thought it was wrong that the delegation should pay for it” 
(Miguel Larramendi, son). 
 
c) Humility. This trait has also been continuously pointed out amongst the 
interviewees, since it isn’t frequent that people who receive great professional 
recognition and accumulate a lot of power adopt an attitude of true modesty. 
Possibly his humble attitude has to do with his profoundly Christian concept of 
the world, recognising the dignity of each person, as brothers and sisters and 
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children of God. “He was a person who, when he didn’t know a subject well, 
sought advice and informed himself, which isn't typical amongst people who 
have achieved great business or professional success” (Alfonso Bullón de 
Mendoza, historian, chairman of the ACDP) 
 
d) Tolerance. This virtue is also significant, since his firm traditionalist ideological 
stance didn’t prevent him from always showing great respect for approaches 
that differed from his own. One of his daughters interviewed explains that her 
father always had great empathy with people, and tried to make people see 
that their vices or faults had some origin such as not having received a correct 
education, their difficult personal circumstances, etc. “He was a man who 
always put himself in your place” (Manuel Lorente, senior executive 
responsible for MAPFRE in Catalonia) 
 
e) Sociability, ability to make true friends and to select people well. His associates 
in MAPFRE declared to have spent some excellent moments during dinners and 
trips accompanied by their wives and the Larramendi couple. He left behind a 
wide network of friends in European and Ibero-American countries, which was 
of great help in the internationalisation process of the insurance company. It 
was even partly thanks to his personal relationships that MAPFRE was saved 
from bankruptcy in 1955, as his friendship with Donald Warrener, a director of 
the English company Mercantile & General, led the latter to provide MAPFRE 
with reinsurance cover, even though he was warned that the Spanish mutual 
society wouldn’t be able to pay the balances.149 “Creció haciendo crecer a los 
demás” (Irene Prada, sobrina). 
 
f) Work capacity. He himself described himself as a workaholic at a conference. 
During his time at the helm of MAPFRE, he was totally dedicated to his 
professional activities during the week, usually working at home at night, and 
at the weekend it was customary for him to summon his closest associates to 
his home on Sundays for work meetings. “He was very active, he never wore a 
coat” (Duke of Segorbe, manager and owner of historical archives). 
 
g) Austerity. On a personal level, his lifestyle always manifested the utmost 
moderation. This virtue was “exported” to MAPFRE, where he never had a 
company car, always flew economy class, work lunches were extremely frugal, 
the hotels where he stayed were always the cheapest, etc. “I was embarrassed 
when I greeted Larramendi on a flight, I was in first class and he was in 
economy class” (Ex-employee of UNESPA).  
 
h) Infinite curiosity, innovative, imaginative, rebellious, visionary. These five 
features were undoubtedly decisive in MAPFRE's rise to first place amongst 
Spanish insurers. His constant thirst for learning led him to make several stays 
and trips abroad, which allowed him to introduce the practices of the leading 
insurance companies of the world at that time, such as Lloyd's, Metropolitan 
 
149 AA.VV.: (1991): Ignacio H. de Larramendi y Montiano, p.119. 
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Life, Prudential and State Farm.150 On the other hand, his rebellious nature 
made him not accept the situation when he saw that things weren’t being done 
in the best possible way, whilst his imaginative and innovative capacity allowed 
him to look for creative solutions to problems. Quite possibly his accurate 
vision of the future came from having the right information and analysis for 
each situation, since he always sought out the person who knew the most 
about the subject when he had to get information or ask for an opinion. “He 
was a great visionary, since the 1960s he was obsessed with us learning 
English” (Sebastián Homet, MAPFRE executive); “He used to invite me to lunch 
so that I could tell him what was happening and what trends there were 
amongst young people” (Pilar Troncoso, niece). 
 
i) Businessman. The good executive is the one who makes decisions and takes 
risks. Larramendi took many decisions that bore excellent results, but which 
originally had their detractors internally, because of the change, the novelty 
and the risk they entailed. “When Don Ignacio preferred to invest the surplus of the 
premiums of the policyholders in the company instead of returning it to them, some 
executives thought that MAPFRE would collapse, and not only did this not happen but 
many insurance companies followed suit (Ángel Luis Sierra, former executive of 
MAPFRE's personnel department)  
 
j) Communicator. He had a natural gift for convincing people, exciting them with 
his projects, and at events he was able to give lectures without reading his 
notes. “He was a great motivator” (José Manuel Martínez, former chairman of 
MAPFRE) 
 
k) Consistency. In the different spheres—personal, political, and professional-, he 
maintained an attitude perfectly in line with the values he professed. “He never 
voted because he had traditionalist values” (Luis, son). 
 
Leadership style 
We can see, in short, that Larramendi's leadership was based on a very solid 
foundation, which began to take shape shortly after his arrival, when he took the 
decision to reduce his initially agreed salary after discovering that the mutual society’s 
financial situation was much worse than expected. “Don Ignacio” was considered by 
many of his associates as an example to imitate, and several of the people interviewed 
acknowledged the great influence he had on their way of being.  
Two years before Larramendi arrived at MAPFRE, in 1953, he attended a 
conference organised at the chair of the Professional Insurance School in Madrid, 
where the director of the French Insurance Productivity Action Committee, Jean-
Raymond Fouchet, explained the keys to achieving significant savings in personnel and 
administration costs in various companies.  As a result of this event, Larramendi wrote 
 
150 Caruana de la Cagigas L. (2019): “La introducción de nuevas tecnologías en MAPFRE (1960 - 2000)”, Transport, Services and 
Telecommunications, 40, p. 48. 
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a note entitled “Productivity and public relations in insurance”, in which some of the 
ideas that marked his management style at MAPFRE are set out. So he stated:151 
“Fouchet not only considers productivity as a cheaper and faster method of production but also as a true state of 
mind that demands enthusiasm and resolution, which must be instilled in all the components of a company to imbue 
them with a sense of improvement in their work and above all a sense of solidarity that identifies them with the 
institution to which they belong. Productivity isn’t something mechanical but something human, in which man's 
bonding is the most important thing, because if this state of improvement isn’t achieved, of always looking for things 
that can be done better, the technical progress that is used is of little use . . . “ 
On the other hand, the characterisation made by two of Larramendi's 
associates, José Luis Catalinas, a fundamental help in his last years, and Alberto 
Manzano, who would become the chairman of the foundation, is very illustrative:152 
“Larramendi imposed a peculiar management style at MAPFRE, characterised by his intuition for detecting problems 
and finding imaginative solutions, his enormous tenacity and capacity for work, his concern for continuous 
modernisation and simplification of administrative systems and processes and his travelling spirit, the seed of his 
future international activity, which at that time led him on a continuous pilgrimage around Spain, visiting the 
Branches and promoting a climate of optimism, work and confidence in MAPFRE's future”. 
He was a charismatic leader who exercised a leadership style that was a 
mixture of autocratic, making decisions for himself, but also democratic, involving 
others, and laissez-faire, delegating to other executives as the company grew. He 
himself, in his farewell speech, determined that:153  
 
“There is no personal succession. This has been achieved with something that could be called “charismatic 
dictatorship”. I may be a person with characteristics that prevent me from abusing power, but dictatorship did in 
fact exist, which isn’t good even if it is exercised well. That is why I was convinced of the need for a new structure 
when my time at MAPFRE came to an end. “I’ve never been a salesman. I haven’t known how to do it, but I have 




151 Larramendi I. H. (1953): “Productivity and public relations in insurance”, Unpublished study topic. 
152 AA.VV.: (1991): Ignacio H. de Larramendi y Montiano, p.120. 
153 Larramendi, I (1990): Farewell speech as the chairman of Fundación MAPFRE and Corporación MAPFRE and of the MAPFRE 
System Control Committee. General Meetings of MAPFRE Mutualidad and Corporación MAPFRE 16 June 1990, p. 6 
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PRINCIPLES THAT ILLUSTRATED LARRAMENDI'S LEADERSHIP AT MAPFRE 
 
“Companies that choose badly, end badly, and if the quality of the top management 
is poor, so will be the lower level be poor”154  
Ignacio Hernando  de Larramendi, 2000 
 
Importance of the social role of the insurance company 
Larramendi's solid traditionalist principles explain his aim of promoting a 
business project with a marked social character, which he called “business 
institutionalism”, as opposed to wild liberalism and collectivism. In 1965 he declared:  
“The company isn’t an institution to achieve the maximum return on capital or labour. Its purpose is to provide a 
service to the public and, in particular, to customers, thus fulfilling a specific mission within the general interests of 
the country's economy”. 
The institutional nature of “his MAPFRE” was based, according to him, on the 
fact that “its ownership was associative, its founding contributions weren’t cosmetic 
and because there was an express declaration of this nature incorporated in its 
bylaws”.155  
Significantly, the fact that the executive would reject the proposal to transform 
the mutual society into a public limited company in the late 1950s, even though, as he 
himself stated, it would have meant a significant financial gain for him. However, 
Larramendi was convinced that if MAPFRE had dispensed with its institutional 
character it would have achieved much less. Thus, he stated that 156 
“a large part of its success comes from a generous willingness to share with others, beyond contractual obligations . 
. . “ 
since  
“. . . a company with an institutional spirit favours the loyalty of its employees and associates, who render their 
services more generously when they consider it worthy. Loyalty can’t be maintained only with a carrot, nor only with 
a stick, but with an ideal that fills everyone with pride”.  
The social aspect of the insurance company, however, permeated all the 
executives and it was common for them to collaborate altruistically in its foundations. 
  
 
154 Companies that choose badly, refers to what we understand as recruitment and selection.  
155 Larramendi, I. H. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, p.139.  
156 Larramendi, I. H. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, p.141. 
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Both Ignacio Larramendi and MAPFRE's chairman, Dionisio Martín, were 
convinced of the importance of establishing regulations from the outset to prevent 
misuse of power and potential abuses by executives and employees. The influence of 
Dionisio Martín in this action was truly relevant, in fact Larramendi pointed out that 
this issue was “almost an obsession” of the chairman of the mutual society.157  
In Larramendi's words: 
“MAPFRE isn’t only made up of those who provide its services but also of its members, its customers and those who 
relate to it and entrust their interests to us. That is why it has always been a special concern of those of us who are 
at its head, Directors and Executives, to seek formulas to defend the rights of those, against the possibility of abuse 
by ourselves”.158 
The main principles, both statutory and non-statutory, which had to be 
respected referred to very diverse areas:159 limitations on executives and directors 
holding shares in MAPFRE Group companies; prohibition on the use of the insurer's 
resources for ideological, political or other purposes, with the sole exception of 
contributions to foundations promoted by MAPFRE; prohibition on the incorporation 
into the company of second-degree relatives of executives, managers or employees; 
compulsory retirement of executives and staff at the age of 65; guarantee of total 
independence from outside the insurer; and finally, the principle of overall 
remuneration: the remuneration of executives was calculated on a flat-rate basis, with 
no allowances for attending board meetings or similar allowances being permitted. 
The executives of the insurance company had to maintain a code of conduct, the 
“Larramendi Decalogue for Success”, which included the following commandments: 
1. It is essential to be ethical to be profitable. 
2. You have to be frugal in your spending. 
3. Always tell the truth. 
4. There is no cheating in the economy or even with the Treasury. 
5. You have to be serious about your work. 
6. Fairness in decisions must be maintained. 
7. You have to maintain great transparency with your employees and customers. 
8. You have to be very objective when judging and assessing a situation. 
9. You always have to show your face when confronted with difficulties, you have 
to be courageous in business. 
10. You must have great respect, especially for the workforce. 
Larramendi's MAPFRE was a company in which the rules and codes of conduct 
were explicit and highly relevant, a circumstance that clearly differentiated it from its 
competitors. On the other hand, from its beginnings the insurance company had a 
clear social mission, since it was an institution oriented towards the development of 
people, it protected the interests of the mutual members, and it returned part of its 
profits to society.  
 
157 See Larramendi, I. H. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, p.143. 
158 Larramendi, I. H. (1982): Speech at MAPFRE's General Meetings. 
159 See Larramendi, I. H. (2000): se hizo MAPFRE, p.143-154. 
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An indicative fact of the importance of respecting the rules and achieving 
transparency and internal control is that MAPFRE was the first financial or industrial 
group in Spain, not just in insurance, to offer a full consolidated audit of all its entities, 
without legal obligation.160 In this regard, it is worth noting that the person who 
encouraged Larramendi to introduce external auditing was Santiago Burón, partner in 
Chile of Pinedo Hermanos-Arthur Young and chairman of the Union of Christian 
Businessmen of Chile between 1970 and 1972. 
Another unique aspect of Larramendi's MAPFRE was his policy of strict compliance 
with its tax obligations, from the very beginning, in line with the fourth commandment 
of its decalogue. This executive, although in his writings he expressed the need to 
improve the efficiency of the public sector, at the same time was clear about the need 
to provide the Administration with sufficient resources to finance public services. Thus, 
in 1977 in his lecture at the Club de Aseguradores Internacionales he stated that:161 
“...the biggest mistake of the socio-political set that dominated the country (during the last few years) was to believe 
that a market economy was possible without strict compliance with fiscal obligations. The situation of tax fraud that 
Spain has gone through justifies, or at least explains, the generalised challenge to companies that today seriously 
endangers their immediate equilibrium.  
Tax fraud hasn’t been limited to the corporate sector, much less to large companies, but it is true that the corporate 
finance sector has always made it difficult to practically implement effective tax reforms. Now, when perhaps 
economic relaunch requires a greater emphasis on job creation than on equity, tax reform is needed for ethical 
reasons. 
If with regards to unemployment we can talk about the irresponsibility of trade union leaders, in taxation we should 
talk about the irresponsibility of business leaders”. 
When assessing the importance of the role played by ethics in MAPFRE's 
success, Larramendi stated on several occasions that in his opinion it was the most 
important element. In 1995 he wrote162: 
“Naturally, MAPFRE hasn’t only been the result of ethical principles and social responsibility, although this has been 
the most important thing, but it has also resulted from its methods of action, which have contributed to its success”.  
In 1997 he declared:163 
“After many years in which there has been a lack of concern, the importance of ethics in business is gaining ground. 
There are three positions on this: 
Those who believe that ethics is only a hindrance to business success; 
Those who believe it can help. 
Those like me who believe that only with attitude and ethical concern can a great and lasting enterprise be 
achieved.” 
A year earlier, he had published an article entitled “La ética como elemento 
determinante del éxito empresarial”, in which he criticised the scant attention that 
business schools have traditionally paid to ethics. In the article he explained that he 
doesn’t see himself in a position to enter into abstract considerations of what ethics is, 
 
160 See Larramendi I. H. (1989). 
161 Larramendi I. H. (1977): “Empresa 78”, Lecture at the cycle organised in Madrid by the Club de Aseguradores Internacionales. 
162 Larramendi I. H. (1995): “Empresa y directivos en la España actual”, Instituto de Dirección y Organización de Empresas, Num.1, 
1st Quarter. 
163 Larramendi I. H. (1997): “Apertura del Encuentro” First Meeting of the Insurance Sector, IESE, Barcelona, 27 February. 
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and to describe what he considers to be ethical conduct in business, he referred to 
what he tried to impose, which he summarised as follows: 164  
“I haven’t lied, except in cosmetic aspects, nor have I harmed any person with false information, either internally or 
externally. I haven’t broken my word, and for that reason I’ve had problems and difficulties, even with personal 
financial outlays. I haven’t made a decision to select, promote or dismiss personnel or other types of influence in my 
direct interest, or in that of my family, or by ideological criteria, nor that would cause, to my knowledge, harm to 
employees, partners, or customers. I haven’t stopped accepting risks, personal, over and above managerial, if this 
attitude was in the company's interest. I haven’t consciously disregarded fairness in any of my decisions. I haven’t 
made any public proposal that was actually favourable to what I was managing, but always what I thought was 
good for everyone, nor have I induced actions that were convenient for the company but dangerous for those who 
had to carry them out.  
It can be seen, in short, that the features of Larramedi's management style with 
generally consistent with the approach proposed by the theory of Management by 
Values, which emerged at the end of the 1990s, thus giving his management style at 
MAPFRE an absolutely pioneering character. 
 
Other areas of Larramendi's strategy  
Obsession with growth 
A trait pointed out by all of Larramendi's associates was his obsession for 
MAPFRE's growth and for becoming the leader in the Spanish market, which was 
achieved in 1984. In 1989, the executive declared that “the company that doesn’t 
aspire to grow ceases to be a real active company and becomes a company in 
liquidation, transformation or on the eve of absorption”. 165 
Larramendi's obsession with growth must be related to his aim of leaving his 
mark and creating something transcendent that will last over time. His statement is 
eloquent in this regard: 
“When talking about growth, we must always ask ourselves why or what for. The existence of the company implies 
by itself the will to grow; if this is lacking, there is no real company as a social institution, even if it has the legal 
characteristics for it. However, there is always something else, a differential element between one company and 
another, which ends up giving it its own personality in the market. In some cases, the economic ambition of those 
who promote it dominates, who see the possibility of enriching themselves in balanced and self-financed growth and 
creating a family or personal wealth. It is apparently the most widespread cause, the only one seen by critics of free 
enterprise, but in reality it is rarely the main driver in leading companies. There is more often a yearning for action, 
for the creation of something transcendent that will last in time, as happened with discoverers and colonisers or with 
the creators of an agricultural heritage through work: a desire to overcome; a challenge in the face of obstacles. In 
the end, the maximum use of the talents with which God has endowed men and women and of which the Gospel 
speaks to us”.166.. 
In addition to the above motivation, it should also be noted that Larramendi 
was aware that in order to improve efficiency in the insurance sector it was necessary 
to increase the size of companies and raise the degree of concentration, as the Spanish 
sector was excessively fragmented. In this respect, the study provided to the 
 
164 Larramendi (1996): “La ética como elemento determinante del éxito empresarial”, Situation, No. 3, pp. 241-250. 
165 IHL (1989): ‐ RIESGOS ESTRATÉGICOS DE ALTA DIRECCIÓN  [Lecture delivered at the 3rd International Seminar on Risk 
Management and Solvency of Insurance Companies, Santiago de Chile, 18-20 April 1989] 
166 IHL (1983): “POLITICA Y ESTRATEGIA DE CRECIMIENTO DE UN GRUPO ASEGURADOR”, lecture given on 2 February at the 
Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions of MEXICO 
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Directorate General of Insurance in 1984167 is of great interest. It calculated the 
aggregate market share of the five main insurers in 1977 and their evolution up to 
1982, and showed that the Spanish market was the most fragmented of the 25 
countries analysed, with the five main insurers (Unión y el Fénix, MAPFRE, 
Catalana/Occidente, Mutua Madrileña and Sanjurjo) having a combined market share 
of 17.2 per cent, compared to values of around 40%-50% in many of the other 
countries. 
Standardisation and ultra-information 
Ignacio de Larramendi approached bureaucratisation in MAPFRE in Weber's 
positive sense, understanding that it is necessary to establish action protocols for 
those operations that are performed in a repetitive manner. Let us bear in mind that 
even 90 per cent of insurance actions have this characteristic.168 The importance of 
standardisation in the insurance company is included under a new term, “pre-
programming”, and even points out the problems derived from its application, in the 
sense of the problem of the increase of necessary documents, which shouldn’t 
paralyse its implementation, due to the advantages of the standardisation of processes 
and for the improvement of training, due to the fact that it entails more efficiency. 
The standardisation of processes is necessary in insurance companies, with 
performance standards that allow those who have to carry out an activity to be able to 
act more quickly by knowing the working methods. The consequence is the 
improvement of the company's performance. We know that organisations need the 
right level of regulation to gain efficiency. 
 
MAPFRE tried to mechanise certain activities in order to gain efficiency, for 
example, accounting activities, data bank, direct debit of receipts, etc. All this allowed 
technical auditing, data collection to be improved and costs reduced. Larramendi also 
uses the term “manualisation”: 
“Manualisation involves collecting complete instructions for the company's regular processes and operations as well 
as precise guidelines” 169.  
Thus, in the confidential report on MAPFRE's situation in 1955, he pointed 
out:170  
“The need for a large mechanisation of the work and  a methodical exploitation, with prepared production 
campaigns, of the network with specialised local agents” 
This understanding of mechanisation indicates that the emphasis was on tasks, 
following the Taylorist idea. On the other hand, he was noticeably clear that in order to 
gain efficiency, he must move away from bureaucratic processes, defining the need to 
 
167 See Larramendi I. H. (1984): “El seguro en el mundo y en España”, [Lecture delivered at the Official Event of the Directorate 
General of Insurance, Madrid 10 May 1984]. 
168 Larramendi, I (1966): “La nueva dirección Revista doctrinal . . . “ op. cit. p. 90 
169 Larramendi, I (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE. Mi tiempo... Op, cit 
170 Ignacio de Larramendi wrote a confidential report on the situation of the company in 1955, in which he pointed out the 
deficiencies he had detected in the insurance company. Amongst them, he pointed out the necessity of a great mechanisation of 
the work and a methodical exploitation of the network of local agents. He also pointed out that a reorganisation of all methods of 
control of agencies and branches is indispensable.... 
78 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter II Ignacio Larramendi’s people-management style 
 
 
implement an anti-bureaucracy, because if it isn’t fulfilled, it wouldn’t be possible to 
compete in the sector and the company would disappear:171 
“Bureaucracy has led to the end of all empires and of all large companies, especially by losing the direct influence of 
their creators. Bureaucracy is the accumulation of people who have outlived their usefulness or never had any, and 
to whom artificial jobs are assigned and cornered to avoid the discomfort of correcting wrong decisions”.  
All of this makes it possible to improve productivity, in a context in which it will 
be increasingly important to reduce costs in order to be able to compete, and bearing 
in mind that a fundamental cost for insurance companies is personnel costs.  
Larramendi in 1985 before Spain's entry into the European Economic Community 
declared that:172 
 
“the greatest challenge of the next few years will be to eliminate any type of expenditure that isn’t absolutely 
essential in order to reach an adequate level of competition”.  
With regards to “ultra-information”, Larramendi, a few months after arriving at 
MAPFRE, despite the serious problems, began to use punched card equipment, 
maintaining the attitude that it was necessary to get ahead, and using distributed 
computing and other improvements in communications before anyone else. It should 
be noted in this regard that MAPFRE installed the second fax machine in Spain, the first 
was in Banco Santander.173 
Common sense and the importance of delegating 
On management style, Larramendi pointed out the need to use “common 
sense”, to delegate and to reject mystical management styles, surrounded by majesty. 
In 1984 he noted that :174 
“The basic quality of the manager, which is often forgotten, is “common sense”. Managers who survive are the ones 
who have common sense, and many managers trained in great universities or management schools, with 
outstanding master’s degrees, fail in their roles because they’re so conceited about what they know that they forget 
common sense”. 
“The manager must fulfil his obligation to govern the assets and the group of people that make up the company to 
the best of his ability. That is why we must demystify management and, above all, distribute it, make a large number 
of people participate in governance with the possibility of making their own decisions, until many of them can 
become managers”. 
 “...the manager is just one more at the level of all his associates and all the employees and not someone surrounded 
by majesty, above good and evil. […] 
People as the main asset 
In most of his works, Larramendi makes an express reference to the vital 
importance of people for the success of companies. Ethical reasons, together with 
 
171 Larramendi, I  (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE. Mi tiempo... Op, cit. p. 213 
172 Larramendi, I. (1985): Some comments on insurance in 2000, “Seguros Caribe” meeting, Bogota 5-3-1985, pp. 7, 9 
173 See Larramendi I. H. (1995): “Empresa y directivos en la España actual”, Instituto de Dirección y Organización de Empresas, 
Num.1, 1st Quarter. 
174 Catalinas J. L. and Manzanos A. (1991): “Pensamiento empresarial”, in Ignacio H. de Larramendi y Montiano, MAPFRE, p. 88. 
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practical reasons, make it necessary to take care of employees and associates. In 
Larramendi's words:175 
“The amount of the work capacity of each person in the service of the company is said to be its main asset. I think it's 
the only important asset. Under these conditions, ethics and social equity aren’t the only reasons that demand a 
satisfactory policy with the staff, but an absolute necessity for their livelihood”. 
For this reason, the success of a company's labour relations policy is the main 
determinant of its success. He affirmed: 
“The former Head of Personnel, with merely passive roles has been transformed into a 
fundamental piece of the company for the selection, training, appropriate framing and creation 
of a satisfactory environment amongst workers as well as to collect and meet their wishes and 
interests as much as possible and maintain the most cordial relations with the higher bodies of 
the workers that allow a satisfactory job stability”176 
In 1967 he explained the keys to employee loyalty and motivation: 
“The great modern company tends to achieve the support and sentimental bonding of those who work in it, as an 
almost indispensable fact for its success. More important than financial incentives are sincerity and human warmth, 
which can’t be faked. When this is achieved, the employee is disengaged from the Trade Union, which seeks to 
isolate them from a direct relationship with their employer. By linking workers to their company, they’re integrated 
into a community that protects them above and beyond their strict rights and obligations”.177  
Another characteristic feature of his style was to give people autonomy, since 
only in this way could all potential be exploited. In his view, one of the main 
shortcomings of the Spanish company isn’t giving enough freedom to subordinates. 
This he stated in 1994:178  
“Maybe we Spaniards are a bit different, we like to work less, but I consider it secondary. Our workers 
are excellent but they aren’t always allowed to create, it is thought that they can only obey, that they 
lack interest for the high hierarchies because they’re theoretically inferior to their bosses, a serious 
mistake”. 
On the other hand, he was a strong advocate of the specialisation of people. In 
his quest for specialisation, it was clear to this executive that each division manager 
had to be the one who knew the most about their area179 
The loyalty of the employees towards the company was high, achieving a very 
warm working environment. Despite the long days involving 12 or 13 hours, the 
employees had internalised that MAFPRE “was their home” and that every effort had 
to be made to achieve a good result. 180 
For this reason, the tendency at MAPFRE was for employees to remain with the 
company from the time they joined until they retired, except in the case of personal 
 
175 Larramendi (1965): Notas para la estructuración y reforma de la gran empresa, Lecture delivered at the “Reforma de la 
empresa” course, organised by Acción Social Patronal de Madrid, 26-27 January. 
176 Larramendi I. H. (1965): “Notas para la estructuración y reforma de la gran empresa”, lecture delivered at the “Reforma de la 
empresa” course, organised by Acción Social Patronal de Madrid, 26 and 27 January 1965. 
177 Larramendi I. H. (1967): La empresa como cuerpo social intermedio. Unpublished document 
178 Larramendi, I. H. (1994): “Empresa y crisis actual”, lecture delivered at the University of Albacete, 23 May 1994. 
179 Under Larramendi's management there was a constant search for specialisation with a wide prominence of the new 
technologies available at the time.  See Larramendi, I. H. (1984), A simple Insurance Strategy for the Future, in International 
Insurance and Risk Management Conference. 
180 Interview with Ángel Luis Segura, former executive of the personnel department 
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circumstances that involved leaving or economic problems that made it unfeasible for 
the employee to continue.181  
“The objective was for all employees to pursue their professional careers at MAPFRE”. 
Staff recruitment 
For Larramendi, the personnel policy practices of the Spanish insurance sector 
in the 1960s were very inefficient:  
“the personnel policy of the Spanish insurance sector has been contrary to the suitable one in almost all aspects. 
There hadn’t been an effective initial selection, nor had there been concern for their subsequent training and 
adaptation, nor had it been possible to demand performance, because for this it would be necessary to start from a 
good organisation. All this had given rise to a real anti-selection, in which employees with initiative moved to other 
sectors, whilst many remained unsuitable or without a spirit of improvement”.182  
During his first years as an executive, he was dedicated to recruiting “young and 
enthusiastic people”183, and they were pioneers in implementing what we know today 
as one of the most important measures within transparency and good governance. 
This is how he explained it:184   
“We believed in the man and recruited without prejudice or discrimination, not amongst rich yuppies 
but amongst modest people, without recommendations, who wanted to get a decent job where they 
could be proud of the service they rendered.” 
 
As for the candidate profile that was sought in the company, it was to some 
extent different to that of the sector, looking for a new way of leading. Specifically, in 
the 1960s, MAPFRE was a pioneer in recruiting young university students, with the aim 
of turning them into the business executives of the future.  
In 1964, job offers were published and advertised in the press, due to the need 
for recruitment. The novelty also consisted in launching specific offers to look for 
candidates with specific training, for example, law graduates for the job offer of head 
of organisation.185 
Nevertheless, this form of recruitment wasn’t simple:186  
“Employment should increase in the insurance sector, as its technification requires more people 
full time and reduces the number of amateurs, so the profession will also be dignified and 
attract more university students, although perhaps not the brightest”. 
Universities and recommendations from executives were mainly used as 
external recruitment sources. In this sense, we found that more than 40 executives at 
MAPFRE were recruited through external sources, mainly universities, which 
permeated a spirit of improvement at all levels and of generating the attraction of 
 
181 Larramendi (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE. Mi tiempo, p. 212.  
182 Larramendi (1961): “La empresa. . . .” op. cit.  p. 2 
183 MAPFRE: un liderazgo ganado a pulso a pulso, interview with Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, Actualidad Económica, 1-04-
1982 
184 Larramendi, I. (1994): “Empresa y Crisis Actual . . . “ op. cit. p. 1 
185Tortella, G. Caruana, L y García Ruíz, J.L (2008): De mutua a Multinacional . . . op. cit. p. 117 
186 Actualidad Económica (1987): Interview given to Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi: Años para afianzarse. 
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what we know today as talent. Indeed, the concern for the recruitment of senior staff 
was notorious, and special attention was paid to it.  This was he ratified it in 1984:187 
“About 20 or 25 years ago we used to select young university students in my company, back then it was easy, those 
who came out of university could afford to choose a job. Sometimes we would run stimulating advertisements that 
not a single graduate would answer. How times have changed! When I made the selection, which I did personally, I 
always asked them “do you want to be a manager or an advisor?” and I explained that a manager is the one who 
takes risks and accepts the responsibility of making mistakes, whilst an advisor advises or explains so that someone 
else can make the decision”. 
The recommendations of executives were also used to incorporate new people 
into the organisation, with the regional director being in charge of recruiting several 
candidates, selecting a shortlist of three, from which Don Ignacio himself was in charge 
of choosing the most suitable one.188  
Exemplariness and transparency were important values in the company, so in 
order to avoid recommendations of executives leading to recommendations of family 
members, as mentioned above, the company's Articles of Association included a 
prohibition on hiring family members of employees:189  
“Persons who are related up to the second degree of kinship, even by affinity, to the chief executive officer, 
managing director, executives, managers, heads or employees in active service of the Mutual Society may not join 
the Mutual Society as chief executive officers, managing directors, executives, heads or employees. The 
incorporation of persons related to the third degree of kinship requires the authorisation of the Board of Directors”. 
Larramendi himself explained it:190 
“What really led to success in a company was the selection of its executives and employees, due to their own talents 
and not due to friendship or sympathy, with concern for the interest of the company, immediate and future, and not 
due to the interest of their power team”. 
During the years 1970-80, due to the important growth of the company, the 
line executives began to carry out the whole incorporation process of employees into 
the organisation. The aforementioned organisational structure provided additional 
justification for decentralisation. The new structure complicated direct recruitment by 
the central office, and gave it up in favour of territorial recruitment, also taking into 
account the need to recruit at this level. The territorial aspect, as has been pointed 
out, was important, so it became more important, and it became increasingly 
necessary to delegate recruitment actions from the head office to the territorial 
organisation. This is how Larramendi understood it when he predicted for 2000:191 
“Major insurers that make up the market, each with their own personality, characteristics and even historical 
circumstances, will maintain common denominators that make them relatively similar. They will have a structure 
with small, sophisticated central services, few, but very specialised employees, which may not represent more than 
15 per cent of the total number of employees of the entity”.  
The selection of people was linked to the future internal promotion in the 
company, looking not only for people to be hired for a specific job but also for them to 
pursue a professional career in MAPFRE in a vertical sense, through internal 
promotion. In this sense, any incorporation of administrative or junior employees was 
 
187 Larramendi, I (1984): El reto de la nueva empresa . . . op. cit. p. 7  
188  Interview with S. Homet 
189Article 7 of MAPFRE’s Articles of Association 
190 Larramendi, I (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE. Mi tiempo... Op, cit. p. 205 
191 Larramendi, I (1993): El Seguro en el año 2000 . . . op cit. p. 11 
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done with their commercial, managerial, or technical promotion in mind.192 This 
implied a particularly important intrinsic motivation based on professionalism, since 
the employees had real possibilities to pursue a professional career, motivating 
improvement day by day.  
Generally, new positions were usually filled through internal promotion, hence 
employees at second and third organisational levels were motivated to perform well 
because they knew that new, higher ranking positions would be filled by company 
personnel. For internal promotion it was also important to occupy territorial positions, 
and then move on to important positions in the head office. This also prompted the 
idea of integrating the territorial delegations into the head office.193 
This candidate selection process, based on good practice, involves achieving 
two major premises: on the one hand, a clear evolution towards transparency and 
good governance in the incorporation of people into organisations, and on the other 
hand, the professionalisation of profiles.  
As a singular note we should point out that Larramendi's MAPFRE followed a 
policy of not hiring people with a Master in Business Administration (MBA), since, 
“coming out of a distinguished school, they demanded several times more than that a 
classic employee would, and they’re the ones who have created my MAPFRE”.194 It is 
interesting to note Larramendi's assessment in 2000, in the introduction to the 
“territorial curricula” section, when he states that his greatest pride is to have 
achieved success at MAPFRE “thanks to the influence of decentralisation, whilst the 
studies and qualifications of each person have been of little importance”.195 
Training and development 
The efficient allocation of resources was essential for Larramendi, so training 
and development played a fundamental role in his objectives. Let us bear in mind that 
the entity is legally independent and national, without institutional interference or 
support from banks. This casuistry implied not wasting any resources, seeking 
specialisation, gaining in competitiveness, which made it necessary to invest in training 
with the aim of making its employees increasingly capable of managing their tasks 
better and more efficiently.  
On the other hand, when Larramendi explained the criteria for the Christian 
businessman amongst others, he pointed out:196 
“Obligation of maximum professional promotion of all the components of the company, who must find a vehicle for 
their personal fulfilment in it. This promotion is achieved through the delegation of duties, the creation of areas of 
autonomous decision-making and the independent exercise of authority, with ample information and objective 
promotion in the hierarchical scale”. 
and amongst the measures to improve business in Spain he pointed out three areas:197 
 
192 Ibidem 
193   Interview with S. Homet 
194 Larramendi (2000), p.196. 
195 Larramendi (2000), p.397. 
196 Catalinas J. L. and Manzanos A. (1991): “Pensamiento empresarial”, in Ignacio H. de Larramendi y Montiano, MAPFRE. 
197 IHL (1970): Practical orientations for the reform of the Spanish capitalist enterprise : communication. 
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“[...] Special concern for internal corporate fairness, the personal dignity of employees and fairness in promotions 
and in the allocation of roles and responsibilities, of particular importance for the individual rights of those who work 
in the company and for the use of their human potential. 
Professional and technical training of employees to the limit of each individual possibility, a complementary aspect 
of the previous one, considering this action as the most effective system of professional promotion and participation 
of work in the company. 
Staff participation in as many business decisions as possible . . . “ 
With these principles, it is easy to understand the great importance given by 
MAPFRE to the training of its employees, which evolved over the years, until it became 
a very intensive company in training, firmly committed to it.  To have well-trained 
people, to alleviate the great deficiency of the sector in staff training was a priority 
objective, which wasn’t the case in other European countries such as England and 
France, where complex training courses were provided.198 
In Spain, the few training institutions in the insurance sector were: 
a) ICEA, Investigación Cooperativa ente Entidades Aseguradoras, created in 
1963. Larramendi believed it was the only institution dedicated to training with the 
capacity to provide training to insurance companies. It promoted market research, 
new products, insurance prevention and distribution, and organised courses and 
seminars. 
b) Professional insurance school. It offered “preparatory degrees” for office 
boys, auxiliaries, and officials as well as specialised courses by branches. Their work 
should be improved, and not be limited only to these profiles, but as Larramendi 
indicated: 
“They should be the instrument of technical training for the market, and not be limited to auxiliaries and officials but 
to those who constitute the nucleus of intermediate departments, and executives, giving appropriate prestige to the 
titles awarded, as has happened in regards to England199““ 
c) Labour Universities. They began to offer a diploma course in Insurance, 
starting in the 1962-1963 academic year, with a three-year duration.200 
Within the company, Larramendi promoted different internal training actions:  
a) Continuous training for employees by correspondence and training meetings, 
allocating a budget for continuous training from 1965 onwards.201 The transmission of 
the identity and the way of transmitting knowledge so as to further professionalise the 
learning of employees, was materialised in the production of manuals that were the 
basis of the first courses. Amongst them, the correspondence course on motor claims 
in Spain and later on life claims was particularly noteworthy. The training followed 
MAPFRE's organisational structure: firstly, it was aimed at senior management and 
executives at the highest hierarchical level, who had to pass on the knowledge 
 
198 Cfr. Larramendi, I. (1961): La empresa aseguradora española . . . op. cit., pp. 2, 3 
199Larramendi (1965): Note on the training of inspectors and agents, Colloquium on the training of inspectors, ICEA, October 1965 
p.10 
200  Professional School of the Insurance Syndicate, 1972 
201   Interview with S. Homet 
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acquired to the rest of the employees. The training meetings at the Hospedería del 
Valle de los Caídos, Madrid, served to exchange professional experiences. 
b) Going abroad and language training: following in Larramendi's footsteps, 
trips abroad were promoted to study insurance, mainly general and life insurance. 
Additionally, executives were encouraged to learn English, and were encouraged to 
spend their summer holidays abroad to learn the language and try to establish 
professional contacts.202  
c) Internal training courses provided by territorial executives to efficiently 
transmit their knowledge to employees. This training was conducted in a totally 
delegated and different way in each entity, depending on how each organisational unit 
considered it was more appropriate, with the clear intention of avoiding the 
“straitjacket” that a centralisation in a training department and the bureaucracy that 
would be associated with it would entail. Larramendi stated that: 
“Some of our territorial executives dedicate five or six hours each week to personally give courses to their various 
teams of employees, inspectors or agents. This multi-training is positive; however I consider the concern for 
coordination that ends up not allowing to act as negative”203 
d) “Disciple-teacher” training: Particularly important in the company, it involved 
direct learning based on learning the roles by working with a professional having 
satisfactory performance: 
“At that time we used the system of putting them to work for a month with an inspector, 
whose performance we considered satisfactory, and gradually, perhaps within a period not 
exceeding one month, we launched them to produce204““. 
This system alone wasn’t enough, and Ignacio de Larramendi himself 
determined that further preparation was necessary. 
e) Internal rotation:  Training to undertake positions of special relevance in the 
insurance company, involved devising a complete system with different phases, 
starting with training based on courses with theoretical learning and specific 
documentation about insurance, along with on-site training in various departments to 
properly learn the insurance business such as the Issuing and Contracting Policies 
Department or the Claims Department, ending with learning on the street, in contact 
with the customer: 
“Once in the Regional Directorate, we gave the Inspector a period of three or four months of purely technical 
preparation. We started by assigning them to the issuing and contracting department . . . trying to get them to 
perform the work of a normal employee in at least two or three branches . . . . For a period of 15 days to a month, 
they went to the claims department . . . . After this period, we tried to get them to spend one or two months in 
production work with an experienced inspector, doing street work . . . . In fact, they started their real professional 
apprenticeship after a full year of independent work”. 
As advantages of the training process in the company, we found: 
 
202   Interview with S. Homet 
203 Larramendi, I (1984): Formación en el Seguro Español. Remarks at the closing ceremony of the ICEA meeting, Madrid, 30 
November 1984, p. 7 
204 Larramendi, I (1965): Note on the training of inspectors and officers. Colloquiums in the training of inspectors, ICEA, October 
1965, p. 2 
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- The establishment of a formal and standardised training process for specific 
jobs such as that of Inspector. 
 
- A successful combination of different types of technical training based on 
scientific method, through the preparation of manuals, training provided by 
territorial executives with decision-making capacity and training through direct 
learning for the roles to be performed. 
 
- Achieve differentiation by using training as a strategic element. Ignacio de 
Larramendi, considered that: 
“Training is a competitive weapon, and no one can give up their weapons to others . . . . A company that doesn't pay 
attention to training won’t be able to resist the strength of its competitors with a spirit of training”205 
- Attraction and retention of talent thanks to the assumption of responsibilities 
as a result of the training process. It was in the 1960s when the training policy 
was developed with the aim of achieving the subsequent promotion of young 
employees, who had started their professional activity as clerks. Thanks to this 
training system, the employees took on increasing responsibilities, combining 
their university studies with their work. This training plan for university 
students meant that between 40-50% of them subsequently stayed on to work 
at MAPFRE. 
 
- To be a “training school for Spanish insurance executives”: thanks to the 
training and experience acquired, some executives and employees received 
offers to work in other insurance companies, generating a process of 
dissemination of human capital to the insurance sector as a whole.  
 
Remuneration 
Internal equity plays a fundamental role in the design of the insurer's 
remuneration system, seeking a fair way to redistribute the benefits achieved, 
according to the division and burden of the work borne.  This is how Ignacio de 
Larramendi himself understood it: 
 
“The cost of the CEO or highest chief executive should represent a ratio of the income; this ratio is decreased as the 
income increases. This is fair, because the increase in operations forces a division of labour process and the executive 
has to unload duties that continue to have a cost that no longer belongs to senior management. The whole process 
of business growth involves a gradual division of labour in the managerial duties when the company is small; top 
management absorbs many duties, from which they gradually detach themselves from. For example, the executive 
cost ratio in a new insurance company could be as high as two or three per hundred of the premiums collected 
annually, but as the volume increases, the cost must be reduced to one per 1,000 or even 10,000, although it is 
possible that the set of functions originally retained by the executive maintains a similar overall cost. For example, in 
my company's case it wouldn’t be correct to compare the relative cost of my remuneration now and when I was 
appointed in 1955. At this time, the managing director was the only senior management position, and today there is 
a deputy managing director, two managers and three deputy managers”.206 
 
The following is also proposed: 
 
205 Larramendi, I (1984): Formación en el seguro . . . op. cit. p. 8 
206 Larramendi, I (1966): La nueva dirección Revista doctrinal de la dirección general de seguros, Nos. 15-16, p. 87 
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“A logical and equitable system of remuneration for executives, which allows the most useful ones to 
be retained without creating situations of social injustice”.   
 
Remuneration management in the company evolved from the beginning of 
Larramendi's management until his retirement.  
 
The first years under his management were difficult due to the crisis situation 
the company was going through, which directly affected its remuneration policy.  In 
1955, wages lost purchasing power, there were social tensions, and the wage increases 
with which the government tried to contain the wave of strikes only fuelled the 
inflationary spiral.207 Faced with this economic and social situation in Spain, and 
MAPFRE's own accumulated losses, Larramendi had to set an example and began by 
cutting his agreed salary by 40 per cent.  The search for social justice was a common 
denominator in the regulations governing insurance companies, where salaries were 
set according to wage categories, not exceeding a specific number of times. For 
example, in 1956, in the National Regulation of Work in Insurance Companies, we saw 
in the salary scale that the average salary of a boss was 2.54 times that of an 
employee.208 For example, in MAPFRE's first collective agreement in 1980, the salary 
scale in the insurance company was 2.26 times, according to the calculations made209  
As for the salary concepts paid in 1955, the most significant were the following:210 
- Punctuality and permanence in the company: a check-in and check-out control was 
established whereby workers who strictly complied with their timetable would be 
rewarded. 
- Start of incentive plans for employees and managers: remuneration based on the 
achievement of objectives, which was a new approach for the years in question. 
- Bosses: salary and profit sharing. This initiative was equally novel, and established 
in the agreements, with a percentage in premiums. 
In 1965, bonuses were granted to executives based on their effort, starting a 
variable remuneration based on the achievement of objectives, a common system 
nowadays in management by objectives.  
On the other hand, the concern for the employees and their welfare was reflected 
in the social aid that the company granted through the “Employee Assistance Fund”. 
This was a budget item that MAPFRE had available to assist its associates with non-
refundable amounts when they were experiencing financial difficulties due to 
extraordinary circumstances. This aid, which was granted on a discretionary basis, 
without any regulations governing it, was part of the mutual society's commitment and 
social responsibility towards its employees, and played an important role in motivating 
and building employee loyalty, providing them with a certain economic safety net 
against possible contingencies. 
 
207 Tortella, G. Caruana, L y García Ruíz, J.L (2008): De mutua a Multinacional . . . op. Cit 
208 The salary of a graduate after two years was 40,000  pesetas gross per year, whilst that of a specialised labourer was 15,700  
pesetas gross per year. Cfr. Order of 26 October 1956 amending the National Regulations on Work in Insurance Companies.  
209 According to the 1980 MAPFRE agreement, the senior manager had a gross salary of 1,006,434  pesetas whilst the building 
porter, with the lowest salary, was 443,782  pesetas. 
210 Tortella, G. Caruana, L y García Ruíz, J.L (2008): De mutua a Multinacional . . . op. Cit 
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The arrival of MAPFRE's first own agreement 
Until the arrival of the first company collective agreement in 1980, MAPFRE was 
regulated by the inter-provincial collective agreement for insurance, reinsurance, and 
capitalisation companies211, as were other competing companies such as Grupo 
Asegurador la Estrella 212 , Grupo Asegurador Catalana-Occidente 213  and Grupo 
Asegurador Zurich-Vita-Hispania, 214  which also drew up their own company 
agreements. We find these first own agreements interesting in order to be able to 
compare the conditions of MAPFRE employees with respect to other insurance 
companies, and to analyse the possible differences according to the criteria of the 
remuneration systems such as salaries, bonuses, incentives, scholarships, and others.  
In the MAPFRE agreement, a total of 21 categories were included in the salary 
tables, ranging from Head Legal Advisor to Legal Assistant, and the salaries of senior 
management weren’t taken into account. 
Base salary 
By comparing the base salaries of the aforementioned insurance companies for 
different professional categories (senior manager(s); section head(s); graduates more 
than a year; and graduates less than a year), we can analyse the differences that 
existed and determine a relevant issue in terms of external equity. The first thing we 
have found in order to proceed with the comparison is that, according to the collective 
agreements of the different companies, there is homogeneity in the designation of the 
positions, which facilitates the analysis, with one exception:  in both MAPFRE215 and 
Zurich-Vita-Hispania, the “section head” category had a lower salary than graduates of 
more than one year, so we understand that they would have different competencies 
and responsibilities. All insurers improve on the wages of the state agreement from 
which they came in 1979, over and above the annual increase required by the high 
inflation of those years. We note that the La Estrella insurance company sets the 
highest gross salaries in its collective agreement in comparison with the other 
insurance companies mentioned, between 14 per cent and 17 per cent in comparison 
with Zurich-Vita-Hispania, which has the lowest salaries. This is only surpassed by 
Catalana-Occidente for the category of senior manager. In the case of MAPFRE, the 
base salaries for the categories studied are in second place, except for the senior 
manager category, which is third place in the comparison. Specifically, they’re between 
3 per cent and 4 per cent below La Estrella, and they're 3 per cent and 5 per cent 
above Zurich-Vita-Hispania.216 Amongst these companies, there is external equity for 
jobs within the same category. 
 
211 See Official State Gazette (BOE) no.147 
212 See Official State Gazette (BOE) no.59 
213See Official State Gazette (BOE) no.234 
214 See Official State Gazette (BOE) no.203 
215 MAPFRE had the category of Head Legal Counsel (1,174,425 pesetas) and Lawyer (1,021,230 pesetas) with salaries higher than 
the senior manager. 
216 Comparatively, MAPFRE paid 14 per cent more for the category of Section Head, 12 per cent more for graduates with more 
than a year and 17 per cent more for graduates with less than a year than Zurich. 
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Table 1. Base salary comparison. MAPFRE and other companies in the sector. 
Source: Prepared by the authors with data in pesetas from the collective agreements of insurance companies. 
(*) MAPFRE had the category of Head of Legal Counsel (1,174,425 pesetas) and Lawyer (1,021,230 pesetas) with salaries 
higher than the senior manager.  
Evolution of remuneration between 1980 and 1990. 
It is important to measure not only the salary at a given moment in time but 
also its evolution over the last decade, which we are studying. Salaries in the insurance 
company were above the inter-provincial agreement in all categories. If we compare 
the salaries of 1980 and 1982, the increase between these years was 43 per cent for 
senior managers, 34 per cent for graduates with more than one year, 13 per cent for 
graduates with less than one year, and 24 per cent for heads of section. Let us keep in 
mind that inflation in 1982 was 14 per cent. 
In 1982, salaries at MAPFRE were fixed in accordance with the salary table of 
the state wage agreement, and a bonus was added directly to the approved amount. 
For example, for a graduate, the gross salary according to the state agreement was 
908,145  pesetas per year, which MAPFRE increased with a bonus of 150,000  pesetas 
per year.  This information is significant, because it once again places MAPFRE with 
salaries above the average for the sector. In 1985 this same formula was used, so 
attracting and retaining talent via salaries is important in the company. 
Already in 1990, the categories are grouped by levels, so we can’t make the 
previous comparison. 
Salary supplements and other improvements for employees 
In addition to the base salary, it is important to assess the existence and 
relevance of the different salary supplements and other improvements that insurers 
provide to employees. Taking into account those appearing in MAPFRE's first collective 
agreement, we highlight the following: 
Economic supplements: 
The supplement for attendance, punctuality and permanence was higher than the 
inter-provincial agreement and the rest of the competing insurance companies, being 
80 pesetas per day and increasing considerably in subsequent agreements. With 
regards to the length of service payments, employees were offered a monthly bonus 
payment for 25 years’ service in the company. However, this supplement, as will be 
analysed later, is significantly extended in the following agreements. For marriages 
















Senior Manager/s 782,400 888,030 925,020 1,006,434 947,232 
Heads of Section 588,690 786,840 814,170 757,265 712,720 
Graduates + 1 year 637,890 841,305 866,730 820,556 772,288 
Graduate – 1 year 581,190 783,855 823,245 747,609 703,632 
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Christmas, employees received 3,000  pesetas for the purchase of gifts, and 
additionally, for the Three Kings holiday, 500  pesetas for each child under 15 years of 
age. 
Scholarships for Studies: 
The entity subsidised 75 per cent of the cost of the employees' studies, at COU ( 
Preparatory Course for University Study), FP (Vocational Training) and university 
levels.217 As for the studies of the employees' children, 15,000 pesetas were financed 
for the children's studies at nursery, pre-school and the first stage of EGB, and 20,000 
pesetas for the second stage of EGB (Elementary School), COU, FP and university 
studies. 
Other improvements for employees:  
Employees enjoyed life insurance and a pension fund, medical check-ups, and 
loans with very advantageous conditions for the purchase of housing, 500,000 pesetas 
for the purchase of the first home and 400,000 pesetas for an exchange, with the first 
300,000 pesetas being interest-free. The insurance company granted other loans to 
employees up to a maximum of 100,000 pesetas, with interest. 
Evolution of supplements at MAPRE218 
Punctuality, seniority, marriage, and birth bonuses established in the first 
company agreement were maintained throughout the decade of 1980-90, increasing 
their amounts, by above annual inflation. For example, in 1990, the punctuality 
allowance reached 8,160 pesetas gross per month. 
Life insurance, medical check-ups, pension funds, housing loans and other 
extraordinary expenses as well as employee participation in premiums were retained.  
As novelties from 1982, the supplement for economic assimilation to the higher 
category due to seniority appeared for some categories such as auxiliaries, second 
officials and first officials, who would receive 50% of the difference between the salary 
in the tables of their respective categories and those of the next higher ones. In the 
1988 agreement, the categories that could benefit from the allowance were extended 
to Administrative and Office Assistants and the percentage of the allowance: 75 per 
cent upon reaching 14 years’ seniority.  
It is significant that in 1985 the collective agreement included the situation in 
which both spouses provided their services to MAPFRE, in which case the right to 
certain allowances (marriages, births or children’s education allowances) would only 
be granted to one of them.  
Of great interest at this stage is the payment for languages, if the 
corresponding tests established by the company are passed, which appears for the first 
time in the 1988 agreement, unlike other competing companies that had already 
 
217 Seventy-five per cent of the enrolment, textbooks and monthly fees were subsidised. 
 218Based on MAPFRE's collective agreements for 1982, 1985, 1988 and 1990 
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established it in previous years. In the subsidies for employee training, the 1980 
percentages are re-established: Seventy-five per cent of the total for enrolments, 
textbooks, and monthly fees.  
The economic allowances for Christmas and Three Kings gifts, which until now 
were individualised per worker and members of the family unit (dependent children 
and ascendants), undergo a change, and are now directly per worker, without taking 
into account family responsibilities.  
Aid for children's studies is also maintained and increased considerably in 1988, 
with a maximum amount of 40,845 pesetas for all education, from nursery school to 
university. 
According to Larramendi himself, there were improvements in the collective 
agreement: 
“In 1990 for non-managerial employees: increases on sector salary tables; incentives for positions of responsibility; 
pension plan contributing twice as much as the employee; bonus in the contracting of insurance: improvement in the 
amount of life insurance with respect to the agreement; awards for punctuality, attendance, marriage and births; 
permanence; subsidy for studies of the employee and children; loans for the purchase of housing; reduction of 
working hours for those over 63 years of age”. 219 
A note for reflection 
MAPFRE, with a truly clear and structured wording, typical of agreements of 
later dates, managed to be very transparent from its first agreement with the concepts 
and specific amounts that are defined, avoiding ambiguities that appear in other 
collective agreements of competing companies such as “to be determined by the 
committee”.  The agreements analysed describe a wide variety of supplements that 
made MAPFRE a company that today we would call socially responsible, highly 
committed to its employees. 
We see that MAPFRE stood out in the sector for being the company with the 
highest amounts paid for attendance, punctuality, and permanence bonuses. 
Additionally, it had different elements such as compulsory medical check-ups, help for 
the purchase of housing and loans for extraordinary expenses. None of these 
complements and aid were offered by Grupo Asegurador La Estrella; only Catalana-
Occidente and Zurich-Vitas-Hispania offered a marriage bonus,220  and the latter 
offered a home loan with worse conditions than MAPFRE. The great importance of the 
pension fund for employees can also be seen, being again the only company of those 
studied that has included it in its agreement. The insurance company La Estrella221 
didn’t present any improvements related to Christmas, marriage, medical check-ups, 
loans, or pension funds in its agreement. Only for births and scholarships for the study 
of employees' children but with lower amounts than MAPFRE and not including 
university studies.  
 
219  Larramendi, I (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE. Mi tiempo... Op, cit. 
220 The marriage allowance was considerably higher in these companies, 23,000 pesetas per employee or child in Catalana-
Occidente and 23,200 pesetas in Zurich. 
221 La Estrella insurance company had the highest gross salaries of the companies compared. 
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Likewise, MAPFRE was the only company amongst those analysed that gave 
each employee's child a gift on the feast of the Three Kings, for the purchase of 
“specific gifts” for the date. This fact, together with the fact that it was the company 
that allocated the largest amount to scholarships for children's studies, including 
university level, shows the concern for the family nucleus and how it made the 
employees' children participate in being part of the company as well.  
The training subsidies for employees stood out, which included, unlike other 
insurance companies with their own agreement, university education, with a grant for 
75 per cent of the costs (enrolment fees, text books, etc.) 222. Moreover, it wasn’t 
limited to the Professional Insurance School alone, which is in line with Larramendi's 
view that insurance schools were ineffective and didn’t solve the problem of lack of 
training.223 This aid was transferred to the closest circle of workers, their children, also 
setting grants for their training at all stages of education. Additionally, MAPFRE was 
the only company amongst those compared that had Christmas and Three Kings gifts 
for employees and their children.  
The insurance company was also the only company amongst those compared 
that offered an annual medical “check-up”, later called a health check-up, provided a 
pension fund during all the years studied, and granted loans for the purchase of the 
first home with advantageous conditions (without interest for the first 300,000 
pesetas) as well as other extraordinary loans. It also gave a supplement for marriage 
and birth of children, which was increased especially from 1988 onwards. 
It was incredibly significant that employees also had life insurance and, from 
1985, in addition to the seniority bonus, higher salaries for those who met the 
requirements of permanence in the company. Those employees who substituted 
workers in higher categories for more than a month were paid the salary of the latter. 
Employees also had a share in premiums, in general 0.25 per cent of the proceeds. All 
of this is in line with Larramendi's stated desire for MAPFRE to give all its employees 
the opportunity to pursue a professional career, rewarding effort and commitment.  
There was special recognition for pensioners and the disabled to whom, 
according to the agreement, he gave the “employer's insurance” supplement. In case 
of death of the employee, the insurance company also helped their families with one 
month’s pay, or three month’s pay if it was during service.  
The working hours in the 1980s were below the inter-provincial agreement of 
insurance companies, to which it belonged until 1979, decreasing by 55 hours a year 
later. 
The design of the social benefits established in the agreement responded to the 
values of the company as can be seen, highlighting remuneration for training, loyalty, 
commitment, and responsibility of the employees. MAPFRE was also concerned about 
the employee's family, the image of the unit, and possible groups that could be more 
vulnerable, for example the company's retired employees. 
 
222 In the 1979 inter-provincial agreement of insurance companies, 20% of the employees' basic salary was granted for university 
or higher studies and 10% for specialisation in professional insurance schools. In 1980, in La Estrella, 11,000 pesetas for studies in 
the professional Insurance schools. In Catalana-Occidente and Zurich-Vita-Hispania, according to the committee. 
223 Larramendi, I,(1961): “La empresa . . . “ Op. cit. 
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MAPFRE today leads the prestigious “Great Place to Work” ranking of 
companies with more than 5,000 employees, occupying the first position in 2019. This 
situation is undoubtedly partly the result of Larramendi's legacy and the solid 
foundations he laid during his term of office.  
LARRAMENDI, FORERUNNER OF THE MANAGEMENT BY VALUES STYLE 
 
As early as 1990, Larramendi used the concept of the soul of the company to 
refer to the ability of companies to succeed whilst respecting ethics, a quality he 
recognised in MAPFRE: “MAPFRE companies, at least many of them, are something 
that is living, with a soul, with a heart, with their own methods that allow them to 
succeed, without irregularities or temporary get rich quick schemes, and without 
harming mutual members, shareholders and employees”.224 
 
The executive was aware of the radical importance of human capital in insurance 
companies, and even more so in the case of MAPFRE, since without financial or other 
types of support, it depended on itself to be able to grow and succeed in the market. 
For this reason, he placed great emphasis on achieving optimal management in this 
area, involving himself very directly. As this chapter has shown, the main characteristic 
features were: 
 
- Development of codes of ethics and other measures to limit the power of 
executives and ensure that their actions and motivations were aligned with 
those of MAPFRE and focused on defending the interests of policyholders and 
enhancing MAPFRE's contribution to improving society. 
- Exemplarity. In order that principles and values are respected, those which one 
wishes to instil, the indispensable requirement is that the general management 
and senior management set an example to the rest of the employees. 
- Seeking to motivate employees through various mechanisms beyond financial 
remuneration. These included enhancing meritocracy and promotion 
opportunities, taking responsibility and being part of a “family”, where one 
received “human warmth” and participated in a transcendent project aimed at 
improving society as a whole.  
- Adoption of an innovative personnel selection policy, using advertisements in 
the press and demanding candidates with suitable profiles for the business 
project to be conducted over the long term. 
- High investment in the training of employees and executives, also through 
innovative methods, seeking a high level of technical training and specialisation 
of people. 
- Promotion system based on professional development. 
- Establishment of economic incentives that reward productivity and the 
fulfilment of objectives as well as other complements of a social nature, which 
respond to workers’ needs. 
 
 
224 Larramendi, I. H. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE. Mi tiempo, p.136. 
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Ignacio de Larramendi, a pioneer in the manner by which he recruited his 
employees, used external sources to recruit young university students, who later 
became executives. He exercised transparency and good governance in hiring, not 
allowing family members to join the company. Promotion and career development 
were fundamental pillars in the company, and motivational elements. From a 
centralised model, he moved to a more decentralised, flexible one, managing to give 
more value to territorial organisation in MAPFRE’s organisational structure, delegating 
the recruitment of people.  
A pioneer in understanding employee training as a key aspect of human resources 
management, Ignacio de Larramendi was concerned about having well-trained 
employees, valuing university studies positively and giving in-company training courses 
even in the early years of his management. In 1961, he stated that “companies that 
carry out research are growing, and since the insurance sector doesn’t need large 
facilities, experimental laboratories or pilot plants, what is really necessary and unique 
is to have trained personnel for this specific research mission”. 
Concerned about the working method to standardise processes and improve, he 
implemented regulations in the company to cope with business growth and improve in 
efficiency. Under the school of human relations, we can affirm that Larramendi 
approached this school, managing people knowing that the work environment, 
recognition, and continuous improvement were the fundamental bases. 
He went farther, however, because his management style corresponded to a great 
extent with an authentic Management by Values, a strategy that emerged at the end 
of the 1990s as a new theory of Business Management, which put the person and his 
development at the centre of the system, and proposed that the bonding and 
commitment of employees be achieved by appealing to transcendent values and the 
common good, always respecting well-defined explicit values. 
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I call a “leading company” the large company that reaches an institutional character in its sector, 
coordinated with an aggressive commercial action and the will for greater penetration, with agility to 
adapt to each new change, the absence of bureaucratisation and a capacity for the innovation and 
creation of new products or services at a prudent, minimal cost. 
 






99 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter III Innovation and its results in Larramendi’s MAPFRE  
 
 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, we first propose to identify the main trends in the evolution of 
innovation and technology management practices in insurance companies since the 
1950s; a starting point for subsequently addressing the possible distinctive nature of 
innovative activity at MAPFRE under Larramendi's management. This should make it 
possible to determine whether the management of innovation and technology was a 
key aspect for MAPFRE to achieve its objectives in the 1955-1990 period. 
The introduction of new information technologies in MAPFRE is a phenomenon 
that has attracted the attention of scholars of Spanish business history. In this regard, 
it is worth noting the works of Caruana de las Cagigas (2014) and (2019), which detail 
the processes of introducing IT into the Spanish insurance sector and in MAPFRE, 
respectively.  
Our approach is broader, since we propose to study the characteristic features 
of the innovative activity promoted by Larramendi as a whole, as well as its 
consequences. Thus, the main hypothesis of the chapter is to check whether 
Larramendi's MAPFRE can be considered an “innovative” company, and as sub-
hypotheses, the following are proposed: 
a) - that innovation was a key element in explaining the insurer's 
success between 1955 and 1990; and 
b) - that the innovations introduced under Larramendi's leadership 
were mainly of a progressive nature and affected many different areas such as 
the product, organisation, human resources, and marketing aspects. 
c) Most importantly, innovation allowed the company to develop a 
competitive advantage in costs, which accentuated rivalry in the Spanish 
insurance market, with positive consequences on the efficiency of the sector 
and on the Spanish economy as a whole.  
 
THE MEANING OF “INNOVATION” IN BUSINESS 
 
Business innovation is generally understood as an improvement in the business 
model or product which consists of making organisational, productive, or technological 
changes, in order to be more efficient and achieve a better position in the market or 
even create a new market. 
A common mistake is to limit innovations to the realm of technology. 
Freeman225 distinguishes between innovation and technological innovation, the latter 
referring to the body of knowledge related to techniques and dedicated to the 
 
225 Freeman, Christopher, The Economics of Industrial Innovation (1982). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for 
Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship.  
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advancement of knowledge, whilst innovation itself is the dissemination and 
improvement of products and processes.  
Amongst the many definitions of innovation, the one we're interested in 
adopting for this study is the one offered by the American consultant John Kao,226 
according to which “innovation is the ability of people, companies and entire nations 
to continuously achieve their goals”. Innovation is identified with a certain “muscle” 
with which organisations can equip themselves, and which will allow them to achieve 
their proposed goals such as, for example, expanding their market share, achieving 
high profitability, improving the conditions of their employees or the public services 
produced, reducing environmental impact, maximising welfare work and expanding 
scientific knowledge, etc. However, for an action to be classified as innovative, it must 
be based on resources related to scientific knowledge, technology, analysis, or 
creativity.  
If we look at the classification of innovations widely used by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), we can distinguish four types: 
product, process, organisational and marketing innovations. Within each of these 
categories, in turn, a distinction is made between “progressive” innovations, which 
involve an improvement on something existing, and “radical” innovations, which 
involve completely different products or processes. 
Applying this approach to our research, to the cases of MAPFRE and 
Larramendi, the study of the innovative activity of the insurance company consists of 
analysing the strategies and specific actions based on intelligence and knowledge, 
which allowed this institution to achieve the goals that were set at each moment. 
Hence, from Ignacio de Larramendi's personal perspective, his “innovative action” 
corresponds to his ability to achieve his goals in the field of business leadership and 
social action through the mutual society and the foundations he promoted.  
The fundamental consequence of business innovation is that it promotes 
efficiency, in other words, it manages to increase the productivity of the resources 
used, either by generating greater value—without increasing consumption—or by 
reducing the number of inputs used without reducing production. According to the 
approach of the Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Robert Solow, innovations are 
largely responsible for the so-called Solow residual or Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 
which is identified with “the increase in production that isn’t due to a greater 
application of traditional productive factors: labour, capital or land”. 
The increase in TFP can be achieved through greater training and/or motivation 
of employees and executives, the improvement of process efficiency, for example, by 
avoiding excessive bureaucracy and improving coordination, or the obtaining  
improvements that discover new ways of organising physical object by using 
technology and research to achieve products or production methods with greater 
added value.  
 
226 Kao, J. (2007): Innovation Nation, Free Press 
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According to Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development, innovative 
organisations are key to improving the economic welfare of society, since beyond the 
positive consequences for their employees, customers, and owners, most of the 
benefits generated are often not internalised, but rather, as imitators emerge, the new 
technique or idea spreads amongst the rest of the companies in the sector. 
 
INNOVATION IN THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 
 
Innovation isn’t simply the investment in new technologies, but the integration 
of these technologies into business processes and strategy. According to Laudon and 
Laudon,227 the main advantages associated with investment in new technologies and 
innovation are: 
• Automation of information processing activities: lower cost of 
data collection, storage, and retrieval. 
• Automation of the activities of the physical component. 
• Reducing the cost of development (R&D) and launching new 
products: information systems reduce the time and cost of creating and 
designing new products. 
• Reduction of the costs of adapting products to new segments 
and customers, which has an impact on the reduction of promotion and 
customer service costs in new markets.  
• Reduction of the costs of coordinating activities on a global scale. 
 
The innovations by companies in the insurance sector in the last century can’t 
be separated from those in the financial sector.228  In both sectors, companies in the 
more developed European countries began to introduce computers into their day-to-
day operations in the 1960s.  
As for insurance companies, this introduction of IT innovations resulted in the 
centralisation of many decisions, delegating much of the power of the branches to the 
head office (see Bátiz-Lazo, 2016). This was common in companies throughout the 
industry. This increased centralisation, coupled with cost savings, allowed us to 
develop a competitive cost advantage. 
The value chain is useful as a means to understand how different companies in 
the insurance industry can use information systems most efficiently to improve their 
competitive position.229 It should be noted that the business is analysed as a chain of 
 
227 Laudon, K. C. & Laudon, J. P. (2016):  Management Information System, Pearson, Estados Unidos 
228 Bátiz-Lazo, B., 2013. Direct Line Insurance: A case study on telephone banking and its impact on the competitive performance 
of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 1985 - 1995, Zeitschrift für Internehmensgeschichte/The Journal of Business History, vol. 18, pp. 54-
72 
229 Porter, M. E. (1989). From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. In Readings in Strategic Management (pp. 234-255). 
Palgrave, London. 
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primary and support activities that add a certain value to the products or services it 
offers.  
Thanks to information technologies, most of the new companies in the 
professional service sectors have broken the traditional entry barriers, based on 
physical infrastructures and the face-to-face service relationship. All of this has driven 
these sectors towards new levels of competitiveness and quality of service at a cost 
that is difficult to match. 
Today, thanks to the use of enabling technologies such as big data, cloud 
computing and blockchain, many sectors have undergone a comprehensive 
transformation, adapting to customers’ needs through a customised service offer. Fully 
inserted in the information technology revolution, new digital or virtual business 
models are emerging in the sectors of banking and insurance. In this context of new 
business models is the sector of new insurance intermediaries or Insurtech. 
Innovations in the insurance sector are designed to achieve and maintain two 
types of competitive advantages, cost, and differentiation, which arise from the 
execution of activities in the value chain:230 
- In cost advantage, the business offers its products or services 
cheaper than its competitors thanks to the efficiency in its operations and the 
reduction of different types of costs. 
- In the context of differentiation advantage, the business is able 
to differentiate its products or services from those offered by the competition, 
providing greater value to the customer. 
 
INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY AT MAPFRE UNDER LARRAMENDI’S MANAGEMENT 
 
The innovative attitude and commitment to the use of technology by MAPFRE's 
executive, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, is vital to understanding the insurer's 
success. A large part of the innovations introduced were aimed at reducing costs, and 
for this executive, cost control was a priority in the insurance sector, and a large part 
of his actions were directed towards this goal. This is what he said in 1958: 
“We are reaching international (productivity) figures, and we will do our best to contribute to the reduction of the 
cost of insurance, as an indispensable fact for Spanish insurers in the new economic situation of the country, 
especially if they don’t want to expose themselves to growing animosity and distrust by policyholders and the 
dangers that this may imply in terms of interventionism and nationalisation”.231 
Also, in 1982 he stated, 
 
230 Porter, M. E. (1989). From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. In Readings in Strategic Management (pp. 234-255). 
Palgrave, London. 
231 MAPFRE. Report for 1958 
103 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter III Innovation and its results in Larramendi’s MAPFRE  
 
 
“Despite claims to the contrary, solvency problems are often not the result of insufficient rates but of excessive costs. 
A company's primary obligation is to offer its products to the public at the lowest possible price that doesn’t harm its 
solvency position”.232 
In the same article, he added: 
“For many years MAPFRE has devoted its utmost attention to this objective, with a 
demanding general line, perhaps difficult to understand at times for the staff, who see a 
disproportion between the increase in their remuneration and the increase in the 
company's revenue and profit”.233  
He always took into account and applied to business decisions what he called 
“creative imagination” in management through new technologies and innovation as 
well as his role in improving Spanish society as a whole. At the same time, he also 
valued the role that other companies could play, regardless of the sector, in 
contributing to the improvement of Spain thanks also to their possible advances and 
innovations.234 
The following is an analysis of a series of innovative actions linked to each 
other, which characterised Larramendi's management within a framework of 
continuous search for productivity improvements as a way to improve the service 
received by mutual members and policyholders. 
 
Innovations in processes and introduction of information technology. 
A first aspect to consider is that the Spanish insurance sector found it difficult 
to introduce the innovations arising from the development of information technology 
in the period of 1950 to 1990, partly due to their fragmentation.235 Indeed, smaller 
companies faced difficulties due to the indivisibility of certain investments in new 
technologies, which made their introduction unfeasible if there was no minimum size, 
and due to their lesser possibilities to recruit the necessary qualified personnel. 
However, Larramendi's MAPFRE, a staunch advocate of technology, wasn’t left 
behind. The constant search for information, transparency, and productivity, to a large 
extent marked the training of its staff, who, under his leadership, achieved a 
continuous innovation of its processes. Recent research conducted by Caruana de las 
Cagigas has concluded that “an explanatory part of his (Larramendi's) success was his 
determined support for the incorporation of new technologies, which placed MAPFRE 
amongst the insurance companies that were most committed to this strategic decision 
from its beginnings”.236 
 
232 Larramendi, 1982 
233 MAPFRE. General Meetings, 29 May 1982. (Box 15, unit 25) 
234 See Larramendi, I (1997) in the First Meeting of the Insurance Sector organised by IESE Business School 
And Larramendi I. H. (1987) in Associação Brasileira para a Ciência do Seguro and the Brazilian Section of AIDA  
235 Caruana de la Cagigas L. (2014): “La introducción de las nuevas tecnologías en el sector del seguro (1960 – 2000)”, XI 
International Congress of AEHE, Madrid. 
236 Caruana de la Cagigas L. (2019): “La introducción de nuevas tecnologías en MAPFRE (1960 - 2000)”, Transport, Services and 
Telecommunications, 40, p. 48. 
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Two years after Larramendi's arrival, in 1957, the Adrema machine was 
replaced by the Remington Rand, which was later replaced by the French-made Bull 
computer in 1960. They were on the point of acquiring a computer from IBM, but they 
didn’t complete the purchase with the American supplier because MAPFRE's 
management considered that the latter had poor after-sale service. The search for 
constant improvement of processes through continuous investment in software is seen 
today as a benchmark for innovation in the insurance sector. Regarding software, in 
1962 MAPFRE decided to create its own company called Servicios de Organización y 
Mecanización (SDOMSA), in charge of the development of programmes in the motor 
industry, training its programmers with foreign personnel. This commitment to 
mechanisation brought great benefits for MAPFRE in the motor sector.237 
It is worth noting that, although in the 1960s everything was manual, MAPFRE 
created a system to stop doing things by hand thanks to its perforated card. Each 
operation had its own punch card (which was later replaced by the IBM computer). As 
the 1960s drew to a close, he trained a team of people from different areas in order to 
make them aware of the importance of advancing in these innovations.  
In 1966, the Board of Directors considered commissioning work from IBM, with 
the company finally working with Bull and IBM. Subsequently, they chose to work with 
IBM. Thus, in 1967 the first IBM 360 computer was purchased for 1 million dollars. 
MAPFRE, despite being a medium-sized company, made this investment practically at 
the same time, and even earlier, than larger companies did. La Unión and Fénix 
incorporated the IBM 360 in the same year, whilst La Estrella and Mutua General de 
Seguros did so in 1968.238 
The main objective with the purchase of this computer, which was assembled 
in an air-conditioned room, was to increase productivity. Shortly afterwards, the IT 
department was created, which was quite a novelty. It implied a certain loss of power 
by the regional directors, as the central organisation would carry more weight. A 
methods and analysis department was also created. 
The central computer made it possible for agents to provide information on 
their work, reducing any kind of opacity, which in some branches led to savings in 
management costs of up to 40 per cent.  
In 1973 the punched card disappeared, and a CMC multi-keyboard system for 
recording data on disc was installed. This led to an improvement in the productivity of 
the IT department, which made it possible to reduce the number of employees in 
drilling by 36 per cent, whilst increasing the number of programmers. Significant 
savings were also made in the management of direct debiting of bills as well as an IT 
package to improve the accounting system with respect to territorial offices.  
To reduce management costs, computer equipment was implemented in the 
territorial offices. They even rented 24 IBM model 3741 computers (each of which had 
 
237 The study by Caruana de las Cagijas L. (2019) quantifies that this mechanisation of the motor industry meant a saving of 41 per 
cent in 1965. 
238 Caruana de la Cagigas L. (2014): “La introducción de las nuevas tecnologías en el sector del seguro (1960 – 2000)”, XI 
International Congress of AEHE, Madrid. 
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8K of memory, two floppy disks, a screen and a printer). The reduction of work 
estimated by the company was 70 per cent, as indicated by Caruana in his study. 
In the second half of the 1980s, the process of implementing software more 
adapted to the needs of the company continued as well as the connectivity of the 
computers of each delegation with the central office, reducing, amongst other things, 
the previous bureaucratic activities.239 
On the other hand, MAPFRE promoted a subsidiary company, ITSEMAP, an 
engineering company dedicated to risk management services in the areas of industrial 
safety and fire prevention, emergency plans and environment. 
MAPFRE's Road Safety and Experimentation Centre. 
The creation of CESVIMAP (Centro de Experimentación y Seguridad Vial de 
MAPFRE (MAPFRE Centre for Experimentation and Road Safety) in 1983 also stands 
out as an innovation of processes, although its antecedents date back to the end of the 
1970s, when the aim was to professionalise the work of motor insurance loss adjusters 
to the maximum by updating their knowledge.240  
CESVIMAP has played important roles since its creation and up to the present 
day, such as:241  a) it allowed a reduction in claims costs; b) it is a training school for 
people both internal and external to MAPFRE; c) it has served as a commercial 
instrument, offering services that no other company offered; and d) it has collaborated 
in MAPFRE's international expansion.  
CESVIMAP's background is the need to provide technical training to MAPFRE's 
own loss adjusters, which the company decided to undertake, unlike the rest of the 
sector, which used loss adjusters shared with other insurers. The own loss adjusters, 
suitably trained, made it possible to reduce the average amounts of the claims, by 
“using the knowledge of what is real and technically fair”.242 
The training of loss adjusters was undertaken with practical demonstrations in 
the workshop by means of the so-called crash test, an impact of the vehicle at low 
speed that marks the beginning of the investigation.  
The centre, located in Avila, tried to calculate the costs of the claim for each car 
model. While at that time competitors set prices without taking into account the 
different possible repair costs for each model, through this centre, MAPFRE crashed 
different types of cars in order to see how many parts needed to be replaced in each 
one depending on the impact. So, for example, they found that some Japanese 
vehicles were more expensive to repair after a crash than other European vehicles, as 
the former required a greater number of parts to be replaced and were less compact.  
 
239 The decentralisation of the company and the elimination of bureaucracy were fundamental areas in his 
management, as Larramendi stated in an interview in Dinero Magazine in April 1983.  
240 CESVIMAP, 2008. Cesvimap, su primer cuarto de siglo.  (p. 16) 
241 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p. 736) 
242 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p. 738) 
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Since the main competitors didn’t know how to set prices for each vehicle, the 
different companies in the sector began to set prices after MAPFRE did so. 
Another major role of CESVIMAP consisted in the development of road safety 
systems, by analysing and conducting studies on the constitution and behaviour of 
vehicles for their active and passive road safety. It became the first research centre to 
explain in a report, through a series of mathematical calculations, the circumstances 
involved in an accident between two vehicles, specifically a Fiat Uno Turbo and a 
tractor. This was a milestone in the investigation and reconstruction of traffic 
accidents, developing a reliable methodology. 
Following the success of CESVIMAP, MAPFRE decided to establish similar 
centres in Brazil and Argentina, giving rise to Cesvi Brazil and Cesvi Argentina. 
Subsequently, Cesvi Mexico, Cesvi Colombia and Cesvi France were created. 
Establishment of technical service companies for customers in non-life activities 
In a permanent search for technological leadership and comprehensive 
customer protection, Larramendi, followed by an enthusiastic team, created, in 
addition to CESVIMAP, a whole series of service companies that complemented the 
insurance activity in the different lines of business. This work facilitated a reduction in 
outsourcing of services by increasingly performing all activities in its  in-house value 
chain. It also implied greater control, a reduction of costs and highly specialised 
training for all its employees. At this time, MAPFRE was the only Spanish insurance 
group and one of the few in the world to have this structure. The following companies 
were involved: 
ITSEMAP FUEGO. Dedicated to advisory services and personnel training, testing 
of equipment and materials, technical and practical research in the area of fire 
protection, investigation of material damage in major disasters. It had a technology 
centre with a laboratory and practice field provided with the most advanced 
technology. 
ITSEMAP AMBIENTAL. It shared headquarters with Itsemap Fuego. It had an 
independent laboratory, and was focused on technical services and safety and 
environmental audits, environmental risk assessment and improvement plans. It was 
also active in the field of industrial hygiene. 
SERMAP. Commissioned for safety damage, prevention, and evaluation of 
losses for transport risks both in maritime hulls as in goods transported by any route. 
Perform claims investigation and mitigation and recovery management. 
SEGURMAP.  Security against risks of theft and intrusion by means of its own 
alarm reception centre. Open 24 hours a day and offering services in different 
languages, it was one of the first of its kind in Spain. 
RELECMAP. Loss-adjustment services and other auxiliary insurance services 
such as processing, evaluation and settlement of property-damage claims on behalf of 
third parties. Additionally, it specialised in the repair and recovery of electronic 
equipment affected by a disaster. 
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SERVIMAP.  Repair and maintenance of buildings and their facilities. It had a 
qualified technical team and repairers throughout the country coordinated by a 
permanent call centre. 
CONSULTMAP. Consultancy services for the provision of advisory, management 
and administrative services related to the insurance and reinsurance activities of third 
parties. 
MAPFRE’S decentralisation 
Larramendi was a strong supporter and promoter of decentralisation in 
MAPFRE's organisation. This stance was possibly at least partly a product of his strong 
Carlist political convictions. He explained the need to decentralise companies in 1966 
with these words: 
“Excessive centralisation reduces the efficiency of the business and is somewhat akin to the situation of those who 
use excessive materials because they haven’t mastered the technique of construction and fear that their buildings 
will collapse”. 243 
He also made the following point: 
“More accurate can be the decision of a mediocre person near a fact, than that of an intelligent man 500 kilometres 
away”. This happens because the information from a distance comes through the mediocre one who doesn’t know 
how to explain the situation, although on many occasions he isn’t mistaken in decisions that are truly clear in that 
place. 
However, for Larramendi, efficient decentralisation required adequate control: 
“You can't decentralise without a good organisation. Problems are inevitable when roles are delegated without the 
means to control the activity of those who've been given decision-making powers or to quickly correct deviations 
resulting from erroneous decisions. 
Decentralisation doesn’t mean creating “anarchic kingdoms of Taifas”. On the contrary, it requires delimitation and 
coordination”. 
In the 1960s, the insurance company followed an organisational model in which 
the basic nuclei of the organisation (Technical Directorate, Administrative Directorate, 
General Sub-directorate) and 17 Regional Directorates244, which were headed by a 
responsible province, were differentiated. From the latter, sub-central offices were 
created. We could define it as a divisional model by geographical areas,245 with a clear 
territorial structure. In 1965, a new organisational chart was established, incorporating 
the concept of division.246  
In the 1970s, the regional directorates evolved and developed the objective of 
“attending to and controlling” the provincial network, establishing a territorial 
hierarchy, since it became difficult for the Central Office located in Madrid to deal with 
all the delegations. The problem called “administrative bureaucracy” arose in the head 
offices of the region called regional directorates, so in 1975 a new formula was 
 
243 IHL (1966): “La nueva dirección”. Doctrinal Journal of the Directorate General of Insurance “Riesgo y Seguro”. Nos. 13 and 14, 
First and Second Quarters of 1966. 
244 Western Andalusia, Jaén, Catalonia, Levante, Cordoba, Castile, North, Aragon, Southeast, Eastern Andalusia, Ciudad Real, 
Toledo, Badajoz, Asturias, Cáceres, Galicia, Canary Islands 
245 Tortella, G. Caruana, L y García Ruíz, J.L (2008): De mutua a Multinacional: MAPFRE 1933/2008, MAPFRE, Madrid, p. 116 
246 Ibidem p. 117 
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proposed: the transformation of the regional directorates into sub-central ones, 
allowing a direct administrative relationship with Madrid but with the exclusive 
supervision of a sub-central manager, normally the director of the most important 
province in the area. 
It was also in 1975 that the MAPFRE247 Group was created, with three entities: 
MAPFRE Mutualidad (general insurance) and subsidiaries: Later, as a result of a 
restructuring, MAPFRE Mutualidad focused on the exclusive development of the motor 
branch, Vida in life insurance and Industrial on non-life insurance. These divisions were 
joined in 1982 by MAPFRE Reaseguro and MAPFRE Internacional. 
In the 1980s, Fundación MAPFRE became the owner of the name “MAPFRE”, on 
which the following depended: MAPFRE Mutualidad and Corporación MAPFRE, as can 
be seen in the following organisation chart:  
Illustration3  MAPFRE's organisation chart in the 1980s 
 
Source: MAPFRE (1982) 
Not only was the decentralisation process of the group important, but even 
more important was the coordination process of the organisational structure. This 
thinking was motivated by the study of the failure of a competitor, La Unión y el Fénix. 
Ignacio de Larramendi, indicated that:  
 
247 García del Val, M. (2004): El sistema MAPFRE. “Desarrollo de una organización mutualista líder en el sector asegurador español, 
Economía Social. La actividad económica al servicio de las personas” Mediterráneo Económico 
Fundación MAPFRE 
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“The origin of the failure of La Unión y el Fénix stemmed from the lack of capacity to integrate the territorial 
structure into the company, keeping it at a distance and discriminated against”.248  
Hence, he was the main driver of the structure, drawing conclusions from 
observing how it was designed in various organisations. He believed the company with 
the best organisational structure was Mutua Madrileña Automovilista, thanks to which 
they were able to achieve outstanding success in the market. The problem they faced 
was that the Mutua model couldn’t be imitated at MAPFRE, mainly because of 
commitments made to former delegates. Mutua Madrileña didn’t need agents, and 
paradoxically it attracted customers like a magnet.249  
Nevertheless, MAPFRE undertook a novel idea in its organisational model, 
which implied achieving a great difference with respect to other competing 
companies. It consisted of creating an organisational structure based on the territorial, 
thus creating its own “blue ocean”.250 The figure of MAPFRE's exclusive delegate, and 
the large number of offices open to the public outside its headquarters, even exceeded 
that of all its competitors combined. This meant the elimination of the less 
professional agents, where direct contact with the customer and the representation of 
a single company created closeness and trust with the customers.  
Its divisional structure that continued to grow and was divided by geographical 
areas251 led to success, through the integration of the delegations or sub-central 
offices, which felt that they were part of a whole, of the company as a whole, being an 
important part. This way of proceeding, of creating the territorial as fundamental in 
the company, is what from the organisational point of view made it create a solid 
company, where the organisational principles are transmitted. 
MAPFRE's decentralisation process implied, from the perspective of the 
organisation of employees and executives, the need to assume a high degree of 
geographical mobility. As a result, it was common for many of the employees to rotate 
between different regional offices, or even, later on, abroad. 
  
 
248 Larramendi, I (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE. Mi tiempo, Actas editorial, Madrid 
249Tortella, G. Caruana, L y García Ruíz, J.L (2008): De mutua a Multinacional . . . op. cit. 
250 Blue Ocean is a strategic concept used to define those companies that instead of competing with others trying to attract 
customers from the competition (red ocean), create their own market. MAPFRE, thanks to its integration of the territorial aspect 
in the company as a whole, of its own organisational structure, managed to provide a high-quality service to the customer by 
creating its blue ocean. 
251 The divisional structure by geographic areas refers to the territorial organisation. 
110 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter III Innovation and its results in Larramendi’s MAPFRE  
 
 
Capillarity of the distribution network and ground floor offices.   
A unique strategy of MAPFRE in the Spanish insurance context was its 
“ruralisation”, understood as its presence in population centres, however small they 
might be, throughout Spain. Although MAPFRE had this orientation since its origins, 
this characteristic was sharpened by Larramendi.252  
 
The ground floor offices were also a great idea of Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi. He paid very little for the premises and was the first company in the 
sector to establish itself on ground-floor offices.  
 
Human Resources 
One area in which MAPFRE stood out for was in undertaking a differentiated 
and innovative policy in human resources management. Although this issue has been 
analysed in the previous chapter, we believe it is worth mentioning some of MAPFRE's 
singularities in this section: 
a) At the end of the 1950s, incentives were established for 
managers and employees based on the achievement of objectives. This policy, 
together with other singular actions, clearly pioneering in the sector at the 
time, came to provoke friction with trade union liaisons and the Ministry of 
Labour (Tortella 2009, p. 94).  
b) In the 1950s and 1960s the selection of personnel was a “quality 
recruitment”, based on the signing of recent graduates through advertisements 
in the press, with the aim of training them, offering them to be able to pursue a 
professional career in the company, and giving them responsibility and 
freedom of action to achieve a high level of motivation. This policy allowed us 
to increase loyalty and reduce staff costs. The criterion of not incorporating 
MBA graduates was also applied, as it was considered that they demanded 
higher salaries.253 
c) Stock option plans for executives in the 1980s was a practice that 
was introduced 10 years earlier than in other companies. 
d) Larramendi promoted the principle of single remuneration for 
executives, avoiding the receipt of additional allowances and per diems for 
participating on boards. This tendency prevented people from becoming 
attached to jobs, avoiding tensions and problems.254  
e) The management style implemented by Larramendi 
corresponded to a large extent to a Management by Values, which sought to 
build loyalty and motivate employees by giving opportunities and 
responsibility, taking advantage of each person’s potential, in a climate of 
transparency and justice, which appealed to transcendent values and fostered 
a feeling of family that provided “human warmth”, and promoted pride in the 
 
252 Larramendi (2000), p. 214. 
253 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. ( p. 196) 
254 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p. 317) 
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contribution that the company made to the improvement of Spanish society, 
and later, to the brother nations of Ibero-America. 
 
Introduction of the policyholder ombudsman 
This figure, now mandatory for any insurance company of similar size, was first 
introduced in MAPFRE in 1984 at the request of Larramendi. The initiative, which 
influenced Spanish insurance legislation, seeks to prevent frictions with policyholders 
due to slow judicial processes, in which, as Larramendi points out, “the company has 
superiority over the claimants”.255 The jurist Fernando Suárez González was appointed 
chairman of the Policyholder’s Committee, in which two other jurists of recognised 
prestige participate. 
 
This initiative was a major milestone in the improvement of MAPFRE's quality 
and was bound to have a significant impact on the insurer's reputation, as it clearly 
positioned and signalled its desire to act fairly and look after the interests of 
policyholders.  
 
Prompt payment policy for claims. Quality and Service 
This was another of MAPFRE's differentiating actions, aimed, like the previous 
one, at improving quality. This action avoided lawsuits and the cost of litigation and 
positioned MAPFRE as an insurance and reinsurance company of unquestionable 
quality.  
 
For Larramendi, quality in insurance corresponded to:256  
 
“paying out accurately and promptly what was contracted in the policy, helping prevent the occurrence of 
claims, and helping reduce the consequences of loss to policyholders.”  
 
The culture of quality and service to policyholders was clearly differentiating in 
Larramendi's MAPFRE. This service culture was especially important for employees 
who had contact with policyholders. 
Innovations in the insurance offer.  
As indicated in previous sections, Ignacio de Larramendi was a leader obsessed 
with MAPFRE's growth, which led him to continuously seek out and take advantage of 
opportunities. He instilled a culture of innovation and risk-taking in MAPFRE, seeking at 
all times to anticipate market trends, positioning itself in the insurance branches with 
the greatest growth potential. 
Additionally, MAPFRE was a pioneer in incorporating complementary services 
to insurance, launching the concept of “insurance-service”, beyond mere monetary 
 
255 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p. 181) 
256 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p. 197) 
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compensation. Hence, it incorporated legal assistance and roadside assistance for cars, 
and the industrial prevention service for industrial risks. 
The main strategies undertaken along this line are described below. 
a) Life insurance 
 
Life insurance wasn’t very popular in the mid-1960s due to the economic 
situation of Spaniards, their low salaries and low education, together with inflation and 
competition from Social Security, which meant that customers were more attracted to 
insurance of other types, including motor insurance.257  The weight of life insurance in 
the total premiums of the sector in Spain, in 1966, was 7.3 per cent. This situation was 
reversing, and in 1985 it accounted for 14 per cent and more than 50 percent in 
1990.258 
In the 1960s, MAPFRE changed the image of life insurance, talking about 
“hope”, “life” and “enjoyment”. It renewed its products, increased the networks of life 
sellers, commercial and marketing lines. It started using PM49 mortality tables, whilst 
the rest of the companies continued to use tables from the previous century. The 
success of this strategy, as Larramendi acknowledged, was due to the excellent work of 
Fernández-Layos.  
Subsequently, in 1970 he created MAPFRE Vida insurance, which sought to 
create a more modern, dynamic, and profitable insurance, through a reduction in 
agents' commissions, intensification of the recruitment of inspectors, incentive with 
conventions for salesmen and agents and important television campaigns. Since its 
establishment, MAPFRE Vida has introduced numerous original products, not only in 
Spain but in many countries. 259 
It is worth noting that the MAPFRE Vida advert was the first advert for an 
insurance company in Spain. It cost 25 million pesetas, which was equivalent to its 
share capital, as MAPFRE Vida was established with capitalisation of 25 million 
pesetas. 
In the 1980s MAPFRE Indosuez and MAPFRE Inversión were created. The 
Fundación Cultural MAPFRE Vida was also established during this decade. Important 
products include Invida, which guaranteed the payment of the established capital to 
the insured if they were alive at the end of the contract, the Millón de Vida, basic 
short- and medium-term savings insurance, and Permanent Flight Insurance, which 
insured the passenger on all the flights they took for a single payment.   
b) Hail insurance 
 
In hail insurance, MAPFRE introduced various innovations, including what was 
known in Spain as “counting” in the loss adjustments, which consisted of the loss 
 
257 Fernández-Layos, J. (1980): Situación actual del seguro de vida en España y posibles estímulos para su desarrollo, ICEA. 
258 Tortella et al. 2014, pp. 304 
259 Larramendi, I (1987). Historia de MAPFRE, Artículo Revista de Mercado.  
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adjusters arguing about the percentage of damage to a given area, using a ring that 
was placed on the damaged surface and then counting the damaged ears of corn 
within the surface of the ring. This practice, which Larramendi learned from the Swiss 
Hail company, was an evolution from the previous “unscientific” and informal 
agreements that were usually reached between the representative and the insured.260 
c) Motor insurance.  
 
In 1966, Larramendi pronounced these premonitory words about the 
importance that motor insurance would have for the company: 
“Until life insurance is fully developed, and this depends partly on political factors, the strongest entity in the 
Spanish market will be the one with the largest volume in motor insurance. For this reason, if MAPFRE aspires 
to a pre-eminent position in the insurance industry as a whole, it must devote special attention to it”.261  
Along with motor insurance, MAPFRE tried to specialise in the marine hull and 
transport insurance business, reaching the top positions in a few years. It also started 
underwriting aviation insurance, a limited field in Spain with poor results.  
As far as motor insurance was concerned, he managed to carve out a niche for 
himself in the industry without any previous experience in the sector. The success was 
achieved thanks to the constant innovations that improved its competitiveness, to the 
important distribution network that the company had, to which was added an 
increasing investment in advertising.262 
Beginning in 1967, the compulsory nature of motor insurance gave a significant 
boost to this branch, with MAPFRE offering an additional service at this time, such as 
the Green Card, a document issued by the Spanish Office of Motor Insurers 
(OFESAUTO) which accredited the existence of motor insurance at an international 
level. Omnia, the insurance company of the Royal Automobile Club of Spain, stood out 
during this period, having a strong weight in the sector at the time. 
In the 1970s the service became more specialised through the contracting of 
motor insurance loss adjusters (based on lower-level graduates), the preparation of 
Motor Insurance Manuals, campaigns to combat fraud in motor insurance, 
specialisation since 1975 in the management of personal injury and property damage 
claims, increased technical and human resources in the specialised claims 
departments, improvement of voluntary motor insurance (as a complement to 
compulsory insurance, incorporating occupant insurance, criminal defence and 
damage claims), and launch of new packages (Large Damage and Good Coverage 
policies, with bonuses for not declaring claims).  
Special mention should be made of the innovation introduced in 1978 called 
“Loss adjustment and quick payment”, which allowed the insured to go to certain 
centres located in provincial capitals with their damaged vehicle, have the loss 
adjustment made immediately and receive a cheque with their compensation. This 
 
260 See Larramendi I. H. (1997): “Apertura del Encuentro” First Meeting of the Insurance Sector, IESE, Barcelona, 27 February. 
261 MAPFRE. Report for 1966 
262 Tortella et al., 2014  
114 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter III Innovation and its results in Larramendi’s MAPFRE  
 
 
differentiating service offered important advantages to workshops, loss adjusters and 
policyholders. 
While in 1975 the leading company in the sector was Mutua Madrileña, 
followed by Unión y Fénix and MAPFRE, this situation changed over the years. The 
aforementioned actions, such as the creation of CESVIMAP, the specialisation of loss 
adjusters, improvements in insurance conditions and premium bonuses for not having 
claims, made MAPFRE the leading company in the insurance sector in 1983.263  
 
Exploitation of new markets and social role in America. 
Larramendi was aware of the important advantages that internationalisation 
offered insurance companies in terms of diversification of risks and markets and 
exploitation of economies of scale. In the late 1960s, he began to lay the foundations 
for MAPFRE's internationalisation process, for which he developed a network of 
personal international contacts that would be key to identifying and exploiting 
business opportunities abroad. Additionally, the books on the insurance sector 
published by Editorial MAPFRE were used, which served as an unbeatable business 
card for the Spanish insurer in Ibero-America. 264  MAPFRE's internationalisation 
strategy in Ibero-America would also enable it to strengthen Spain's ties with the 
brother nations of the Americas. Hence, the insurance company and its foundations 
would perform not only an important economic but also a cultural function in the 
region. 
 
3.4.11 Development of financial projects 
Along with the development of the insurance business, Larramendi's MAPFRE 
promoted important projects in the financial area. In 1962 a company was acquired 
that four years later would give rise to Central de Inversión y Crédito (CIC), initially 
focusing on financing operations for the purchase of cars, with the idea that this 
activity would allow MAPFRE to increase its penetration in motor insurance. In 
subsequent years it grew significantly, promoting the creation of provincial finance 
companies in collaboration with local shareholders, and in 1973 it began a policy of 
diversification, acquiring shares in industrial companies and promoting real estate 
companies. However, the economic crisis that began in 1974 made it necessary to 
carry out a profound restructuring, giving rise to Corporación MAPFRE in 1978. 
Hence, in 1963 and 1964 the Mutualidad de Inversores SA (MUNSA) and 
MUNVER were established under MAPFRE and SAFEI, to manage independent real 
estate funds, and the MAPFRE Investment Department was created, which years later 
became the company Asesoramiento y Gestión Económica, in which various savings 
banks participated. 
 
263 Tortella G., Caruana L. and García Ruíz L. (2009): De mutua a multinacional. MAPFRE, 1933 - 2008. Madrid, MAPFRE SA. 
264 Caruana de las Cagigas L. and García Ruiz J. L. (2009): “La internacionalización del seguro español: el caso de MAPFRE”, 
Información Comercial Española, núm 849. 
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On the other hand, in 1967 an agreement was reached with a small credit 
cooperative in Barcelona, Crédito y Previsión, to promote its activities in coordination 
with the mutual society. After a period of expanded activity and the opening of offices 
in different regions, in 1975 it was agreed to transfer its business to Banco de Gredos, 
which in return made a significant contribution to Fundación MAPFRE. 
Another important milestone was the purchase in 1989 of Invherbank, the 
second brand of Banco Herrero, with a view to MAPFRE having its own bank, and thus 
taking advantage of the significant commercial and financial synergies existing 
between the banking and insurance businesses. The expansion of Banco MAPFRE's 
branches throughout most of Spain occurred in the early 1990s, but the project didn’t 
work out, and in 2002 it transferred all its business, around €1,800 million, to Caja 
Madrid. In 2000 Larramendi acknowledged that he hadn’t achieved his goals in this 
area. 
“The poor evolution of Banco MAPFRE hasn’t allowed me to achieve an objective that I started late in my 
professional life, that of facilitating the transformation of MAPFRE into a commercial network of banking and 
insurance services that could compete with Savings Banks”. (Larramendi, 2000, p. 390). 
 
THE RESULTS OF INNOVATION 
 
As couldn’t be otherwise, the set of actions described in the previous section 
was reflected in the main indicators representing MAPFRE's performance: business 
growth, productivity, and profitability. The actions aimed at achieving high quality, 
such as the high level of specialisation of its divisions and staff, the quick payment of 
claims, the figure of the policyholder ombudsman, and its vocation to serve the 
policyholder, enabled MAPFRE to develop a “differentiating competitive advantage” 
with respect to its competitors. At the same time, the demanding policy of cost control 
and austerity, the results of investments in technology and the exploitation of 
economies of scale made the insurer the cost leader in the Spanish market. All this led 
to a remarkable growth of its business between 1955 and 1990, always maintaining a 
positive profitability.  
Regarding revenue growth, the figures speak for themselves. MAPFRE in 1955 
posted 33 million pesetas in premium income, compared to almost 122 billion pesetas 
in 1990. In the last year, MAPFRE topped the ranking of the Spanish insurance sector, 
with a premium turnover far higher than that of the following operators, Euroseguros 
SA (105 billion), Grupo Vitalicio (85 billion) and Unión y el Fénix Español (54 billion). 
See  Table 2-.  It was in 1984 that MAPFRE managed to surpass Unión y el Fénix for the 
first time, with 25,138 million pesetas in premiums, compared to 24,458 million.  
Table 2. Ranking of Spanish insurance companies in 1990. 
COMPANY INCOME  
Grupo MAPFRE (1) 121,964 
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Euroseguros, S.A.  105,351 
 Grupo Vitalicio  85,276 
 Unión y El Fénix Español 54,030 
 Mutua Madrileña Automovilista 48,671 
 La Estrella, S.A. 43,846 
 Catalana-Occidente, S.A. 40,003 
 Winterthur Sdad. Suiza Seguros  35,575 
 Musini, Sdad. Mutua de Seguros y Reaseguros a Prima Fija 34,235 
 Santa Lucia, S.A. 33,023 
 Asistencia Sanitaria Interprovincial A.S.I.S.A.  29,503 
 Schweiz Cia. Anonima Española de Seguros y Reaseguros 26,945 
 Multinacional Aseguradora, S.A.  26,699 
 AGF Seguros, S.A.  25,872 
 Plus Ultra Cia.  23,877 
 Aegón-Union Aseguradora, S.A.  23,211 
 Ocaso de Seguros y Reaseguros  22,848 
 Cia. Española De Seguros Crédito y Caución 22,040 
 
(1) Comprising MAPFRE Mutualidad de Seguros y Reaseguros at a fixed rate (61,320 million), MAPFRE Vida (36,297 
million) and MAPFE Industrial (24,347 million). 
Source: Spanish Insurance Yearbook (1990). 
The change in MAPFRE's turnover between 1955 and 1990 represents a 
cumulative annual growth of 26.5 per cent over the ensuing 35 years. If the effect of 
inflation is eliminated, the premiums collected in 1990 by MAPFRE would amount to 
some 4,600 million pesetas in 1955 pesetas, a difference implying annual growth of 
15.2 per cent.  
Amongst the main Spanish insurance companies, MAPFRE was the second 
fastest growing in the period studied, behind only Mutua Madrileña Aseguradora, 
which posted a slightly higher annual variation of 17.6 per cent, although it started 
from a premium income figure of just €6.3 million.  
Table 3. Income growth of the main Spanish insurance companies between 
1955 and 1990. 
    
Cumulative annual 
growth 
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Insurance company 1955 1990 






Mutua Madrileña Automovilista 6.3 48,671 1,836 29.1 17.6 
Grupo MAPFRE 33 121,964 4,600 26.5 15.2 
La Estrella S.A. 26 43,846 1,654 23.7 12.6 
Winterthur Sdad. Suiza Seguros. 22.3 35,575 1,342 23.5 12.4 
Catalana-Occidente, S.A.  48.1 40,003 1,509 21.2 10.3 
Grupo Vitalicio  151.1 85,276 3,216 19.8 9.1 
Santa Lucia, S.A.  87.9 33,023 1,246 18.5 7.9 
Plus Ultra Cía.  129.6 23,877 901 16.1 5.7 
Unión y el Fénix Español 327.1 54,030 2,038 15.7 5.4 
Ocaso de Seguros Y Reaseguros  152.9 22,848 862 15.4 5.1 
Mutua General de Seguros 140.1 19,542 737 15.2 4.9 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on Revista del Sindicato Vertical del Seguro (1955) and Anuario Español del 
Seguro (1990). 
As far as productivity is concerned, and using the “premiums per employee” 
indicator in constant terms so as to avoid the fictitious rise due to inflation, it increased 
at an annual rate of 6.4 per cent between 1967 and 1982, the years for which it has 
been possible to draw up a homogeneous series. This rate of growth was clearly higher 
than that of the Spanish insurance sector as a whole, which stood at 3.6 per cent (see 
. 
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Table 4. Evolution of “Premiums per employee” in MAPFRE and the insurance 
sector as a whole. 1967, 1975 and 1982. (Thousands of pesetas) 
 1967 1975 1982 
 MAPFRE Sector MAPFRE Sector MAPFRE Sector 
Current prices 900 966 3,308 3,126 14,351 10,299 
Constant 
prices (1967) 
900 966 1,621 1,532 2,296 1,648 










    
Source: prepared by the authors based on MAPFRE's Annual Reports, Private Insurance Statistics (UNESPA) and Annual 
Statistics (National Insurance Union). Note: The CPI has been used to deflate the series. 
According to this productivity indicator, MAPFRE started from a level below the sector 
average in 1955, and managed to surpass it in 1975 (see Graph). In the mid-1980s the 
difference in favour of the company was already close to 40 per cent. 
Graph 1: MAPFRE's relative level of “premiums per employee” compared to 
the average for the Spanish sector 
 
Source: prepared by the authors based on MAPFRE's Annual Reports, Private Insurance Statistics (UNESPA) and Annual 
Statistics (National Insurance Union). 
 
MAPFRE's greater efficiency was acknowledged in internal reports in the mid-
1980s, estimating a management expense ratio of 30.5 per cent of premiums, more 
119 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter III Innovation and its results in Larramendi’s MAPFRE  
 
 
than 10 points lower than that of its main competitors, with the sole exception of 
Mutua Madrileña.265 
At the time of the liberalisation of rates in the sector, which occurred in 1985 
(Official State Gazette (BOE) of 21 January), MAPFRE had a very favourable competitive 
position, thanks to its higher levels of efficiency and productivity, lower average 
production costs and the differentiation of its products. It should be noted that at this 
time the large insurance companies, unlike MAPFRE, had a large bank behind them, 
which gave them a large captive insurance niche and their own financial muscle. 
Nevertheless, MAPFRE managed to surpass them all, positioning itself as the leader in 
its market.  
 
MAPFRE, A PROMOTER OF EFFICIENCY IN THE SPANISH INSURANCE SECTOR. 
  
Previous sections have analysed the significant improvement in efficiency 
achieved at MAPFRE de Larramendi thanks to its various innovative activities. It is 
important, however, to identify which economic agents benefitted from productivity 
improvements because the consequences on a country's economic welfare can be 
quite different, depending on how the results of technical progress are distributed.  
Thus, in monopolistic environments, productivity improvements often have an 
impact mainly by improving the remuneration of internal productive factors, capital, 
and workers. On the contrary, from a social perspective, it is appropriate that there are 
positive effects on customers, who will enjoy an improvement in the quality-price ratio 
of the service, increasing the “consumer surplus”. Whether the benefits of innovations 
are passed on to customers will depend on the market power of the innovating firm 
and the degree of competition to which it is subject. Highly competitive environments 
and rivalry between producers automatically lead to a pass-through of cost reductions 
to prices. On the contrary, a cartel structure, such as the one that had characterised 
the insurance sector in the first half of the twentieth century, will allow companies to 
improve their results without customers benefiting from technical progress. 
Unlike the widespread trend in the Spanish and European insurance sectors, 
which proposed syndication and the establishment of single rates,266 Larramendi 
always had firm convictions about the desirability of competition between insurers as 
a way to improve the competitiveness of the sector and provide a better service to 
policyholders.  
Generally, Larramendi was a strong advocate of trade and competition as an 
instrument for the improvement of economic efficiency at all levels. Thus, in his 1952 
book, Tres claves de la vida inglesa, he gives the following statement.  
 
265 Larramendi, I.  Chairman’s Report, 1984 
266 Pons Pons J. (2003): “Diversificación y cartelización en el seguro español: 1914 - 1935”,  Revista de Historia Económica, No. 3, 
págs. 567-592. 
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“Two effects of extraordinary public and political impact are achieved through trade: that in the life of the country 
those who are most suitable stand out . . . and that each person ends up being placed in the place which corresponds 
to them due to their natural conditions, and their aptitude is greater, since elsewhere it would be displaced” 267 
The mention of competition as a dynamic element of business efficiency is a 
constant in his writings.268 This was stated, for example, in 1965:269 
“A freely competitive regime is indispensable for the reform of enterprises with a low average level of technical 
organisation. A few years of so-called economic liberalisation have produced more effective business reforms than 
the exhortations of religious associations, such as this same Acción Social Patronal, the advice of economists, the 
diatribes of extremist politicians, and the array of provisions that have sought the same objective. 
Only with free competition will Spanish business be adequately reformed to become an efficient instrument that 
contributes to raising the economic level of our people... 
. . . The economic regime of free competition, although it can give rise to high remunerations and material 
satisfactions, is the most uncomfortable and hardest of all those that man can submit himself. The constant tension of 
struggle, the hardness of the decisions, that anyone can be an active or passive subject, demand an extraordinary and 
permanent effort. Regimes without freedom, even the most enslaving, are in many cases more comfortable. The 
tension of free competition is the current and future price of material wellbeing”. 
In 1977, he concluded his speech at the International Insurers' Club with seven 
recommendations, including:270 
“Avoid the temptation to eliminate free competition. The independent company is justified by the advantage offered 
by its action in market competition; if this disappears, its justification would cease. History, however, is dominated 
by the pressure of businessmen to reduce free competition, if possible with state protection, against the general 
interest.” 
In keeping with his convictions, he was an executive who sought competition 
and shunned corporate attitudes that protected the interests of the companies in the 
sector against those of the insured. This is how he stated it when referring to the 
situation in 1955. 
“The market was competitive but at the expense of policyholders, as there was a situation of single, compulsory 
rates maintained by distinguished insurers, more concerned with protecting themselves than offering their 
policyholders a service that could improve on that of their peers. I was always against it, I can quote the lecture I 
gave in 1949, at the School of Insurance, with my views on what should be done, in which I defended freedom of 
competition and freedom of rates. Naturally, my colleagues didn’t have much professional affection for me. What I 
defended then as an inspector of the Ministry of Finance I’ve always maintained and I maintain 
it now.271   
He adds:  
“In the 1950s and 1960s well-meaning people considered immoral the only thing that was moral to me, which was 
to break a compulsory rate or get rid of a cartel. I remember being accused by my colleagues of lack of solidarity, but 
I always maintained that what I was doing was the right thing, as is now generally accepted; today, however, what 
was then desirable isn’t even understood”.272    
Larramendi also explains MAPFRE's contribution to the liberalisation of fire 
insurance in the 1970s, which until then had been “cartelised” through the Vertical 
 
267 Larramendi I. H. (1952): Tres claves de la vida inglesa, Editorial Cálamo, p. 61 y ss.  
268 Without being exhaustive, the idea that competition must be encouraged is expressly stated in Larramendi (1965), Larramendi 
(1977), Larramendi (1994) and Larramendi (1997). 
269 Larramendi I. H. (1965):  Notas para la estructuración y reforma de la gran empresa, Paper presented at the course on 
“Reforma de la empresa”, organised by Acción Social Patronal de Madrid, 26-27 January. 
270 Larramendi I. H. (1977): “Empresa 78”, Lecture at the cycle organised in Madrid by the Club de Aseguradores Internacionales. 
271 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p. 253) 
272 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p.141) 
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Insurance Syndicate, since “MAPFRE believed in free competition and opposed 
agreements against the interests of policyholders”.273 
Equally significant is his speech at an event at the Directorate General of 
Insurance in 1984, where he denied that the difficulties experienced by some 
companies in the sector are the result of excessively low rates:274 
“In my opinion the level of motor rates is reasonably satisfactory and hopefully will remain so. I don’t agree with the 
widespread assertion that insufficient premiums in this line are the most important cause of some insurers' 
difficulties. I believe that if there are entities in difficult situations, it isn’t because they haven’t been able to apply 
sufficient rates (except perhaps in the medical assistance branch, with which I’ve never had any relationship), but 
fundamentally for other reasons: payment of unsustainable commissions, excessive level of expenses, failure to 
properly assess claims and lack of knowledge of the real results of each financial year, due to being deceived by the 
initial effect of a policy of delay in the payment of claims”. 
He concluded his speech by stating that the time of crisis is also: 
“a time of great opportunities for Spanish insurance and for those within it who have the vocation of free 
businessmen, those who genuinely believe in individual initiative, in freedom and in risk, who don’t complain about 
competition or governments and who don’t need “combinations” to the detriment of the public...” 
These convictions explain why MAPFRE left the sector's employers' association 
UNESPA in December 1980, following a series of frictions with this association, when 
the insurer refused to follow some of its guidelines, for example in the area of staff 
remuneration. Larramendi, on the other hand, always encouraged a good 
collaboration with ICEA, considering that training and research in the sector were 
fundamental elements to improve the competitiveness of Spanish insurance 
companies as a whole.  
MAPFRE thus broke the status quo in the insurance sector. According to the 
Economic Theory of Cartels, if firms competing in a market have similar cost structures 
it is unlikely that price rivalry will be reinforced. Therefore, no firm has an incentive to 
start a price war, as there is no clear winner. For this reason it is precisely companies 
with lower cost structures and/or those which have achieved an “differentiation 
advantage”, such as MAPFRE, which potentially have more interest in establishing a 
framework of free competition, avoiding collusion.  
With regards to relative costs, Larramendi stated in 1995 that “in motor 
insurance MAPFRE has reached a comprehensive management cost of less than 20 per 
cent, probably more than 10 points lower than the market average and more than 15 
points lower than that of many entities”.275 In the same vein, in 1997 he stated that in 
the Canary Islands motor insurance market, some companies suffered losses of 5 per 
cent on premiums, whilst MAPFRE achieved an operating profit of more than 5 per 
cent.276 
 
273 Larramendi, I. (2000): Así se hizo MAPFRE, Editorial Actas S.L. (p.319) 
274 Larramendi I. H. (1984): “El seguro en el mundo y en España”, [Lecture delivered at the Official Event of the Directorate General 
of Insurance, Madrid 10 May 1984]. 
275 Larramendi I. H. (1995): “Empresa y directivos en la España actual”, Instituto de Dirección y Organización de Empresas, Num.1, 
1st Quarter. 
276 Larramendi I. H. (1997): “Apertura del Encuentro” First Meeting of the Insurance Sector, IESE, Barcelona, 27 February. 
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Larramendi explained on several occasions the effects that leading companies 
have on the rest of the sector and the economy as a whole. Thus, in 1991 he stated:277 
“I call “leading company” those large companies, which reach an institutional character in its sector, coordinated 
with an aggressive commercial action and the will for greater penetration, with agility to adapt to each new change, 
absence of bureaucratisation and capacity for innovation and creation of new products or services at a prudent 
minimum cost”. 
“If a country wants to maintain or improve its economic balance and its presence and influence in the concert of 
peoples and nations, it needs to have a sufficient number of companies that meet these conditions in its main 
economic sectors”. 
Amongst the characteristics for the qualification of “leading company”, 
Larramendi points out that they must have:278 
“...competitive costs with regards to its colleagues, allowing them to offer reduced prices that contribute to lowering 
market averages and force other entities to follow the same line”. 
Subsequently, Larramendi used the distinction between “active” and “passive” 
companies. All of them are worthy according to him, but the active ones can serve as 
an engine, they’re locomotives of the economy, since they influence industrial quality, 
they can go abroad, and they promote free competition and with it the reduction of 
costs and improvement of quality.279 
We can conclude, therefore, that in the case of MAPFRE, the efficiency 
improvements achieved thanks to the innovative activity were mostly passed on to the 
company's millions of policyholders and mutual policyholders, and indirectly, to 
Spanish households and companies as a whole, since the rest of the insurance 
companies responded to the competition exercised by MAPFRE by imitating some of 
its measures and improvements in its offer.  
The insurance sector in the 1990s had a notable weight in the Spanish economy 
as a whole. In this sense, in 1995, Spanish household spending on insurance exceeded 
557,000 million pesetas (€3,350 million), whilst that of companies stood just above 
313,000 million pesetas (€1,880 million). The main branches of production demanding 
insurance in Spain in 1995 were the transport sector, construction, and the chemical 
industry (see Table 5).  
Table 5. Main sectors demanding insurance 
Sector Insurance 
expenditure 
Land transport and transport via pipelines 29,496 
Construction 24,986 
Chemical industry 16,192 
Rental of machinery and household goods 14,349 
 
277 Catalinas J. L. and Manzanos A. (1991): “Pensamiento empresarial”, in Ignacio H. de Larramendi y Montiano, MAPFRE. 
278 Catalinas J. L. and Manzanos A. (1991): “Pensamiento empresarial”, in Ignacio H. de Larramendi y Montiano, MAPFRE. 
279 Larramendi, I. H. (1994): “Empresa y crisis actual”, lecture delivered at the University of Albacete, 23 May 1994. 
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Retail trade; repair of personal effects 14,212 
Hotels and restaurants 12,753 
Wholesale trade and intermediaries 11,648 
Metallurgy 8,812 
Other 124,083 
Source: INE. Input-output tables 1995. 
In terms of the weight of insurance in total expenditure, the sectors with the highest 
demand for insurance were Machinery rental, Extraction of metallic minerals, Petroleum and 
Health (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Productive sectors with the highest insurance expenditure over 
production level 
Rental of machinery and household goods 7.9% 
Mining of metal ores 4.5% 
Forestry and logging  3.4% 
Crude oils, natural gas, uranium, and thorium 3.2% 
Health and welfare 3.2% 
Sea transport 2.9% 
Land transport and transport via pipelines 2.8% 
Ancillary activities  2.8% 
Research and development 1.9% 
Associative market activities 1.8% 
Gas production and distribution 1.7% 
Anthracite, hard coal, lignite, and peat 1.6% 
Recreation and culture 1.5% 
Coke ovens, refining and nuclear fuels 1.5% 
Fishing and aquaculture  1.4% 
Source: INE. Input-output tables 1995. 
Poor value for money in insurance implies a certain degree of inefficiency that 
will be passed on to the prices of Spanish companies, reducing the competitiveness of 
the industrial sector and the rest of the service branches. It should be pointed out in 
this respect that, unlike what happened with other branches of services, the studies 
conducted in regards to the Spanish insurance sector at the end of the twentieth 
century show that it was in line with other European countries. Although it is 
impossible for us to estimate the counterfactual scenario—what would have happened 
if MAPFRE and Larramendi's pro-competitive attitude hadn’t existed—we believe the 
available evidence allows us to affirm that the role played by this insurer in 
modernising and improving the efficiency of the Spanish insurance sector as a whole 
was decisive. 
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PhD José Manuel Muñoz Puigcerver 
 
                                       “MAPFRE's great success is to have been, at least in the insurance sector, the 
first Spanish company with a foreign vocation to become a multinational”280 
 





280 Vid. HERNANDO D E LARRAMENDI, I. (2000).  
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THE INTERNATIONALISATION PROCESS IN THE INSURANCE SECTOR. THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
  
When trying to understand the reasons that encourage a company to 
undertake an internationalisation process, we start from different models such as 
Coase's281 transaction costs model, Vernon's282 product life cycle, Hymer's283 industrial 
organisation theory, Uppsala's “gradualist” model, Rugman's284 risk diversification 
model or Porter's285 localisation model In MAPFRE's internationalisation, as we will 
show, the predictions of these different models have been fulfilled. 
The internationalisation process of a company has a series of characteristics 
common to all sectors and industries. Undoubtedly, the first step to take into account 
is the identification of the markets in which you want to operate. This is important not 
only when determining the proximity or remoteness of the country of destination in 
order to determine the transport costs of the product—a matter, for obvious reasons, 
less relevant in the service sector and therefore in the insurance industry, which 
concerns us—but also for conducting certain market studies that guarantee the sale of 
products abroad. In this phase, a PESTEL study is usually prescribed, examining the 
Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Ecological and Legal situation of the markets 
that could be of interest a priori in order to subsequently select the most suitable 
ones. 
In addition to the knowledge of the general characteristics of the new country 
in which we are going to sell our product, it is necessary to delve deeper into the 
specific characteristics of the market in which we are going to operate, especially—at 
least in the first exploratory phase—with regards to the state of the market concerning 
its dynamic process. From this perspective, we can find ourselves before the different 
stages of the product life cycle model, namely:  
 
• Introduction phase. The sales of the product in the market grow 
very slowly and don’t compensate the high initial investment made by the 
company, which is why its profitability is usually negative.  
 
• Growth phase This is the phase in which the company makes up 
for the losses incurred in the previous phase, as sales of the product 





281 Vid. COASE, R. H. (1937). 
282 Vid. VERNON, R. (1966). 
283 Vid. HYMER, S. (1976). 
284 Vid. RUGMAN, A. M. (1981).   
285 Vid. PORTER, M. E. (1990). 
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• Maturity phase Most of the potential consumers of the product 
have already purchased it, so sales will stabilise, growing at very slow rates 
until they reach a turning point where they will begin to decrease. In this 
phase, the investments made by the company in its attempt to maintain the 
product in the market are usually very high, for example, by making 
modifications to the initial characteristics that can provide new competitive 
advantages over its competitors.  
 
• Decline phase This is the final phase of a product in a given 
market, when sales growth has stagnated or even become negative, at 
which point the efforts made by the company to sustain the product are no 
longer profitable.  
 
In any case, the differentiation of the product with respect to those of the 
competition is essential. For this reason, the definition of a strategy is the next natural 
step after the selection of the target markets and, for this, it is best to carry out a 
SWOT analysis, i.e., an internal analysis to determine the weaknesses, threats, 
strengths, and opportunities of the company itself. This is where it is essential to take 
into account the possibility of minimising risks, such as different protectionist 
measures, existing trade agreements between the countries in question or specific 
market conditions such as interest rates and exchange rates. 
 
The service sector has a series of specific characteristics that must be taken into 
account when conducting an internationalisation process. Special attention should be 
paid to the fact that the insurance sector is sensitive to certain economic variables. 
This is what happens with inflation—generalising the financial sector as a whole—as 
the countries that experience significant price level increases will be less conducive to 
providing services as a creditor as they’re penalised in favour of borrowers. 
 
Preceding the product life cycle theory is Coase's theory, being based on 
transaction costs. Traditionally, this theory has been analysed from the legal 
perspective, assuming a synthesis between the more rational aspects of economics 
and the more formal aspects of law. This is because transaction costs are defined as 
those that need to be incurred in order to materialise any agreement, which, in 
practice, tends to be assimilated with contracting costs. However, transaction costs go 
beyond the purely legal and, as we define them, encompass any type of cost necessary 
to reach an agreement. 
 
By incorporating transaction costs we can be more aware of the important role 
they played in MAPFRE's internationalisation process, especially considering that the 
company's international expansion derived, to a large extent, from Larramendi's 
personal relationships. Without a predefined international development plan, MAPFRE 
started in Ibero-America when the Spanish market was starting to become too small, 
given that unlimited growth was one of its obsessions and, to this end, Larramendi 
took advantage of the numerous contacts he had to drive the process forward. Thus, 
the reduction of transaction costs was a key factor in the internationalisation led by 
Larramendi, as it made it possible to operate in the different markets from positions of 
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a certain competitive advantage. In-depth knowledge of the political and economic 
situation as well as of the insurance sector itself, in countries with similar cultural 
traits—including a common language—and with well-established friendships, enabled 
the exploitation of economies of scale materialised in fully trusted strategic partners. 
 
“I’ve always had an Americanist vocation, even before visiting it. My professional life has given me the possibility of 
applying it. I encouraged MAPFRE to set up in America. Many years ago, I thought that MAPFRE needed—and I 
perhaps needed—America. I don’t hide the fact that, together with the sentimental factor, there was another 
factor: this objective forced me to travel, to get to know new lands and new people, since perhaps my vocation has 
been more to make history than to study it, and the one I liked was created from personal and direct contact with 
new friends from other countries”.286 
 
The application of Hymer's theories of industrial organisation and the gradualist 
Uppsala model developed by Johanson and Valhne is also relevant to MAPFRE.287 
Hymer distinguishes between direct investment and portfolio investment, since the 
latter, unlike the former, is more sensitive to cyclical market circumstances—such as 
changes in interest rates—even if it doesn’t discriminate greatly between different 
types of business organisation across countries. However, in direct investment 
decisions, firms try to maximise their competitive advantages—through economies of 
scale or product differentiation—in order to try to control the output of the new 
market or, in other words, to obtain the largest possible market share. In order to 
maintain this position, the company will try to accumulate as many factors of 
production as possible, such as skilled labour, capital, or technology. 
 
The relationship between Hymer's postulates and MAPFRE's 
internationalisation process lies in the fact that the main motivation for the company is 
not to reduce costs—on the contrary, setting up in a new market usually entails 
additional costs, even if these are part of a medium or long-term investment plan—but 
rather to take advantage of the company's characteristics in other markets—its 
relative advantage—to maximise its potential market share. Larramendi himself was 
aware—and even stated so on occasion,288—that MAPFRE would never achieve 
anything if it didn’t leave Spain, and that is exactly what it did: the saturation of the 
Spanish market, in accordance with the industrial organisation model, motivated its 
own internationalisation.  
 
The internationalisation process of MAPFRE initiated by Larramendi was, 
basically, a personal commitment of his own, despite which being very controlled at all 
times. The strategy was very well planned by Editorial MAPFRE itself in order to 
minimise risks, something to which Hymer attaches great importance in the postulate 
of his theory regarding direct investment. Additionally, as mentioned above in 
reference to transaction costs, portfolio investment in local companies in which it 
gradually increased its shareholding until it took full control—several specific examples 
of this will be discussed later on—was a constant in this process. Thus, MAPFRE not 
only managed to penetrate a new market thanks to its strategic alliances, but also, in 
the end, eliminated potential competitors in order to obtain a sufficient market share 
 
286 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1994). 
287 Vid. JOHANSON, J. y VAHLNE, J. (1977). 
288 Santiago Gayarre y Andrés Jiménez. In-depth personal interview (14-2-2019). 
130 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
Chapter IV Larramendi in MAPFRE's internationalisation process 
 
 
that would eventually allow it to lead that new market. Hence, the internationalisation 
scheme initiated by Larramendi follows the guidelines of Hymer's theory of industrial 
organisation. 
 
The Uppsala model predicts that a given company will have a greater presence 
in a country the more knowledge it obtains of that country, a prediction that fits in 
perfectly with the line followed by MAPFRE in its commitment to reinsurance, precisely 
in order to obtain greater information on the markets in which it decides to operate.289 
Thus, gradually, the resources invested by the company will gradually increase as the 
accumulated experience and, therefore, the performance in dealing with local 
competition becomes more efficient.  
 
There is several specific evidence of Larramendi's commitment to reinsurance. 
Thus, in the report to the Directorate General dated 28 September 1974, 290 
Larramendi refers to the trip to Taipei to take part in the International Insurance 
Seminar as well as to Moscow, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Of these trips, he highlights the 
possible “productive” contacts established with the Ingrostach International group to 
obtain shares in the Russian reinsurance market as well as the progress in the 
relationship with various Japanese companies for this purpose. It is particularly 
revealing that, in the same report, he underlines the need to coordinate the opening 
towards South-east Asia with Latin America, a continent that would end up being the 
company's destination market par excellence.291    
 
This greater involvement in foreign markets has been one of MAPFRE's main 
hallmarks in the internationalisation process initiated by Larramendi, as the company 
never opted to establish itself directly in any country from the outset. Instead, they 
proceeded with a minimal investment in an existing company. Subsequently, the 
investment in the company increased until, finally, total control was achieved. In turn, 
the experience acquired in the consolidation in certain markets can be considered as a 
process that feeds back on itself since, despite the obvious and intrinsic differences 
between the different markets covered by the internationalisation process, the 
learning acquired in some countries can be applied in order not to make the same 
mistakes in others.   
 
It is also important to point out, with respect to the Uppsala model, the 
vocation of permanence in the new markets in which MAPFRE established itself, which 
is why information is particularly relevant when it comes to making a direct investment 
-which in turn is closely related to the Hymer model. Consequently, the information 
provided by reinsurance wasn’t only valuable in gauging the desirability of 
implementing certain investments but also in adjusting to the particularities and needs 
of individual countries. To this end, the ability to act flexibly is absolutely essential in a 
company that aspires to industry leadership. This flexibility was particularly put to the 
test in Ibero-America since, in the words of MAPFRE America Chairman Rafael Casas, 
“MAPFRE's internationalisation in Latin America has been a learning process”.292 
 
289 Sebastián Homet Duprá. In-depth personal interview (10-12-2018). 
290 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1972 - 1985). Report 28-6-74, p. 4. 
291 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1972–1985). 
292 Vid. Casas, R. (2010). 
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MAPFRE's involvement in the target markets, beyond mere speculative investments, 
has been another of the hallmarks of the internationalisation that Larramendi had 
implemented. 
 
This vocation of MAPFRE to remain in the Ibero-American markets, as will be 
seen below, is part of the context of the responsibility which, in a way, Larramendi 
believed Spain should exercise in those territories with which it shares unbreakable 
historical ties and interests far beyond the economic sphere. The social work 
Larramendi thought should be carried out on that continent is still part of MAPFRE's 
corporate culture today. By hiring local staff and training them, innovating and 
transferring knowledge through MAPFRE's different operating units—decentralised 
and autonomous—Larramendi not only sought to ensure the solvency of investments 
with consolidated returns but also to contribute to the development of the 
communities in which MAPFRE operates in its most diverse dimensions.  
 
A foretaste of Larramendi's Americanist passion can be found in what is 
probably his most heartfelt definition of Ibero-America:293 
 
“What is Ibero-America?....your identity, mine, it is important because it takes into account the human soul, it is less 
impregnated with selfishness, and it has allowed a civilisation that is not of  “purely me” but of the “you”; of 
brotherhood and solidarity because it hasn’t in vain managed to maintain its Christian roots”. 
 
It is worth mentioning two other relevant theories on international trade, those 
of Rugman and Porter. With regards to the first, the way companies proceed in 
international markets when they make a direct investment doesn’t differ so much 
from when they make a portfolio investment, since they act using the same principle 
as a guide: risk diversification. Thus, internationalisation should be carried out in 
markets whose interdependence is as low as possible -the greater the degree of 
heterogeneity, the lower the risk of correlations- in order to minimise possible 
negative impacts on the company in hypothetical negative situations. Therefore, 
geographical, cultural, sociological, and economic diversification—from a structural 
perspective—is decisive when selecting target markets.  
 
Given the potential risk involved in Larramendi's strategy of entering markets 
with unstable economic conditions, the requirement for diversification was more 
imperative than ever. This will, in fact, be the reason for the decision to make a strong 
commitment to Europe after MAPFRE's presence was already a reality in the most 
powerful Ibero-American markets. The European markets were highly mature and had 
little scope for expansion compared to the scope for growth offered by the American 
continent. Nevertheless, the need to face the more established competition from the 
Old Continent was successfully fulfilled. Furthermore, although it didn’t represent a 
turning point in the internationalisation process itself, Spain's membership of the EEC 
from 1986 onwards made it easier to establish itself in those countries that made up 
the common market. 
 
 
293 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1989b). 
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It was clear to Larramendi that for MAPFRE to continue to grow, it had to 
operate abroad, which is why, when the Spanish market became too small, he decided 
to make the leap to Ibero-America.294 However, when it came to selecting the specific 
markets to be targeted, he wasn't guided by economic criteria alone. 
 
As for Porter's theory, it can be seen as a derivative of his famous diamond 
model and its five forces applied to international trade. In an attempt to explain the 
comparative advantage of companies, Porter sheds light on the determining role 
played in the establishment of companies abroad by circumstances as diverse as 
differences in the number of productive factors, geography, climate, infrastructure, 
and the skills of the workforce. Porter also includes exogenous factors in his model 
such as differences in administrative rules or, simply, luck. In MAPFRE's case, this 
somewhat “random” component in the selection of markets is evident. 
 
We must not forget the importance that Porter also gives to supply in the 
internationalisation strategy, that is, the decision to go abroad when the domestic 
market is considered mature and market shares remain relatively stable—which makes 
business growth extremely difficult—as well as the relationships between the different 
companies -also in the different links of the production chain- in the target markets, all 
of which are dealt with in the case of MAPFRE's internationalisation process 
undertaken by Larramendi.    
 
The crucial role played by innovation in business growth and development as 
well as training, is well known. Larramendi saw this clearly from the beginning and 
MAPFRE managed to stand out in a very stagnant insurance market in Spain, according 
to his own opinion.295 
If we delve even more specifically into the field of insurance companies, a good 
entry strategy in the country of destination may be to opt for reinsurance, as MAPFRE 
did, since this option allows the company with internationalisation intentions, to 
obtain greater knowledge of the market in which it wishes to operate. In fact, in Spain, 
the insurance sector internationalised very little during the twentieth century, with the 
exception of the reinsurance market niche.296 
 
In the last 20 years there have been a series of factors that have led to a boom 
in the internationalisation of the service sector in Spain:297 
 
• Entry of foreign capital, especially from the European Union. 
 
• Improvement in the level of training and skills development of 
human resources 
 
• The prominent role played by R&D&I in the promotion and 
expansion of the service sector.  
 
294 Sebastián Homet Duprá. In-depth personal interview (10-12-2018). 
295 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1985). 
296 Vid. GARCÍA-RUIZ, J. L. and CARUANA, L. (2009). 
297 Vid. RUBALCABA, L. and MAROTO, A. (2008). 
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Once the theoretical framework on the internationalisation of insurance 
companies has been analysed, including the most decisive factors of the process in 
Spain in recent years, we have established the reference from which, in the following 
sections, we can analyse the context of the insurance sector in Spain and, therefore, 
the context in which MAPFRE operated in order to identify the differentiating feature 
between the theoretical basis and the implementation of the process carried out by 
Larramendi.  
 
“Spain has been an important part of the old Europe and should be an important part of modern Europe. MAPFRE 
wants to contribute, within its limited means, to ensure that Spain isn’t a second-class country and that it not only 
knows how to receive but also knows how to give and contribute actively with original business and technological 
ideas and applications”.298 
 
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONALISATION IN THE SPANISH INSURANCE SECTOR 1955 - 1990. 
 
The end of the period between 1955 and 1990 in the Spanish insurance sector 
will be clearly marked by Spain's entry into the EU in 1986. In fact, the 1950s were 
conditioned by the ups and downs in the ownership of capital in the sector during the 
previous decades. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 40 per cent of the 
Spanish insurance market was controlled by foreign capital, a situation that took an 
abrupt turn in the 1940s as a result of the autarkic economic policy imposed by 
Franco's regime immediately after the Civil War. The policy's rejection of foreign 
capital caused the aforementioned 40 per cent figure to drop to 20 per cent in 1942.299 
 
This situation changed in 1952 when the limitations on the entry of foreign 
capital were eliminated—at that date, the percentage had already fallen to 15 per 
cent—and, in fact, the Insurance Law passed in 1954 was “very liberal, even careless, 
with the sector”.300 At this time, Spanish insurance companies didn’t have sufficient 
capacity to operate in other countries in competition with much more efficient 
companies. The only exceptions were La Unión and El Fénix Español, a leader in the 
insurance sector in Spain at the time and which became strong in Paris. This was 
somewhat logical, on the other hand, considering that when it was established in 1864 
60% of its capital was French-.301 Only La Estrella tried to compete with MAPFRE when 
it came to spearheading the internationalisation process. However, it failed in the 
attempt, whilst just the opposite occurred with MAPFRE.302 
 
During the Transition in Spain, the economic crisis that the country experienced 
was a major stumbling block that insurance companies had to face. However, the 
situation was much more bearable for MAPFRE, which climbed steadily until it reached 
 
298 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1989a). 
299 Vid. GARCÍA-RUIZ, J. L. and CARUANA, L. (2009). 
300 Vid. GARCÍA-RUIZ, J. L. and CARUANA, L. (2009). 
301 Vid. GUTIÉRREZ, J. A. y MARTÍNEZ F. J. (2014). 
302 Vid. GARCÍA, J. L. (2017). 
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national leadership in 1983, most particularly thanks to the independence it enjoyed. 
Until then, insurance companies were linked to banks such as La Unión and Fénix, 
which belonged to Banesto, or La Estrella, to Banco Hispano Americano. At that point, 
the way was clear to begin an internationalisation process which, in order to continue 
to grow and be a leader, was inevitable.303 
 
A fundamental aspect of the beginnings of MAPFRE's internationalisation was 
the need to accompany Spanish companies, both large and medium-sized, in their 
need for insurance, which during the 1960s were beginning to seek new markets 
thanks to the process of opening up Spain at that time. The lack of international 
experience of most of the national companies made them a natural customer when 
undertaking these new projects. It is therefore unavoidable to link the moment in 
which MAPFRE internationalises to the economic and social situation that Spain was 
experiencing in that period.  
 
On the other hand, Larramendi perfectly understood that, for a company to 
achieve leadership in its sector, it was crucial to obtain a relevant competitive 
advantage through specialisation and economies of scale, an aspect in which 
Larramendi managed to open a decisive gap with respect to its competitors. His 
obsession for the constant growth of the company, together with his constant desire 
to lead the sector, led him to take the decision to internationalise MAPFRE, focusing, 
as will be seen below, on Ibero-America, the choice of this region being more for 
sentimental than strategic reasons. 
 
This inseparable relationship between leadership and internationalisation is 
clear in Larramendi's thinking. In fact, in a lecture given in Sao Paolo in November 
1983, he describes as a “new company” . . . “that leading company which a country 
needs in each area of activity, to achieve, if it does so broadly and as a whole, internal 
economic balance and influential international presence”, pointing out, moreover, as 
one of the characteristics of any “leading company” the “vocation for growth and, if 
necessary, foreign expansion to participate in the objective of international 
presence”.304 
 
An insurance company that doesn’t internationalise can’t be a leader and, in 
order to materialise this unavoidable need, as analysed in the theoretical introduction, 
domestic demand emerged as one of the key factors. The Spanish insurance market in 
the 1950s and '60s was clearly insufficient to meet the expectations Larramendi had 
placed in MAPFRE's expansion. The structure of the Spanish insurance market was 
therefore decisive in at least two ways: 
 
• On one hand, a demand made up of demanding buyers who 
know the characteristics of the products they purchase is an important 
component of the increase in competitiveness of companies, since this type 
of customer tends to put pressure on national companies to raise the 
quality of the goods offered and, if possible, at increasingly competitive 
 
303 Vid. TORTELLA, G. (2000). 
304 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1983). 
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prices. In the light of what has been said so far, this wasn’t the case in the 
Spanish market, where the insurance culture was rather scarce and, as a 
consequence, resulted in a very stagnant market. Larramendi, as a pioneer 
in the modernisation of the insurance industry, was fully aware of the 
limited incentives that the Spanish market provided to aspire to increase 
the efficiency of the company. 
 
• On the other hand, the size of the market also contributes to the 
achievement of decisive economies of scale. Obtaining a critical mass of 
potential customers, with the consequent increase in market share, 
provides the necessary stimulus to carry out the relevant investments that 
will lead to the modernisation of the sector through technical change. For 
this reason, Larramendi considered that Spain's membership of the 
European Union would act as the boost that the Spanish insurance market 
needed.    
 
“For international markets and for multinational activities, regional monetary units are important, which always 
imply a loss of national sovereignty, as Europe is feeling in its process towards a single currency”.305 
 
With few resources and using above all his intelligence, his business acumen 
and, above all, his contacts—he became close friends with key businessmen who 
helped to introduce MAPFRE in their respective markets and to make the brand 
internationally known—Larramendi never doubted that a strong MAPFRE abroad 
would also contribute to the economic and social development of Spain. In fact, he 
made this clear in many of his writings. 
 
“Spain has been an important part of the old Europe and should be an important part of modern Europe. MAPFRE 
wants to contribute, within its limited means, to ensure that Spain isn’t a second-class country and that it not only 
knows how to receive but also knows how to give and contribute actively with original business and technological 
ideas and applications”.306 
Some of these contacts are expressly mentioned in the reports made to the 
Board. For example, in the one dated 28 June 1979, Larramendi expressly refers to the 
trip he made to the American continent to participate in the General Meeting of the 
company Aseguradora Nuevo Mundo S.A. with the aim of strengthening the position of 
the stake that MAPFRE Internacional held in that company. The same report also 
mentions his participation, as chairman of a Working Group, in the International 
Insurance Seminar also held in Dallas in 1979, thanks to which he managed to increase 
his contacts in the United States, specifically to participate in a Syndicate of 
reinsurance acceptors that was to be created in New York.307 
It is worth analysing in a little more detail the relationship established by 
Larramendi with some of the key figures in certain countries in order to better 
understand not only the process by which MAPFRE entered these new markets but 
also to link, by way of a common thread, with the success that the insurer is achieving 
 
305 Vid.  LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1992). 
306 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1992). 
307 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1972 - 1985). Report 28-6-79, p. 3. 
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today in many of these countries. A clear example of this is Brazil, where in 2018 it 
managed to strengthen its strategic alliance with Banco de Brasil, which dates back to 
2011-. However, MAPFRE's interest in the Rio de Janeiro market originated in 1971 
when, during Larramendi's first visit to Rio de Janeiro, he had the opportunity to make 
friends with Leonidio Riveiro Filho, CEO of Sulamérica, the most important Brazilian 
insurance company at the time. Additionally, Larramendi had already established a 
relationship with the chairman of Sulamérica, Antonio Sánchez de Larragoiti, and with 
his father, who had lived in Madrid.308 
This pattern was repeated in many countries, especially in Ibero-America. 
Although the list of contacts harvested by Larramendi in the American continent is 
innumerable, it is worth mentioning some of the most outstanding ones. For example, 
in Argentina, the participation in Aconcagua was possible after having deepened its 
relationship with Luis Orcoyen, founder of the National Reinsurance Institute -INDER- 
and chairman of Aconcagua itself.309 Closely linked to the Argentine market was that of 
Paraguay, where MAPFRE continues to enjoy a high reputation today. In fact, in 2019, 
Zaida Gabas de Requena, the CEO of MAPFRE PARAGUAY, was chosen as the 
businesswoman of the year by the Spanish Chamber of Commerce in Paraguay, the 
first woman to win such an award. In Larramendi's own words about Paraguay: “... is a 
little jewel of MAPFRE in Ibero-America”.310 
Larramendi's friendships in Colombia were also key. Some of the most 
prominent were Efrén Ossa, director of Compañía Central—dependent on the Banco 
Central Hipotecario de Colombia—Luciano Herrera, of Colombiana Seguros, Ariel 
Jaramillo, of the company Agrícola del Banco Cafetero, Bernardo Botero, of Colmena—
belonging to the Grupo Social de los Jesuitas in Colombia—or Andrés Restrepo 
Posadas, chairman of UNIAPAC in Colombia. This last case is particularly relevant 
because it shows how Larramendi took advantage of the influence derived from his 
membership of this ecumenical organisation for Christian businessmen.311 
Finally, we can also highlight the personalities Larramendi met in Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Peru. In the first case, the figure of Manuel Gómez Linares, secretary of 
the Asociación de Aseguradores Mexicanos (AMIS), was important. In Venezuela, 
Pedro Manuel Arcaya, director of the company Caracas, should be mentioned. In Peru, 
he established a relationship with René Corpancho, the CEO of Reaseguradora 
Peruana.312 
We will now examine in greater detail the choice made by Larramendi for the 
internationalisation of MAPFRE, with special emphasis on the profound twinning 
relationship he felt between Spain and Ibero-America, which is why MAPFRE's 
presence on the American continent was so intense. 
 
 
308 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 646. 
309 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), pp. 643-644.  
310 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 645. 
311 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 650 
312 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), pp. 651-652, 654. 
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“Nobody in 1970 believed in Ibero-America, and even less in the insurance sector, reinsurers avoided it, a mistake 
that MAPFRE didn’t make, because for the most part they worked with intermediaries, without direct contact with 
each assignor, whilst MAPFRE decided to do it personally, with higher travel expenses, but a more specific, personal 
approach to customers, along the lines that had been followed since the nineteenth century by the world's leading 
reinsurers, especially Munich Re and Switzerland Reinsurance”313 
 
THE IMPRINT OF IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI 
ON MAPFRE'S GLOBALISATION PROCESS 
 
Larramendi's personality, embodied in his leadership skills, was amply reflected 
in the internationalisation process that MAPFRE underwent during his tenure. From a 
personal point of view, we could define Larramendi as a charismatic and accessible 
leader, characteristics that are completely essential to understand his wide network of 
contacts in  Ibero-America, which ultimately allowed MAPFRE to make the leap to the 
American continent. From a business standpoint, he was a visionary and highly 
innovative leader who took risks under the premise of inevitability for the continued 
growth and expansion of the company, both of which were his great obsession. The 
decision to land in Ibero-America, a continent that in the 1980s was suffering a serious 
debt crisis, is framed both by the cultural proximity to these peoples and by the desire 
to strengthen ties with Hispano-America. 
 
“Spain and Portugal will inevitably be a meeting point between the EEC and Ibero-America, as Britain has been with 
the United States and the English-speaking world”.314 
 
It should be noted that his passion for the American continent led him to 
publish several works related to it, including Utopía de la Nueva América. Reflexiones 
para la Edad Universal, as well as a series of books published under the title of 
Colecciones MAPFRE 1492, were written on the occasion of the celebration of the fifth 
centennial of the discovery of the New World. In fact, prior to this time—specifically, in 
1988—Larramendi had initiated the Fundación MAPFRE America project, within the 
framework of which the aforementioned Colecciones were published, resulting in a 
compendium of more than 250 works carried out by 330 historians from more than 40 
countries.  The subjects covered in the books published in the Colecciones, were 
diverse but were all related to the great historical events that occurred in 1492. For 
this reason, in addition to the milestones related to the discovery of America, others as 
significant as the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, Al-Andalus or issues related to the 
Maghreb are included. 
 
In the aforementioned Utopía de la Nueva América. Reflexiones para la Edad 
Universal, he made clear in the same prologue his vision of the objective of these 
publications, basically aimed at giving back to Ibero-America at least part of what it 
contributed to us. For this reason, the main activity of Fundación MAPFRE America 
consisted of promoting, through different activities of both a scientific and artistic 
nature, the twinning and solidarity between the different Ibero-American peoples. 
 
313 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 643. 
314 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1985). 
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Although the book belongs to the aforementioned Colecciones, Larramendi himself 
indicated that, although the books published in them refer to the past, with Utopia he 
made an exception and projected the analysis into the future. 
 
“. . . this book is an exception and looks to the future, to what may be the New America of the twenty-first century 
and of the third millennium, that of two neighbours, enemies and friends, condemned to live and survive together, 
forming a continental unit that is destined to strengthen reciprocal ties, not forgetting their historical and future 
relations with their homeland and with Europe. Spain, being in it, is split to the point that America, at least the part 
twinned by the language, really begins in the Pyrenees, although Europe ends in Gibraltar, whilst Anglo-America 
could be thought to begin in the English Channel”.315 
 
There were reasons to advise against the American market as a destination for 
MAPFRE's investments. Without going any farther, in Brazil in the middle of the 
twentieth century, there was a hyperinflation that particularly affected the insurance 
industry, and it wasn’t until 1986 that foreign capital was allowed to enter the 
country's insurance companies. Despite the economic problems that Brazil was going 
through, MAPFRE, thanks to Larramendi's determination, was one of the pioneers in 
having a presence in the Brazilian market that same year. Also, in 1986, MAPFRE 
entered Argentina, a country where the insurance sector didn’t begin to deregulate 
until 1991. And, in this case too, Larramendi's Americanist strategy had to cope with 
galloping inflation, which would reach price increases of up to 3,000 per cent in 1989. 
The same could be said of other countries in the region such as Nicaragua, Bolivia, 
Peru, or the aforementioned Brazil, which had an inflation rate of 2,700 per cent in 
1993.316 In the specific case of Argentina, MAPFRE's journey began with the acquisition 
of the Aconcagua insurance company which, in 1986, occupied 42nd place in the 
Argentine market, with a 0.63 per cent market share.317 
 
In Chile, on the other hand, private initiative in the insurance sector was 
allowed earlier, in 1980. This country is a clear example of how Larramendi used 
reinsurance to enter the markets of Ibero-American countries. In 1931, the Caja 
Reaseguradora was created in Chile and reinsurance was compulsory until it was sold 
to MAPFRE in 1989. The situation in Mexico could also be considered somewhat 
better, as the country had enjoyed great economic development during the two and a 
half decades prior to MAPFRE's presence in the North American country. 318 
 
It should be noted that MAPFRE's internationalisation process, although led by 
Larramendi at all times, was possible thanks to the involvement of the various teams 
that carried it out in each country. Although it is true that the workforces were made 
up of local workers, Larramendi looked for reliable people with a consolidated track 
record in the company to start each project. Some examples are Rafael Casas in 
Venezuela, when he was manager in Alicante or Alfredo Fernández Larrea in Colombia, 
when he was manager in Valencia.319 
 
 
315 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1992), p.19. 
316 Vid. FADUL, W. R. (2010). 
317 https://www.mapfre.com.ar/seguros-ar/sobre-mapfre-argentina/historia/30-anos-argentina/ 
318 Vid. FADUL, W. R. (2010). 
319 Santiago Gayarre. Phone Interview. 26-6-2020. 
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This particular human resources policy abroad was quite characteristic of 
MAPFRE. Unlike in the banking sector, where entire families were “disembarked” in 
the country where the new operations were to be undertaken, Larramendi preferred 
to propose individual candidates with sufficient experience. This was the case with 
Santiago Gayarre, who left the Canary Islands to execute MAPFRE's expansion in 
Argentina. According to Gayarre himself, the beginnings were extremely hard, as they 
started by acquiring the aforementioned Aconcagua at a time when its most qualified 
personnel had been hired by competing companies and when, in addition, 
technological resources were scarce. Precisely in this last respect, MAPFRE Soft was 
created in 1986, a company that would manage MAPFRE's software not only in 
Argentina, but throughout Ibero-America.320   
 
Consequently, what was in Larramendi's opinion one of MAPFRE's major 
shortcomings—information technology—began to be mitigated in the international 
arena. In fact, according to Larramendi:321  
 
“IT is the main factor of weakness that concerns us (...). This is our main challenge because, in IT, movements and 
changes are slow and it takes many years to correct any mistakes, and because our starting point isn’t at the same 
level as MAPFRE's other achievements”. 
 
The relevance of cultural factors in the internationalisation process of 
companies has been highlighted by several authors. This is the case with J. J. Duran,322 
for whom Ibero-America should be the natural destination for Spanish companies 
wishing to venture into new markets. J. Noya also highlights some of the advantages of 
this relationship with the American continent:323 
 
• The image of Spanish companies in Ibero-American countries is 
extremely good, with a high level of confidence in the products they offer, 
although there are differences between countries.324 
 
• There is a good general perception of the country's economy.  
 
• The difference in the level of development existing in Spain and 
the Ibero-American countries is also perceived by the latter as an 
opportunity to improve economic conditions in the region. 
 
Precisely, this last aspect also acquired a special importance in the decisions 
that Larramendi chose to execute in Ibero-America since, instead of entering the 
continent through the acquisition of consolidated companies, he advocated the 
contribution of a certain know-how that would contribute to a substantial increase in 
the welfare of these countries. The feeling of responsibility towards those territories 
with which Spain had historically maintained unbreakable ties was a determining 
factor for Larramendi. In this sense, several of his statements are more than 
 
320 Santiago Gayarre. Phone Interview. 26-6-2020. 
321 Vid. VARIOS (1983), p. 221. 
322 Vid. DURAN, J. J. (1999). 
323 Vid. NOYA, J. (2003). 
324 Vid. NOYA, J. (2009). 
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significant, making clear, moreover, his absolute conviction that cultural aspects such 
as language represented an important competitive advantage.   
 
“...those of us who spoke Spanish and Portuguese had superiority [in Ibero-America] over the English-speaking 
competitors, because we represented the same understanding of the world”.325 
      
It was in 1969 when MAPFRE's Board of Directors approved as an objective “the 
start of a policy of expanding operations outside the national territory” during the 
1970s, choosing the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries as the most suitable 
ones to carry it out.326 Thus, the acquisition of small stakes in companies in the sector 
began, in addition to initiating reinsurance operations in MAPFRE Industrial. This 
second fact was especially relevant in the internationalisation process, since the 
volume of reinsurance increased to such an extent that it was decided to found the 
company MAPREA to manage these operations. Thus, MAPREA contributed greatly to 
the expansion of MAPFRE Industrial's reinsurance. In fact, the success was such that, of 
the premium volume of 2,000 million pesetas reached in 1981, 80% came from outside 
Spain and only 20% came from the domestic market.327 
 
Finally, in 1981, MAPFRE Reaseguro was created, an entity that would begin 
operations in 1982 under the management of José Manuel Martínez, with the same 
management team as MAPREA and the business segments established by MAPFRE 
Industrial. Its headquarters were established in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, a 
geographical symbol that served as a link between the three continents designated as 
the main frameworks for action: Europe, America, and Africa.328 MAPFRE International 
had already been established in 1976, which was the first international step from 
reinsurance to insurance. The company was established in 1976 with capitalisation of 
50 million pesetas, which rose to a total of 14,893 million pesetas of equity in 1990.329  
 
Likewise, the trips made by Larramendi as CEO to Ibero-American countries 
were decisive in making the MAPFRE brand more widely known. For example, taking 
advantage of the invitation received to attend the II Pan-American Congress of 
Insurance Law and the Hemispheric Insurance Conference held in Buenos Aires and 
Viña del Mar in 1969, he took the opportunity to visit most of the countries of the 
continent.330 
 
Larramendi, in fact, became better known in America than in Spain and took 
advantage of his personal contacts to introduce MAPFRE to those markets. Moreover, 
aware of the high risk generally involved in investing abroad, his strategy was clearly 
conservative. This is what he said in 1989:  331 
 
“Within this framework, we are developing our international strategy, which is the result of intense and tenacious 
work in this “decade of the 1980s”, based on our own people, on our friends and on companies with a clear and 
 
325 Vid. LARARMENDI, I. H. (2000). 
326 Vid. VARIOS (1983), pp. 151-152.  
327 Vid. VARIOS (1983), p. 152. 
328 Vid. VARIOS (1983), p. 153. 
329 Vid. Pons, J. (2017) 
330 Vid. VARIOS (1983), pp. 153. 
331  
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solid situation, without risky or high-cost acquisitions..... Our investments have all been made directly, without 
“crossovers”, as I said before, without debt, amortising all acquisition costs in each financial year, including Life 
insurance, exclusively with our own funds, and therefore without risk for policyholders, as we don’t use the 
“technical reserves” for this purpose and, also, without our dividends having arisen from updates or realisations”. 
 
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the first economic activity carried out on 
that continent was through the editorial MAPFRE, whose main activity was the sale of 
insurance manuals. Hence, the MAPFRE brand began to open up its small market 
niche, ceasing to be a complete stranger to potential customers. The second step, 
reinsurance, allowed market penetration in a much more consistent and solid way by 
obtaining key industry information in each country. This was done by offering 
reinsurance training in exchange for small shares in the companies. 
 
“It is logical that reinsurance should be a major player in the globalisation process of insurance, especially when one 
notes the resistance of national markets, with and without government influence, to the prominent presence of 
direct insurers from other countries”.332 
 
Some evidence of the important role that the MAPFRE publishing house played 
in the internationalisation process can be found in the express mentions that 
Larramendi makes of it in some of the reports to the Board. For example, in that of 23 
October 1977, referring to an internal training plan that would cover both MAPFRE 
Industrial and Editorial MAPFRE, he states that this plan would consist of the 
publication of 12 texts, under the name of Textos MAPFRE, which would deal, in a 
didactic manner, with various aspects related to the particularities of companies in the 
insurance sector. These texts would be given to those who participated in the 
aforementioned training process with the intention of extending it to Hispano-America 
and facilitating the sale of these 12 publications on the American continent. Hence, the 
MAPFRE brand was growing in visibility by enabling other insurance companies to 
access its own published material.333 
 
Editorial MAPFRE also had a significant impact as a publishing house 
specialising in insurance in other parts of the world. With reference to Europe, without 
going any farther, Larramendi mentions, also in one of his reports to the Board of 
Directors dated, in this case, 25 September 1980, the possible collaboration in the 
French edition of the Fire Protection Manual, which had already been published in 
Spanish by the same publishing house. In turn, with regards to the United States, 
Larramendi mentioned certain meetings held with various executives of the National 
Fire Protection Association (N.F.P.A.) for the expansion of Editorial MAPFRE in that 
country.334   
 
Also relevant is Larramendi's involvement with UNIAPAC—Unión Cristiana 
Internacional de Ejecutivos de Empresa (International Christian Union of Business 
Executives)—a Christian organisation with an ecumenical vocation for men and women 
in business that allowed Larramendi to establish a considerable network of contacts. 
UNIAPAC's objectives were perfectly aligned with Larramendi's humanist pretensions, 
considering that capitalism is a powerful tool for development as long as it is guided by 
 
332 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1984). 
333 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1972–1985). Report 23-10-77, p. 5. 
334 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1972–1985). Report 25-9-80, p. 4. 
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principles of social justice. In his view, the constant pursuit of corporate profit is not, in 
itself, indicative of the contribution made to society. Throughout the entire 
internationalisation process, Larramendi would always bear this principle in mind.   
 
“Capitalism needs corrective principles that are put into practice by business leaders capable of operating new 
combinations of the economic and the social until a harmony of justice is achieved”.335 
 
Thus, it could be said that what is nowadays known as corporate social 
responsibility was the cornerstone of MAPFRE's internationalisation strategy devised 
by Larramendi. Aspects such as the brand or customer loyalty through the trust 
generated with the insured were the signs of identity pursued by him, in order to 
establish a lasting and stable presence in the target markets. Hence, a virtuous circle is 
generated that leads to an increase in business competitiveness and, in turn, 
strengthens its position in the market whilst instilling greater certainty in potential 
customers. It was not, therefore, a task conceived from a merely altruistic perspective: 
the responsibility that Spain had acquired with Ibero-America was an opportunity that 
a businessman with Larramendi's intuition shouldn’t let slip away. 
 
Furthermore, this virtuous circle also operated in a second direction since, by 
increasing the size of the market and acquiring sufficient economies of scale, the 
resources available and, therefore, the investments that MAPFRE could make were 
greater, which allowed it to have an impact on a more inclusive business model. The 
capital used for this could be considered as an investment in itself since, by focusing on 
the needs of local communities and the personal and local development of those 
groups with more difficulties in accessing the insurance market, the target segment 
increased considerably. Today, public pressure for corporate social responsibility to be 
incorporated as a matter of course in the business policies of multinationals has led 
many businessmen to choose this path. However, the merit is even greater when, like 
Larramendi, the strategy is applied at a time when corporate social responsibility 
wasn’t in vogue.  
 
“. . . great economic power without social responsibility leads to formulas of wild and anti-social capitalism such as 
the one that appears and can dominate the western economic world”.336 
 
Starting from scratch in a new market was excessively onerous, hence the 
importance of Larramendi's leadership skills in reaching agreements with strategic 
partners. The ultimate objective was to be present in these markets and, since the 
necessary economic resources weren’t available to acquire companies in their entirety, 
the participation in them would begin as a minority and would gradually grow. 
Furthermore, not only with the aim of saving costs but also for purely operational 
reasons, when MAPFRE finally acquired its first premises in third countries, it would 
respect the work teams of the acquired company, a practice it would continue to carry 
out over time.  
Table 7. Number of MAPFRE employees by country in 2019. 
 
335 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1982). 
336 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1989c). 
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Source: MAPFRE. Integrated report 2019. 
 
The first office opened in 1984, in Mexico, with a Mexican team.337 This fact, 
however, didn’t prevent, in order to maintain MAPFRE's philosophy, staff from Spain 
from travelling frequently to the different offices that were being opened abroad to 
train local staff and also to transmit the austere character that characterised 
Larramendi. 
 
A good example of the latter were the seminars and symposiums held from 24 
to 29 September 1984 in Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile on protection 
and prevention, with the participation of Spanish speakers, of whom Larramendi 
highlights in his report to the Board of 23 October 1984 the high quality of these 
seminars and symposiums, as well as their high participation, estimated by himself at 
between 400 and 600 attendees per country. In fact, he was so pleased with the 
success in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile that he planned to repeat these events the 
following year in Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia. Hence, Larramendi managed not 
only to make the MAPFRE brand more widely known to the rest of the world, with 
special emphasis on what for him has always been Ibero-America but also to 
contribute to the association of the brand with the quality that is imprinted by the 
concern for training. As indicated above, his interest in what we understand today as 
corporate social responsibility was one of his great hallmarks and, without doubt, one 
of his great legacies, without which it would be impossible to understand the role that 
MAPFRE plays today at a global level.338 
 
 
337 Santiago Gayarre y Andrés Jiménez. In-depth personal interview (14-2-2019). 
338 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (1972–1985). Report 23-10-84, p. 4. 
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The above-mentioned Schumpeterian character is key to distinguish MAPFRE's 
current way of operating, in which it does manage to acquire companies at 100 per 
cent. Larramendi's intuition, that instinct which distinguishes the businessman who 
takes risks when entering new markets, can’t be separated, in order to better 
understand the internationalisation process, from the closeness he exuded in his 
constant travels around the world, thanks to which he earned the admiration and 
respect wherever MAPFRE was established. 
 
Precisely, the trips made by Larramendi were so frequent that they deserve to 
be analysed in greater detail. Even before the internationalisation process, during the 
1950s and 1960s, professional trips throughout Spain in search of talent were 
abundant. Nevertheless, the trips to London, Paris and, above all, the one made in 
1959 to the United States with a select group of national businessmen in which he was 
the only one belonging to the insurance sector and whose purpose was to learn about 
new models of business management.339 
 
The decade of the 1960s would bring him new trips to the most diverse 
European territories: France, for the annual meeting of reinsurers in Monte Carlo, Italy, 
to attend the World Congress of the International Association of Insurance Law in 
Rome, Belgium, to prepare an action plan for European mutual societies, taking 
advantage of the Brussels Expo, and Sweden, to attend a seminar of the European 
Federation of Financial Institutions in Stockholm. In 1962 he made a second trip (this 
time alone) to the United States to analyse American insurance and also to attend the 
meeting of the International Insurance Seminar (IIS), which that year was held in 
Austin. The decade would end with his first trip to Ibero-America, the aforementioned 
trip to Argentina in 1969, which would literally change his life.340 
 
“America is in Spain; we Spaniards are Ibero-Americans and we don’t 
cease to be Spanish”.341 
 
In the 1970s he travelled to the American continent but also expanded his list 
of destinations: New Delhi, Moscow, or Osaka, to participate in another IIS meeting, 
would be some of them. In fact, his participation in IIS meetings will be recurrent in 
this decade and would take him to places as different as Berlin (1971), Mexico (1972), 
Taipei (1974), San Francisco (1976), Oslo (1977), Manila (1978) or Dallas (1979). The 
UNIAPAC congresses also gave him the opportunity to visit the Ivory Coast in 1975 and 
Manila in 1979.342  
 
The 1980s would follow a similar trend in terms of travel. He attended several 
UNIAPAC meetings such as the Hong Kong meeting in 1981 and also the Third World 
Insurance Association (TWIC) meetings in Casablanca (1984) and Beijing (1986). Of 
course, he continued his tour of Ibero-America and continued to attend IIS congresses 
in Paris (1980), Rio de Janeiro (1981), Toronto (1982), Singapore (1983), Vienna (1985) 
 
339 Vid. CATALINAS, J. L. (2001).  
340 Vid. CATALINAS, J. L. (2001). 
341 Vid. CATALINAS J. L. (2001). 
342 Vid. CATALINAS, J. L. (2001). 
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and Orlando (1986). Finally, in 1990, he made his last professional transatlantic trip to 
Chile.343  
 
Despite what has been said so far, not all the adventures were successful. 
Without going any farther, MAPFRE's step into the direct insurance market, for 
example, in Colombia, where it acquired a stake in Seguros Caribe, was a challenge due 
to the extreme disorganisation that the company was experiencing and, since the 
internationalisation process didn’t follow any predetermined strategic plan, but was 
adjusted to the decisions that Larramendi was taking in the short term, the operation 
had to be carried out on a country-by-country basis. Even in Mexico, MAPFRE was 
forced to sell its stake in Seguros La República, an investment once again oriented 
towards reinsurance, which didn’t yield the profitability initially expected.344 
 
Nevertheless, the balance of MAPFRE's landing in South America is clearly 
positive, which can’t be said of all the territories in which MAPFRE has a presence. 
MAPFRE Philippines, for example, hasn’t obtained good business results and yet, for 
Larramendi, being present in these places was almost a moral obligation, a question 
that went far beyond mere economic factors and that can only be understood from 
the knowledge of the determining factor of his humanist nature—the company 
understood not only as a generator of profits but also as an element of social and 
cultural cohesion—in the internationalisation process. The differences in the results of 
the different countries in which MAPFRE currently operates can be seen in Illustration 
4. 
 
Illustration 4: MAPFRE's premiums and results in the first quarter of 2018 by 
country (in millions of euros). 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data published in Expansión on 9-6-2018. 
https://www.expansion.com/empresas/2018/06/09/5b1aafa0e5fdeaf3078b45e2.html 
 
343 Vid. CATALINAS, J. L. (2001). 
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Although Larramendi's obsession with the Ibero-American continent is evident 
due to the factors already analysed, this wasn’t the only region of the planet in which 
MAPFRE decided to establish itself. In fact, Larramendi himself explains that, although 
Europe didn’t offer the same business opportunities as Ibero-America, his presence in 
the Old Continent was necessary in order to maximise risk diversification.345 For this 
reason, the first country MAPFRE entered in the 1970s—10 years before embarking on 
the Ibero-American adventure—was Belgium. In Belgium, the Assubel mutual society 
was subsequently incorporated as the public limited company CIAR and, although its 
shares were initially divided equally amongst its participants, they were eventually 
acquired by MAPFRE.346 
 
At the end of the 1980s, Belgium was followed by other countries of the Old 
Continent such as Italy and Portugal in 1986, Ireland in 1987 and Luxembourg in 1988. 
As a curiosity, it should be noted that Larramendi considered Europe to be a difficult 
place for an insurance company to establish itself (outside of Portugal) and exemplifies 
this precisely in Italy's case, showing pride in the fact that MAPFRE was the only 
insurance company—both national and international—with its own building in Sicily.347 
 
Portugal always deserved a special consideration for Larramendi due to the 
close relations of the neighbouring country with the Spanish business network. In fact, 
from 1980 onwards Larramendi would visit the Fidelidade Insurance Group to obtain 
as much information as possible about the Portuguese insurance market as well as 
about the general situation in the country. He always attributed to Portugal the status 
of a sister nation and, for him, the physical presence in Portugal was to be a strategic 
move that would tie in with his quasi-simultaneous expansion into Ibero-America.348 
 
It is also interesting to analyse MAPFRE's international expansion at the end of 
the 1980s, making inroads into countries that were to some extent exotic. This is the 
case with Tunisia, where the company was established in 1986, the first time it has 
done so on African soil. Nevertheless, MAPFRE's presence in Africa is quite modest 
and, even in Tunisia itself, it was limited to the Assistance branch through Afrique 
Asistance in collaboration with the Maaoui family: the intention was to make Tunisia a 
springboard for expansion throughout the Maghreb (today MAPFRE is also present in 
Algeria and Libya).349 The success can be considered remarkable if we take into 
account the growth of the workforce in that country since, from five employees in 
1997, it grew to more than a hundred in 2018, with the team being 100% Tunisian.350  
 
The Philippines was another of Larramendi's personal commitments, given the 
common past of this nation with Spain. In this case, MAPFRE's presence dates back to 
1985 with the direct opening of an office to carry out reinsurance operations. In a 
similar way to what was discussed in the case of Tunisia, Larramendi's idea was to use 
 
345 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 663. 
346 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 663. 
347 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 664. 
348 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 662. 
349 Vid. LARRAMENDI, I. H. (2000), p. 664. 
350 https://noticias.mapfre.com/mapfre-exito-cumbre-espana-y-tunez/ 
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the Philippine market as a bridge to expand throughout the Asian continent—including 
the Middle East—and, in fact, MAPFRE has been operating in Bahrain and Singapore 
since 1994 and 2015, respectively.351 
 
As far as the United States is concerned, once again Larramendi's preference 
for those territories with obvious cultural affinities is palpable. Not by chance, 
MAPFRE's spearhead in this country was Florida, also with the expectation of making 
the leap from there to other Caribbean nations such as Cuba. Its presence in the North 
American country dates back to 1986, with the creation of a motor insurance 
subsidiary.  
 
Illustration 5: MAPFRE's earnings and results in the first quarter of 2018 by 
geographical area (in millions of €). 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data published in Expansión on 9-6-2018. 
https://www.expansion.com/empresas/2018/06/09/5b1aafa0e5fdeaf3078b45e2.html 
 
Graphs 5 and 6 show the importance that the international business currently 
represents for MAPFRE, both in absolute and relative terms. Although the Iberia region 
(comprising Spain and Portugal) continues to be the most relevant, it is appropriate to 
highlight the case of Brazil, a country that accounts for almost a quarter of the total, 
and which stands as a geographical region in its own right for MAPFRE's international 
policy. Furthermore, it can be seen how the American continent, as a whole, 
represents more than half of the turnover (52%), which clearly indicates the long-term 
success of Larramendi's commitment to this region of the world. It is particularly 
significant that MAPFRE disembarked in Ibero-America in the 1980s, a decade 
considered, precisely, as the lost decade of that region.  
 
Illustration 6: Breakdown of MAPFRE's premiums by geographical area (as a 
percentage of the total). 
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Source: MAPFRE. https://noticias.mapfre.com/la-apuesta-de-mapfre-por-latinoamerica/ 
 
In any case, MAPFRE's commitment to internationalisation was clearly 
conservative, in the words of Larramendi:352 
 
“Some say that our apparent action (abroad) is greater than our real 
action and they’re right, for we have sought maximum reduction of the risk 
that this action represents. Of the 7 billion, more than 1 billion is real 
estate acquired for logistics support in excellent condition: 4,500 million 
are in Europe and the United States and only 1,500 million in Ibero-
America, always in insurance companies with very upwards-oriented 
activity, with operational balance, likely revaluation and without any loan 
or complementary obligation of the debt type, which has created problems 
for many financial institutions”. 
 
Today, MAPFRE is present in 49 countries on five continents. This makes it 
one of the leading insurance companies in Ibero-America and the world. It has 
34,324 employees in its 13,024 offices around the world.353 Graph 7 shows the 
evolution of MAPFRE's premiums and results worldwide, showing that the 
business is expanding constantly. Undoubtedly, the result of the path initiated by 
Larramendi more than four decades ago, whose entrepreneurship allowed 
MAPFRE to become the successful multinational it is today. 
 
 
352   
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Illustration 7: Evolution of premiums and results 2012 - 2017 (in millions of euros).
 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data published in Expansión on 9-6-2018. 
https://www.expansion.com/empresas/2018/06/09/5b1aafa0e5fdeaf3078b45e2.html 
 
Finally, having analysed MAPFRE's internationalisation process and the impact 
that Larramendi had on it, Table 8 shows the list of countries in which MAPFRE has an 
international presence, in chronological order of arrival in the country in question:  
 





























2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRIMAS RESULTADO
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Puerto Rico 1989 











Costa Rica 1998 
Russia 1998 
Bolivia 1999 


















Source: Compiled by author based on GARCÍA-RUIZ, J. L. and CARUANA, L. (2009). 
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Case Study 1: Larramendi as the architect of change. The transformation 
process at MAPFRE from 1955 to 1990: Strategic change and its effect on 
the company and the insurance sector. 
PhD Manuel R. Tejeiro Koller 
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Mutualidad de Seguros de la Agrupación de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de 
España or better known as MAPFRE is currently the largest Spanish insurance company 
in the world. It is number two in the Spanish ranking by premiums, with a market share 
of 11.43 per cent in 2019, just 1.9 per cent behind the market leader, Vidacaixa. It is 
worth mentioning that in this data it should be taken into account that many 
companies transformed deposits into life insurance to use them as investment tools in 
a context of extremely low interest rates. This may have artificially inflated some 
figures. The first two together account for 24.8 per cent of the market and more than a 
third if the Mutua Madrileña Group is added (see Table 9). Behind these figures are 6.5 
million customers who enjoy their insurance, investment funds and pension plans. 
Within the MAPFRE Group are as the main entities,  MAPFRE España, MAPFRE 
Vida, Bankia MAPFRE Vida, MAPFRE Global Risks, Bankinter Vida, Bankinter Seguros 
Generales, Ccm Vida Y Pensiones, Verti Aseguradora. In addition to these there is a 
long list of entities by country and with a certain diversification, as is the case with 
Funespaña SA, a funeral company.  
The business group has a total of 34,324 employees, 12,526 branches and a 
partnership of 86,500 agents. Its income for 2018 amounted to €26.59 billion, of which 
it earned a profit of €529 million.  
Table 9  Ranking of Total Direct Insurance by Groups and Entities in 2018 








      
1 VIDACAIXA 8,217,652,695.19 -14.99% 12.76% 12.76% 
2 MAPFRE 7,291,086,999.07 8.03% 11.33% 24.09% 
3 MUTUA MADRILEÑA 
GROUP 
5,270,255,730.30 5.30% 8.19% 32.28% 
4 ALLIANZ 3,612,449,058.26 2.78% 5.61% 37.89% 
5 ZURICH 3,559,582,114.71 -6.48% 5.53% 43.42% 
6 GRUPO CATALANA 
OCCIDENTE 
2,854,016,029.33 0.97% 4.43% 47.85% 
7 GRUPO AXA 2,599,050,814.05 7.82% 4.04% 51.89% 
8 SANTALUCIA 2,583,883,458.63 1.89% 4.01% 55.90% 
9 GENERALI 2,408,746,660.21 -1.50% 3.74% 59.64% 
10 SANTANDER 
SEGUROS 
1,976,757,398.32 31.27% 3.07% 62.71% 
Source: ICEA 2019, Rankings : Total Sector 
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The parent company of the group is the holding company MAPFRE SA, whose 
market capitalisation in July 2019 stood at €8,385.6 million. Its shares are listed on the 
Madrid and Barcelona stock exchanges and it is registered in the IBEX35, Stoxx 
Insurance, MSCI Spain, FTSE All-World Developed Europe Index, FTSE4Good, 
FTSE4Good IBEX and Dow Jones Sustainability World indices. The shareholders behind 
the holding company are Spanish and international institutional investors, Spanish 
private individuals and to a lesser extent international non-institutional investors. 
However, the majority of the shares are in the hands of Fundación MAPFRE, which 
holds 68.2 per cent of the capital. 
Internationally, MAPFRE is present in 45 countries on five continents, with 
5,256 direct offices, positioning itself as the third-largest insurance group in Latin 
America and the leader in non-life insurance in this region. In Europe they're ranked 
tenth and have managed to establish themselves in the top 20 in motor insurance in 
the United States of America.  
The company is organised into four business units: insurance, assistance, global 
risk, and reinsurance. While the first three are in turn subdivided by region, according 
to their presence in the different countries (Iberia, LATAM, International), the 
reinsurance unit is managed on a global level (see Figure 4). Antonio Huertas Mejías 
has chaired the company since 2012, after joining the company in 1988 and holding a 
long list of positions, starting with Regional Director of MAPFRE MUTUALIDAD in 
Asturias and Extremadura. In addition to Antonio Huertas, the board of directors is 
made up of 15 other members. 
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Source: Annual MAPFRE report 2018 
However, this company, which has managed to reach the top of the market 
with an enviable competitive position, wasn’t always like this. It was established in 
1933 as a humble mutual society to cover work accidents in the agricultural. It suffered 
heavy losses and was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1955, when Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi became director of the company. It was up to him to transform this 
company or go down with it. He faced a complicated internal situation, with a 
company with accumulated losses, low profitability and straitjacketed in a rigid 
regulatory environment. The Spanish post-war period was still very much in evidence 
and their competitors were large and firmly established in the market. Nevertheless, 
Larramendi decided to face the challenge and not only managed to avoid bankruptcy 
but also to build the foundations of the company we know today. 
Illustration 8 MAPFRE S.A. Organisation Chart 
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Illustration 9 MAPFRE’S Development 
 
Source: MAPFRE Website - MAPFRE's History 
As we can see, the MAPFRE Group was created in 1970, Corporación MAPFRE in 
1981 and Sistema MAPFRE in 1985. It became a leading insurance company in 1983 
and began to expand internationally the following year. Settling in one market before 
expanding to the next (cascade strategy) as an international expansion strategy would 
become its most common form, as we will see below. We also see a gradual expansion 
of its business areas such as the integration of motor insurance as early as 1952 or the 
vertical integration with roadside assistance (included in MAPFRE Asistencia). Another 
important milestone was the launch of the company Verti, through which a sales 
channel is created exclusively by internet and telephone in 2011. With this company 
MAPFRE strengthened its direct online sales and created an offer with cheaper prices 
for a younger audience. 
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MAPFRE UNTIL 1955 
The Mutualidad de Seguros de Accidentes del Trabajo was established on 16 
May 1933,  which began to be known as “Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas”, which received 
the acronym by which it is known today by its founding body, the Agrupación de 
Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España. It began its insurance activity by insuring 
accidents at work in agriculture, quickly including fire and theft coverage. Despite the 
outbreak of the Civil War, the company continued its operations in the national area, 
even managing to expand its insurance portfolio to include livestock in 1938. When the 
government later implemented Compulsory Health Insurance in 1944, MAPFRE began 
to collaborate in the implementation of this insurance in rural areas as Collaborating 
Entity No. 35. After accumulating losses of 26.77 million pesetas, it ceased operations 
in 1953. Low wages and high mortality of agricultural workers were identified as 
causes of this unfavourable development. The crisis with the Collaborating Entity No. 
35 and the National Welfare Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previsión - INP), which was 
behind it on behalf of the Ministry, reached its pivotal point with the arrival of 
Larramendi in 1955. That year, the INP was claiming 15 million from MAPFRE and even 
higher amounts were being claimed by the pharmaceutical associations. In order to 
meet these debts, the vast majority of the buildings owned by the mutual society were 
impounded. Thanks to a personal negotiation carried out by Larramendi with INP’s 
CEO, a lawsuit that had been filed against MAPFRE was withdrawn and a payment of 
50% of the debt was agreed in the future and against profits. This led to a habit of 
building up reserves before turning a profit to ensure a sound financial position, before 
seeing profits committed. This unfavourable financial situation was compounded by an 
internal conflict within the Board of Directors, with opposing sides making normal 
operations almost impossible. The problems didn’t end at the management level but 
extended to the employee level with an excess of almost double, according to 
Larramendi's initial estimates. 
In 1954, the year prior to Larramendi's incorporation as CEO, MAPFRE recorded 
losses of 1.7m pesetas, together with accumulated debts with agents and delegations 
of 1.3m pesetas. In addition to this, there were liabilities of almost 4 million pesetas in 
bank loans and other creditors as well as some 1.7 million pesetas in overdue taxes 
pending payment. In total the debt amounted to 7 million pesetas or one third of the 
balance sheet. The company's situation was so worrying that Larramendi thought 
about why he had accepted responsibility for the company during many sleepless 
nights. However, he quickly identified that the company's two main problems were 
cash flow and financial equilibrium. The first, because of the accumulated debt and the 
losses recorded, and the second because of the type of insurance marketed and the 
disbursements for claims. It was also important to understand the relationship 
between the head office and the agents. These were a fundamental asset of the 
company, as they showed growth despite the company's poor situation and 
represented a variable expense. Nevertheless, it was necessary to transmit them 
security and seriousness in how it operated, and that their efforts would be greatly 
diminished if they thought that the company was bankrupt, accelerating the fall. 
Although MAPFRE's commercial network can be considered its greatest asset at the 
time, even this didn’t appear to have value in the market of companies, as no 
competitor made a takeover bid. Had this been the case, MAPFRE's fate would have 
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been sealed, as it was something that Larramendi considered and even promoted as a 
solution to the serious crisis.  
Situation of the insurance sector up to 1955 
After the Civil War, the insurance sector in Spain faced an extraordinarily 
complex situation. On the one hand, the premiums collected and the companies' 
reserves fell far short of the amount of claims payable and, on the other hand, there 
was a lack of clarity regarding the companies' obligations in the event of war. After a 
period of debate, the Law of 17 October 1940 was signed. To address the first issue, 
the Insurance Compensation Consortium was created and a formula was found for 
shared support of damages with the insured (the “losses community”). The second 
question tried being resolved, referring to the coverage explicitly stated in the 
contracts signed, excluding those cases in which coverage in cases of “social revolution 
or civil war” hasn’t been explicitly stated. The situation experienced during the war 
was also compared with the only eventuality then covered by insurance contracts, 
known as “mutiny” (defined as “determined by the more or less tumultuous actions of 
undisciplined masses”). It was decided that those situations furthest from this 
description would be compensated at 50 per cent, increasing the percentages as the 
case came closer to the agreed definition.  Approximately two-thirds of the insured 
claims were covered by reinsurance with foreign companies, on which part of the 
payments fell. These difficulties led the Spanish insurance sector to unite in a common 
front in order to overcome the difficulties, thus explaining to a certain extent the great 
normalisation and trade unionisation that can be observed in the period after the Civil 
War. 
Here it is worth mentioning several points that characterise the post-war 
Spanish insurance situation. Firstly, the Insurance Compensation Consortium went 
from being a transitory to a permanent solution and was in charge of coverage for 
extraordinary events. To finance it, a 10% increase was applied to the premium, which 
used to be 1 per cent of the sum insured, so the impact on premiums was minimal. 
Additionally, there was a change from a system of variable premiums to fixed 
premiums, improving the conditions of clarity for policyholders. Insurance gained 
prominence and justification in society because it proved to have lessened the effect 
of the destruction suffered during the war. For insurance companies, on the other 
hand, it led to a more rigorous control of the calculation of premiums on insured 
capital.  
An important development was the entry of the public sector into insurance. 
Although the policy of the Franco regime was benevolent towards private capital and, 
in fact, tried to protect it, a series of circumstances were identified in which state 
intervention was considered necessary. These include “old-age”, maternity and 
unemployment insurance, and later on insurance against sickness would also be 
added. As we already know, Social Security would end up taking care of a large part of 
these insurances, after its formal creation in 1964. However, it is worth mentioning 
that before that, in 1944, the Collaborating Entity no. 35, composed of MAPFRE and 
Unión and El Fénix, which would manage the insurance financed by the National Fund. 
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This agreement was dissolved in 1954 at a loss to all concerned and after proving 
unsuccessful. 
Despite the entry of the public sector into insurance, post-war hardships, a 
difficult international geopolitical environment and years of autarchy (which 
particularly affected the lack of foreign exchange), the number of insurance companies 
grew (see Table 10 for industrial accident insurance). 
Table 10 Industrial Accident Insurance Companies, 1935-1964 
Source: Tortella Casares, Caruana de las Cagigas, García Ruíz, Manzano Martos, & Pons Pons, 2014 
This was a highly regulated and rigid sector in terms of regulations and 
limitations to free competition. The premiums followed a system of single rates that 
were compulsory for all insurers. Two bodies with great power in this Franco era were 
the Sindicato Nacional del Seguro, which imposed strict conditions on relations with 
agents and employees, and the Junta Consultiva, which issued recommendations on 
regulations. The latter played an important role in maintaining a sort of “status quo” 
amongst the insurance companies that made up the market, as it had great influence 
on the various laws that regulated the sector and limited the access of new companies. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy would be the law of 20 December 1952, which required 
a minimum capital of 25 million pesetas (50% paid up), with 5 million pesetas 
deposited as a guarantee. Foreign companies were required to ensure that their 
countries of origin had benevolent policies towards Spanish companies. It can be 
argued that this set of regulations was a reaction to an initially very fragmented 
market with overly lax requirements.354 In any case, the entry of new entities was very 
limited, which may have contributed to the fact that the market leader, La Unión y el 
Fénix Español, remained at the top of the table for almost five decades (1930-1975).355 
In the year in which I. H. Larramendi took the reins of the company, 1955, MAPFRE 
didn’t appear in the Top 10 of the ranking, the leaders being La Unión and El Fénix 
Español with more than double the amount of premiums invoiced than their followers, 





354 Pons Pons, 2013 
355 Tortella Casares, Caruana de las Cagigas, García Ruíz, Manzano Martos, & Pons Pons, 2014 
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1 La Unión y El Fénix 
Español 
202.3 7.8 La Unión y El 
Fénix Español 
661.4 6.9 
2 Mutua General de 
Seguros 
102.2 3.9 Banco Vitalicio 
de España 
331.3 3.4 
3 Federación de 
Mutualidades de 
Cataluña 





4 Banco Vitalicio de 
España 
93.8 3.6 El Ocaso, S.a. 280.7 2.9 
5 El Ocaso, S.a. 87.9 3.4 Mutua General 
de Seguros 
279.2 2.9 












69.6 2.7 Santa Lucía, 
S.A. 
196.4 2.0 
8 Bilbao, Compañía 
anónima de 
Seguros 





9 La Equitativa 
(Fundación 
Rosillo), vida 




10 General Española 
de Seguros 





 Total top 10 
companies 
849.0 33.0 Total top 10 
companies 
2,780 29.2 
 Total premiums 
1950 
2,571.6 100.0 Total premiums 
1960 
9,504 100.0 
Source: Pons Pons, 2013 
In terms of branches, it is transport insurance that shows its greatest growth, 
starting, curiously, with marine insurance due to a law that made this insurance 
compulsory in 1942 for all hulls in entities registered in Spain. However, the greatest 
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growth in motor insurance can be seen from 1955 onwards, with motor insurance 
revenue increasing fourfold between 1955 and 1960. 
An indicator of the beginning of the professionalisation of the industry was the 
inclusion in 1953 of actuarial studies at university, thus improving the skilled workforce 
for the industry and reducing the need for in-house basic training by insurers. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
According to the former chairman of MAPFRE Vida from 2001 to 2006 and 
member of the board of directors until 2011, Sebastián Homet Duprá, Larramendi's 
arrival at MAPFRE was like the arrival of someone who acquires a house in ruins. Like 
someone who wants to restore a decayed mansion, Larramendi approached the work 
of recovering the company in phases, starting by shoring up the ruins to carry out 
extensions.  
Underpinning: avoiding ruin 
As we have already seen in the section 0, the mutual society into which Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi entered as CEO had a series of problems. A cost structure 
that was too high and a lack of liquidity were the two most urgent problems to address 
in order to avoid bankruptcy. This forced hard cost adjustments, with numerous lay-
offs and an adjustment to a more cost-effective structure. These were tough years, in 
which the company was on the verge of suspension of payments on more than one 
occasion and had to adjust its accounts to the maximum, postponing payments in 
order to survive. 
Larramendi did something unusual for the time. Not only did he demand an 
ironclad philosophy of austerity, but leading by example, he cut his salary by 40 per 
cent. The managerial class wasn’t exempt from this adjustment, with the average wage 
cost of a manager going from 2.47 times that of an employee in 1955 to 1.57 in 1957. 
This gesture gained the trust of the employees and conveyed the message that they 
were all in the same boat. It was this attitude, that he was the first to be held 
accountable for the consequences of his decisions, which was decisive in convincing 
the rest of the team. He described the working atmosphere as good at this time, even 
in spite of the bad situation they had to live in, because everyone felt united by the 
same struggle for the survival of the company. Thus, the harsh cutbacks that reduced 
the plant's workforce from 86 employees in 1955 to 39 four years later didn’t create an 
atmosphere of panic or rejection amongst the other employees. The turnaround 
strategy was clear: cost reduction for the economic viability of the company. Efforts 
were focused on reducing costs in the cost centres (mainly the head office) and 
strengthening the revenue centres, such as the branch offices. These were increased 
from 1103 in 1955 to 1242 in 1958.  
In line with the philosophy of greater cost control, a system was implemented 
to increase control over schedules, demanding greater rigour from employees. The 
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punctuality effect wasn’t only intended to increase worker productivity but also to 
improve the quality of customer service. In return, a profit-sharing measure was 
introduced for executives and target-based bonuses for employees, a novel measure 
for the time and the sector, which was governed by a wage agreement. Amongst the 
bonuses, promotions were also introduced based on merit and not on competition, 
which was also rare at that time. 
In this phase austerity was implemented as a value in the organisation. It was 
justified, because it saved the organisation from bankruptcy and it was supported by 
the staff, because they understood its necessity. It had the effect of uniting those who 
formed part of MAPFRE even more, as they feel like survivors who together fought to 
refloat an almost sunken ship. This value wouldn’t leave the organisation and can be 
recognised in various actions implemented in subsequent years.  
During this period Larramendi was accompanied by José García, who rejoined the 
company after a leave of absence in 1956, and who was appointed auditor of MAPFRE 
shortly afterwards. As number two in the company, he was able to decisively support 
and implement the decisions of the CEO. Larramendi described him as an excellent 
accountant with great management and administrative skills. The latter's execution 
style complemented Larramendi's creative approach in the professional field very well. 
The management team was joined by Benito Tamayo and Fernando Sadornil, whom 
the CEO acknowledged as having played decisive roles in MAPFRE's transformation. 
While the former brought a young and aggressive commercial initiative, the latter 
introduced a technical approach to insurance diversification beyond those related to 
agriculture. 
Restructuring: back to business as usual 
In this second phase, MAPFRE's common operations were reviewed for the 
purpose of seeking greater technification, professionalisation and strategy in its 
operations. This was reflected in all areas of the company, from human resources 
policy to commercial and technological development.  
An important change was the introduction of new recruitment practices, where 
higher qualifications were sought and university graduates were recruited. The 
emphasis was on technical preparation but also on the motivation to learn and 
dedicate oneself to the cause, as the insurance training received at that time in 
Spanish universities was minimal. In order to avoid nepotism and promote a 
professional meritocracy, an internal policy prohibited the hiring of direct relatives.  
In the commercial sphere, a system was introduced whereby priority was given 
to marketing those insurances that were most profitable, seeking to maximise the 
return on the scarce resources available to the company. In line with the search for 
greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the delegation of responsibilities over the 
territorial network was increased. Not only was claims management transferred to the 
branches, but a system of quotas and incentives was introduced for them, dependent 
on sales growth. To grow is to survive, as it increases capital inflows and improves the 
cash position. The recruitment of the provincial delegates was supervised by head 
office and their bonuses depended on the performance of their team, to which they 
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themselves could assign a variable part of the salary. These measures are common 
today, but they were a revolution in a sector that was highly regulated and intervened 
by the Trade Union Organisation. MAPFRE developed its “organic plan” for the control 
of local delegates in 1959, thus formalizing control over delegations and establishing 
the basis for its expansion. Additionally, the figure of the comptroller was introduced, 
who was to keep control of expenditures and supervise the performance of the 
provincial delegates. From an independent study, it was concluded that commissions 
had diminishing returns and that these organisational measures were vital for 
continued growth. 
A decisive external factor was the liquidation of Entidad Colaboradora No. 35, 
which corresponded to MAPFRE's management of the compulsory health insurance it 
had contracted with the Ministry of Labour since 1944. When it was concluded that 
the company's loss-making development was due to a contribution well below the 
national insurance average and not due to poor management of the company, the 
State took over the debts contracted by MAPFRE and agreed to the settlement, 
relieving the company of these responsibilities in 1959.  
Rebuilding: business growth and development 
At the Board meeting of 19 May 1958, it was decided to turn the page and 
move on to another stage in MAPFRE's life. The New MAPFRE must consolidate itself, 
characterised by “intensification in production” and diversification. This last feature 
was implemented through the incorporation of the Life, Transport and Machinery 
Breakdown classes in 1958. The following year, it also introduced a voluntary sickness 
and health insurance. The business development initiative continued with the 
territorial expansion, starting with Catalonia and with a branch with great potential, 
although reduced presence at that time, which is Motor Insurance. In this phase, 
product diversification was combined with market development, with growth at the 
national level. Despite what one might think (and what can be observed in many other 
companies), the strategy of territorial expansion was not, in general, to enter with 
force in large cities. Totally the opposite. Remaining true to its roots, the company 
decided to go for an expansion in rural areas, only to move on later to conquer the big 
cities. Hence, the greater competition that existed in these areas was avoided and the 
differential positioning that the company enjoyed in rural areas was taken advantage 
of. Larramendi narrates how this strategy resembled that of Wal-Mart, which in the 
United States had been a remarkably successful one. The U.S. was conquering the rural 
areas less served by the big competitors, to later unseat them from the main shopping 
streets of the big cities.356 
The external development was accompanied by an internal restructuring, 
whereby the Sales Expansion Service was transformed into a Marketing department. It 
supported delegates and agents with commercial material and relevant information as 
well as direct attention to potential customers. This service included an Information, 
Statistics and Direct Contracting Service for the collection, processing, and 
dissemination of relevant information. The process of territorial growth inevitably led 
to an increase in the number of agents and delegates, whose professionalisation was a 
 
356 Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano, 2000 
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priority. This process was accompanied by a significant investment in computer 
equipment that would facilitate communication with the “capillary network” of offices 
that would characterise the company from then on. This push towards technology 
made it possible to speed up the gathering of information, allowing the status of sales 
and claims to be known on a daily basis. Two guiding principles of the new corporate 
policy appeared here: austerity and innovation. The obsession with lowering costs and 
the search for new market opportunities led to a series of actions in which both 
principles went hand in hand: innovation in pricing processes, commercial innovation 
with the use of street-level premises and with the selection of the most profitable 
insurance lines to the detriment of the less profitable ones, increased efficiency of 
internal processes thanks to the use of IT. The use of premises allowed the increase in 
direct sales and in the savings in payments to agents, a very novel practice for the 
time. It was normal for an insurance company to be located on an upper floor, where 
you went by appointment and rarely on your own initiative. A reduction in 
commissions was also introduced: 4.5 per cent was paid when other companies paid 
12 per cent. This can be justified by increasing growth and volume. 
Expansions: market development and new commitments 
Although changes have been made since the new CEO joined the mutual 
society at the time, it is in this last phase of the transformation that the most 
important changes were made. It was the transition from defensive to offensive. It was 
about putting the “hardship” of recovery behind us and changing our perspective. 
MAPFRE was no longer a small mutual society on the verge of bankruptcy, but a 
competitive company, with the capacity for development and a spirit of growth, which 
had managed to make a name for itself, become more professional and had much to 
contribute to the sector.  
Having established the business in Spain, the company was now looking 
abroad. Larramendi stated at the ceremony for the awarding of the Grand Cross of 
Civil Merit:” Nobody in 1970 believed in Ibero-America, and even less in the insurance 
sector [...]. I foresaw in the 1960s that a process of foreign expansion would take place 
in Spain, both economically and socially, and that MAPFRE should take advantage of 
it”. 
In the internationalisation strategy it was decided to start with less developed 
markets, where it could stand out from the competition, and where there wasn’t only 
a cultural connection but also a personal connection by the chairman. Although the 
first international excursion was in Belgium,357 Hispano-America was the priority 
because it fulfilled both requirements and had a great cultural proximity, with the 
same language and where Larramendi had managed to develop personal ties through 
Larramendi's participation in the various meetings of the International Association of 
Christian Directors (UNIAPAC). Additionally, MAPFRE had created an image of technical 
knowledge of the sector and gained a good reputation thanks to the wide distribution 
of various publications by Editorial MAPFRE. After the first step taken by Editorial 
 
357 This first formal move abroad was part of the creation of the CIAR group for co-insurance with 
Schadeverzekering-Maatschapij NV of the Netherlands, Assubel Accidents et Domages of Belgium and 
L'Occidental de Réassurance (GAMPF) of France. 
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MAPFRE, reinsurance began with the company “MAPFRE Industrial” (which is what the 
current MAPFRE Reaseguros was called). Reinsurance was a common way to enter a 
new market, as contact with the end customer was more difficult. In a first step, the 
company assumed the risks of companies already present in the territory through 
reinsurance, thus allowing it to better understand the market and open channels. This 
technique was applied in markets such as the Philippines or Mexico, amongst many 
other countries. Secondly, insurance training and partnerships with local companies 
were offered. The wide dissemination of insurance manuals by Editorial MAPFRE 
(particularly in Ibero-America) had created an image of the company as an insurance 
loss adjuster. As such, the brand image preceded MAPFRE's entry on many occasions, 
with the brand often being associated more with insurance manuals than with the 
insurance business itself. The third step was to open a representative office and to 
seek equity from established companies. These were competitive markets, regulated 
by licences and with their own idiosyncrasies, which led to entry through partial or 
total acquisition of established companies. If there weren’t sufficient funds to enter as 
a majority shareholder, it was entered as a minority shareholder, with the prospect of 
increasing that shareholding. The first country in which MAPFRE opened its own office 
was Mexico in 1984 (even though it had previously opened in Belgium), directed by 
Andrés Fernández Avilés, who, like the team that was subsequently formed in this 
country, was local. With this situation, the following question arises: How can 
MAPFRE's experience and know-how be transferred to less developed markets? While 
respecting local teams, due to their knowledge of the market and contacts, it was 
normal to send MAPFRE employees to introduce the way of working and the culture of 
the company. The aim wasn’t to replace the local workforce of the acquired companies 
but to complement their local market knowledge base with the know-how and best 
practices, reflected in MAPFRE Spain's processes and procedures. This was one of the 
fundamental contributions to the acquired companies, in which we always sought to 
add value from the head office. 
Participating early in the international expansion was Andrés Jiménez 
Herradón, who pursued his entire career in the company (46 years), passing through 
various management positions related to the international business. He describes 
MAPFRE as “builders” in the first phase of international expansion, as they sought to 
develop and expand the business of the companies they entered. These were 
purchases of companies with room for improvement and at a lower price. Later they 
become “real estate” because they acquire more competitive companies with less 
need for intervention by the MAPFRE team. Ready-made companies, in which the 
importance lies more in market presence than in development, with the contribution 
of the head office being minor. 
After the initial success in Latin America, horizons were broadened and markets 
sought in the United States of America, Japan and, finally, Europe.  
In the same way that the opening of new international markets was sought, an 
internal development of the company was also sought. On the one hand, it included 
the offer of new product lines (new insurance) and on the other hand it implied a 
constant improvement of internal processes. Once again we find innovation as a 
driving force or as a consequence of MAPFRE's vision of growth. In 1957 Larramendi 
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introduced UNIVAC perforated tokens and a calculator, which were major advances for 
the time. The part that today we would call IT was centralised in the Servicios de 
Organización y Mecanización S.A. (SDOMSA), where all the company's data was 
processed.  In 1971 the first computer was installed at MAPFRE, the IBM 360, which 
led to a salary freeze in order to finance it. Andrés Jiménez described Larramendi's 
interest in technological innovation as an “obsession with mechanisation”, which is 
how the use of IT was described at the time. The computer had its own air-conditioned 
room, but it allowed a significant speeding up of data processing and storage. The 
more processes were streamlined, the more costs were reduced and the less time it 
took to serve customers.  
Another important innovative initiative came with the creation of its R&D 
centre for motor insurance in 1983, CESVIMAP, the Centro de Experimentación y 
Seguridad Vial MAPFRE (MAPFRE Centre for Experimentation and Road Safety). For the 
first time, experiments were carried out with new vehicles to estimate the costs of 
repairs associated with claims, so that premiums could be calculated more accurately. 
Car manufacturers gave CESVIMAP new vehicles, which simulated accidents and 
carried out the necessary repairs, in order to calculate the costs. This activity continues 
to this day, in addition to others related to R&D related to the car and its components. 
The information obtained from this in-house research centre enabled the company to 
calculate car insurance premiums more accurately. It was found that some vehicles, 
which were more expensive to purchase, as was the case with Volvo, were then 
cheaper to repair than their lower-priced competitors. Such was the case with the 
Japanese models of the time, whose spare parts came in assembled packages, forcing 
the replacement of entire parts, rather than being able to repair individual 
components. The practice of setting premiums in motor insurance based on this 
scientific process converted MAPFRE into a benchmark in the market. The other 
companies were waiting for MAPFRE to set their premiums before positioning 
themselves in relation to them.  
It is worth adding other innovative activities for which MAPFRE has become 
known outside the technological sphere. It introduced a change of concept by offering 
solutions to claims, rather than the usual financial compensation and was the first 
company to offer travel insurance as part of motor insurance, also offering this type of 
insurance on a usage basis, rather than by contract. It was also the first insurer to 
include a profit share in life insurance. The Policyholder Ombudsman was practically an 
invention of MAPFRE, as no other company had this figure before in Spain and a large 
part of Europe.  
 
A good manager is the one who gets things done. A good manager is able to rectify when he has made a mistake, 
instead of insisting on his decision, just because he is the manager. I. Hernando de- Larramendi, 2000 
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LARRAMENDI, THE ARCHITECT OF CHANGE. 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano, born in June 1921, joined 
MAPFRE as CEO at the age of 34. To do so, he gave up a post as an Insurance and 
Savings Inspector, which he obtained through a public exam after completing his law 
degree in 1944. He was able to finish his studies after the end of the Civil War, in which 
he enlisted as a volunteer at the age of 16. His previous education had been at the 
Colegio de Nuestra Señora del Pilar in Madrid, although his childhood was spent 
between San Sebastian and Madrid. He had seven siblings and his parents, of Basque 
ancestry, passed on to him many of the values that are recognised in his life's work. His 
father, Luis Hernando de Larramendi (1882-1957) was recognised as a prominent 
lawyer and important Carlist politician, with a key influence on his son's value 
structure.  
When Larramendi joined MAPFRE in 1955, it was after two years at the head of 
the Spanish office of the English insurance company Royal Insurance Company. During 
this time, the young lawyer had tried to introduce innovative changes in the 
organisation, but had been frustrated by the procedures and bureaucracy in this large 
multinational. In MAPFRE he found the freedom to act as he saw fit and to introduce 
all the innovations he considered necessary. 
Larramendi's stamp can’t be called a stamp but rather a creation, if we consider 
that MAPFRE went from having 40 branches in 1955 to 1,648 when, in 1990, he left all 
his positions in the company (except for the chairmanship of Fundación MAPFRE 
America). He transformed and created a company on the verge of bankruptcy with less 
than 200 employees into the market leader with nearly 4,500 employees in 1990 and a 
turnover of 200,000 million pesetas and 500,000 million in assets.  
In his 1961 article, “La Empresa aseguradora española ante el mercado común”, 
Larramendi showed a pioneering vision for the time, in which he set out a rationalist 
and open company management perspective. He based his statements on a rigorous 
study of the national and international competitive environment, where he looked for 
the quantification of measures that he considered key for the company, by means of 
preparing indicators chosen by himself. Comparing the situation of the Spanish 
insurance industry and the company with its European (particularly France and 
England) and US counterparts, he highlighted the weaknesses that needed to be 
addressed. He demonstrated the urgency of change in view of the forthcoming 
opening of the Spanish market and the resulting increase in competition. His proposals 
were clear and specific, explaining the relationship between the proposed changes and 
the expected results. He provided a global approach to the company, with special 
emphasis on the “company philosophy” as an integrating and guiding element of the 
entire company. This term refers to what is known today as corporate culture. Here he 
didn’t neglect the ethical component, which he considered fundamental in strategic 
formulation.  
The company's independence was paramount in the development of the 
company. MAPFRE was never backed by any bank, nor was it accountable to any 
political power, whilst its major competitors were backed by financial institutions such 
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as La Unión and Fénix Español with Banesto, Seguros Vitalicio with Banco Central or 
Seguros Bilbao with Banco Bilbao.  
It is evident that he drew his inspiration from his experiences abroad (especially 
in England) and his spirit of reform and non-conformism is remarkable. This stance was 
very logical when he expressed his concern about the performance of the company 
and the industry in general, stating that if the necessary changes aren’t made, they 
won’t be competitive and will eventually disappear. He clearly saw the urgency of 
change and set no limits to what needed to be changed. There were no “sacred cows” 
in his vision for the future. 
Santiago Gayarre Bermejo, who joined the company in 1970 and left it in 2013 
as a member of the board of directors, after having held various management 
positions throughout his career, gives a multifaceted description of Larramendi. He 
describes him as a charismatic and firm, though not authoritarian, leader. A person 
close to his associates and demanding but with an extraordinary ability to inspire 
confidence in those around him. He was a visionary, an innovator and a non-
conformist. He constantly questioned the status quo. It was clear to him that MAPFRE 
had to be transparent and fair, avoiding, whenever possible, any type of litigation, 
even if this meant paying compensation before some claims had been clarified. 
Gayarre describes his management as both professional and human at the same time. 
While introducing clearer and more formal processes and procedures, he tried to 
maintain maximum closeness with all employees. As well as demanding total 
dedication, he often pushed his staff out of their comfort zone. He made them go 
farther than they themselves thought they could go, following their vision for the 
future of the company. He had a clear vision of what needed to be done and he 
counted on his team to help him achieve these goals This included the opening of new 
national and international markets or the introduction of technology and new 
practices in the company. However, these efforts were always accompanied by two 
fundamental things: his own example and unconditional support. He always gave a 
chance to whoever he saw capable.  
He encouraged agile communication, both formally, requiring the production of 
“notes” in any meeting and as a tool to follow up on actions, and informally, where he 
held personal conversations with his associates. The notes went back to their sender, 
with comments and annotations for the sender to act upon. Larramendi had a direct 
relationship with both his closest associates in the management team and with 
employees at more operational levels. Throughout his travels he sought direct, first-
hand contact with everyone he could and was interested in the person, rather than the 
employee. For Larramendi it was important to see the problem personally, in addition 
to the reports he received, and to hear the opinions of those directly involved. At the 
same time he demanded this practice from his associates, which would later become 
known by Toyota as Genchi Genbutsu, go and see for yourself. 
In addition to his interest in understanding first-hand the business issues on the 
ground, it was his habit to ask about the family and to acknowledge in detail important 
personal events such as a marriage or the birth of a child. In his own words, he 
expressed his philosophy towards employees as a humanistic respect for the freedom 
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of employees and associates that would lead him to be able to affirm “...we wanted 
free men, and we had free men that weren’t afraid”. 
Larramendi was a person with a very broad vision of the business, not afraid to get 
involved in too many issues. Personally, he is described as “tenacious, independent to 
the point of heterodoxy and provocation, intuitive, willing to listen, but disinclined to 
take notice, skilful and determined to quickly avoid obstacles and inconveniences . . . 
“.358 
 He showed confidence in people and pushed them out of their comfort zone to 
stretch the company's reach. People had to constantly acquire new skills, as they were 
challenged very often. However, these were accompanied by a trust placed in the 
individual and a policy of staff retention and internal promotion that gave employees 
enough security to dare to move forward. Even when they themselves didn’t feel 
capable, as was the case with Santiago Gayarre in his first position as head of claims in 
Zaragoza and so many others. 
Even though he was the top manager of the company and had great informal 
authority, he was integrated into the company as one more, without boasting of 
greatness, although with a clear presence in any meeting. He had a very captivating 
personality and that kind of charisma that made the centre of a meeting to be where 
he sat. 
Those who worked in the organisation with him say that “As he did it before, 
how could we not do it?” When the step into the unknown was taken, which 
Larramendi asked for, his personal and formal recognition could be counted on, 
through internal promotion and salary increases. Finally, he was characterised by 
severe personal and professional austerity. He was usually accompanied by his old 
tatty briefcase, he was humble in the hotels he stayed in during the trips he made for 
the company. He didn’t drive, as he didn’t have a driver's licence, nor did he have his 
own car or a company car, and he had the curious habit of bonding with an associate 
whilst on a business trip, in which the associated would be behind the wheel and he'd 
do the talking. These travel times served both as a time to catch up professionally and 
to build human relationships beyond formal dealings. He demonstrated a unique 
ability to connect with the people he worked with, achieving a loyalty that went 
beyond the strictly professional. 
This philosophy extended to his management of MAPFRE and explains many of 
the actions that have made the company what it is today. The values that Larramendi 
demonstrated during his tenure have become deeply embedded in MAPFRE's 
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Annex 1. Balance sheet 1954 
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Annex 2 Summary Annual Accounts MAPFRE SA 2018 
 















        
        
  Operating income N.A. N.A. N.A. 
  Ordinary income before taxes 457,438,000 459,054,000 438,652,000 
  Profit/loss for the financial year 493,455,000 495,530,000 468,831,000 
  Total assets 10,265,690,000 10,072,689,000 9,874,349,000 
  Shareholders' equity 7,384,036,000 7,334,129,000 7,272,687,000 
        
        
  Economic profitability (%) 4.46 4.56 4.44 
  Financial profitability (%) 6.19 6.26 6.03 
  General liquidity N.A. N.A. N.A. 
  Debt (%) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
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NOTES FOR CASE 1: LARRAMENDI AS THE ARCHITECT OF CHANGE. THE TRANSFORMATION 
PROCESS AT MAPFRE FROM 1955 TO 1990: 
 
Key terms: organisational change, innovation, internationalisation, leadership 
Summary 
It comments on the transformation of a company that was on the verge of 
bankruptcy into one of the most successful companies in Spain. It shows how they 
managed to avoid its demise and rebuild the organisation, following different business 
policies and strategies. The figure of the executive is discussed as a central element in 
this process, studying both management style and decision-making. Ignacio Hernando 
de Larramendi is the executive who led the transformation process described above, 
when he joined the company in 1955. In the year of his retirement from the company, 
1990, he left behind a leading insurance company in the national market, diversified 
and internationalised. His influence in the process stands out as key, due to his 
personality and management style, in addition to his sound strategic decision making. 
Although the current situation of the company is described, the case focuses on the 
time when the transformation took place. 
Learning Objectives 
Concepts such as organisational change, change management, organisational 
adjustment (lean), internationalisation and innovation strategies as well as the role of 
the leader are reviewed. With the use of this case, students will be able to see a 
practical example of these concepts and develop: 
- What the steps in the transformation of a company can be, applying defensive 
strategies of cost savings and supply limitation. 
- The development of corporate strategies for business growth such as 
diversification, product development and internationalisation. 
- See the importance of innovation in business growth and its role as a source of 
differentiation. 
- Discuss the role of the leader in a transformation process, highlighting change 
management techniques. 
 
Application of the Case 
The case can be used to deal with subjects such as Strategic Management, Business 
Management, Human Resources, Innovation Management or Business Organisation. 
The case can serve as an example to demonstrate a process of change but also to 
develop creative solutions around the situations raised. In this sense, students can 
reflect on alternative solutions to the problems posed. It is recommended that the 
case be read outside of class, even if a discussion of the questions takes place during a 
face-to-face session. 
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Suggested timeline for 90-minute session: 
• Reading: 30 minutes 
• Answer three questions in groups: 30 minutes 
• Resolution of questions and debate: 30 minutes 
Recommended Reading 
- Cuesta, F. (2010). Transformación empresarial para superar la crisis. Harvard 
Deusto Business Review, (187), 70-79. 
- Reeves, M., & Deimler, M. (2012). Adaptability: The new competitive 
advantage. Own the Future: 50 Ways to Win from the Boston Consulting Group, 
19-26. 
- Moraleda, A. (2004). La innovación, clave para la competitividad 
empresarial. Universia Business Review, (1), 128-136. 
- Tejeiro Koller, M. R. (2016). Exploring adaptability in organizations: Where 
adaptive advantage comes from and what it’s based upon. Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 29(6), 837-854. 
Questions 
1. What have been the key dimensions that you can see in this business 
transformation? 
2. How would you assess the role of the executive in the change process? 
Additionally, assess whether the leadership style followed is appropriate for the 
situation. 
3. Relate what you have observed in the case to the theories of adaptability 
studied. 
4. Highlight the innovations achieved over the years and how they have 
contributed to the company's competitive advantage.  
5. What leadership traits can you highlight in Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi 
and how have they influenced the development of the organisation? 
6. Describe MAPFRE's internationalisation strategy. Critically appraise this 
approach and compare it with the alternatives. 
7. Analyse the human resources policy followed by Larramendi and how it has 
influenced the renewal of the company.
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Case Study 2: Social Responsibility and Philanthropy: the foundations 
promoted by Larramendi at MAPFRE 
PhD Manuel R Tejeiro Koller 
 
Case study on the use of foundations as a structural tool for the execution of the 
businessman's social intention, showing the implementation of values inside and outside the 
company. 
 
“The company isn’t only bound to the efficient provision of its own service, but is also subject to institutional 
obligations deriving from its influence on social life and its participation in the national heritage”. 
                                                                                                                                 I. Hernando de Larramendi, 1996 
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FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE TODAY AND ITS ORIGINS 
 
MAPFRE Fundación Cultural Privada is one of the most recognised and largest 
foundations in Spain. The figures are truly striking. It has assets of €2,780.8m 
(December 2018), with income of €64.4m, which comes almost entirely from dividends 
on the shares it holds in MAPFRE Group companies. It is present in 28 countries, most 
of them in Ibero-America, where it carried out more than 1,600 activities in 2018 with 
the collaboration of 8,618 volunteers. 
It declares its mission as “...to contribute to the improvement of people's 
quality of life and to the progress of society through multinational programmes and 
activities”,359 by acting in five different fields: Social Action, Culture, Health Promotion, 
Prevention and Road Safety and  Insurance and Social Welfare. Each of them is looked 
after by an independent institute. The two main areas of activity, by application of 
funds, are Culture and Social Action, and the least important is Insurance and Social 
Welfare (see Illustration). 
Illustration 10 Distribution of funds 
by area of activity 2018 
Culture 
The area of culture aims to 
disseminate culture in all its artistic 
expressions, including training in art 
accessible to all and the collection. 
Exhibitions, workshops, and training 
courses are held. Throughout the 30 
years of its activity, more than five 
hundred exhibitions have been 
organised, and it currently has 
4,500m2 of exhibition space in two halls in Madrid and one in Barcelona. The 
permanent collection of the Espacio Miró, with more than 60 works by the master, is 
one of the most complete collections dedicated to this artist. Hence, Fundación 
Cultural MAPFRE has managed to become a benchmark in the art scene and exhibition 
halls, in places as competitive as Madrid and Barcelona. In keeping with its goal of 
bringing art to all audiences, a large part of the collection has been posted online . In 
addition to the activity of art collection and organisation of exhibitions, workshop visits 
are carried out, in which certain works, artists or periods are studied in depth. The 
visits have been adapted for the hearing impaired, including sign-guides or audio-
description for the visually impaired. 
Social Action 
 











Promoción de la 
Salud
12%
Seguro y Previsión Social 5%
Source: Compiled by the authors from Fundación MAPFRE 2018 
annual report 
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This area focuses on improving the conditions of the most disadvantaged 
people in 25 countries, following the principle of equal opportunities for all. The aim is 
to mitigate the risk of social exclusion and poverty, through activities focused, above 
all, on education and facilitating access to the world of work. Its impact is considerable, 
with a figure of almost three million beneficiaries.360 
Amongst the initiatives carried out are examples such as the “Sé Solidario” 
programme, which collaborates with small NGOs in Spain and addresses areas such as 
the welfare of people with rare diseases, the provision of basic necessities for 
disadvantaged people and support for families in vulnerable situations. Likewise, social 
projects are undertaken at an international level (health, training, empowerment of 
women, etc.), social programmes for employment or education programmes. The 
Volunteer Programme also serves as a channel to help participating organisations 
publicise their projects and find volunteers. 
The initiatives carried out here have received various recognitions, with five 
different awards in 2017, such as those received by the Sevillian Asperger's Association 
and the RANDSTAD Foundation for the Social Employment Programme. 
Prevention and Road Safety 
The aim is to reduce, if not completely eliminate, accidents, especially those 
involving vehicles but also in the home. This involves activities aimed at safe driving, 
road safety education for pedestrians (especially young people) and those related to 
risks in the home such as fire and drowning. €5 million was invested in 2018 for the 
promotion of safety in society in training, awareness and communication, and research 
programmes. The actions are carried out in 23 countries, especially Spain, Ibero-
America, Portugal, Germany, the Philippines, Turkey, and Malta, with the collaboration 
of public administrations or local NGOs. In Spain, there is cooperation with the General 
Directorate of Traffic and Civil Protection, whilst abroad work is undertaken with 
national or supranational organisations such as the Ibero-American Road Safety 
Observatory (Observatorio Iberoamericano de Seguridad Vial - OISEVI) and the Ibero-
American Firefighters Organisation (Organismo de Bomberos Iberoamericanos - OBA). 
The Foundation is a member of several international organisations active in this field, 
such as the UNRSC (United Nations Road Safety Collaboration), a working group and 
advisory body of the United Nations for road safety. 
In addition to the work already mentioned, this area awards prizes for the best 
initiative in prevention and road safety, for innovation in mobility and road safety as 
well as grants to obtain a driving licence. 
Promotion of Health 
The Foundation focuses its attention on non-communicable lifestyle-related 
diseases such as heart problems, obesity, and addiction. Educational, awareness-
raising and research activities are conducted in 13 countries in collaboration with 
public institutions, scientific societies, and schools. Some examples are the Mujeres por 
el Corazón campaign, which seeks to raise awareness of the risks of cardiovascular 
 
360 Fundación MAPFRE, 2019 
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diseases in women, or the SOS Respira campaign, which worked with staff in the 
hospitality sector to act in the event of choking. Programmes such as Vivir en Salud 
have trained more than 800,000 people since 2009 in healthy habits and nutrition. On 
the other hand, research grants amount to €700,000 per year. 
Insurance and Social Welfare 
In this area, the aim is to promote knowledge of insurance in society, especially 
focused on social welfare. This objective is achieved through the teaching of courses at 
different levels, both school, undergraduate, graduate, and professional. Its activities 
are also international, being present in 11 countries (mainly in Ibero-America), where 
work is undertaken in collaboration with universities, professional and business 
associations, public administrations, and NGOs. It also manages an important 
knowledge base on the insurance sector, which it expands annually with the 
publication of reports and monographs. Its extensive collection on this subject, with 
more than 145,000 references in its Documentation Centre and its insurance reference 
dictionary, the Diccionario MAPFRE de Seguros, is available to the public, with 90,000 
annual queries recorded in the dictionary since 2017. It also has a gamification tool for 
the dissemination of insurance culture as well as the Insurance Museum, located in 
Madrid, all with the aim of developing insurance culture. 
 
From 1974 
However, it didn’t always engage in these areas of activity, nor did it achieve its 
size and impact from the outset. The origins of this great foundation can be found in 
the promotion in 1974 (although it wasn’t formally constituted until 1975) by MAPFRE 
Mutua Patronal and MAPFRE Mutualidad.  
Prior to the creation of Fundación MAPFRE, the entities promoting it, MAPFRE 
Mutua Patronal and MAPFRE Mutualidad, had already initiated certain activities that 
were later continued by the Foundation. Such were the activities in the field of 
occupational risk prevention, which were spurred on by the department with the same 
name existing in MAPFRE Mutua Patronal prior to the Foundation, which already had 
its Prevention and Rehabilitation Centre in Majadahonda as well as the research centre 
in the Industrial Hygiene Laboratories. On the other hand, MAPFRE Mutualidad had 
significant experience in road and fire safety, areas in which the foundation continued 
its research. The social and scientific work to be conducted by the foundation is based 
on the previous experience of its sponsoring organisations. 
Fundación MAPFRE 's international activities began in 1984, with congresses in 
Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo, and expanded with the sponsorship of various 
conferences in Colombia, Venezuela, Chile and Uruguay the following year. Also in 
1985, scholarships began to be awarded for the training of professionals from Ibero-
America in Spain. After opening delegations of the foundation in Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Portugal, and Venezuela, it continued its expansion to reach 28 countries at 
present.  
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When, in 1989, activities related to medicine became the responsibility of 
Fundación MAPFRE Medicina, Fundación MAPFRE increased its training and scientific 
activity with close collaboration with universities, reaching more than 30 agreements 
with institutions in Spain and South America. Postgraduate courses, grants and 
scholarships are offered and research projects are developed in these. The translation 
of manuals in the field of safety prepared by MAPFRE is also conducted. The 
Ergonomics Institute, a field that was little researched in the 1990s, was also 
established in collaboration with the General Motors factory in Zaragoza, conducting 
training, information, and research activities. In turn, the Instituto MAPFRE de 
Seguridad Vial (MAPFRE Institute for Road Safety) carries out similar activities in this 
area. It is also worth mentioning the Instituto de Prevención, Salud y Medio Ambiente 
(Institute for Prevention, Health and Environment ), which focuses its efforts on 
technological developments. 
In 2005 the creation of the foundation as it’s known today began. The Board of 
Directors of MAPFRE Mutualidad approved the merger of MAPFRE' s national 
foundations (Fundación MAPFRE América, Fundación MAPFRE Vida, Fundación 
MAPFRE Estudios and Fundación MAPFRE Medicina) into Fundación MAPFRE, which 
was established the following year and whose objectives are detailed as:361 
• To promote the safety of people and their property, with special attention to 
road safety, medicine, and health 
• Improving the Quality of Life and the Environment 
• To promote the dissemination of Culture, Arts and Literature 
• To promote training and research in matters related to Insurance 
• To promote research and the dissemination of knowledge in relation to the 
common history of Spain, Portugal and the countries linked to them by 
historical ties 
• To contribute to the improvement of the economic, social, and cultural 
conditions of the least favoured people and sectors of society 
Following the contribution of €24.4 million by the various foundations, Fundación 
MAPFRE continues with the activities conducted in five specialist institutes:  
• Prevention 
• Health and the Environment 
• Road safety 
• Insurance Science 
• Culture and Social Action 
 
THE SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE 
 
“The only justification for leadership is accountability.” – Larramendi, 1966 
 
 
361 Annual Report Fundación MAPFE 2006 
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The promoter of the foundations that gave rise to Fundación MAPFRE was the 
CEO of the insurance company between 1955 and 1990, Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi. In addition to managing to refloat the bankrupt company when he joined 
and transforming it into one of the most striking business success stories in the history 
of insurance in Spain, he contributed significantly to the country's foundation 
landscape. 
What might have motivated the executive to take these social initiatives?  
To understand the executive we must speak of the person and make a brief mention of 
his origins, since it will be here where we will find the shaping of his character and the 
source of the values that marked the decisions of his life. Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi y Montiano grew up between San Sebastian and Madrid, receiving the first 
years of his education under the tutelage of a private tutor. He received a great Carlist 
influence from his father, who was very present in his education and who, as he 
himself acknowledges in his book Así se hizo MAPFRE: Mi tiempo, he provided a value 
structure that would influence his decision making for the rest of his life. In this sense, 
we can suppose that certain notions of freedom and clear rules in the interest of 
justice and order may have their origin here. At the same time he received an 
education in which the Catholic religion played a fundamental role and which would 
mark his lifestyle and convictions. Being a member of a large family with nine siblings 
and with a traditionalist background, he made the family a central value in his 
personality.  
Two of his most intimate convictions are loyalty to oneself and respect for 
freedom. If we refer to a review of 60 interviews held about him with colleagues, 
employees, and family members, we can see that the terms that are most often 
repeated when describing Larramendi are: honesty, independence, non-conformism, 
tenacity, dedication, humanism, humility, austerity, curiosity, Christian humanism, and 
closeness. He is described as a creative person who placed great trust in others and 
thus managed to stimulate personal growth, especially amongst the young people he 
hired at MAPFRE. 
Traditionalist thinking and “social Christianity” were the pillars of his ideology, 
which made itself felt both personally and professionally. For Larramendi the Christian 
caritas, that is, the charity of giving to alleviate situations of injustice and to alleviate 
the suffering of others, was a fundamental principle throughout his life. Therefore, we 
can observe a conception, first, of doing business, in its human resources policies and 
its dealings with employees and customers, and then in its foundational activity that 
always seeks the welfare of others. As MAPFRE became more consolidated and 
profitable, Larramendi felt he had to give back to the company part of what it had 
given him. At the same time that the company was earning more profits and having 
guaranteed in the company a way of operating in which the human being occupied a 
central place, it was shaping in the diverse foundations the values that it considered 
necessary to promote. 
He described the “traditionalist socio-political doctrine” as his third way, 
between the social doctrine of the church and liberalism. He believed in both sides and 
sought a balance, which would allow men to be free, whilst protecting the weaker 
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from abuse by the stronger through a system of strict rules. His understanding of duty 
was that duty was above rights and that personal dedication to a cause ennobled the 
person. 
In 1998 Larramendi received the highest state recognition with the Grand Cross 
of Civil Merit for his activity in MAPFRE and his promotion of its foundational activities. 
As far as business was concerned, Larramendi was convinced that ethics in 
business was a necessary condition for lasting success, being first and foremost the 
moral obligation of every citizen. According to his conception of what a company 
should be, it had to be useful to society and contribute to social balance. He stated 
that “with ethics, it’s not only possible for a “big company” to be successful, but it’s 
indispensable, in the face of “getting rich quick” systems , enrichment and abuse of the 
managerial function”.362 We can recognise a strong collectivist spirit in his decisions, 
where the company was to be put above oneself, which in the end would be for the 
good of all. The notion of subordinating oneself to a greater purpose, both a specific 
task and the common good, is recurrent in the statements of the executive and the 
individual. 
He summarises his own concept of business ethics according to fundamental 
values such as honesty, responsibility, and fairness. He emphasizes that he always tried 
to be faithful to his convictions even when it could involve personal financial outlays or 
various difficulties and that he sought to establish himself in the business activity. This 
is reflected in the pursuit of equity and the fight against nepotism, taking hiring 
decisions without discrimination. In the most global decisions of the organisation, the 
executive insists on having always put the organisation first, even taking into account 
the consequences for those workers who had to carry them out.363 
For Larramendi, ethical behaviour helped to win the loyalty and trust of 
workers and customers. He also emphasised the role of the executive as an example to 
follow, with the greatest responsibility falling on the executive to create an ethical 
company. He wasn’t only to act ethically at all times but to design the rules and culture 
that would lead others to do so. 
He considered the prominence of ethics in business to be inevitable, since it arose 
from his deepest religious and moral convictions, and he was also convinced that it 
ensured long-term business success. It goes farther, stating that ethics also shows 
positive effects in the short and medium term. The union of religious and business 
values is developed in the forum of Christian businessmen, Acción Social Empresarial in 
Spain and UNIAPAC in Europe and Latin America.  
  
 
362 Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano, 1996, p. 243 
363 Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano, 1996, p. 245 
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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE COMPANY UNDER LARRAMENDI 
Before analysing the actions related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
conducted at MAPFRE, it’s necessary to place ourselves in the historical context of the 
company during Larramendi's first stage in the company and after a tough phase of 
adjustments to save the company (1960-1980). The historical moment was one of 
protectionism, with Francisco Franco's regime running the country, with significant 
state intervention and almost total control by the insurance unions. This meant that 
wages and working conditions were heavily regulated and didn’t allow for free 
competition in this area between companies and restricted freedom in the design of 
compensation. Despite what might be expected in this context, salaries weren’t high 
and there was no common practice of transparency and meritocracy in the 
organisations. The common corporate culture was autocratic, with leaders imposing 
their criteria and setting clear distances between executives and employees.  
We can find the first reflection of Larramendi's conception of CSR already in 
MAPFRE Mutualidad’s Articles of Association of 1965, where it’s established that two 
foundations financed by the company should be created, one for the improvement of 
Spanish agriculture and the other for consumer protection. Later, in 1969, it was 
decided to join forces in a single foundation, thus laying the foundations for Fundación 
MAPFRE, which was created in 1975. 
Larramendi was clear about the difference between personal ethics and 
organisational ethics, the former being the way of making decisions in all areas of a 
person's life, whilst the latter referred to the system created in an organisation to 
promote the ethical behaviour of its members. The importance of the company's own 
culture, based on ethical values, is extremely important when creating this system. 
In order to formally regulate certain basic principles, a series of rules were 
introduced into MAPFRE's articles of association:364 
I. The executives may only receive a salary and never receive allowances for 
participating on the Board and Committees, nor may they participate in 
businesses or companies that are related to MAPFRE or that compete with it. 
II. Prohibition on the employment of children and relatives, up to the second 
degree, of employees and directors. 
III. Prohibition of any kind of donation or contribution of corporate resources for 
political, ideological, or religious purposes. 
IV. Decision to act rigidly within administrative and fiscal legality. 
For the executive, freedom had been a maxim, along with social justice, and he 
understood that there had to be a regulatory body inside and outside the company to 
ensure compliance with rules that would benefit the operation of the company and 
ensure a fair and transparent system. This is why he established the practice of hiring 
by selection tests and the prohibition of hiring immediate family members. At the 
same time, he maintained a very personal management style, where he himself served 
as a guide and leader for the organisation. This imprinted a style that radiated 
throughout the rest of the organisation, thus transferring his values to the corporate 
 
364 MAPFRE, 2019 
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culture. His example showed the importance of discipline and tenacity, of work and 
personal and close involvement in matters. At the same time, he showed a sincere 
concern for his employees, always seeking direct contact and personal involvement. 
His continuous travels not only gave him first-hand knowledge of the problems on the 
ground and enabled him to pass on instructions but also allowed him to establish 
personal ties with the people involved.  
He also demonstrated that with freedom comes responsibility and that 
responsibility leads to successes that are recognised. He was quick to place confidence 
in his associates, even when they weren't confident in themselves. He pushed them 
out of their comfort zone, but at the same time gave them the necessary support and 
recognised their efforts with promotions within the company. Hence, he encouraged 
dedication and outlined a future in the company for people who showed loyalty and 
dedication. In a social context where an entire family (including grandparents) often 
depended on one worker and low unemployment compensation had just been 
introduced in 1961, job stability was of vital importance. Larramendi understood that 
his responsibility extended to the families of his employees, but he conceived stability 
from a liberal perspective. Instead of forcing it through rate agreements and ironclad 
contracts with the unions, he understood that the company must recognise the efforts 
of its workers and that they wouldn’t only not see their jobs jeopardised, but would be 
able to freely access promotions and additional compensation in accordance with their 
dedication. Internal promotion was always sought first before external recruitment. 
This is why he broke away from the rate agreement and offered a freer and more 
competitive remuneration system than the unions had established. 
However, he felt that his social contribution must go beyond the business sphere, 
so he embarked on the creation of several foundations, through which he sought to 
materialise his convictions. 
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Chronology of the Foundations 
1975 – Fundación MAPFRE 
1985 – Fundación MAPFRE Guanarteme 
1986 – Fundación Hernando de 
Larramendi 
1988 – Fundación MAPFRE América 
1989 – Fundación MAPFRE Vida 
1989 – Fundación MAPFRE Estudios 
1989 – Fundación MAPFRE Medicina 
1996 – Fundación Histórica Tavera 
2006 – Merger of all foundations 
(except Hernando de Larramendi and 
MAPFRE Guanarteme) into Fundación 
MAPFRE. 
CREATION OF FOUNDATIONS 
However, the most important part of my action has been the annual contributions to Foundations for actions of 
general interest [...] “This is my true legacy, the work of a “poor retrograde Carlist” who wanted to collaborate 
with his national and  Ibero-American environment”. - Larramendi (in Fundación MAPFRE Tavera, 2002) 
 
Prior to Fundación MAPFRE, a series of independent foundations had been 
created, each with a different objective. We see here their founding objectives in 
chronological order of the year of their foundation. 
Fundación MAPFRE - 1975: To contribute 
to meeting the needs related to safety in all its 
forms through studies and research and the 
provision of services and activities, aimed at the 
prevention of industrial accidents, protection 
against fire and other material risks and the 
promotion of physical and professional 
rehabilitation of victims of accidents of all kinds 
and the improvement of prosthetic systems, the 
promotion of preventive medicine and others as 
determined by the Board of Trustees. 
It expanded its founding activities in the 
1980s. It is dedicated to activities related to 
medicine, such as preventive medicine, 
rehabilitation, traumatology, and professional 
training until 1990, a year after the creation of 
Fundación MAPFRE Medicina, transferring its 
activities to the latter.  
Fundación MAPFRE Guanarteme - 1985: To cooperate in the educational, 
cultural, and charitable welfare of the society living in the Canary Islands. 
Fundación Hernando de Larramendi - 1986: The Foundation aimed to 
contribute, through the free satisfaction of physical or intellectual needs, to the 
following purposes of general interest: 
a) Promotion of charity in social relations as a specific expression of love and 
preference for the weak and poor, the basis of the doctrine of the Catholic 
Church, and protection of persons or groups who are economically or otherwise 
disadvantaged. 
b) Analysis of the role of independent institutions as a means of optimising 
resources and making society more dynamic. 
c) Study of the historical influence of the action of Carlism in Spanish society. 
d) Promotion of studies or actions of a scientific nature of general non-profit 
interest. 
It changed its name after the death of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi in 2001 and 
became the Fundación Ignacio Larramendi. 
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Fundación MAPFRE América - 1988: The development of all kinds of scientific 
and cultural activities that contributed, on a disinterested and non-profit basis, to the 
following purposes of general interest:  
a) Promotion of the sense of solidarity between Iberian and American peoples and 
cultures and the establishment of bonds of brotherhood between them. 
b) Defence and dissemination of the historical, sociological, and cultural legacy of 
Spain, Portugal, and American countries in their pre- and post-Columbian 
stages. 
c) Promotion of cultural, technical, and scientific relations and exchanges between 
Spain, Portugal and other countries of the European Economic Community and 
American countries. 
Other activities determined by the Board of Trustees of the Foundation in the 
spirit of the preceding sections.  
Fundación Cultural MAPFRE Vida - 1989: To carry out activities aimed at 
promoting and disseminating culture and art, by calling for and awarding artistic and 
literary prizes, organising exhibitions of paintings or sculptures and organising 
meetings of an artistic and literary nature, and disseminating studies on art and 
literature. 
It has its origins in the prizes awarded by MAPFRE Vida, the González Ruano 
Prize for Journalism in 1975, the Penagos Prize for Drawing in 1982. 
Fundación MAPFRE Estudios - 1989:  
a) To facilitate access to specialised teaching in subjects related to private 
insurance, security in all its manifestations, Social Security in general, business 
management and administration. 
b) To contribute, through the above, to improve the level of training and efficiency 
in the companies of people who participate in it, especially in areas related to 
insurance and safety.  
c) To promote research and dissemination in the business world of techniques and 
knowledge related to the aforementioned subjects. Its activity would be mainly 
oriented to Spain and Ibero-American countries.  
In 1997 it absorbed the Fundación MAPFRE America. 
It achieved international recognition for its postgraduate courses, conducted by 
the Instituto de Seguridad Integral.  
Fundación MAPFRE Medicina - 1989: The promotion of support for scientific 
research in the area of health, training and professional and scientific technical training 
of people whose training may be of collective interest in contact with the medical 
specialities of the Foundation, which are: traumatology, ..., for which purpose the 
Foundation may create or support centres or institutes of teaching and research as well 
as grant aid to research teams or individual researchers and grant scholarships.  
It absorbed all the medical-related foundations that were previously managed 
by Fundación MAPFRE. 
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Fundación Histórica Tavera - 1996: development of programmes, individually or 
in collaboration, aimed at the preservation and dissemination of the historical 
bibliographical and documentary heritage of the countries that make up the Ibero-
American Cultural Community. 
Promoted by MAPFRE Mutualidad and integrated into the MAPFRE system in 2002, 
changing its name to Fundación MAPFRE Tavera. 
It was a pioneer in the digitization of documents, using the CD-ROM in 1995 for the 
digitization of the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492. 
CSR AT MAPFRE TODAY 
MAPFRE SA describes its position towards sustainable business as its “sustainable 
value creation model”, which it bases on its mission, vision, and values statements. It 
defines its values as follows:365 
• Solvency  
Understood as financial strength with sustainable results over time that give us 
full capacity to meet our obligations to our stakeholders. 
• Integrity  
MAPFRE's executives, employees, agents, and associates must have ethical 
conduct at the core of their behaviour and a socially responsible approach in 
all their activities and long-term commitments. 
• Vocation of service 
We permanently seek excellence in the development of our activities. Our 
initiative is continuously oriented to the care of the relationship with the 
customer. 
• Innovation for leadership 
We understand differentiation as a key aspect to grow and improve constantly, 
with technology at the service of our businesses and their objectives. 
• Committed team 
Full involvement of employees, executives, agents, and other collaborators in 
the MAPFRE project and constant development of the team's skills and abilities. 
It also publishes its good governance policy as its “Institutional, Business and 
Organisational Principles of the MAPFRE Group”, which details the company's Articles 
of Association, various regulations, corporate policies, good governance reports and 
remuneration of the Board of Directors.  
Globally, MAPFRE carries out its responsible activity in accordance with three 
pillars: 
1. Good governance 
2. Environmental social responsibility 
 
365 MAPFRE SA, 2017 
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3. Contribution to society 
The first area serves purposes such as ensuring compliance with the law, 
promoting ethical behaviour, ensuring transparency and maintaining good corporate 
governance practices. The tool through which these are articulated is the code of 
ethics, published on its website (http://www.mapfre.com). It consists of 18 pages and 
includes a code of conduct applicable within the organisation and with regards to third 
parties. 
The second area focuses on the impact of the company in the social and 
environmental sphere, analysing its different stakeholders. The aim is also to promote 
the company's environmental performance and to demonstrate the transparency of 
CSR activities using international standards. To implement these lines of action, the 
documents defining the CSR policy and the Sustainability Plan, which is still 2016 - 
2018, are published. The CSR policy carries out a detailed and structured exercise of 
what this means for the company, taking into account each of its stakeholders. It 
defines nine general principles and six more for each of the stakeholders. The 
application of the CSR policy is supervised by the Sustainability Committee, which 
reports directly to MAPFRE's Board of Directors, the Delegate Committee or the 
Executive Committee. The Committee is chaired by a member of MAPFRE's Executive 
Committee. 
The third area seeks to contribute to society beyond the business activity and 
to make reference to Fundación MAPFRE for its development. 
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NOTES FOR THE CASE OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PHILANTHROPY: THE FOUNDATIONS 
PROMOTED BY LARRAMENDI AT MAPFRE 
 
Key terms: corporate social responsibility, corporate philanthropy, responsible 
leadership, business ethics. 
Summary 
The case describes the creation of one of the largest  foundations with most 
impact in Spain, Fundación MAPFRE. This is promoted by the company that gives it its 
name, Grupo MAPFRE , thanks to the impetus of one of its most important executives, 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi. The case shows the creation of several foundations 
promoted by the executive, which almost all end up merging into the one that 
currently exists.  
Likewise, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies implemented in the 
company are reviewed, allowing a certain comparison between the activities 
conducted within the company and those which are carried out by the foundations. 
Learning Objectives 
Students will be able to study the case as an example of CSR activity in the 
company and apply theoretical frameworks of business ethics. The difference between 
philanthropy and CSR will be discussed as well as the importance of an executive in 
promoting these types of activities. The concepts of business ethics and responsible 
leadership will be established. 
More specifically, it will be possible to learn through this case: 
- The relationship between the executive's personal values and 
the ethical activity of the company. 
- The mechanisms by which companies can develop corporate 
social responsibility and ethical activities. 
- The identification in practice of theories on business ethics. 
 
Application of the Case 
This case can be used in a Business Ethics, Business Organisation, Management 
or Human Resources class. It will serve to demonstrate in practice the theoretical 
frameworks related to business ethics and responsible leadership. It also shows how 
philanthropy in its expression in foundations is different from corporate social 
responsibility, although both can be rooted in the values of the executive.  
Suggested timeline for 90-minute session: 
Reading: 30 minutes 
Answer questions in groups: 30 minutes 
Resolution of questions and debate: 30 minutes 
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1. Describe the difference between philanthropy and corporate 
social responsibility based on the actions performed by Larramendi at MAPFRE. 
2. What schools of ethics can you identify in the thought of Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi? 
3. Highlight the elements used for the creation of an ethical 
organisation mentioned in the case. 
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PART ONE  
AT THE ORIGIN, THE INSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONALISM OF ENGLAND AND 
THE POLITICAL TRADITIONALISM OF SPAIN 
 
AT THE ORIGIN OF A BUSINESS STYLE, TRES CLAVES DE LA VIDA INGLESA (1952)  
Speaking of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi's dedication to insurance, it has 
already been noted to what extent his decision was a random one; he had studied law; 
he learned that official examinations for Public service were being held for senior 
inspectors to work at the Directorate General of Insurance: he applied, passed, and 
worked as an inspector between 1944 and 1952. 
At that time, it was England that offered the best prospects in the insurance sector, 
and the future businessman took a decision that was unusual at the time (it was a time 
when French civilization was still the main reference for the most cultured Spaniards 
and that was the language studied by most baccalaureate students). He understood 
that he needed to find out about the world of insurance in England and off he went 
there, on short trips, between 1947 and 1951, to master the language and that 
particular sector of the British economy.  
This meant, of course, that he sought not only information on how the insurance 
sector worked and the predominance of contractual arrangements in it, but also about 
the channels through which disputes arising from such arrangements were resolved. 
And that required knowing about two main things: how justice was administered by 
English judges and how the interests of each party were defended; that is, how the 
legal profession worked.  
He probably already knew what was said about the so-called British common law; in 
continental European countries (and in Iberian America), the rationalising reforms 
imposed with the French Revolution (1789) and culminating in the Napoleonic code of 
the early 19th century had been assimilated, while England remained faithful to a legal 
system—the common law—which certainly involved the application of legal rules 
emanating from the competent authorities, but maintained the primacy of 
jurisprudence and the force of custom. 
However, knowing that was not enough to foresee what Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi found in England. As far as we know, only Emilio Gómez Orbaneja—when 
translating the book Jueces y tribunales en Inglaterra, Francia y Alemania, by Robert 
Ensor, published by Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado in 1935—had anticipated 
some of the things that surprised him (Cachón and Petit, 2014). It was not a bad 
precedent; Gómez Orbaneja was an eminent specialist in procedural law, a chair he 
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had held in Valladolid until 1937 when he was removed from the position, in principle 
because he had been absent (in 1936, at the outbreak of the war, he was in France, 
from where he returned in 1938 [Petit, 2012: 353]) and had worked in the Court of 
Constitutional Guarantees in 1934, in the days of the second republic. Before that, he 
had studied the judicial procedures of France and Germany in situ, as an intern of the 
Junta para Ampliación de estudios (Board for Extension of Studies) until 1930; but he 
had been denied the request he made in January 1934—before being appointed 
member of the Court of Guarantees—to study the same thing in London, under an 
English perspective, and he contributed to the need to delve into these procedures by 
means of the bibliography he had at his disposal.  
What he enjoyed, in any case, was litigation, and what Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi set out in his 1952 book Tres claves de la vida inglesa was broader (and 
less technical; let us say more vivid). Another thing is that, in the studies for the degree 
in Law, the latter would have handled the extensive bibliography of a litigation lawyer 
(who, by the way, was already then reintegrated into the service; he had been granted 
this in 1941, due a transfer as a penalty that took him to the University of Salamanca). 
Of the vision that was the Tres claves de la vida inglesa that Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi highlighted in that book, there are two that clearly had surprised him in a 
particular way: one, that no rationalization of the law had ever been undertaken in 
England as it had been in continental Europe; the other, that private companies that 
came to provide a particular service to society in such terms that their service could 
duly be regarded as performing a role of public interest. Therefore, they obtained 
formal recognition which constituted a crucial incentive—in terms of honour or 
prestige—for them to subsist and maintain these benefits even if they were no longer 
particularly lucrative. The distinctive feature was to allow them to put the word royal 
before their name. 
The first news of the use of this adjective dates from the 14th century; in 1952, it 
was a privilege that had to be expressly granted by the monarch and that is how 
Ignacio Larramendi found out about it. He could not foresee that, in the following 
thirty years, many businessmen in the English-speaking world would reward their own 
initiatives in this way until the Flags, Emblems and Names Protection Act of 1981 
expressly prohibited it in New Zealand (Macaulay, 1992).  
In a way, it could be said that British law remained not only jurisprudential and 
customary, but also casuistic (as had been the case with Spanish law until the 
application of the rationalising legislation of the Cortes of Cádiz, from the beginning of 
the 19th century, and that of so many European and American countries). In fact, the 
legal systems of the new Ibero-American republics that were formed in the first 
decades of the 19th century were also based on these new principles, the liberal 
principles; although the enactment of the consequent codes was delayed in some 
countries until the beginning of the 20th century, so that, as unusual as it may seem, 
the Partidas of Alfonso X (13th century) remained in force in them as far as private law 
was concerned.  
It said that until the rationalization of Cadiz, general rules were promulgated in the 
Spanish monarchy, but many more referred to the resolution of specific cases 
explained in the corresponding preamble. And these resolutions, even though they 
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were not strictly speaking court judgements, but legal regulations—most of the time 
royal warrants—were incorporated into the jurisprudence that, by analogy, the judges 
applied. 
The very fact that the application was analogical, on the other hand, meant that 
judges had to carry it out at their own discretion, to the extent that the opposite was 
true: that the king would sign a ruling for a specific case and, if the competent judge in 
the case considered that the evil caused by that measure could be greater than the 
one he was trying to correct—or simply that the circumstances had changed and were 
no longer relevant—it was left to his own discretion, which in the Spanish monarchy 
was usually ruled with the phrase “obeyed but not complied with”. The judge, of 
course, had to give reasons for “not complying or enforcing” that regulation, to the 
extent that, if they were not convincing, this could lead to prosecution of the judge 
himself.  
In this way, not only was the judicial function exercised with a freedom (and a 
responsibility) that was, at the same time, an honour and a danger difficult to 
understand in mid-20th century Europe, when Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi was 
writing his book; the judge was sometimes forced to act as a true legislator; he passed 
regulations when he thought it necessary so that the crimes would not be repeated 
and, if the circumstances demanded it he asked for the monarch's acquiescence not 
before but after it was promulgated.  
These initiatives by the judges were not intended as part of a perfectly rational 
organisational project, but as specific changes to remedy specific aspects. And this 
gave continuity to the legal order that allowed—in the case of Spain, until the Cortes of 
Cadiz (1810-1813), in the case of England up to 1952—to continue in roles—
appropriate to the present moment—bodies and positions that were quite a few 
centuries old. 
Well, that is what Ignacio Larramendi discovered and was characteristic of the way 
in which England was organised—specifically in the legal and economic system—in the 
years of the second post-war period of the 20th century. Without going any further, 
the most important and famous British insurance company, Royal Lloyd—to which he 
dedicated the third part of Tres claves de la vida inglesa—had been founded in the 
18th century in Lloyd's coffee house, a “café”, we would say today, where London 
insurers met, so that those who wanted to take out insurance used to go there. The 
owner had the practical sense, the entrepreneurial sense, to see to it that they 
continued to do so, so that any Londoner who needed to take out or pay for insurance 
knew that he had to go to that coffee house; one of the things he started to do was to 
print out and display the names of the policyholders who had made this place into 
their own office on a sheet of paper, adding the financial conditions offered by each of 
them. What surprised Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi two centuries later was not 
only that the coffee house had become one of the world's leading insurance 
companies, but that it continued to operate as an insurance “market”. It had almost 
nothing to do, it was obvious, with the 18th century coffee establishment—neither 
Lloyd's nor the New Lloyd's coffee house that opened with the intention of competing 
with the former (Burling, 2014: 13-15)—but had been changing and growing reform 
after reform without ever making a decision that implied a total transformation. 
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Reform after reform, it was adapted to the needs and convenience of the users until 
it became a company that could be said to provide an unavoidable public service. But 
Larramendi discovered even more; this was not an exception in the English business 
world, but it was a response to the desire to give continuity to the corporations that 
became irreplaceable—or simply necessary—responses for the English to have certain 
services settled. That meant, of course, that someone would say when a particular 
company reached that level and how those companies could be encouraged to survive, 
even if they were private and no longer profitable to the extent desired. And someone 
pointed out to Ignacio Larramendi that this was achieved⁸ through the title of royal 
(regia, royal, of the king). Royal Lloyd's was called royal, because that was the way to 
declare that a private company was performing a public role that should not cease, 
and that was for the common good of the British people. In England as elsewhere, one 
of the reasons for setting up a business was to meet a need that was not well served. 
This meant that companies that emerged in this way generally went through a period 
in which the important thing was people should know that a particular service was 
being offered; they therefore tended to be particularly profitable, for as long as it took 
for competition to emerge that offered the same service on better or similar terms. 
From that moment on, businessmen could redirect their initiative to the search for 
new “gaps” in the supply of services. At that point, however, it became clear that it 
was not they—the businessmen—but the consumers or users who needed the service 
to continue to be provided and, therefore, for the company to survive, and the way to 
encourage them, even if the profit was lower, was to award them a royal status.  
In Tres claves de la vida inglesa, there were therefore two main messages: one, 
which we have just said, implied a certain underestimation—with respect to the 
European continent—of the public sector or, as required, a singular 
“institutionalisation” of the principle of subsidiarity which weighed up the services 
considered public much more than in other countries; the other, also in the economic 
institutional system, the preference for using the legislative power to reform what had 
emerged bottom-up, that is, from the private sector, instead of establishing premature 
state patterns through which private initiatives were channelled even by force of law.  
What was unique about Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi's book was not, however, 
that he explained these things, but rather that he related what he saw in England with 
the traditionalist political ideology that he professed and that deep down an idea of 
the company that was consistent with this relationship would be germinated. 
“CORPORATISM”. A MISNOMER 
To better understand the scope of what I have just said, it is necessary to recall 
what was understood by traditionalism in Spain from a business point of view and, 
apart from that, what the political organisation was, which had been articulated since 
1936 within the Régimen (as Franco's regime used to be called) to channel not only 
business initiatives, but all Spanish economic activity. Of course, as we know, we will 
only recall what Ignacio Larramendi criticized when he drew attention to the 
institutional “buildings” that arose from the reform of what needs to be improved, 
arising from the base, and those created from top to bottom as ideal and, therefore, 
empty constructions. 
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With the decree of 20 April 1937—the one creating the Falange Española 
Tradicionalista y de las JONS as a national political entity that excluded any other group 
from joining—Franco had assumed the “points” of the Falange as the only 
“programmatic regulation” and the ninth point stated that Spain, “in the economic 
aspect,” was created “as a gigantic trade union of producers”. This was the starting 
point. Understood literally, this wording meant that “the economic” was one way of 
creating Spain and, on the other hand, that “the social” was the same; in both cases, in 
a “totalising” sense. We mean that the “total Spain” could be seen—all of it—in an 
economic perspective and, equally, all of it, in a social perspective and that, from both 
perspectives, it could be said that they had to be linked through the channel of a single 
trade union: if Spain, in the economic field, was conceived as a “gigantic trade union of 
producers”, Spanish society would be organised “corporately by production branches 
through a system of vertical trade unions”, at the service of national economic 
integrity.  
The adverb “corporately” might sound great to the traditionalists and was accepted 
by many Falangists (some did not); the creation of the community as a set of bodies 
arranged amongst themselves was already clearly seen in the 13th century and, in the 
pre-war period of the 20th century, it had been taken up by all those who affirmed—
and they were the majority—that the Great War (1914-1918) had ruled the death of 
liberalism and party democracy.  
Corporatism was not, in other words, a heritage of traditionalism or fascism. That 
unity was strength and that this must be articulated in the most effective way, that is, 
in people and groups that were arranged to achieve an end, was a principle of common 
sense. A few months before declaring itself to be statutorily socialist, at the congress of 
the General Union of Workers held in 1928, a major paper had been approved that 
advocated the corporate articulation of state political representation; those belonging 
to UGT had thus crowned their collaboration with Primo de Rivera in the National 
Corporate Organisation of which we will soon speak.1 The current constitution of the 
USSR (1936) defined the Union as an exercise of power by the workers “represented by 
the soviets of workers' deputies” (Article 2) and admitted two forms of ownership: that 
of the state and that of the cooperative associations that were the Kolkhoz (Article 5), 
a fundamental part of which were the “collective enterprises” formed within it (Article 
7). Only on that basis was it understood that “the economic life of the USSR was 
determined and run by the state plan for the national economy” (Art. 11), which was 
therefore a plan involving the corporate organisation of men and associations. The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics itself was precisely that, a (federal) corporation of 
republics (art. 13) (Constitution, 1936).  
In fact, the same laissez-faire of the liberals did not oppose the obvious, but above 
all supported freedom of association, also in the field of business, taken to the extreme 
 
1 I tried to explain it in El socialismo durante la Dictadura, 1923-1930, Madrid, Tebas, 1977. The main documents were 
included in the documentary Appendix, which was formed by Ignacio Olábarri. He himself had suggested this subject to me as a 
“master class” in the “official examinations for Public Service” in which Miguel Artola made Ricardo de la Cierva an assistant and 
therefore a university professor. I gave Ignacio the opportunity to sign the book jointly because of the generosity with which he 
had provided me with a fundamental part of the documentation I used. He did not accept; I offered him the original as I had 
finished it so that he could adopt what was largely based on his knowledge and publish it under his name alone; but he did not 
accept this either. 
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of considering any intervention by the authorities as harmful and, consequently, 
reducing distributive justice to the jurisdiction of the individual conscience of 
businessmen and capitalists; in fact, of owners.  
This was not, however, what Ignacio Larramendi found in England, and it should be 
noted that here, also on a theoretical level, one could find a kind of corporatist 
liberalism that was very close to what he discovered through observation and 
conversations with experts (apart from reading as much as he could get hold of on the 
subject). We cannot say for sure that he was familiar with John Stuart Mill's economic 
thinking in particular; but if he was, he must have seen some of what he wrote in the 
book of 1952 reflected in it; John Stuart Mill thought that, in fact, large-scale 
enterprises, including those of a strictly capitalist nature, should be true social 
institutions, and the latter in the sense that they should not be reduced to bodies that 
make the capital invested profitable, but also to impose a fairer social system by 
means of paying special attention to the needs of their employees. The latter not only 
gave priority to capital-labour relations, but also advised that “corporatisation” be 
extended to employees so that they could negotiate on a one-to-one basis with the 
businessmen. In this way, what some called a true “economic democracy” could be 
achieved (Christie, 1984).  
This was not the case, as Ignacio Larramendi did in practice, when he projected 
what would come to be called “corporate social responsibility” that was well beyond 
labour relations alone, which would constitute a contribution to the improvement of 
Spain's institutional structure. 
It is very interesting, however, to know how these approaches developed in the 
United States, went so far as to include, in a way that is unusual for the Latin world, 
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which was adopted in 
1868 to recognise the equal rights of all persons, regardless of their characteristics. 
The amendment had emerged as one of the tools to legally address the racial 
problems arising from the abolition of slavery. What was very unique was that, in the 
Supreme Court, it was understood that this did not only serve to put an end to racism, 
but also that corporations—every corporation—had the character of a person and, 
therefore, their rights should be equal to those of any citizen; natural persons and legal 
entities should be equal before the law, which meant this equality was expressed in 
terms derived from Roman law. The case of the Santa Clara County-Southern Pacific 
Railroad dispute (1886) made this particularly clear: the equal protection of the laws 
recognised to all persons in the 14th Amendment included corporations of all kinds as 
persons. This interpretation undoubtedly had to do with the desire of many North 
Americans that it not be applied, however for black people, for whom it had been 
primarily enacted and, in fact, the Amendment was used to defend corporations rather 
than to defend individuals; between 1868 and 1896, one hundred and fifty cases 
expressly involving the 14th Amendment came before the U.S. Supreme Court. Well, 
135 of them had to do with business entities and only 15 with black people. 
Although the waters have returned to their course since the second decade of the 
20th century and North American jurisprudence has refocused the so-called Equal 
Protection Clause on matters relating to equality between individuals. It was mainly 
applied in the field of education and access of black people to the same educational 
facilities as white people and in the field of labour rights and the conflicts they caused. 
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But there was a quarter of a century (1886-1910, roughly) when the vast majority of 
the cases that judges had to decide in relation to the 14th Amendment concerned 
corporate entities and their egalitarian “personal” nature (Kellman, 2000; Meyers, 
2001; Hammerstrom, 2002).  
The supporters of the four sets of political proposals that I have mentioned so far 
(traditionalists, fascists, socialists and liberals or, better, free traders) disagreed, 
without a doubt, on the way to set up the corporations and swung from the 
traditionalist assertion that it should be respected as a natural tendency, arising from 
bottom-up; the free trade movement, which defended the same thing but emphasized 
the restriction of individual freedom that all association entailed and therefore thought 
the corporation to be a lesser evil, although indispensable, and the Statism movement, 
in which socialists, communists and fascists coincided and distinguished itself from the 
others—on paper—in that the resulting corporations were previously defined as a 
constituent part of the state.  
What happened next is that the corporatist vagaries of Italian Fascism and its defeat 
in 1945 in the World War disrupted several basic concepts in Latin countries, and 
among them, “corporatism” came to be presented as a form of Fascism or as a 
nostalgia for the past when one heard traditionalists sighing about the good results 
that had been achieved, for centuries, by the guilds, in the face of the novelty that, in 
the 20th century, had begun to receive the name of “trade union”.  
In Anglo-Saxon countries, this idea did not stand up; corporations remained the 
backbone of social and economic organisation.  
Let us understand each other: on the continent, too; but, there, and especially in 
the Latin sphere, since 1945, after the defeat of Fascism, you had to be careful when 
using these derivatives of “body”; they could call you a Fascist at the drop of a hat and, 
if you were careless, they would put together all the nicknames and come out with 
such grotesque accusations as “conservative militant Catholic.” They mixed apples with 
oranges; I know. But that is the way it was. For the time being, those corporate whims 
approved at the 1928 UGT congress were erased from history, and the USSR's 
corporate organisation was also hidden in the freezer that, after all, was the “cold 
war”.  
Well, in spite of all this, Luis Hernando de Larramendi and the Spanish traditionalists 
in general did not give in to the confusion between corporatism as a natural solution 
and the military defeat of fascism in 1945; they insisted that the corporate articulation 
of society is not a convenience, nor is it enough to value it as a necessity; it is, strictly 
speaking, a pure and simple fact derived from the inter-relational nature (they 
preferred to say “social” nature) of every human being; but it must arise from bottom-
up. It must be the result of human freedom that translates into actions that seek all 
possible good and, even more so, do the least possible evil. They maintained, in other 
words, the ideal of “the creative tradition”. Ignacio Larramendi himself maintained this 
when, after Franco's death, at the dawn of the Transition (to a democracy of political 
parties) he wrote up two facts: that corporate organisation existed everywhere, 
whatever the form of government, and that “organic democracy” tried out in Salazar's 
Portugal for forty-five years and in Franco's Spain for around forty was, in fact, a 
“symbiosis [...] of corporatism and fascism”. He was talking about two different things I 
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think: organic democracy as a form of government as contemplated in political law and 
organic democracy as a synonym for real society: 
 “In reality, inorganic democracy has never existed in a stable way. Political formulas 
based on universal suffrage have been supported, and this is the basis of their political 
roots, by social situations or institutional developments that have given them an 
organic nature in practice. The removal of the right to vote in large social sectors and 
the disproportionate nature of the constituencies is characteristic of the United States 
and England, to the extent that in the nineteenth century it could have been 
considered a lordly-rural oligarchy and not a real formula for democracy. The 
entrenchment of European democracy has depended on strong structures that provide 
a basis of stability that mitigates against the pure application of universal suffrage. In 
France, with no such deep social roots, the coordinating factor has been a public 
administration with greater social strength than in other countries. Political parties, 
institutionalized in the United States and England and probably in other countries, are 
another factor of balance and stabilization. 
But they are, he said, precisely because they interrupt what constitutes the essence 
of the form of government called democracy: “They have become organic institutions 
that reduce people's scope of choice, whose suffrage has psychological importance but 
does not constitute a real factor in decision making, remaining a symbol of the 
individual's influence on the State. The difference between Republicans and 
Democrats in America or between Labour and Conservatives in England has not 
become substantial, except in election promises. Universal suffrage has become a 
method of selecting political leaders after an organic process of purging, a flexible 
formula of oligarchy with the mechanism of classic democracy” (1977: 51). The latter, 
yes, was what defined it as a form of government in the strictly legal-political sense: 
oligarchy with the mechanism of classical democracy. 
Certainly, expressions such as “creative tradition” were repeated so much among 
traditionalists, that they could also degenerate into empty concepts if they were not 
“filled” with realities and, in the days of which we speak, specifically since October 
1936, the supreme power in the Spain that rose up on 18 July against the Government 
of the Republic—that is, the two institutions from which that void could be filled—was 
not, purely, either in the Social Democrats, Liberals, Traditionalists or Fascists; it was in 
the above-mentioned Government of the Republic, whose members could barely just 
keep alive, and in Francisco Franco, who was interested in convincing Mussolini and 
Hitler—and their Spanish addicts—that he was one of them. 
It is thus understood that the corporatism of the Régimen seemed to Luis and 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi a complete mistake destined to failure. And it is 
surprising that the censorship allowed for the emphatic sentences found on this 
subject in Tres claves de la vida inglesa, in 1952: “Statification”, he wrote, “is not the 
best system for defending the public interest ... The tendency towards statification has 
the same origin as that which seeks to organise teaching into uniform bureaucratic 
moulds or to “rationalize” justice in the continental way. It is the easy solution, useful 
to convince the masses, but of an “impolitic” nature" (1952: 67).  
England had shown him that what we have already seen was better: to paraphrase 
what we have just quoted, statification was not the best system for defending the 
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public interest; the best was to recognise the public interest of the services provided 
by private initiative (provided, of course, that private initiative assumed the priority of 
serving the public interest, which was what was recognised by giving the title of royal 
to companies that deserved it for that reason). 
They thus “crowned” an economic system in which very ancient guilds, even 
“medieval” ones subsisted, fully adapted to today's needs. 
The fact is that the latter is what the Spanish traditionalists repeated as the main 
principle of their creed; they continued to invoke the goodness of the business 
organisation set up by the guilds until the liberal revolution abolished their privileges 
and, thus, the freedom to create companies was imposed. In Spain, it cannot be said 
that the disappearance of the guilds was imposed by law; what the royal decree of 8 
June 1813, in the Cortes de Cádiz, meant was the imposition of the property and 
contract regime, and that—after the legislative ups and downs between the Old and 
New Regime that took place between 1814 and 1840—ended up making the guild 
organisation inoperative. In the 20th century, some survived, however, especially 
among fishermen and, in general, the so-called “Seafarers” (thus in Iver, 2013).  
What Larramendi discovered in England was that, there, survival responded to a 
principle of law that was not the Spanish one or that of the rest of the European 
continent and that, deep down, it conveyed a true cultural trait, which was the use of 
law to improve what was real, rather than to build what was ideal. And that was what 
he meant—I think—when he used the word “medieval” in Tres claves de la vida inglesa 
(1952) and said: “The fundamental error made by those who wanted to be inspired by 
the corporate system of the medieval economic regime is that they believed that the 
public power, at a certain moment, could create institutions equivalent to those that 
had been so hard to form naturally and, instead of an entity with its own soul and life, 
bureaucratic machines arose in which nobody had faith and they failed” (1952: 89). 
THE IMPOSITION OF VIOLENCE 
It is singular that, without knowing how far his differences could go, Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi was appointed Managing Director of the then Mutualidad de 
Seguros Agrícolas by a man intimately linked to the project of turning Spain into a 
gigantic trade union of producers. I am referring to Dionisio Martín Sanz, who had 
become chairman of the mutual society in 1955 and before the end of the year had to 
give his approval to hire the young insurance inspector. 
Dionisio Martín Sanz had been born in a village in the province of Valladolid (Tudela 
de Duero, 1909) and was twenty-two years old, therefore, when his fellow countryman 
Onésimo Redondo, a little older than him (1905), founded the Juntas Castellanas de 
Actuación Hispánica (1931), one of the first Spanish parties that defined themselves as 
supporters of German Nazism as it declared itself in those days. Still in 1931, Onésimo 
Redondo's JCAH joined the “Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (JONS)”, created 
in October of that year by the philosopher and politician from Zamora, Ramiro 
Ledesma Ramos, a disciple of Ortega y Gasset. In 1933, the lawyer José Antonio Primo 
de Rivera, son of who had been the dictator with Alfonso XIII between 1923 and 1930, 
formed the Falange Española in view of the elections of November of that year and, in 
1934, they chose to merge with the JONS in the party that became FE de las JONS. It 
was precisely in the Falange Española de las JONS programme that the merger took 
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place, where the purpose of turning Spain into a giant trade union of producers was 
assumed. Through that bridge, that of FE de las JONS, Dionisio Martín reached the 
Central Technical Committee for Agriculture that Franco constituted in October 1936. 
From there, the Committee, Dionisio would go on to the Under-Secretariat of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, entrusted to his friend Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta in 1938, in 
the first government formed by Franco.2 He remained as under-secretary until 19393 
and, in 1943, he joined the first Cortes put together by Franco as a court lawyer for 
trade union representation, and as court lawyer in Cortes he continued in 1955 (and 
would continue until 1976) (Santos, 2002). He therefore experienced the evolution of 
Spain very close at hand and, in particular, that of the Spanish state and 
administration. 
But the Larramendi family also experienced it and the result was not the same, as 
we will see.  
 
Before Dionisio Martín and Ignacio Larramendi became chairman and general 
manager, respectively, of the Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas, specifically in the twenty 
years between 1955 and 1936, many things had happened that marked their way of 
thinking and living. It is enough to say—to begin with—that Larramendi assured sixty 
years later, from the second date (1936), that what happened in the Eastern countries: 
that a Marxist political regime was imposed “could easily have happened in Spain in 
1936” (1996: 94).  
In those countries, it had another chronology; in some, it had already happened in 
1917-1921 and, in those and other countries, it happened in 1945. Spain was left in the 
middle and, according to the businessman whose work we are examining, “the 
atmosphere immediately prior to these elections [those of February 1936] was 
[already] charged with the worst omens.” The formation of the Popular Front—
precisely in view of these elections—gave them a great deal of impetus. For this 
reason, the Carlists chose to form coalition candidacies wherever possible; in 
Catalonia—a Carlist defence in those days—it was called the Frente Catalán de Orden 
and, in the electoral candidacy that emerged from it for the district of the province of 
Girona, was Luis Hernando de Larramendi, Ignacio’s father (2000): 57).  
 
2 Cf. the obituary of Santos, 2002, where it expressly states that he was the Under-Secretary of Agriculture. The chairmanship 
of the Central Technical Committee, in Lucha: Diario de Teruel al servicio de España, ii, No. 72 (25 February 1937) 4. His 
appointment as Under-Secretary of Agriculture appeared in numerous newspapers: thus, in El Diario palentino: Defensor de los 
intereses de la capital y la provincia, lvii, No. 16286 (3 February 1938) 1; Diario de Burgos de avisos y noticias, xlviii, No. 19579 (3 
February 1838) 1, among many others. 
3 The cessation, signed by Franco on 19 August 1939, in the Boletín oficial del estado (Official State Gazette), 22 September 
1939, p. 5260 (ref. 14943). 
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The Popular Front won 82,466 votes throughout the province and, with that, five 
seats in the Cortes, while the Frente de Orden obtained 60,000 and had to settle for 
two: Joan Estelrich and Carlos Badía i Malagrida, two diplomats who belonged to the 
Lliga catalanista. The first of those six was José Puig Pujadas, who was convicted of 
involvement in the Catalan Revolution of October 1934 and served sixteen months in 
prison when he won that election—in February 1936—and was therefore immediately 
released. El Heraldo, a monthly newspaper in Figueres with a Protestant evangelical 
orientation, reported on the victory of the Frente d'Esquerres with a caricature worthy 
of El Motín in which a friar looking like a gorilla represented what would have been 
imposed if Frente Catalán had won. But that was the culmination of the editorial, 
entitled Alegrémonos, whose wording is an excellent example of how one can present 
oneself as a very restrained conservative and put an end to a hope that presupposes 
that there must be violence (even if only legal violence): in the editorial, they declared 
themselves—in that order—entirely unconnected with politics and, immediately, 
liberal. They were therefore pleased with the result of the elections, which was “the 
national crusade to reconquer the Republic” (not in italics, but in bold). It was a matter 
of recovering the political freedoms defined at the end of the 18th century, which now 
demanded an end to “ecclesiastical power” and “papal sovereignty” that subjugated 
the Spanish, it is understood that while the winners of the 1933 elections governed, 
who were now the losers. 
I draw attention, in passing, to the fact that they presented themselves as actors in 
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a “national crusade”. Years ago, I published a brief study on the use of that word in 
those months and I noticed that, well into the 19th century, it had become a term of 
even more extreme political liberalism.4 It could be due, in part, to the idealised 
medieval studies that was Romanticism.  
That, obviously, must be taken into account to understand how, on the other side, 
already during the war of 1936, they began talking about “crusade” in the same sense 
that the editor of El Heraldo de Figueras (and so many others) did and the concept was 
reinforced until it became a definition of war, but on the other side (and this despite 
the reluctance of many bishops to call it that; they saw the danger that the military 
rebels would act as “crusaders” who, like those of the Middle Ages, did not hesitate to 
bring the bishops themselves into line. In fact, they did not speak of the war as a 
“crusade” in the Collective letter addressed by the Spanish episcopate to all its 
brothers and sisters throughout the world, as early as 1937. 
LUIS HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT AND FRANCO 
In San Sebastian, where the Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano family lived at 
that time, Ignacio was able to see the same thing that—perhaps with greater 
brutality—spread throughout Spain, not only, but especially in the regions where the 
CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) had greater strength, such as Catalonia. In 
San Sebastian, after the February 1936 elections, it could be expected that the weight 
of the Carlists and the Basque nationalists would stop the violence that was unleashed 
everywhere; but, even so, Larramendi the son, would remember “the conflicts that 
terrorised the atmosphere daily after the triumph of the Popular Front” and pointed 
out, among them, the assault on the existing Carlist Circle in the capital of Gipuzkoa. 
“Immediately, with the speed and recklessness that characterised him, my father set 
up a protest meeting with no other resources than his own, which had little 
significance bar a symbolic one, because the people were already afraid and locked 
themselves in their homes” (2000): 57). 
Fear had also won over the people; the landowners of Salamanca affiliated with the 
Bloque Agrario, for example, tried to keep the legal channels open in the negotiations 
they had to face with the working class, but requested handguns from a foreign 
company in case they had to defend themselves from an attack or something similar. It 
was not the middle of July 1936 yet (Rodríguez Almeida, 1986: 223).  
It was like that; people were afraid; a fear, simply, of losing their lives. But some, as 
we have just said, perceived, each in their own way, that this transcended the choice 
between dying violently or simply living, and that it was also the way of living that was 
at stake even in the most intimate aspects of each person. On 29 March 1936, a 
banquet was held at the premises of the Lliga Catalana de l'Alt Empordà, in Figueres, 
to pay tribute to the two members of the Lliga who had won a seat in the Catalan 
Parlament and the other two who had won it in the Spanish Parliament for heading up 
the candidacy in which Luis Hernando de Larramendi was running. We already know 
that the latter were the diplomats Joan Estelrich and Carlos Badía i Malagrida; let us 
add that those in the Catalan Parlament were Tomás Carreras and Artau, philosopher 
 
4 “The name of 'Crusade' and the war of Spain”: Aportes, No. 8 (1988), 65-72. 
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and professor of ethics at the University of Barcelona, the businessman Joan Vallés i 
Pujal and the historian Raimon d'Abadal.  
It is revealing that, in that homage, two things were mixed that seemed to 
contradict each other: that they resorted to the form of homage that had been 
imposed in the 19th century—offering a banquet with speeches—and to hear in the 
latter expressions that made one think that they were in a historical moment of 
enormous gravity and of western, not to say universal, scope:  
Vallés referred to the “serious political-social situation in Spain” and urged 
everyone to face it with courage and without a trace of desertion. “It is not possible to 
play the role of a prophet,” he added, “but, whatever the events that occur, the 
members of the Lliga will always move within the guidelines of patriotism” (a term 
that, at that time, surely referred to Catalonia, created, however, as the call to save 
Spain). 
Joan Estelrich went on to ratify this by presenting Catalanism as “the only ideality 
[idealitat] within Spain, which can save Spain by example”. He did not hide “the danger 
of destruction of Spanish society” which he perceived at that time to the point of 
endangering “our civilisation”; “today, in Catalonia, the only conservative force, giving 
the word the most liberal meaning, is the Lliga. Therefore, those who want to save our 
civilisation should join the Lliga”.5 He did not add it; but it was an indication that he did 
not put aside Catalan Carlism.  
The strikes and attacks against property that were repeated in the following months 
throughout Spain (Sánchez Pérez, 2011; Plaza, 2012) did not hide the ant-Catholic 
attitude of many left-wing militants; in some dioceses (I have documentary evidence in 
Toledo and Granada [Martínez Sánchez, 2015, and Titos, 2005, respectively]) many 
parish priests left their parishes and took refuge in the seats of the bishopric, and that 
not because, let us say, precaution, but because, the militants of the Popular Front 
explicitly told them that they should either leave or be killed. 
When the war broke out in the middle of July 1936, all of that spilled over and it is 
fair to say that it did so on both sides. This is not the subject of this research and, as a 
historian, I have expressly rejected the unilateralism of historians who only study the 
barbarity of one of the two sides, be it the one or the other; I distrust accounts that 
coincide in favour of the militancy of the historian who makes them and I have tried to 
provide elements of judgement from another perspective, that of the Spaniards who, 
on both sides, did everything possible to save their political enemies or people in 
whom they saw, simply, people. I have published something about it and I refer to.6  
It is not a question of implementing do-goodism, but of contributing to bring the 
panorama of what happened closer to reality; most Spaniards, including those 
mobilised in both armies, did not want war; the insistence of the leaders of the two 
 
5 “Homenatge als diputats de la Lliga per la circumscripció de Girona: Diari de Girona d'ads i noticies, xlviii, No. 73 (Tuesday 31 
March 1936) 4. All the phrases in this article that we put in quotes above are in Catalan in the original. 
6 “The Civil War as a confrontation between Christians,” in Religión y guerra civil española: Gran Bretaña, Francia, España, 
Santiago de Compostela, CSIC (Institute of Galician Studies “Padre Sarmiento”), ed. by Antón M. Pazos, 2011, pg. 117-148. He had 
shaped the proposal in “Historical or simply shared memory (of the Civil War and Repression),” in La República y la Guerra civil, 
setenta años después, coordinated by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luis E. Togores, t. I, Madrid, Editorial Actas, 2008, pg. 170-
187. 
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sides on fighting and winning the propaganda battle is revealing in that this was the 
case (Rollo, 2013); it was not only a matter of washing their respective faces with a 
view to attracting the sympathy of the rest of the world, but also of “mobilising” the 
very Spaniards, whom they saw as too lukewarm in their respective favour; the Jesuit 
Toni was forced by the censors of the Régimen to remove the reference from a text he 
was going to publish in 1937, to the many Spaniards who had the legal age to take up 
arms, which he saw in the terraces of the bars while those of his call—up fought and 
died in the front.7 
Let us say it with all the words that are relevant: the repression, in both areas, 
especially until November 1936 (in both), was the work of cowards who, armed to the 
teeth, dared to take on totally defenceless enemies. 
They were the counterpoint of the idealists, who, in the respective front or rear 
guard, only saw the good part.  
Perhaps Luis Hernando de Larramendi did not see Franco with sympathy—at least 
politically—from the moment the spirited “African” military man was appointed a 
gentleman of the house by King Alfonso XIII; honour (and nothing more than honour) 
that was, above all, a way of expressing royal appreciation. That I did not think much of 
him at the outbreak of the war, is deduced from what Luis Hernando de Larramendi 
told his son Ignacio on 17 July 1936, according to the latter’s memories, when news of 
the Moroccan army uprising began to reach San Sebastian and Franco's name rang out; 
“it was when my father told me that, if he was going to control the situation, all was 
lost. I could never find out why he thought that way, although he obviously did not like 
him and perhaps he foresaw his cruel actions in the post-war period” (2000): 82). 
In any case, what was the last straw for the discontent in Luis Hernando de 
Larramendi may have been the way he took power. 
The uprising of July 1936 had failed; what the military rebels intended and expected 
was a minimum of military resistance from the Republican Government that they could 
finish off in a few weeks. But they found that this was not the case and tried to save 
what they had achieved, to reorganise it and for this, to reorganise themselves in order 
to achieve the greatest warlike effectiveness and to see if, in that way, they could—
step by step—straighten out the situation. 
Among historians, it has been discussed whether the uprising was supported—
understood as within the next forty-eight hours—by the majority of the army officers 
or whether they were not in the majority. Without wishing to be a third party in the 
debate, perhaps the role of indecision should be assessed a lot more. I mean that there 
are sufficient indications to think that, on 18 July 1936, many officers refrained and 
waited to see what would happen before deciding on one side or the other, and one of 
the first things that happened was that the civil authorities of the Government of the 
Republic and those who remained faithful to them, in all the places where there was 
an arsenal, found themselves with that very thing: the doubt as to whether they had 
sufficient officialdom for the regular army itself to defend the constituted order. And, 
in doubt, they opened up the arms depots to the leaders of the trade unions opposed 
 
7 That and more episodes, I studied in ¿Fascismo o Estado católico,? already mentioned. 
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to the military coup, the main ones, the CNT and the UGT, and found that many of 
these leaders, especially anarcho-syndicalists, did not bow to the corresponding army 
officers, but set themselves up as strictly military commanders. 
Then, how can I say, not without a certain gracefulness, in his memoirs, one of 
General Emilio Mola's close friends, Felix Maíz (2008), the armed trade unionists—
called “militiamen” from now on, as members of the “popular militias” that they 
were—gave priority to undertaking the revolution in the rear guard, and the rebel 
military took the opportunity to reorganise and overcome the situation of defeated.  
It is true that they counted on thousands of volunteers who joined the flags of the 
Falange and the tercios of the Requeté, even though the men who took this decision 
did not consider themselves to be either of them. It was simply the Falange and the 
Requeté were the main channels for people who considered the republic constituted 
between 1931 and 1936 to have been simply a disaster.  
In the following months, the heads of the rebel military who, constituted in the 
National Defence Board, understood that the direction of the war had to be in one 
direction in order to make it more effective; on 28 September 1936, they took the 
decision to appoint Franco “Head of the Government of the Spanish State,” with the 
title of “Generalissimo” of the army and with “all the powers of the new State”; these 
phrases were included in a decree signed by General Cabanellas and published in the 
Boletín oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional (Official Gazette of the National Defence 
Board) on the 30th. Historians have given different versions of what happened in those 
days. In principle, it can be said that, between 28 September and 2 October, Franco 
became Head of State by the simple procedure of removing the expression “of the 
Government” that we read in the Boletin de la Junta and that we have just transcribed. 
I suppose any historian who thought about it would say—in my opinion, with good 
reason—that it was a white-collar coup d'état. What was done was to put the fait 
accompli in front of the generals who formed the Junta. How? By getting all the 
newspapers with the largest circulation in Spain, which defined itself as “nationalist” 
for the time being, to publish the content of the decree of the 30th within the 
following 48 hours with the expression “Head of State” instead of “Head of the 
Government of the State”. 
THE COUP D'ÉTAT OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1936 AND THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF LUIS 
HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI 
Why did the generals who had decided on the appointment allow it and abide by 
it as published? Some historians downplay the importance of this change of name, that 
of the “Head of Government of the State,” since it was followed by the recognition 
that all the powers were left to him, whether he continued as head of Government or 
did what he did, which was to leave the phrase in “head of State,” and they therefore 
maintain that the question we are asking ourselves—why did the other generals 
tolerate it—is not appropriate. 
We will not go into that; we must admit that there was an aggravating factor that 
invited silence; do not forget that the coup in mid-July 1936 had failed and that this did 
not only give decisive importance to the Army of Africa, which was the one 
commanded by Franco. Even so, the forces at their disposal were still insufficient, or so 
they thought; for this very reason, they had to rely on volunteers as a shock force; at 
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first, most of the thousands of volunteers who joined the Falange or the Requeté (or 
one of the smaller groups that appeared or were reinforced at the time, such as Acción 
Ciudadana, a kind of militia in its origin), had been entrusted with auxiliary or 
secondary missions, such as border surveillance. But as early as the summer of 1936, 
they began to fight at the front. 
The latter—the abundance of volunteers—no doubt depended on the national 
sentiment being as emotional as was necessary, in the rear guard, for the men of arms-
taking age to join in. And, in those circumstances, to bring to light the dissensions 
among the rebel generals and discover that there was a struggle for personal power 
among them—especially between supporters of Mola and supporters of Franco—
could end or excessively weaken popular support and encourage the enemy to 
reassemble. 
The advance from Navarre along the Cantabrian coast—where the uprising did not 
succeed—was slow and costly. Ignacio witnessed the entry of the requetés in San 
Sebastián, by Ategorrieta, with his brother Luis Manuel, on 13 September 1936. “At 
about twelve o'clock in the morning, the forty of Artajona arrived”, which was the 
number four company of the tercio of Lácar, commanded by Captain Ignacio Ureta 
Zabala. “It was impressive, they came in rags, with dirty red berets, some with 
espadrilles, “resolute” more than due to the struggle of walking in the mountains. They 
were Carlist volunteers from that town, who knows what their children and 
grandchildren would think now. There was no defence, the previous night people had 
fled through the port and by road to Bilbao. [...] San Sebastian was absolutely empty, 
hardly anyone dared to leave their homes, only us reckless youngsters” (2000: 83). A 
few hours later, the streets of San Sebastian were full of people with their arms raised, 
the “imperial salute” renewed by the Italian Fascists and taken up by the Spanish 
Falangists.  
Was it a warning that the Donostians believed that they should greet the requetés 
in this way?8 In any case, the truth was that Franco and his people had managed to act 
more quickly; under the command of the Army of Africa, they had advanced from 
north to south through Extremadura until they united the east of Spain with the area 
dominated by the Army of the North, under the command of Mola. But Franco decided 
to delay the arrival and presumed takeover of Madrid a few days in order to strike a 
blow: to free the more than two thousand military and civilians, men, women, and 
children, who had made themselves strong in the Alcazar of Toledo and had been 
enduring a very hard siege for two months. On 27 September 1936, Franco took the 
city called “Imperial”; on the 28th, those of the Defence Board appointed him “Head of 
the Government of the State”. What followed, we already know.  
We are interested, however, to know what could reach the lawyer Luis Hernando 
de Larramendi from all of this and, if instead of sticking to the most read newspapers 
then, we look at the ones with a smaller circulation, we can get closer to the confusion 
 
 8As far as I know, it was not surprising that the Donostians who felt liberated that day made that gesture and to what extent 
hereinafter the photographs of that Donostian crowd published in Spanish newspapers could have an impact. It would then 
become compulsory whenever the national anthem, the Oriamendi of the traditionalists or the Cara al sol of the Phalange (cf. 
Sánchez Erauskin, 1994: 83-85). But it was not on 13 September 1936, and the subsequent obligation would fall into disuse. 
Around 1950, in multitudinous meetings—for example, sports meetings—in which the national anthem was played, it was striking 
that some of the people present, very few, raised their arms. 
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that was created among the common people (the ones who read newspapers and 
talked about what was going on). At Franco's inauguration ceremony, presided over by 
General Cabanellas as the senior military officer of the Junta de Defensa Nacional, he 
must have said these words: “Dear Head of the Government of the Spanish State: in 
the name of this Board, which I chair, I hand over to you the Powers of State”.9 If we 
now look for the news in the Soria newspaper El Avisador Numantino we have to wait 
until 3 October and admit that it was because it had not received the necessary 
“reports”, as its editor claimed. Whatever the case, the first page transcribed the 
decree of 30 September and therefore listed Franco as the head of the Government of 
the Spanish State, as he was also called in the title of an article on page 2 entitled 
Resumen de los sucesos más destacados (Summary of the most outstanding events).  
But, in this one, the words attributed to Cabanellas when he invested Franco were 
no longer only the ones we have read, but several were changed and, in particular, the 
ones I put in brackets were added: “I give you [absolutely all] the Powers of the State”, 
he would have said.  
On the third page, the congratulations of the Management Committee of the 
Provincial Council, of Soria, presumably, dated 30 September and addressed to the 
"Head of State" were inserted, while on the fourth page, the congratulations that had 
been addressed, apparently jointly, by the military and civil governors of the province 
to the “Head of Government of the State” were added.  
The icing on the cake was when they turned from page three to page four; in the 
third, they warned that the Junta de Defensa Nacional had published “an interesting 
decree” in the first article of which “all political actions and trade union and business 
actions of a political nature” were prohibited and only “the groups exclusively subject 
to the authority of this Junta de Defensa Nacional and its delegates” were authorised. 
However, on page 4 (under the heading Al cerrar) it was stated that, on 2 October, 
“the Head of Government of the Spanish State” had promulgated “a very important 
law” on the organisation of the new “National State” in which he declared, firstly, that 
“the management and administration of the State will be in accordance with 
nationalist principles” and that, for this, “a Technical Board and various Committees” 
(specifically, the Finance, Justice, Industry, Commerce and Supplies; Agriculture, 
Employment, Culture and Education, Public Works and Communication committees 
were created—the last two sectors, in a single Committee—and several other 
positions and bodies, among which was the “General Secretariat of the Head of 
State”.10 
The editor of this last review excused himself from publishing the law in its 
entirety due to lack of space. But the truth was that by doing so, perhaps without 
intending to, he avoided placing the emphasis that was perceived in the regulation 
when he spoke of the creation of the “Technical Board of the State” and pointed to the 
“Head of State” in the second and fourth articles as the last instance that would take 
the corresponding final decision, in each case that was presented. This was stated in 
 
9 In Heraldo de Zamora , xi, number 12808 (1 October 1936) 4. 
10 All of this, in El Avisador Numantino, lviii, 2nd period, no. 5391 (Saturday, 3 October 1936) 1-4.  
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the Official State Gazette published in Burgos on Friday, 2 October 1936, with the 
identification “Year 1” and “number 1.”11 
On the same day, 2 October, the last issue of the official Boletín oficial de la Junta 
de Defensa Nacional was published (which disappeared, of course). 
It is completely implausible that Luis Hernando de Larramendi would not follow 
this war of names (and jurisdictions) without discovering that, behind it, there was a 
coup d'état and that Franco had just established a dictatorship, even if he did not call it 
that. It cannot be assured; but it is possible that the anti-Francoism of Larramendi 
father and son had a decisive milestone, in that fact. The gentlemen of Alfonso XIII 
rose up with the saint and the alms.  
That was the political situation in February 1937, when Luis Hernando de 
Larramendi wrote El sistema tradicional, a book in which, maintaining himself on a 
theoretical level, he expressly repudiated “The Dictatorship,” the title of one of the 
chapters and, as a whole, the “new law” of which the jurists who supported the 
Spanish Falange had begun to speak. His son considered it much later “his most 
ambitious political work”. He wrote it in San Sebastian, spending a month in the Hotel 
Londres, and [...] the myopic censorship of that time did not allow it to be published 
for 14 years. Great public figures were members of that censorship, many of whom 
later pretended to set an example of freedom... It was a satisfaction for me, in 1952, in 
a minuscule editorial adventure with other Carlist friends, to publish that book, 
outwitting the censorship, under the changed title of Cristiandad, Tradición y Realeza. 
It was one of the great satisfactions of my life to see the satisfaction of my father [...] It 
still deserves to be read for the timeless wisdom it contains... El sistema tradicional—
my father says—does not need to be implanted, it is always implicit in the social 
nature: that is why society, not knowing how to interpret it in many occasions in an 
affirmative way [...] misses it by an inexhaustible route of exclusion, knowing that, for 
every new unfortunate attempt or formula, that is not!” (2000: 58); this last sentence 
perhaps intentionally paraphrased the title of the article No es esto, no es esto (This is 
not it, this is not it), which José Ortega y Gasset had published in Crisol on 9 September 
1931, when he became convinced that the politics of the Second Republic were 
beginning to take excluding paths [Ortega, 1931]).  
The words used by Luis Hernando de Larramendi in the chapter on “The 
Dictatorship” in El sistema tradicional were, in any case, inadmissible for anyone 
defending Franco's legitimacy as head of state. For the author, the dictatorship was 
the revolution's own response to its failure, and this to the revolution's recourse to 
violence. To explain it, he did need to say that this was what happened because of the 
misgovernment of Spain that the Popular Front had committed itself to:  
“When the decomposed, contradictory violence of all the loose revolutionary tyrannies makes social life, political life, 
impossible for man,” wrote Luis Larramendi at the beginning of 1937, “the Revolution turns to personal power: 
precisely its excessive and thematic enmity. But not to the paid personal power, justified by tradition and fair titles, 
but to anyone, to the most unprepared of men, to the most inexperienced of the unknown, or to the most discredited 
of the tyrants in circulation” (2011: 90).  
 
11 Year 1, No. 1, in www.boe.es > Gazeta: colección histórica.  
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And it must be acknowledged that a physiognomic selection like this one was not 
digestible for those who admired Franco, especially if other signs of identity were 
added, even if they referred to the First World War (1914-1918) and not to the one 
that was being waged in Spain when he was writing the book; it was enough to change 
the expression “European war” for “current Spanish war”: 
“The European war demonstrated the indispensable need for a single command, so much so that from then on, 
those who want to pass for monarchists but have a revolutionary background generally call for a monarchy: unity of 
command, under the general impression of that experience [...] that is, the absolute suppression of democratic life 
and of parties in order to leave the unity of command in the army [...] and in the full powers of the dictators”.  
Was this what led to his opinion of Francisco Franco? “The dictator is not a 
conductor who has unexpectedly entered into conducting; he usually only reads the 
score of his instrument on a stave and does not know or have the habit of reading, on 
the fly, simultaneously, in each bar, the multiple staves of which the singing and 
accompaniment for the string, wind, brass and patch instruments that make up the 
orchestra are integrated. Nor does he know more than the score itself” (2011: 91, 98). 
LAÍN ENTRALGO’S REASONS 
We know that Luis Hernando de Larramendi attributed to Laín Entralgo the 
prohibition to publish El sistema tradicional and, certainly, it is enough to read what 
the later prestigious humanist (until then, a scholarship holder of the prestigious 
Colegio del Patriarca, in the former kingdom of Valencia, now affiliated to Falange) 
wrote in those same days (1937) in the first newspaper that FE de las JONS had, which 
was Arriba España, of Pamplona. Arriba España had begun to be published on 1 August 
1936, and was the result of one of the many coups d'état that took place on both sides 
in those days: while most of the Basque nationalists in Navarre were registered in the 
Requeté or Falange flags to join the military uprising and go to the front, the premises 
of La Voz de Navarra, precisely the Basque nationalist newspaper of Pamplona was 
attacked; it must have been around 19 July, because its last issue came out that day. 
And it was its machinery that was aggressively requisitioned to found Arriba España. 
The existence of the newspaper soon attracted a group of university students—
including the philosopher Eugenio d'Ors, also Dionisio Ridruejo, Laín, Antonio Tovar, 
among others—who made the Falange newspaper their first spokesman.12 And, in it 
and among many other things, Pedro Laín Entralgo explained his vision of 
traditionalism clearly enough to understand that, in fact, it would later prevent—when 
he could directly influence the censorship of the New State—the publication of El 
sistema tradicional:  
The then young psychiatrist saw four poles that attracted Spaniards in 1936 (and, 
therefore, being poles that attract, they divided);13 he did not mention traditionalists 
with this term, but spoke of the “remains of the great Spanish traditional culture,” 
whose last bastion had been the magazine Acción Española, published between 1931 
and 1937. This description tacitly limited Laín's criteria; it made it clear that he was not 
talking about ordinary people, but about Spaniards with the necessary training to read 
 
12 I studied the trajectory of this group of Falangist university students in ¿Fascismo o Estado católico? Ideología, religión y 
censura en la España de Franco, 1937-1941 , Madrid, Ediciones Encuentro, 1997, 283 pg. 
13 From here until the moment we point out in a note, all quotations and references to Pedro Laín Entralgo, in “Cuatro polos y 
cuatro dimensiones”, Arriba España, 6 October 1937. 
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a magazine that we will call—provisionally—“intellectual,” as they themselves would 
start to call themselves. (Strictly speaking, all human work is “intellectual” work)  
Nor did Laín strictly refer to all educated traditionalists, but to those who had 
developed, consciously or not, the conviction of the superiority of the Spanish tradition 
and, therefore, what was already more of a nationalism founded on the idealisation of 
the past (we would say that “Spain as a thought,” which is how the writer José 
Pemartín titled the presentation of the last issue of Acción española, issue 89, already 
in March 1937).14  
Now we will go into the possible reasons why Luis Hernando de Larramendi was not 
simply known, but appreciated and even “classified”, but was not among the 
contributors to that magazine. Acción española could be considered a Latin nationalism 
in which it was assumed that each of the Romantic cultures (especially the French and 
then the Spanish) had their own characteristics and required total autonomy. They 
could not include the Italian one because of the weight that, here, Fascism had its own 
work, which was differentiated, among other things, by its greater disposition to 
violence and by its mere possibility in relation to the monarchy.  
The name itself, Acción española, did not refer to Spanish traditionalism, but rather 
to the French traditionalist nationalism that its spokesperson in the magazine Action 
française had and its most relevant mentor in the writer Charles Maurras. Maurras 
was, in France, perhaps the main definer of this “Latin Union” (Dard, 2017). 
It certainly included Catholicism, but in the way it was also defended in Spain by 
Ledesma Ramos, an agnostic like Maurras: as a constitutive component of the being of 
both countries. However, they defended it with such force that people like the Cardinal 
Primate of Spain in those days, Isidro Gomá, saw the magazine with good eyes. 
It had been in one of the 1932 issues where Luis Hernando de Larramendi had 
appeared for the first and penultimate time; it was the tribute paid to Ramiro de 
Maeztu in those days at the Ritz in Madrid in order to award him the Luca de Tena 
award, which had been instituted in 1929 to reward journalists who defended the 
values of the ABC newspaper. The event had been organised by those responsible for 
Acción española and was therefore chaired by the magazine's director, the Marquis of 
Quintanar. In a chronicle published by the organisers themselves, the “classification” of 
the most distinguished spectators—among those present, it is understood—was 
introduced, perhaps unconsciously, but not negligibly: Quintanar “seated on his right 
Mr Ramiro de Maeztu, and on his left the Marquis de Luca de Tena, and, successively, 
on both sides, at the presidential table, Mr Garcia Mercadal and Mr Pujol, from 
Informaciones, who with Aznar, director of El Sol, formed the jury of the Luca de Tena 
Award, Marquis de Valdeiglesias, Hernando de Larramendi, Barreto, Herrera Oria, 
Tarduchi, Dr Enríquez de Salamanca, Luca de Tena (Mr Fernando and Madariaga, 
respectively directors of La Época, Criterio, La Nación, El Debate, La Correspondencia 
Militar, Medicina, Blanco y Negro and Libertad, of Valladolid”.15 
We would not vouch to explain that, precisely, the directors of El Sol (Aznar) and El 
Siglo Futuro (Senante) sent their apologies for not attending—even if it was because 
 
14 Acción española, xviii, No. 89 (Burgos, March 1937) 365—407 (ref. Evernote). 
15 "Homage to the Hon. Mr. Ramiro de Maeztu”: Acción española, ii, No. 7 (16 March 1932) 82. 
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they were out of Madrid; with their absence, they perfectly defined the range of 
positions that were present: from the “right” of those inspired by Ortega y Gasset to 
the left of the newspaper of the Integrist Party, both exclusive. (The left of 
fundamentalism was Carlism.) 
We still find Luis Hernando de Larramendi on pages 325-328 of the copy of Acción 
española corresponding to 16 January 1933 (it was a fortnightly magazine); a speech 
was transcribed on those pages, which he had given at the Monumental Cinema in 
Madrid on Sunday, 8 January, and the first thing that stands out is that it was inserted 
as one of the “Cultural activities,” both his own and those of others, which 
satisfactorily attracted the attention of the editors. In fact, the text—and even more so 
with the paragraphs that were not transcribed—was large enough to be included as 
another Acción española article. The fact that it was not done so, but as one of the 
latest successes of the “traditionalist secretariat,” makes one think that the magazine's 
mentors saw it with sympathy but not as something of their own. This is not surprising, 
because the author of the non-existent El sistema tradicional did not hide his reticence 
about the concept of “nation” as something very different from the concept of 
“fatherland,” and the collaborators of Acción española defended both and knew that it 
was not a Byzantine distinction. That same reticence, by the way, was inherited by his 
son Ignacio, who expressly assumed the usual distinction between nationalism and 
patriotism; “the former is based on hatred, resentment and, in many cases, revenge; 
patriotism is a manifestation of deep love for one's own and respect for the love of 
others' fatherland,” he would recall in Utopía para la nueva América (1992): 114n). 
Now we have to be faithful to history and say that it was not perhaps this that led to 
the insertion of the text in Acción española, but the fact that—according to them—it 
had spoken of the “traditional monarchy,” an affirmation that meant distorting pro 
domo sua which, in truth, had happened. The reader might have thought that this was 
the theme of the conference; but there was no such thing; Luis Hernando de 
Larramendi had spoken about “The natural and organic regime of Spain and Christian 
civilisations”; he must have got excited when defining “the traditional system” and 
“pronouncing a certain word that some of the audience interpreted as an allusion to 
the Monarchy” and one of the spectators expressed disagreement; a large part of the 
audience in the stalls started to leave the hall, while in the amphitheatres shouts could 
be heard that dissuaded Luis Larramendi from continuing the conference. He 
recommended serenity so that the cycle would not be interrupted; it was certainly 
organised by the traditionalist secretariat and Victor Pradera and the Count of 
Rodezno, Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, were present. Nothing more happened; on the 
way out, groups of those attending formed in plaza de Anton Martin and calle de Leon, 
and the members of the security forces who were there peacefully dissolved them.16 
In fact, what Laín Entralgo wrote about traditionalism as the first of  the “Four Poles 
and Four Dimensions” that he listed in Arriba España in 1937, first adhered to Acción 
española,, but then expanded, unconsciously, to a much broader spectrum that coincided 
with what we have just seen at the Luca de Tena award ceremony: he said that “his men, 
champions of  Cultural Hispanity during the most turbulent years of  Spain, lacked, 
 
16 All this, in “Traditionalist Conference held yesterday at the Monumental Cinema gave rise to several incidents that forced 
the suspension of the conference”: Hoja oficial del lunes, iv, No. 12 (9 January 1933) 5. The next day, the news was literally copied 
in La Libertad, xv, No. 3997 (10 January 1933) 10. 
215 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
The Basis of Humanist Differential at MAPFRE 
 
 
however, a revolutionary-authentic revolutionary [sic] vision of  the Spanish problem, and 
for this reason they did not manage to reach the people's hearts or win over the spirit of  
young people”. 
Perhaps he did not realise what he was writing in Navarre, where male youths and 
more so female youths had mobilized as one man in favour of the military uprising, and 
that—almost certainly—without reading Acción española. 
“Another pole of the Spanish cultural split,” Laín Entralgo continued, “was called 
Europeanism and its arena was “Revista de Occidente”. There was copious information 
and formal scientific actuality in it; but its people did not know how to twin them with 
the being of Spain, before whose more exalted manifestations they took a criminal 
hostile attitude. 
Then the communists: 
“Orthodox or Leninist communism was the third pole in the life and cultural 
mosaic of Spain. In it there was vigour, a certain air of youth, promises of this future. 
But the revolution it was postulating was only to calm—at best—a hunger for bread, 
which is after all a partial hunger: and dialectical materialism is too superficial and 
crude a thing for the human depth of Spanish minds. That is why only subjects as 
vulgarly sectarian as those of “Leviathan” fell into the net of the so-called Marxist 
culture. (They then; afterwards, who will believe it, much finer minds, because God 
blinds the one who he wants to lose.)” 
Finally, anarchy, also a profound concept of Hispanic culture: 
“The last of the poles of attraction in the cultural sphere was, strangely enough, an 
anarchism that we could call racial or Celtiberian. Strictly speaking, faista anarchism 
(belonging to the Iberian Anarchist Federation) is the indigenous version of 
communism. And even when anarchism's literary production does not allow one to 
speak without sacrilege of an anarchist culture, it is certain that this feeling of racial 
independence sometimes unexpectedly colours cultural productions of higher value: 
for example, that of Valera, [...]; that of Ganivet, and more recently that of Valle Inclán, 
and, above all, that of Baroja.” 
The Falange was not here to destroy but to overcome these four beams by 
bringing them together: 
“National Unionism, which hungers and thirsts for unity and totality, must 
overcome this cultural division in Spain by creating a culture that is both traditional 
and new, and which takes the best or only good from each of these poles. The purest 
traditional catholicity of tradition; the universal breadth of Europeanism; the yearning 
for bread of communism [...]; and the primary vitality of the Celtiberian impetus. Then 
the National Syndicalist Culture will not have four poles, because it will be one and 
universal: it will have four dimensions, as St. Paul attributes to man in grace. Four 
dimensions, quae sit longitudo, et latitudo, et sublimitas, et profundum.”17 
Universal and one and, at the same time, long, wide, sublime, and deep. “No one,” 
he repeats, “should think of serving the national syndicalist culture unless he is 
 
17 So far, the quotes of Laín Entralgo taken from “Four poles and four dimensions”, Arriba España, 6 October 1937. 
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attentive to the thoughts of all those who think, in order to accept it or to annihilate it: 
in order to appraise it, in any case. St. Thomas said that, back in the vituperatived 
Middle Ages, the truth had to be taken from wherever it was, without asking who had 
it, and this seems to have been forgotten by the traditionalists at all costs would not go 
beyond Suarez or Melchior Cano”.18 
That was the point: that the “creative tradition” was seen as a way of staying, in 
reality, in Suárez and, therefore, at the beginning of the 17th century.  
NOBLESSE OBLIGE 
Before going into this, I would like to undo a possible confusion, even if it requires a 
few pages in which neither Luis nor Ignacio Larramendi appear. And that is because, 
really, Noblesse oblige. I have spoken about Spanish fascism and it is necessary to warn 
that I have done so in the sense that they themselves—the Spanish fascists of the 
1930s—gave to that word. It is only fair to emphasize this because, on the communist 
side, anyone who is “right-wing” has begun to be called a “fascist”. I do not go into this 
question because it was no more than a means to insult, a replica of the “Marxist 
hordes” seen everywhere by the spokesmen of Franco's side, who thus replaced 
Bakunin with Marx and made him the inspiration of the anarcho-syndicalists 
themselves, their enemies within the First International sixty years ago. (Remember 
that this first great institutional organisation of what they themselves called the 
“workers' movement” had, among other problems, the confrontation between 
Marxists and Bakunin followers over how to organise that community: whether with 
Marx's criteria of efficiency at any cost or as a democracy in perpetual constitution 
from the bottom up, according to Bakunin's idea of politics [Angaut, 2007].) 
It is clearly very difficult to define what fascism was in the strict sense, not least 
because it can hardly be linked to a proposal for a strict political philosophy, which is 
where the necessary definition should be found. Besides, I have not found any text 
where Ignacio Larramendi spoke about that matter. On the contrary, we will see one, 
at the time, in which he stressed the conviction that he had done well in the face of 
two things that had happened since 1936: one, having taken part in the civil war 
affiliated to Requeté; the second, never having accepted any kind of collaboration with 
the Régimen (as Franco's regime was called). 
In theory, fascism was characterised by a “totalitarian” conception of the state; but 
this other adjective, which had become fashionable in those days throughout the 
West, was not easily defined either. Luis Hernando de Larramendi came close to 
achieving this in El sistema tradicional (1937) when he recalled that the traditionalists 
had been “reasoning, clarifying and demonstrating that nothing is further from 
absolutism than their tradition”. “Practical reality has come, as was ill-fated, to justify 
them, and in a tragic hour that divides the attention of the immense masses19 between 
the attractions of Stalin's absolutism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
germinating experiences of Germany and Italy seeking a new order in the totalitarian 
State, Spain presents its old and perfect legitimist political formula: the substantially 
natural and experienced organic order of all legitimate jurisdictions” (2011): 153). It 
 
18 Pedro Laín Entralgo: "Dimensión de universalidad [II]", ibidem, 20 October 1937.  
19 By “immersed”? 
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was precisely the criterion by which his son Ignacio would understand the English 
political and legal order, one of the main pieces of which was the primacy of a 
constitution that was not written, but “experienced” and, we would say collectively 
“memorised”, so that its existence depended entirely on the English keeping it alive in 
their way of life (and, therefore, it would cease to exist the moment it was forgotten, 
even without the need for rejection). Philosophers called this "ecstatic" memory, 
which only really exists while it is kept in the mind, shared, in the form of a habit 
(Chawla, 2014).  
There is, in the phrase just quoted, an important detail which—perhaps 
fortunately—is difficult to understand today, let alone justify: Luis Larramendi said that 
real masses were immersed in the attraction that Russian communism and Italian and 
German totalitarianism aroused in some. That is crucial. It is not possible to 
understand what happened in the world between wars if one does not assume that 
liberalism was considered to be as outdated as traditionalism could be and that what 
was attractive, what was new, the future was seen in these new forms of government. 
Such a view of reality was, in part, very simple: the war of 1914 and the revolutions 
of 1917 had certified the failure of liberalism, which was seen as something as old and 
outdated as its traditionalist opponent. The second part—the appeal of communism 
and fascism—is more difficult to understand if one does not accept a vital criterion of 
the first order: that beauty is far more convincing than reason, and both communism 
and fascism were, to a large extent, aesthetic ways of expressing oneself and living. 
Falange was a “style”, Laín Entralgo and many others would write at that time, and it is 
not necessary to remember to what extent they were two important seedbeds of 
avant-garde art (even if Hitler attacked it, perhaps when he warned, precisely, of its 
effectiveness, that it could turn against him) (Egbert, 1970; Traverso, 2010).  
The bad thing, it is obvious, is that, in those cases, the style and beauty were 
disguising what it clearly was, pure and simple absolutism, for which, now, a substitute 
had been found that did not have the arbitrary and enslaving sound of “fascism” or 
“Stalinism”: the word “totalitarianism”. 
Such was its strength that it was more predictable than that of “fascism” around 
1936, when the war broke out, and, like that of “empire”, taken from Italian fascism 
and the German Reich, it was expressly reinterpreted, moreover, in a Hispanic way. 
Ortega himself took part in this reconsideration; in 1923 he had published El tema de 
nuestro tiempo, which was, in his opinion, subjectivity as a basic principle of culture 
and life, and in 1934 he was preparing the third German edition, for which he wrote an 
introduction, a Prologue for Germans. In the book, Ortega returned to the laws of 
reason as a way of overcoming subjectivity and historicism. However, in the case of 
Spain, this opened up a creative horizon of the utmost importance, given that, in his 
opinion, the Spanish had not assumed the principles of “modernity”; Spain had not 
become totally “modern”. The overcoming of modernity (so linked to subjectivism and 
historicism) did not present, for the Spanish, the obstacle that it could imply in other 
countries. 
And the German edition led him to conclude that one of those other countries was 
Germany and that it was in the Germans' interest to understand that his work, El tema 
de nuestro tiempo, had to be understood in a different way from that of a Spaniard. In 
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the Prologue (which was not published until 1958, and the latter in its original 
language, that of the Hispanics), he recalled, for that very reason, that Spain had been, 
in the history of Europe, “the first imperial people, chronologically and quantitatively” 
and that, in Spain, “the modern idea of the State, the great national State, something 
completely different from the old States” had been invented, including the expulsion 
of Jews and Moors and the concern for “purity of blood” (1958: 79). Spain, in short, 
was possibly the country best able to transfer the experience it had made centuries 
ago of several of the fundamental changes towards which Europe was moving. (Hitler 
had only been in power for a few months) 
In an introductory note published in 1958 in front of the Prologue, it was clarified 
that it remained unpublished because Ortega had refused to include it in the third 
German edition of Del tema de nuestro tiempo when he found out about what had 
happened in Munich en 1934, in the “Night of the Long Knives”, the one from 30 June 
to 1 July of that year; a night that the Germans preferred to call Röhm-Putsch. SS and 
Gestapo agents had carried out a bloody purge within the Nazi Party itself. Above all, 
members of the Sturmabteilung (SA) had fallen, including Ernst Röhm, its founder and 
leader, a minister without portfolio in Hitler's government. The SA was a Nazi 
paramilitary force that had taken street violence to such an extreme and on its own 
initiative that Hitler came to see it as a threat to his own power. That is why one would 
choose to talk about the Röhm-Putsch , “Rohm Coup d’etat”, from which Hitler 
precisely feared a coup d’etat. 
We have said that some—not a few—FE de las JONS militants admired Nazism 
above all. Well, before going any further, it is only fair to emphasize that, with the 
prudence that the moment demanded, there were also Falangists who put it in writing 
and, precisely, in relation to the Nazi idea of “Empire”.  
The young historian Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois made this clear before the end of 
1937, in the second issue of Jerarquía—the so-called “black magazine of the 
Falange”—which began to be published in Pamplona (and in Pamplona it died the 
following year): “if we are going to create the National Syndicalist State with our kind 
of justice, we have won the Empire.” But, “in saying Empire, we do not find in our 
craving and in our destiny any of the other nationalisms that also cry out Empire. If 
before it used to be said that “Castile is wide”, today we can say “the world is wide”; 
let each one go back to their rightful place and allow the earth to continue turning”20  
Pedro Laín Entralgo repeated the idea, in his own way, in Arriba España: the 
decomposition of democracy in Italy and Germany, he explained, crowned by 
Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922 and Hitler's electoral victory in 1933, has ensued 
the creation of a new order. 
“Also in Spain. But with originality. Because our Empire does not come through a series of democratic victories like 
the German empire; nor like the Italian, through a barely risky March on Rome. It comes through the path of an 
atrocious war, [...]. 
 
20 “El Imperio de España”, Jerarquía, No. 2 (1937), 163. This aspect of Spanish fascism, I tried to make clear in the chapter 
dedicated to “Brotherhood and dissimilarities between national syndicalism, fascism and Nazism” of the book already mentioned, 
Fascismo o Estado católico? Ideología, religión y censura en la España de Franco, 1937-1941 , Madrid, Ediciones Encuentro, 1997.  
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“... let us not be tempted to rationalize events according to preconceived or imported schemes”.21 
Those were the days when Pius XI publicly said that, after the incarnation, death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ, there is no race but the human race, and several of 
the Falangist scholars who took over as the management team of the General 
Secretariat of the Falange resulting from the mergers we have mentioned made it 
clear, in the press, that Spanish totalitarianism was not racist at the same time that 
they claimed to be Catholic. One of those who warned about it was Laín Entralgo.22  
This already long excursus seems indispensable to anyone who read it when it was 
written. It was, we said, about justice. Now it should be added that those who had the 
opportunity to deal with Ignacio de Larramendi for years were able to see that his 
convictions did not usually eliminate reflection and the effort to assume all the aspects 
presented by things and people. This is how I understand his book Anotaciones de 
sociopolítica independiente (1977), dated—perhaps with symbolic precision—18 July 
1976, in the months following Franco's death (November 1975) and one would say at 
the starting point of the Transition (as it was rightly called, the transition from the 
Franco dictatorship to the parliamentarism of political parties that others called 
“synarchy”, something like “co-government” in its Greek roots [Mury, 1946]).  
Let us leave it, therefore, in that the transition from the Spanish one-party 
dictatorship to what was then (1977) beginning to become the Transition par 
excellence, allowed Ignacio Larramendi to reflect on what he saw and to introduce 
important warnings; he observed the frequency with which, in those days, rulers and 
opposition politicians, including union leaders, travelled “to make contacts and receive 
instructions in foreign countries” and it seemed to him that this was “one of the 
symptoms of the special collective psychosis of this transition period.” He considered it 
“an obsession with what people will say” that could have serious consequences: the 
main one being that Spanish policy was unconsciously or consciously submitted to 
advice that suited the countries in which criteria or support was sought and not that 
suited the Spanish people. 
Of course, he was no less harsh on those who preferred continuity: “If we truly 
want a new, fairer and purer Spain, we must achieve a transparent Spain and this 
cannot be achieved in a dictatorship that institutionally demands concealment and 
obscurity. It is worth asking whether, behind the senseless continuist action that has 
created unnecessary dangers to the current political change, there is not precisely the 
terror of a line of transparency that would open up to the Spanish people the socio-
economic frameworks of many years of darkness, much more contained in this 
transition period than the spiritual values that it is intended to protect.” 
Of course, he still saw the solution in traditionalism (attention: as a criterion and set 
of criteria for action, without reducing it to pure ideology, much less to a party). That is 
how he explained it in those days: 
“The battle for specific freedoms and the indispensable rights for the dignity of men and peoples is linked to the crisis 
of Christianity. The defence of jurisdictions during one hundred and fifty years, romantic and anachronistic, may be 
the symbol of what Spain still has to offer to the world of the future [...]. The substance of the jurisdiction is in the 
 
21 Pedro Laín Entralgo: “Magisterio y originalidad de la historia”, Arriba España, 28 April 1937. 
22 I have to refer again to Fascismo o estado católico? 
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right to be, individual and collective autonomy, which arises not only in its territorial content in such a powerful way 
that its excess could be a serious danger for Spain, but in other aspects of growing importance of the social and 
sociological structure. Self-management and participation, words as seductive as they are little known and badly 
used, have in their basis a common substratum with jurisdiction, man's right to take an active part in the collective 
decisions that affect him” (1977: 84-85, 232, 104-105). 
Let us emphasize what he had assumed with these last words: jurisdiction, self-
management, and participation. Now it is worth returning to Laín Entralgo's statement 
that, in the end, the traditionalists were keeping with Melchor Cano and Suárez.  
FRANCISCO SUÁREZ? BETTER, JUAN ROA DÁVILA 
If we are allowed to play with words without deforming reality, we could conclude 
that Laín was not misguided in what in the 20th century seemed to defend a position 
that was expressed with very particular strength around 1600; but it had nothing to do 
with Francisco Suárez or Melchor Cano, whom he quoted, but with Juan Roa Dávila. It 
is true that, in the days of which we spoke before—the Spanish post-war period of the 
20th century—the rediscovery of the Spanish political tradition did not fully 
distinguish—as far as one knows—between Suárez and Roa Dávila (focusing on the 
extremes and leaving Melchor Cano alone, whose work only dealt directly with politics, 
in what one knows; he had touched on it when writing the Tratado de la victoria de sí 
mismo (1551) and De locis theologicis (On Theological Places, Salamanca, 1563). 
Especially in the first one, where he talked about the seven deadly sins, politicians can 
see themselves reflected without too much effort (of course we are talking about 
those of the 16th century only). But Suarez and Roa Davila agreed to be part of the 
next generation; they were born in 1548 and 1552 respectively, and—they did—deal 
directly with political theory.  
I would almost assure you that Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi did not expect his 
children to pay him a posthumous tribute by digitally publishing the main work of Roa 
Dávila, in the version that had been sponsored by jurists and historians José Manuel 
Pérez-Prendes and Vidal Abril at the Spanish National Research Council in 1970. In 
2009, they had already started with the work of Juan de Mariana, who, among many 
other things, had defended tyrannicide in its pure state, so to speak, not long before 
his colleague Francisco Suárez rushed to put conditions in place to make something of 
this magnitude effective (Crespo, 2009).  
He said that the differences between the two were hardly known in the days of 
the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939); one could certainly refer to some pioneers, such as 
the philosopher and jurist Eloy Bullón, whose most significant work on the subject was, 
we believe, El concepto de la soberanía en la escuela jurídica española del siglo XVI; the 
second edition was printed exactly in 1936, and we do not know with what intentions, 
if that of reminding the deputies in the Cortes of the Popular Front, the generals who 
rose up in the middle of July or Franco, of that concept, that of sovereignty. But it was 
in the post-war period when it became clear—insufficiently so, in fact, in the present 
day—to what extent Francisco Suárez accepted the starting point, the origin of 
authority in the constitutive pact between the people and the ruler, but set such a 
number of conditions that had to be met that the people refused to obey (and not for 
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it to be lawful to resort to tyrannicide) that, in the long run, his thinking had as much 
influence on traditionalism as on liberalism, specifically on juridical positivism.23 
Perhaps even more than Suárez, Juan de Mariana was to be one of the most 
widely read Spaniards in the two hundred years that followed his life; Roa Dávila was 
not. But the fact is that Roa Dávila's work had ended up at the Inquisition and would 
not leave there except with enormous difficulty and vigilance, while Mariana, a 
collaborator of the Inquisition as he was, had the honour of having his work publicly 
burned at the Sorbonne. As a prize—as deferred as you like—it would be reissued with 
an “Introductory speech” by the federal republican and follower of Proudhon, 
Francisco Pi y Margall, to whose left only anarchism remained, and—attention to the 
date—in 1939, as a corollary of the civil war, it would be studied by a young Falangist 
and later count of Beretta, Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois (1939), who would 
immediately turn to the study of the history of Spanish-speaking America. 
Why Roa Dávila for Ignacio Larramendi? You see, a human group becomes a 
political community by giving itself an authority, according to Aristotle. This 
endowment implies a pact, in which the elected authority, whether individual or 
corporate, commits itself—according to the Christian ideology contained in 
traditionalism—to respect the divine right and the natural right and also, the specific 
conditions specified in this kind of contract. The Castilian jurists and theologians of the 
16th century precisely warned that, in Castile, no conditions had been placed on those 
who, one day, began to exercise authority, unlike what had happened in the crown of 
Aragon. But that did not mean that, in Castile, the power of authority was absolute. No 
one can ever transgress the two rights, the divine and the natural. The repudiation of 
absolute authority is explicit in the work of the Castilian Diego de Covarrubias, one of 
the peaks of 16th century philosophy of law, and it is just that, divine law and natural 
law, that he argued to affirm such a thing. 
Roa Dávila did not understand democracy as a form of government—as an 
alternative to the aristocracy and the monarchy and all the systems valued in Greece—
but as a condition that must be fulfilled in every regime, and not only to constitute but 
also to change and, therefore, to legislate when establishing new institutions and new 
laws that modify custom, especially when it comes to taxes and their distribution. 
In other words, he understood democracy to mean the participation of all subjects 
in the exercise of authority. How that participation should be undertaken is not the key 
issue. What is decisive is that it really happens, whatever the form of government. In 
that way, if it is participatory, the monarchy itself can be considered democratic. 
Certainly, participation entails “taking sides” and therefore acting as a “party” does not 
entail a contradiction as Rousseau would assert. It could be said that, in short, if there 
is participation within the real reach of all, there is democratic representation. On the 
contrary, not so; when we delegate power, we do not alienate it, but entrust it to 
someone who is part of the community and, as such, has to manage to really know 
how it wants to be governed. If it does not do so and acts in such a way as to violate 
the constituent agreement, the lawfulness of the tyrannicide may be raised. 
 
23 I tried to explain it in “El replanteamiento de la filosofía del derecho en torno a 1600 como parte de un giro histórico 
capital”, in Homenaje al profesor José Antonio Escudero. IV, Madrid, Editorial Complutense, 2012, pg. 89-119. 
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This is the position that Suarez would tacitly oppose almost at the same time. 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi never showed any signs of considering the legality 
of the tyrannicide and he may never have read Roa Dávila; but his idea of polytheia, 
including business, was rooted in these principles. Just read his Panorama para una 
reforma del estado (1996). 
What does this have to do with business? Everything. The purpose of the emperor is 
not to bring about the common good, but to ensure the best possible coexistence, as 
the bishop of Hippo had stated centuries earlier. In the 16th century, Francisco de 
Vitoria had added another observation along the same lines, and that is that—if I may 
paraphrase St. Augustine—the emperor will be legitimately so by virtue of a pact (a 
condition that assumes that no Roman emperor was legitimately so); in the 
constitutive pact the political community—Francisco de Vitoria continues—the natural 
or legal person invested as an authority is not outside the community, but—almost 
always—is part of it. The constitutive pact is, therefore, singular (and its consequences, 
too): it is not a pact between community and authority, but a pact that occurs within 
the community, between those who constitute it. And this was signed by father and 
son, Luis and Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi. 
Mutatis mutandis, which Ignacio would assume and define in the distinction 
between “absolute democracy” and “institutional democracy”. “The absolute proposes 
electing parliaments and having them elect governments, and in reality electing 
political parties that in turn elect parliament and government. Institutional democracy, 
together with a legitimisation of access to power, maintains the strength and influence 
of the series of civil structures that participate in the nation and the pragmatic reality 
of political power, humanising it, making it more difficult to be arrogant and 
preventing absolutism” (1996): 58). 
It is a fundamental principle because it implies that the original pact of the political 
community never implies the assignment of “all” the authority to the elected person or 
persons. The ruler has to make decisions in “tune” with his subjects, even in the sense 
that he has to listen to them and listen to their reasons, even if, at the moment of 
truth, they seem to him to be such a mistake that he does not feel obliged to do what 
they want. Afterwards, he will have to answer for that decision of opting for a different 
solution. 
The latter too: “In the public sphere, every power must be responsible, that is, 
effective, and actively concerned with the service or function that justifies it to the 
citizens. ...] The responsibility for the effectiveness of the rulers must be demanded in 
compensation for the advantages they receive. This is what has become known as 
active legitimation” (1996: 78).  
In fact, this was a variant of the “imperative mandate”, an institution that had been 
ended, in Spain, by the Cortes de Cádiz, but that the traditionalists maintained in their 
programme. Until then (1810-1813), representatives in the Cortes of the so-called 
“underclass” or “third estate” often had to sign a document in which the councillors as 
a corporation pointed out to them the matters they had to defend; so that if they did 
not comply and did not justify why they had not done so, they could be prosecuted 
and held accountable. The introduction of the French liberal regime not only meant, 
therefore, an egalitarian rationalization of the elections, but the consideration that 
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those elected did not only represent their electors—those of each constituency—but 
the “nation” and, consequently, their mandate was only representative, not 
participatory; they could use their vote as they saw fit. It is striking that this was one of 
the main differences with Rousseau's democratic proposal, which defended direct 
democracy and the imperative mandate. In time, only two movements as distinct and 
significantly marginal as traditionalism and anarchism would maintain this principle.  
We do not know what Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi thought about the 
imperative mandate; but, if he ever thought about it, he surely found it an alienation 
that the elected representatives, by relying on their vote, could do as they pleased 
when making decisions that would bind others, their subjects. For me, he would have 
been happy to know that it was that, the annulment of the imperative mandate, which 
was one of the reasons why the American deputies in the Cortes of Cadiz disagreed 
with the 1812 constitution (Porras, 2013).  
In fact, the responsibility (understood to be legal) of the authorities that Ignacio 
Larramendi defended went even further; in the imperative mandate, the 
representative committed himself to defend specific points; in demanding 
responsibility for the way of exercising power, it evoked rather the “trial of residence” 
to which the authorities of the Hispanic monarchy were subjected when their mandate 
ended: a judge was appointed to hear anyone who had anything to say about the way 
in which that authority had been exercised; furthermore, all the supporting 
documentation was carefully reviewed, especially the prosecutor's documentation 
and, in general, that involving the handling of money. At the end, the judgement was 
passed. 
This did not ensure that there was no corruption and injustice; what it did was to 
make it extremely difficult and to keep the king's delegated authorities, while 
exercising as such, the shadow that implied that they were, after all, accountable 
(Mariluz, 1952, 1953; Herzog, 1994, 1997; Collantes, 1998). 
THE (RESERVED) OPINION OF THE SINGULAR JURIST WHO WAS MANUEL MARINA 
Note that the Régimen had already been dissolved between 1975 and 1977, when 
Larramendi was writing these things, and that the main result of the Statist criteria in 
the business initiative itself had been maintained to the end, and even more so; in 
1941, the National Institute of Industry (known as the INI) had been created to replace 
private initiative, anticipating it and thus ensuring the corresponding service—just as 
the criterion he had rejected in 1952—and, until 1980, the INI continued to be the 
largest and most important business group in Spain. Its enormous business assets were 
gradually privatised in the following decade and the National Institute of Industry itself 
was abolished in 1995; but it was replaced by a so-called Sociedad Estatal de 
Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) and by a network of “official institutions not 
integrated into the regular public administration”—of course called by different 
names—which would multiply the intervention of those in power for a very different 
purpose: to have autonomous instruments that would allow for less transparency and, 
therefore, greater effectiveness if the opacity served to seek improvements and not to 
increase. And it is clear that this was not what Larramendi thought a company should 
be; on the contrary, he believed that transparency and political independence were 
fundamental. 
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Now, "Noblesse Oblige" was the title of a few pages that seemed indispensable to 
us today. I must say that the same thing happens with everything we said at the 
beginning about the difference between the economic regime proposed by Ignacio 
Larramendi after his English experience and the articulation from above of what had 
been the Vertical Trade Union and the National Movement. It is too easy to make 
firewood from the fallen tree, especially if the same has not been done when the tree 
was upright and covered with leaves. We are going to close this part, therefore, with 
an assessment of the trade-union superstructure of the Régimen that meets these 
conditions: first, that it does not bear the surname Larramendi; second, that it does 
not arise from the political opposition; third, that it is solvent; fourth, that it is private, 
without censorship of any kind. This last step backwards seems essential, again, to 
finish this first part of the research. 
In May 1938, Pius XII had appointed the diplomat Gaetano Cicognani as apostolic 
nuncio in Spain and it is clear that he had difficulty in understanding the whole process 
of institutionalisation of the National Movement to which we refer; he went to the 
Jesuits and the task of clarifying things fell to the Aragonese jurist Manuel Marina, a 
former propagandist (i.e. member of the ACNdeP), a career judge and journalist 
specialising in labour issues. His contributions to the newspaper El Debate and 
everything else that was needed had made Angel Herrera Oria see that he was called 
upon to take over the running of the newspaper. But when he went to take the step 
and appoint him, the jurist told him that he had decided to become a Jesuit and, as 
such, he was one of the driving forces behind Fomento Social, the institution (long 
before it was a magazine) that channelled a good deal of Jesuit “social” activities 
before the civil war.  
Well, his opinion was this, as he explained it to Cicognani in his report dated January 
1943: not only the state jurisdiction of those big National Trade Unions foreseen in the 
law of Bases of Trade Union Organisation in December 1940, but—much more—that 
priority of the economic mission over “the social part”—which corresponded to the 
Provincial Head Offices—favoured the businessmen. It was the very state or “national” 
leadership of each Trade Union that was formed “in the final analysis by business 
elements”. 
Neither the “social” nature nor the local or, at most, the provincial level of the other 
bodies of the Trade Union Organisation ceased, strictly speaking, to constitute as many 
ways of preventing—in fact—the interests of the employees from being transformed 
into economic policy decisions that would overcome the (very laudable) desire for 
assistance and foresight. In the words of the same Jesuit and jurist, “the former [the 
Provincial Head Offices], operating also from the periphery, and the latter [the local 
ones] [...], coming from the periphery, were detained in the provincial organisation 
without reaching the summit”.24 
The father of the Bases for the Trade Union Organisation promulgated in 1940 had 
been Gerardo Salvador Merino, a jurist openly in favour of the understanding with the 
Nazis, whom Franco had appointed as the national delegate of Trade Unions in 
September 1939, precisely in the days when Hitler forced the outbreak of the Second 
 
24 Report, pg. 25, Archives of the Province of Aragon of the Society of Jesus (Valencia), Papers by Manuel Marina. 
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World War. In the following months, Salvador demonstrated a very effective capacity 
to draw crowds and rescue former revolutionary trade unionists for Franco's Trade 
Union Organisation. Accused of having been a Freemason, he was prosecuted in 1941 
before the Court for the repression of Freemasonry and Communism and sentenced to 
twelve years in prison, which Franco commuted to twelve years of internal exile that 
he served in the Balearic Islands (Seville, 2014). 
The Trade Union Organisation was left unscathed and there was no turning back on 
a single, vertical trade union membership. Not only was there none, but a further step 
was taken, which was to force the trade union membership of all employees (Aparicio, 
1976, 1980). Until then, this could be taken for granted; but, in truth, it was just that, 
an assumption that had to be made. 
But the new national trade union delegate was a man of very different 
temperament, even though he was a militant among the Falangists who refused to 
proclaim themselves corporatist. It had nothing to do with traditionalism but rather 
with belonging to the Catholic Church. I am referring to Fermín Sanz Orrio from 
Navarre, also a jurist, who would remain in office until 1951. In the January 1943 
report, Manuel Marina defined Navarre's policy in this way: 
“Well, without fundamental legislation having changed in any way, a profound change is taking place at present, in 
the sense of avoiding the dualism that we have just indicated. The National Trade Unions are intended to be the 
natural extension of the Local and Provincial Trade Unions and to fulfil, together with the economic purpose, another 
social mission. This means that the concept of verticality is to be given a fuller content and that it not only means the 
harmony of classes within the same Trade Union, but the convergence of all social and economic interests, of the 
periphery and the centre, for the same purpose.” 
“According to this same criterion, which the National Delegation of Trade Unions continues to instil, the following 
levels would be distinguished in the latter:  
“1.It frames the producers in the base, who form the so-called trade union cells, whether they are companies or 
isolated artisans for industry, or even peasant and fishing families; 
“2. It is constituted by the Brotherhoods, Guilds, Unions and Local Business Trade Unions; 
“3. Regional and Provincial Groups; 
“4. Economic Zone Organisations; 
“5. National Organisation of Vertical Trade Unions, Products and Services." 
The Jesuit was not, however, optimistic:  
“It is not possible to make a definitive [criticism] because of the state of gestation in which the work is still in. The 
tendency to overcome class antagonisms is extremely plausible, but in fact there is again a tendency for the 
capitalist classes to arrogate power over the working classes against all that could have been expected. The rank-
and-file trade unions do not arouse any interest in the masses of workers, who certainly welcome the improvements 
they are given, but without the slightest enthusiasm.  
“The performance of the large national trade unions is very diverse, often inefficient and too bureaucratic, although 
they must also be recognised for their meritorious efforts and process of improvement.  
“Perhaps one of the fundamental defects is the desire to fit the entire economic order of the Nation within a simple 
Delegation, a Deputy Secretariat, a Secretariat, a political party..., this one does not even aspire to full national 
representation.  
“Another defect, perhaps the most serious, is the lack of spontaneity of this trade union movement, which is far from 
the corporate ideal traditionally expressed by Christian sociologists.”25 
 
25 These last four paragraphs are only one in the original. We introduce the full stops and sections in order to make its reading 
easier. 
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That last criticism—which the religious man presented as the main one—pointed to 
the waterline and therefore referred to the question of being or not being: Franco had 
opted for the single, gigantic trade union that they wanted Spain to be in economic 
terms and, consequently, in principle, there was no room for even that “spontaneity” 
that Marina and, years later (1952), Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, talked about, to 
be channelled. In the Jesuit's approach, “spontaneity” meant—without a doubt—
freedom of association. But freedom of association implied, in turn, two capital things 
that had not always been fulfilled by the trade unions of the left and the right, 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, which existed until the days of the war: it 
implied not only freedom to create and give life to the trade unions, but also freedom 
of the workers to join the trade union or not and, once they joined the trade union, to 
exercise their own freedom within the corresponding grouping. In this—
unfortunately—it must be said that neither the UGT nor even less CNT and the long list 
of minor trade unions could give lessons to those of the Vertical Trade Union. The 
years (1916-1923 above all) when they forced all the employees of the company in 
question to join a trade union in their organisation, at gunpoint if necessary, were far 
behind (Olábarri, 1995). They were far behind; but the behaviour that those trade 
unions had and imposed since February 1936, plus the war, did not exactly make them 
regret it. 
WHAT WAS LEFT OF THAT GIANT TRADE UNION THAT SPAIN HAD TO BE  
In 1926, the dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera had introduced a novel solution, the 
National Corporate Organisation. It responded to the slogan “the free trade union in 
the compulsory corporation.” The freedom of association was respected (with the 
exception of the CNT and communism); but conflicts had to be resolved obligatorily, 
without a strike or prior threat of any kind, in “joint committees”—of employers and 
workers—that were part of the state administration.  
The result had not been bad for the latter, the workers; the parity of 
representatives, if it led to a tie, gave the decisive vote to the Government 
representative and, in fact, most of the time resolved in favour of the workers. The 
problem is that the Organisation had been oriented to fulfil Primo de Rivera's desire to 
attract the UGT, and the members of UGT only accepted on the condition that the 
militants of the Catholic trade unions could not take part in the elections of workers' 
representatives in the joint committees. The reason they claimed is that they were 
mixed, and certainly many of them were. But others were not. 
This had had a serious effect: committee members were paid and this led to the 
creation of what would later be called “liberated” committees, and, in addition, 
subsidies were given for the construction of buildings so that the entities represented 
on these committees could have real life; this generated a first—and not negligible—
private trade union wealth. In 1930-1931, the leaders of the UGT opted to return to 
the trade union struggle (even revolutionary, in 1934) and the result of the dictator's 
work was in fact contrary to the interest of achieving a policy that was even stable; the 
General Union of Workers—which was not officially socialist—it declared itself to be 
such in 1931, at the time of the proclamation of the republic and already had a notable 
number of buildings that would become its network of “people's houses,” the result of 
its collaboration with the dictator from Jerez. 
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The truth is that, in the second post-war world, in most Western European 
countries, labour relations were channelled according to this principle: freedom to 
organise workers' and employers' trade unions—it is understood that within the law—
and the obligation that their representatives—elected by the trade unions—brought 
the problems to the joint committee therefore formed by the trade unionists elected 
by the workers and the employers elected by the employers themselves (Hyman, 
1995).26 
It is revealing that, when the Republic was proclaimed (1931), the President of the 
Government, Manuel Azaña, channelled the request of the Minister of Labour, the 
Socialist Francisco Largo Caballero, to form “mixed juries” which were, in fact, very 
similar to the joint committees. There was one main difference: the committees from 
1926 onwards formed a pyramidal organisation, from the bottom up, to the state 
jurisdiction. The mixed juries did not go beyond the local sphere, although they were 
under the direct responsibility of a provincial authority, the provincial delegate of 
labour. Only article 101 of the 1931 law provided for the possibility of the Minister of 
Labour to arrange “special forms of support for joint bodies” “with official 
administrative entities of a regional or provincial nature.”27 
The truth is that this allowed trade union representatives to continue to receive 
benefits for serving on mixed juries. But even that was ahead of the “intellectual” time 
we will say in which many lived. What made many Europeans suspicious at the time 
was the attraction of Soviet Marxism, particularly in the workers' milieu; an option 
that, in those years, was shown, expressly, to be in favour of violence that could put an 
end to the institutions and people that supported the states of the West. 
That solution having been rejected, in the case of Franco's Spain, the main, but not 
the only, instrument for trying to get workers to trust the Trade Union Organisation 
could be the elective nature of the trade union offices carried out with the utmost 
honesty. And it was not something that escaped Sanz Orrio. For this, the order of 3 
October1944, in which rules were issued to guarantee trade union elections (and 
which were therefore part of the project to be developed), responded, albeit in a 
different way.28 
It remained, however, a pyramid truncated by the conviction that, in the end, it was 
from above that the basic institutions mentioned should receive encouragement and—
also—guidance. Deep down, Sanz Orrio's idea could be a little closer to that of the 
National Corporate Organisation that Eduardo Aunós had designed with Primo de 
Rivera in 1926, if the presence of those brotherhoods, guilds, and trade unions that we 
have seen was completely free; but now it is better understood that he warned that he 
was not a corporatist; remember that this Organisation was based on the principle 
“the free union in the compulsory corporation”, but that this “obligation” was only to 
accept the corporate arbitration, that of the joint committee; it was not a question of 
 
26 The National Corporate Organisation, I studied it in El socialismo durante la Dictadura, quoted above. Martínez Gómez 
(2005) has studied its functioning in Almería, and there is already a lot of research on specific joint committees. 
27 In Gaceta de Madrid, No. 332 (28 November 1931). 
28 A copy of the order, stencil-printed, in the General Archive of the Administration (Alcalá de Henares, Spain) (hereinafter 
AGA), 6(86) FNR 3 TOP. 35/31.105-109. 
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serving as a channel to make effective the economic policy of the Government, which 
is what remained in place in the Spanish Trade Union Organisation of the Régimen. 
Sanz Orrio's management did not change the Larramendi's attitude; in Tres claves 
para la vida inglesa (1952), there were still more phrases that the Spanish state 
censors could hardly like; Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi did not mention the 
country he was referring to, but left no doubt that they were looking to him and from 
him: 
“The lack of an operative demand for purpose and role, which only arises from 
voluntariness—one could read, for example—is the great defect of associations of 
obligatory membership, which can be maintained artificially, without objectives of 
interest to their members, or with a role that is not beneficial to the community of 
their members or the country, lacking this possibility of immediate adaptation of needs 
to the instrument” (1952): 116). 
Any moderately educated reader of 1952 could deduce that this was the case with 
the Trade Union Organisation formed by Franco and, at most, could doubt whether 
there would be another country in Europe that would suffer from the same defect. 
What I could not doubt was that this phrase described the Spanish Single Trade Union 
and the rejection it aroused. This was not, in short, the opinion of Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi and his progenitor and no one or almost no one else; it was what all 
Spaniards who disagreed with the Régimen thought, at least, including those who did 
not agree either with the Popular Front whose government, at the end of the winter 
and during the spring of 1936, had been the trigger of the civil war. 
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FOR A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI 
THE FIGURE OF THE FATHER 
In short, the unification of all parties that existed in the rebel Spain of 1937 into 
one, by Franco's decree, had ended up creating an authoritarian, dictatorial system, in 
which the fascist lexicon was maintained for the essential time—until well into the 
1940s—to make some feel something like “controllers” of the Régimen; others realised 
that they could participate—and did participate—in the control without giving up their 
fundamental principles, and their way of expressing, while others kept their distance 
without giving up their weapons in the war that had started in 1936. The latter 
considered that on 18 July they had spoken out against a political order that was 
stifling freedom to the point of suffocating the most intimate beliefs and convictions; 
they had not risen up to imitate Mussolini's “march on Rome” in a “march on Madrid” 
that had a similar objective to that of the Italian Duce. “The so-called right-wing 
conspiracy [of 1936, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi thought] was largely an attempt 
to defend the country from the purpose of extending Soviet influence in the southern 
European nation” (2000): 34). It referred, no doubt, to what, in the times of the 
Régimen, was called “national uprising”. 
Luis Hernando de Larramendi had joined the third option, that of rejecting the 
continuation of the dynamics that had been introduced with the Popular Front and 
also that which had emerged from Franco's coup d'état; he was one of the many 
traditionalists who rejected the unification that added the “T” to FE de las JONS by 
turning it into the “Traditionalist Spanish Falange and the National-Syndicalist 
Offensive Boards.” “After the Unification Decree [of April 1937, his son Ignacio would 
remember from his father], he abandoned all political activity, rejecting the Justice 
portfolio that, through intermediaries, was offered to him during one of Franco's 
governments” (2000): 58).  
Perhaps with all this, it is better understood that, in 1998, Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi wrote these paragraphs: 
“After an examination of my long, hectic, varied, and successful life, there are two 
facts that I feel especially proud of, apart from having created a great family, which 
remains united and successful as an independent professional. These facts are:  
✓ My participation in the Civil War, in the Carlist army of Navarre; I have never 
again felt with more dignity, which was that of those around me.  
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✓ No one from the “Larramendi”, directly or indirectly, has participated in the 
politics and management of Franco after the war, which we would have 
considered treasonous to the line of our family history” (1998: 11-12). 
We can doubtless object that Luis Hernando de Larramendi was aware of 
everything I have just said; but it is more debatable that his son Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi, who was sixteen at the time (1937), was. This is not to deny that a person 
of that age could brood at their own peril. What I would like to emphasize is that—in 
addition and above all—the son did not think like his father by happy coincidence, but 
lived with his eyes fixed on him every time he thought about what he should do. It was 
not that he “alienated” himself from his father's will; surely what he was doing was 
reflecting on what he heard from him on the basis that his father's opinion inspired the 
greatest confidence in him. 
What I have just said is deeper than it may seem and the parent-child relationships 
have changed so much that it will be difficult for me to explain. I would start by making 
this fact clear: Ignacio Larramendi belonged to a generation in which the father—when 
he was a sensible man—inspired respect and one would say veneration. To say this 
seems obvious because it is supposed to be true of all times; but it is not entirely so 
and, moreover, what is true of almost all people tends to manifest itself in very 
different ways in each of them and at different times in each person's life.  
Already MAPFRE's Managing Director since 1955—and not to mention in 1990, 
when he brought forward his retirement—Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi was aware 
that his profile as a successful and relevantly innovative businessman could turn into a 
great surprise when he warned of his inclination towards Carlism; he often did so in 
spite of this, even though he did so at times of relaxation of the conversation he was 
having, however business-like it was, and, moreover, he used to add a slightly amusing 
phrase that would make the other party see that it was a family inheritance to which 
he was true. It could easily be thought that he did not have to be; family fidelity is not 
at odds with political dissent. However, for him, one could say that it was a way of 
maintaining—first of all, in itself—the awareness of belonging to a specific lineage.  
At the moment of truth, it was perceived that it was a matter of giving continuity to 
the personality of his father, not in the sense of assuming it as his own—although it is 
clear that it was—but as the one who, in this way, keeps the figure of the father alive, 
so that he does not allow it to be erased from his own existence.  
To a large extent, if one rereads the stories he wrote about his family roots, one 
comes to the conclusion that, in truth, his father, perhaps without intending to, 
brought together in a single reality a professional career as a jurist, a political career as 
a Carlist and a family life that made him and his family a whole that could be said to 
constitute a tradition to be perpetuated.  
Only that this tradition had roots—and no doubt consequences—that were not 
reduced to the relevance that his father, Luis Hernando de Larramendi, might have in 
Spanish political life. Rather than explaining this, which I find very difficult, I will give an 
example that illustrates the background of what I would like to express: his son Ignacio 
may not have been aware that, when he spoke as he did of his father, the times when 
Luis Hernando de Larramendi sat among his children at home and pretended to be a 
fisherman weighed more heavily than he himself believed. It is not that he gave more 
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importance to this—which, perhaps, he did—but that his father represented for him a 
sum of attitudes duly united among those that were more effective than what one can 
suppose, of dedication to his own family when he thought of pretending before them 
that he was fishing in the corridor of the house.  
Forty years later, his son Ignacio said this: “I have never been able to stop 
remembering him with admiration, nor the teachings I have received from him and 
that I want to transmit to my children as much as possible; I try to do so in part with 
the comments I make in this book” (2000: 35). 
Why did he say before that it was an intellectual world in which the father inspired 
respect and one would say veneration and that this other aspect needs to be 
underlined? Because in the United States—where the change began, it seems to me—
in the post-war period of 1945—and almost at the same time in England, in the 1960s 
in Spain and in almost all the other countries of the western half of the European 
continent, precisely western civilisation took a major turn, one of the main signs of 
identity of which—according to the experts—was and is the denial of parental 
authority, generally on the basis—in the case of those who tried to found it—that the 
morals that parents had instilled in their children were simply hypocrisy.  
I am talking about a well-known fact that is very well studied in Anglo-Saxon 
historiography (Altschuler, 2003); in the same post-war period in which the young 
Ignacio Larramendi expressed his admiration for the way in which tradition was valued 
in the English economic order, the 1940s and first half of the 20th century, a historical 
fact of enormous ethical significance came to light; the new generation of young 
Americans who were attracted to Afro music (jazz, then rock) discovered the 
inconsistency of their parents' euphoria as belonging to the great nation that had 
defeated fascism, while at the same time seeing, hearing and feeling the racism that 
those same parents showed towards the descendants of the slaves brought from 
Africa, whose music was winning them over; winning over the young “whites”. And 
from then on, many thought and many affirmed in a strict way that their parents were 
simply hypocrites.  
Strangely enough, this is one of the main roots of the cultural change that all those 
who experienced the consequences of this approach were able to bring about. Not 
unconnected with this, but quite the opposite, are some of the beautiful claims of May 
1968: for example, “Banning is banned”. And a much deeper one, but with the same 
root: “Power to the imagination.” It was, in fact, the denial of the authority of the 
parents (who, moreover, for all that has been said, would be said to have unauthorised 
themselves with their allegedly hypocritical behaviour). 
That neither in Europe nor in the Spanish-speaking countries was there an apartheid 
like the one that actually existed in the United States? Indeed, it was so; but there 
were other forms of exploitation or rejection of others that induced the same 
judgement; the morality of the parents was pure hypocrisy. If not the key, it was 
aesthetics, a main element that led young people on one side of the Atlantic to see in 
those on the other side a mirror in which they recognised themselves as being moved 
by the same impulse, exactly the same one; it was also Afro music and, above all, rock, 
which had already acquired the character of an anthem for the new generations and, 
therefore, a sign of identity of a youth that had thus become intercontinental (or, at 
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least, that is what it seemed). Elvis Presley, the Beatles, definitely the Rolling Stones 
stood out among the common agents of change. 
In Spain, the dictatorial form of the Régimen was decisive so that the importance of 
those engines shared with half the world was not clearly seen (Garrigó, 1970; Gómez 
Pérez, 1971; Villena, 1975; Álvarez Cobelas, 2003; Nadal, 2006). 
I cannot dwell on a matter that would require a long explanation (which, in my 
opinion, is certainly worthwhile); but it is not easy to understand the importance that 
the figure of the father—his own in particular and himself as a father of a family that 
transmits a way of being that seems fertile and good to him—had for Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi without drawing attention to all that. Put simply, what 
emerged on the European continent in May 1968 was a Gnostic vision of life, the key 
to which—at least one of the main pillars—was the denial of authority. And this 
implied an enormous range of fundamental elements for the support of Western 
culture: it implied the closest thing—almost palpable, the rejection of the power of 
parents—until what, precisely in this way, seemed most distant and even alien, the 
denial that God is father. It should not be forgotten that the few or many Westerners 
who had notions of philosophy of law learned from the manuals that political authority 
is founded by extension and analogy on parental authority. But at that juncture (in 
1968) there was more: the umpteenth Gnostic denial of the divinity of Jesus Christ. If 
there was no father, there could be no son. This is how the trio of French-speaking 
ecumenists saw it and wrote it immediately, even without 1968 having ended, who 
were formed by Le Guillou, Clément and Bosc; in 1973, Le Guillou would go further 
into the “modern gnosis” in El misterio del Padre.) 
I remind you that Gnosticism is an alternative to Christianity whose first known 
manifestations are from the second century, but which perhaps came from much 
earlier esoteric beliefs. For Gnostics, Jesus was a demiurge, a demigod, not the son of 
God the Father.  
If anyone is surprised that we are touching on these topics in a study of what 
marked the imprint of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi as a businessman, we had 
better go ahead and invite anyone who thinks like that—quite rightly, of course—to 
reflect for a moment on the possibility that his own strangeness is rooted in just what 
we are saying: that the cultural change that all this entails has already taken place—it 
came to light in Spain around 1970—and, therefore, this surprise is perhaps part of 
that transformation. This same historian is aware of how unusual it is today to talk 
about these issues in order to study the work of a businessman and for many other 
subjects, I would say a very comfortable majority; someone may take him for a 
“conservative militant Catholic”; but it is precisely that which is part of the history we 
are trying to remake, the fact that things have changed to such an extent and how 
Larramendi faced and weathered that storm. 
THE WAR AND THE POST-WAR PERIOD OF CHILDREN, YOUNG BOYS AND SOME OTHER 
PEOPLE 
What I have indicated about the starting point of the cultural change to which I 
refer in the Anglo-Saxon world has to do—perhaps—with the extent that Ignacio 
himself gave to the regression of the Christian faith in England in the 1940s and early 
1950s and what that might mean for the British economic order itself: “The 
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culminating influence of the economic in the development of his mentality [the English 
mentality, we read in Tres claves de la vida inglesa,1952:133] has served to prepare 
the ground more quickly for a suitable arrangement of his commercial life; but in the 
long run it will lead to the disappearance of the system created, since an excessive 
concern for all things earthly makes the development of free trade and freedom in 
general easy at first, but not stable.  
Shortly before that, in the same book, he had warned that the advance of what he 
considered “materialism” in the mentality of the managers of the British economy was 
only one of the possible causes of the fact that the future of England did not seem as 
promising as the present (that of the 1950s) and that it probably came before, 
maybe—he pointed out—from the 19th century.  
Even earlier, he had questioned whether it had anything to do with the Protestant 
Reformation of the English schism of the 16th century. Let me say now that yes, and 
that, strictly speaking, all the dates he handled (the English schism of the 16th century, 
the Protestant element that had just been imposed in the 17th century, the 
anthropological orientation of English science in the 19th century) are milestones in a 
process that shows the resistance of a stable economic order in wanting to die.  
In the social thought of Luis Hernando de Larramendi—his father-, the basis was the 
same: “Remove those born from the authority of their parents of nature or whoever 
acts in their stead and there is no family, nor are children raised.” “There is something 
sacred in the family, obviously. In it is uninterrupted human succession, in it is [...] the 
first and everlastingly reproduced legitimate power of human society: the Father. [...] 
The power of the father is a law of God that is natural and specifically positive” (2011: 
135, 140).  
Deep down, one can guess what the son’s personality was like, consistent with that 
idea of fatherhood when one reads, in Así se hizo MAPFRE, that one of the great 
satisfactions of Ignacio’s life was to verify that of his father's, to paraphrase his own 
statement: “that this book” (which the lawyer had written in 1937 and to which the 
phrases I just quoted belong) “should be published, and that it should be published by 
his son!” (2000: 58)  
For Ignacio, it was undoubtedly very important to know about the existence of this 
letter written by his father to his friend the architect Eduardo Gambra from San 
Sebastian and in the spring of 1938: “Ignacio is also here, has spent three weeks, 
despite being only 16 years old, alone, going round all the fronts in search of his 
brother and making huge treks in trucks that he stopped on the roads, by train, on 
horseback and on foot, through lands unknown to him, in Aragon and Catalonia, and 
often under shrapnel. He is a man.” His brother—one year younger, that is, at fifteen—
had enlisted in the tercio of San Miguel and there was no way of finding him (in 
Hernando de Larramendi, 2000: 82).  
Possibly, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi never knew that, in the same city where 
he then lived, San Sebastian, there were others who did what he did. José María 
Hernández-Sampelayo, future Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Information and 
Tourism with Alfredo Sánchez Bella, falsifying the documents that were required, 
enlisted at the age of thirteen in the 1st Flag of Biscay, in Falange, with a relative of 
similar age, and in this way they were sent to the battle front. It was also 1938 and, 
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more than likely, the reasons why he did it were very similar. In his case, his parents 
had been surprised by the war whilst in Madrid and he felt that absence, even though 
they had entrusted his care in someone they could totally rely on (Hernández-
Sampelayo, 2020). 
During those same months (1938), Manuel Azaña, as President of the Republic, 
ordered the conscription that, with the one that followed in 1939, would receive the 
colloquial name of “the call-up of the baby’s bottle.” It concerned all males born in 
1920, and therefore there were quite a few that were under the age of eighteen. They 
were, however, forced, whatever their political position. But again it is fair to point out 
that there were those who were only fourteen and it cannot be said that anyone 
forced them; I refer to Piera, 2006. Not all of them were forced. 
If we want to look for the differences that might exist between one and the other, 
this historian would start by trying to understand why many of the Aragonese peasants 
who were mobilised by the Catalan anarcho-syndicalists who took over the eastern 
half of the region and imposed the collectivisation of the property rightly or wrongly, 
took their sons to the trenches. But the truth is, that is what they did. Late in the war, 
the authorities of the Republican army reacted to the absurdity of the situation: 
several hundred children's colonies were set up on the coast and in the Mediterranean 
Hinterland, in Catalonia and Valencia, and also in the eastern Pyrenees, and they 
ordered all the children who were there as we have just said, to be transferred to them 
(Crego, 1989).  
There was, in fact, a “children's war” on both sides; no one was surprised that they 
played precisely at that, war, often in the vicinity of the barracks.  
It was also, as can be seen, a situation with very different profiles, which do not 
support Manichaeism. It was not the bad against the good. And there were men and 
women who, without having to give up their way of seeing things, understood that 
they were all right, one and the other; that it was not something that could be solved 
by comparing those of some against the others to know who was more right and that, 
in cases like this, it is only right that the one who has more strength should give up 
exercising it over the one who has less. In 1941, when the war was over, in the midst 
of official euphoria over the victory and with state censorship at its height, precisely 
the women we have just talked about, those whom people called “butiñanas,” most of 
whom lived in Catalonia and northern Spain, published a Breve historia of their ordeal 
during that three-year period of the civil war, and began as if they were returning to 
mid-July 1936. The reader is again surprised that the Régimen’s censors allowed this; 
perhaps despite the fact that it bore the nihil obstat of the Bishop of Gerona, José 
Cartañá What is certain is that it began by evoking “the gravity of the moment, letting 
us see the horrible fury with which the disorder, the scarcity of work and the slavery 
that capital has exercised, in the worker, alleging desires of vindication, where 
arrogance rises up looking for the realization of its black programme in crime and 
profanation.” 
It may seem like a lie to some, but it was written by nuns. And they also added: 
“The Spanish people, united until now with feigned fraternal bonds, break the weak 
bonds and, thirsting for well-being, launch themselves into the fight against their 
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brother, opening up a tragic breach from the very beginning, an indelible stain that 
only a generous forgiveness can erase” (Breve historia, 1941:5). 
No doubt, that was the main thing at that time, forgiveness; but it was not the only 
thing. On each of the two sides, an internal war had been fought, which, on one side, 
became bloody (in Catalonia in “the events of May 1937 [Orwell, 1938]) and, on the 
other, it was resolved, in its own way, by Franco. 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi graduated in Law just at that time, in 1941. He 
took the official examination for public service in the Superior Inspection Body of the 
General Insurance Directorate in 1944 and remained there until 1952, under the 
orders of Joaquín Ruiz y Ruiz as General Director, a post he occupied from 1939 and 
would continue in until 1951. As for their main task, suffice it to say that before them 
they had the need to meet the premiums owed by persons and things that, being 
insured, had been damaged by the war of 1936-1939, either indirectly or directly, and 
that it was estimated that the total would amount to seven hundred and fifty million 
pesetas; an amount that the insurers could not meet. 
Already in May 1940, a few weeks before the creation of the National Trade Union 
for Insurance, a law regulating life insurance had been enacted to deal with one of the 
sums owed through the creation of an Insurance Compensation Consortium, which 
was the entity that served to solve the problem. Needless to say, the problem was not 
that there was an institution, but that a compensation system was created that had to 
be accepted by everyone: policyholders (or their heirs), including those who did not 
claim damages, and insurers.  
The same would be done—creating the corresponding Compensation Consortium 
and sharing the losses—in the other affected sectors (individual accidents and “riots”, 
which was the concept that already appeared in pre-war legislation and was now 
understood as “war” that had damaged insured property. The one formed for this last 
purpose was called the Compensation Consortium for Riot Insurers and was created by 
the law of 24 June 1941. Three years later, it was more modestly named the 
Compensation Consortium for Catastrophic Risks on Things. 
Also in 1941, the Compensation Consortium for individual accident insurers was 
created (Sánchez Ceballos, 2017).  
The detail of what was done is not something to be listed here. Suffice it to say that 
not all the files were resolved until 1956 (Tortella, 2014: 200-201), the year after 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi joined the management of the Mutua de Seguros 
Agrícolas, which he himself began to call MAPFRE. 
He had taken part in the great settlement process that we have just recalled since 
1944, after passing the official examinations for public service and the knowledge that 
he had to acquire about that problem was included in his first book, El riesgo 
catastrófico en los seguros personales (1947), for which he received the Marín Lázaro 
Award. Of those years with Ruiz and Ruiz, he recalled in particular the importance, for 
his future activity outside Spain, of attending the International Insurance Congress that 
the aforementioned director general organised in Santander in 1947, of course, with 
the help of his collaborators, including Ignacio; Santander had suffered a catastrophic 
fire in 1941 and was the most appropriate place; “Spain was at that time [1947] at its 
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lowest ebb, the French had isolated us, they would not allow us to cross their borders, 
and everything Spanish was outside the international circuits. Joaquín Ruiz, who was 
very imaginative, had solved the major problems in insurance after the Civil War in a 
very acceptable way and decided to invite world insurance personalities to a meeting 
to publicise what was being done and the interest it could have in the world” (2000): 
93). 
The conversion of these three Compensation Consortia into a single permanent 
body was not the least of it; it was perhaps the first of its kind in the world; the fire in 
Santander had convinced Joaquín Ruiz of the need to maintain it and to do so, 
furthermore, in such a way that it would not be a sort of dry riverbed; in other words, 
he arbitrated the means necessary for the Consortium to have an economic fund 
capable of dealing with new disasters. 
The Santander Congress, Larramendi summarised, “was a success, above all 
because it was the first international meeting in Spain at that time. As I knew some, 
but very little, English, and was restless, he asked me to collaborate in the organisation 
along with Fernando Herrero, Manolo Suárez Inclán, Salomé Baldasano and Elvira 
Suárez Inclán. Back then the Directorate-General for Insurance was full of influential 
people from Santander. 
“An interesting and fun period of my life, not for the benefit I later got, but for 
itself. It was my first participation in a collective meeting, also with acceptable 
responsibility, and there I met Ralph Blanchard, Bruno de Mori, William Juul, David 
Ainge, William Delaney, Edmundo Merchan and George Lutfalla, important players in 
insurance in different countries” (2000): 93). 
IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI, PURITANICAL MENTALITY AND THE TRUTH 
In his memories of Joaquín Ruiz, the general director under whose orders he 
worked, there is an amusing detail and I can testify that it reveals an aspect of the 
businessman's way of being that gives rise to these pages; the general director of 
Insurance thought that the General Directorate should have a helicopter to attend to 
those accidents that required urgent action; so he arranged an interview with the 
British company's managers and off he went there with his wife and the inspectors 
Fernando Herrero and Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, plus Esteban Olascoaga, who 
was Joaquín Ruiz's private driver. They travelled by car. As a businessman, at the end 
of his life, he valued—negatively, by the way—the usefulness of that journey. What is 
unique is that he was not afraid to add an anecdote that was in keeping with the ethics 
of travellers, including his own: to cover the costs of the trip, they of course asked for 
the daily allowance provided for by Spanish law and, with it, they made a common 
fund. And he adds: “we were spending, always in luxury restaurants, ordering the most 
expensive dishes as well; none of us wanted to make savings if the others did not.” 
Knowing him, there is no doubt that this is not the comment of a punctilious man 
who does not want to leave everything he knows out of the book, and that is because 
of a moralistic mentality that demands sincerity even if it goes against him. No doubt, 
it is a faintly humorous comment that comes from his ability to laugh at attitudes like 
that, for which he did not excuse himself. It was just that they had really done that and 
it had those consequences. “When we arrived in Paris,” he continues, “passing through 
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the entire French Atlantic coast, we had run out of money, although everyone, 
including Olascoaga, had a hidden reserve” (2000: 196). 
I draw attention to this anecdote and relate it to moralism because this was a 
characteristic of the time among educated people throughout the Christian world (and 
it is obvious that I do not randomly use this adjective, instead of “Catholic”; moral 
legalism had become more pronounced with the Reformation, which arose—it should 
not be forgotten—as a reaction to the immorality that Luther encountered on his 
second trip to Rome and within the papal curia itself. (The strange thing is that he did 
not repudiate it in the previous trip, the first one; something that has occupied the 
specialists on the subject but that here is not the case.) The moral legalism to which 
the Christians inclined to since then and until the second half of the 20th century, has 
one of its main reasons of being in that historical fact, Lutheranism as—firstly—ethical 
reaction, and not doctrinal nor much less theological. This came later. 
And—what makes the case here—at the end of the 16th century the Church 
assumed the moral legalism and became part of the most cultured Catholicism (and, 
consequently, more conservative), a part of whose main Spanish defenders became 
part of the Carlism, especially since the 1860s. The latter was, in itself, a pure and 
simple political option; Isabel II had let them down from that point of view and, in the 
end, had contributed to the fact that the 1868 revolution could be presented precisely 
as a moralising response. Whether that and other aspects would lead to the greatest 
failure would be another question; by then, the so-called ”ultramontanos” or “neo-
Catholics” were already involved in Carlism. From then on, there was a learned Carlism 
that advocated moral legalism at all costs and a Carlism, let us say a popular, which 
was Catholic but had nothing puritanical about it. A large part of it would renounce 
Charles VII in 1888 and would go on to form the Integrist Party. The latter was not, 
then, a pejorative adjective; they considered themselves and said they were “the 
integrals”, in the sense of wanting the “integral” Catholic conception of public life to 
become a reality. The “cheating” on his wife, obviously with other women, which was 
attributed to Charles VII was not the only or the main one, but it was one of the most 
important arguments to break the traditionalism in 1888 (Obieta, 2018).  
That the Carlism we have called popular remained with Don Carlos does not mean, 
of course, that he was left without learned men in his ambit; but what we know about 
some of them—Navarro Villoslada for example—invites us to think that, among them 
too, fidelity to Don Carlos was maintained because, in the moral order, they were 
simply more tolerant. 
Well, in my opinion, in this last sector of loyal learned people we must place Luis 
Hernando de Larramendi and his children, including Ignacio. It is enough to look at the 
pages of the Guía sociológica de aspirantes al matrimonio: Centón enciclopédico de 
filosofía científica materialista pedantísima, which was probably finished in 1919 and 
published in 1920, to find some phrases—with a touch of humour like the whole 
book—which a Puritan would refrain from putting in writing: so when he states that 
“the Argentine tango, the matchicha and other respectable productions have a certain 
desirable elimination value against getting arthritis29, since there is no one who cannot 
 
29 We read “arthritis”. 
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stop sweating dancing them or even simply witnessing their contortions; [...] 
something similar happens to those Viennese waltzes that fill you with vague anxieties 
and indefinable yearnings, but do not tell you the name and address of your ideal love, 
nor do they provide you with the rent to ask her parents for her hand in marriage". 
This no doubt has to do with his own statement that “the first description of the 
sensations experienced upon entering marriage refers to the male's impulse to 
embrace the bride.” “There has been no lack of wise colleagues of mine, celibate in the 
service of science and greying due to their study, who appreciated the timeliness of 
such a description; even the actual fact itself deserved their disapproval and either 
denied its existence or declared that they did not understand it. But it seems to me 
that things could not be clearer, nor have greater sociological transparency.” 
Specifically, this is because the male “is Aryan [sic]. He takes her in his arms in the 
same way as the Aryans and their Greek and Roman descendants, when the new bride 
arrives at her new mansion, took her in their arms, raised her on the floor and carried 
her into the house, taking great care that she did not stumble on the threshold. It is 
the same solemn ceremony these days, [...]. However impatient that instinctive 
imperative of the Aryans of the day may be, they disregard the detail of the threshold 
and do not embrace the bride until the staircase” (1920: 39-42). 
In private, his son Ignacio smiled at least when someone joked about similar things 
and, on more than one occasion, added some comment that was like his father's 
humour. In any case, he did not blush eighty years after the edition of that Guía, when 
he referred to “the two months of honeymoon, in 1950”, which he spent in London, 
even though he devoted much of that time to writing Tres claves de la vida inglesa. 
“When we returned, we looked for and quickly found a flat to live in, in December 
1950, [...] where fortunately we still live; its 140 metres have allowed us to happily 
constitute a large, brilliant family of 9 children” (2000: 43). 
Deep down, in Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, not feeling any inhibition when 
talking, including details that approached (and only approached) the intimate, must 
have had to do with two things (besides being his father's son): one is his self-
confidence; the other, his handling of the truth.  
As for what I call “handling” of the truth, I refer to his attitude towards occasions 
when he could tell or hide the truth. A realistic—and truthful—man, the frankness with 
which he even put in writing how he “handled” it refers again to that lack of 
puritanism to which I have referred. When he wrote Así se hizo MAPFRE (2000), at the 
end of 1999, he had no qualms about warning, from the very book he was finishing: 
“They are not personal memories, which would require something I am not willing to 
do; I do not tell any lies but I do not say everything I think”. And at the end of the same 
paragraph, in italics: “I don't say everything I think, but everything I say I think.” “I've 
dedicated a major part of my life to defending: The truth in the face of lies and deceit; 
only the truth dignifies and saves.”  
And quite a bit further on: “There is a culture of truth and a culture of lies, which is 
hiding what exists and hiding reality. Almost fifty years ago, I told one of my bosses, 
Joaquín Ruiz y Ruiz, the Director General of Insurance at the Ministry of Finance, that “I 
hardly ever told lies”, he replied “How do you dare to acknowledge that?”; “Because I 
have respect for the truth,” and if I had said that I had never failed to do so, I would 
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have lied, since white lies are told, especially when something indiscreet is asked that 
could lead to harm to third parties. I have tried all my life and in MAPFRE to always tell 
the truth. This is the only way to gain the trust and respect of employees and 
customers. I identify truth with good and lies with evil in that permanent struggle 
between the two, although it seems that the success of “the business life” is knowing 
how to lie with skill. I have not done so, and a sign is that in my MAPFRE no irregular 
commissions have been given for any real estate operation or other kind of bribe in 
that area or in others, nor support for “changes in land use” to friends and fellow 
believers. MAPFRE has acted with “truth”, acknowledging responsibilities, as in the 
case of third parties injured in cars, without exhausting legal proceedings, for example. 
It is a “MAPFRE standard”, and the reason for its success so far” (2000: 19, 160-161). 
That had its drawbacks, without a doubt; if one was truthful with him and, without 
needing to speak ill of anyone, gave him their opinion on the negative progress of a 
matter without him having asked for it (even if he was grateful for it). In Colecciones 
MAPFRE 1492, one of the least complete is that of Portugal and America; of course, 
there were Portuguese-speaking historians, perhaps without exception, and a 
Portuguese person was also entrusted with the coordination of the authors who 
accepted. Well, as this was not yet up and running, the coordinator of the Colecciones 
went to Lisbon, saw how things were going, foresaw how they might end up and, on 
his return to Madrid, said to Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi plainly and simply: “The 
Portugal and America collection is not coming out.” It was a way of introducing the 
necessary conversation, of course; what was needed was to put things right and that is 
what was talked about on that occasion. 
Well, the coordinator jumped up from the chair where he was sitting when, a few 
days later, when the three mentioned above and a few others were gathered, Ignacio 
asked the Portuguese coordinator to report on the matter; he did so in a discreetly 
positive tone and he replied: “Well, José Andrés thinks it's not like that and it's not 
going to come out.” José Andrés would have preferred to say it himself, in his own way 
and to the Portuguese managers themselves; but he made the mistake of avoiding it 
when he saw it so clearly before leaving Portugal. 
SECURITY AS A BUSINESS AND ALSO AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE 
Since it is not a question of justification, this last point gives rise to another 
consequence of that truthfulness, and that is that someone who had that intelligence 
that is sometimes found in enormously cold, secondary and active people (those we 
tend to consider very “cerebral” and psychologists call “phlegmatic”), someone who 
was phlegmatic and intelligent, I mean, could get Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi to 
trust him just by perceiving that he was telling him the truth above all, and it turns out 
that he was not.  
This happened to him sometimes. But trusting others—with the most realistic 
criteria—compensated him.  
This could be the result of that mixture we just pointed out: that of combining self-
confidence with the confidence that some people came to inspire in him. To put it 
another way, one might ask whether a person like him was more likely to trust others 
just because his self-confidence led him to cut someone off with a clean break when 
someone betrayed that trust. Because in effect he was cutting them off; at least 
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apparently he did not seem to hesitate; he probably knew that the mutual benefit 
society called MAPFRE was not his and that therefore the decision to do without 
someone, if necessary, meant defending an interest as legitimate as that person's; 
other people simply depended on the company. 
It is curious that this self-confidence, he called it “pride” or at least linked both 
features:  
“Everyone has his own kind of pride, just as he has his own kind of impatience or 
anger. In my business and foundational activities I have sinned from this. I believed 
that I could do everything, forgetting future limits, and I did not consult with people, 
which still made the defect worse.  
But he himself slipped that assessment into the way of designating the trait he 
recognised in himself: “Most of my original actions have been possible because of 
feeling secure regarding the future, even if this was excessive. I foresaw what had to 
happen and it happened. It was important in my first stage at MAPFRE, in the face of 
an environment that was contrary to everything I considered desirable. What I did I 
could only do due to the “security of pride”, otherwise I would have been content with 
that of my competitors in the 1950s and 1960s.” 
Of course, he paid for acting like this: “Pride was useful in my operational evolution, 
but it led me to an excessive confidence in my strengths, in my pretensions, in my 
decisions; hence, wishing to leave a perfect MAPFRE, quite well tied up, I kept too 
much confidence in what I believed would happen, which unfortunately affected not 
only me but MAPFRE in general and some people in particular” (2000: 103). 
I can vouch for that. 
And I also attest that this was his “pride”; it had nothing to do with a person who 
breathed arrogance or presumption or superiority. On the contrary, perhaps it also 
had to do with the tendency, one would say systematically—a real habit—to speak 
well of the people closest to you. One would say that too well, and that was because 
those who perceived the rotundity of this tendency could come to underestimate 
these praises. Clearly, they could be excessive. Once, one of his collaborators 
commented it amusingly to Lourdes, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi’s wife; he told 
her that he had observed how well her husband spoke of each and every one of the 
people who worked with him and that this made him happy since, as a consequence, 
he would also speak very well of him; a comment which, in my opinion, did not please 
Lourdes at all; she did not even smile when she heard it. 
But it was like that; of his own children, he left the impression that he himself once 
put in writing: “I have reason to trust in your selflessness, your dignity and your ability 
for work and sacrifice” (2000: 43). I do not know if he ever wrote the same thing about 
his professional partners, but verbally he was not exactly sparing with his praise. That 
this was a real attitude can be deduced from what he would say about MAPFRE’s 
chairman when he joined in 1955, Dionisio Martín: “We had a good friendship despite 
differences in criteria, character and ideology, and he supported me, despite his lack of 
confidence in his partners”; "he never really had any confidence in his relatives or in 
his partners, or in the evolution of his companies, or in MAPFRE” (2000: 276, 325).  
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We already know enough about Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi to understand 
that he was ideologically placed at the antipodes; he had not accepted the union 
between the so-called Traditionalist Communion and the Falange Española de las 
JONS, which Dionisio Martín Sanz however had accepted. With the unification which 
created FET and de las JONS—where Dionisio Martin continued—Franco had wanted 
to liquidate the plurality of the Republic's parties and what he seemed to have 
achieved was that personal interests and even those of the group—legitimate or not—
were in charge of breaking this supposed unity. It would seem that he had succeeded 
in turning politics into a kind of private rather than public sphere. Tensions between 
them would be settled within the Régimen itself, and state censorship was in charge of 
preventing struggles from transcending outside the offices where they were aired. It is 
even possible to think that, in the end, the systematic criticism of partisanship as a vice 
of the past that was made from the Régimen and without distinctions was reduced in 
fact to value mainly (no less than) the instability produced by the projection of partisan 
struggles in common people. With the Régimen, struggles of legal political parties had 
been eliminated, by the very simple way of reducing them to only one, but internal 
fights remained alive. They used to occur within each party and now they only occur in 
one. 
The fact that, within it, an articulation was generated in “political families” 
reminded us, to tell the truth, of the “political friends” of the Spanish Bourbon 
Restoration, that of 1874-1923, when the general party meetings appeared in the 
press as “the friends of Mr.” Silvela, Sagasta or whoever. The difference was that, in 
the Restoration, the so-called “friends of” were those who, strictly speaking, formed 
each of the governing parties and were called upon to occupy government positions at 
least up to provincial level. Now it was the same, but they did not coincide with a 
party, but all the “families” were within the only one there was and, consequently, 
they may have had more strength than before. 
The Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas had been founded before the war; it had existed 
since 1933 and, in 1955, people from the Régimen and people from outside the 
Régimen lived together in it; there were Falange men, such as Martín Sanz; there were 
Don Juan monarchists, voluntarily exiled with him in Portugal, and others who 
continued in Spain. There were also people who, in the days of the Republic, were 
members of the CEDA and, in their own way, continued in similar positions in the post-
war period. By definition, however, they had to be owners; their promoters had a very 
clear purpose, which was to provide themselves with an instrument to deal with the 
occupational accidents suffered by agricultural workers contracted by the members of 
the mutual societies and, between both defining features, the political and that of the 
owners, there were many other attitudes, of all kinds, which allowed them to live 
together, even to be friends, and to dissent if necessary.  
This can be seen from what happened in 1955 at the General Meeting of the Mutua 
de Seguros Agrícolas, which met to appoint a new chairman. There were two 
nominations and both were ultimately supported—in different ways—by personalities 
of the same origin. If Dionisio Martín came from the Boards of Onésimo Redondo, the 
Minister of Labour, José Antonio Girón de Velasco, came from the same board and 
supported the alternative candidate, Ernesto Castaño Arévalo, a member of the 
mutual society from Salamanca who was already a member of the board of directors 
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of the Mutual Society before the war and who had had a relevant political career. But 
in another direction: he had been a deputy of the CEDA and one of the founders of the 
Catholic Agrarian Federation (which Franco had forced to join the Trade Union 
Organisation in 1940 despite the enormous resistance he encountered there) 
(Rodríguez Almeida, 1986; Robledo, 2007).  
There were also family ties that were intertwined with political and economic ties, 
Ernesto Castaño was the brother-in-law of the MAPFRE delegate in Salamanca, Joaquín 
González Coca, who was in turn was related to Fernando Coca de la Piñera, director 
general of Previsión in 1955, and all of them were linked to the family that gave its 
name to Banco Coca, which had contributed to financing Franco's army during the war 
and was then (1955) experiencing a notable growth (García Ruiz, 2001; Prado, 2006).  
The Mutual Insurance Company was not silent in all this; in the Republic, the work 
to expand it in Salamanca lands had led to negotiations precisely with Ernesto Castaño 
as a director who was from the Salamanca Agrarian Bloc, constituted in 1931, with 
whom the Mutual Insurance Company ended up establishing very close institutional 
relations. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi would later speak of “the union of MAPFRE 
with the Block” (2000: 225); it is possible that it had to do with the matters that had 
been discussed at the Provincial Assembly that those of the Block held in Salamanca in 
November 1931, among which the need for services from mutual insurance companies 
and legal and economic advice was weighed up (Rivas, 1986: 232).  
The heterogeneity of the institutional origins—whether political, commercial, or 
family—of Castaño's candidacy was similar to that of Dionisio Martín. Let us say they 
were men of the Régimen or respected in the Régimen (the younger ones, like Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi, perhaps unknown, but, for the same reason, far-removed 
from any kind of suspicion). Dionisio Martín was also supported by people who came 
from CEDA, as well as the Falangists, and, on the other hand, he had the firm support 
of the main owners of the olive sector; he was particularly linked to the cereal and 
olive-growing agricultural sector of the province of Jaén (plus that of Salamanca and 
Valladolid).  
The devastation of the war continued to show its face between 1945 and 1946, 
when the mortality rate in the province of Jaén rose by more than five points, which, in 
the case of children, meant an increase from 90 to 150 per thousand born, and experts 
did not hesitate to attribute this largely to hunger, rickets and vitamin A deficiency. 
Perhaps the fact that the National Institute of Colonization, which had been created in 
1939, gave preference to this province and approved in 1953 what was called “the 
Jaén Plan”, technically called “plan for the coordination of works, colonization and 
electrification”, and that almost two thirds of the six million pesetas spent on the Jaén 
Plan between 1954 and 1964 were invested in hydraulic and colonization works, had 
something to do with all this.  
Note that this means that the designers of this other “company” (it was, in the 
broadest sense the Jaén plan) tried to get to the root of it; it was not enough to 
distribute food to the hungry, but to restructure the economic order. And this was not 
far-removed from either the Mutual de Seguros Agrícolas or to Dionisio Martín, who 
was one of the strongest members of the mutual society, due to the size of his 
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agricultural assets and his personal qualities as a businessman with his own ideas; had 
a marked “social concern”, to use a colloquial term.  
The Jaen plan would put 11,363 hectares under irrigation until 1964. The 
distribution of land was not considered to be the main criterion, but the basis was to 
respect the structure of the ownership and to make it possible for as many workers as 
possible to have an orchard garden to supplement their wages. To achieve the latter, 
the managers of the Jaén plan acquired some large properties before starting the 
work; but these lands were not sufficient to do anything other than what has just been 
said; the large landowners successfully resisted dispossession of their land, and when 
the final results were achieved, those who owned properties of over fifty hectares in 
the areas that were to become irrigable took up much more than three thousand 
hectares, or almost a third of the total, and the colonization villages that were built 
were strategically placed so that those who lived there could work on the large estates 
on a daily basis. This was the case of the town of Guadalimar del Caudillo, which was 
built near Torrubia, where Dionisio Martín Sanz had properties, which won an award, 
as we saw, in 1955, when the Jaén plan was just starting. 
It must be said that this last fact does not necessarily mean that Dionisio Martín 
contributed to the development of the Jaén plan in order to use it for his own benefit, 
nor that those who designed it thought of the benefit of a few; assuming respect for 
the existing structure of property, organising colonization in such a way that the work 
of the workers could be assured benefited both sides—day labourers and owners—
and, in order to find out other possible intentions, it would be necessary to be capable 
of what no human being is capable of—to get into the conscience of the other person; 
we have already said that the designers took care to ensure that large properties were 
acquired to be distributed later, and—we add now—not only tried to distribute them 
in plots that produced the necessary complement to complete the wages for a day’s 
work and make it independent of its continuity; an important part went to plots 
capable of producing what was necessary for the maintenance of a family without the 
need to complete it with wages. This was, in general, one of the facets that failed, 
however; the new owners knew how to grow cereals and olive trees, but were 
intended to produce cotton and tobacco, and it became clear that they simply did not 
know how to do so, and the plan did not provide for this eventuality effectively 
enough. Many abandoned those lands (Araque, 2006: 16-21). 
The failure was relative because agriculture was important from the social point of 
view, but not to the same extent from the point of view of production; the Spanish 
agrarians of the time, like Dionisio himself, thought that agriculture as a way of life 
should give way—without disappearing—to creating it as an economic activity in itself. 
They did not define what they understood by this because they used the expression 
“economic activity” in the sense that everyone took it for granted and that we dare to 
define as the activity of the production of goods and services in itself, disregarding 
what, clearly, is not disregarded because it is implicit in the concepts of “service” and 
“goods”, which is its impact on the life of human beings. Ultimately, they meant that 
agricultural holdings had to be governed by the same criteria as industrial companies 
and that this meant concentrating much more capital than was usual in Spain. They 
were essential, for the time moment, to introduce “the means of traction”—the 
machines—that could now be counted on. By then, the land consolidation law (1952) 
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had been passed and we saw that the colonization plans were underway. The very 
awards for “exemplary exploitation” (such as the one given to that of Torrubia) were 
directly intended to encourage this transformation, which certainly meant eliminating 
jobs that could, however, be described as pure “underemployment”. Jobs were to be 
created preferably in the industrial and service sectors and, in agriculture, only insofar 
as there was a need for well-paid employees (in addition to owners of rural estates 
that were sufficient to support a family on the basis that they were transformed in the 
sense described above (Maceda, 2014).30  
CONCERN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS PART OF THE INTEGRAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
PEOPLE 
That Dionisio Martín Sanz was guided by this type of approach was demonstrated 
by his criticism of the Development Plans that began to be defined and implemented 
in 1964 and continued until 1975. Certainly, they represented a change in economic 
policy of such a magnitude that they managed to change the economic structure of 
Spain and, in that sense, they definitively relegated that idea of converting it into a 
gigantic trade union of producers. It is logical, therefore, that the confrontation of the 
men of the Trade Union Organisation with the so-called “technocrats”, who were the 
ones who proposed and applied the Plans, arose (Beltrán, 1994). And it must be said 
that Dionisio Martín, as a court lawyer in the Cortes, became one of the systematic 
critics of the planning, precisely because he understood that the economic prevailed 
over the social. It was probably his criticisms that had a decisive influence on the fact 
that what had begun to be called a “Development Plan”, with or without the adjective 
“economic”, became known as the “Economic and Social Development Plan” (Martín 
Sanz, 1969b, 1972).  
More important, of course, was that the latter was felt in the passing from Plan I to 
Plan II. In the second (1968), the raising of the standard of living, the fairest 
distribution of income and the respect for the freedom and dignity of the person were 
explicitly placed above production growth, its financing and the adaptation of the 
infrastructures to all this (Alsina, 1987: 91).  
Even so, the problem arose again when Franco died (1975) and freedom of 
expression was respected and it was then—as far as I know—that Ignacio Larramendi 
came out in defence of common sense: “An intellectual entertainment of recent years, 
and not only in our country, has been the systematic attack on the concept of 
economic development, after the uncivil spirit of the right wing had long been accused 
of hindering the technical and economic progress of the people. One might think that 
development was becoming a black word, humiliating the dignity of man. In the face of 
the objective of economic improvement, the basis of a level that allows the human 
quality, difficult to obtain in misery, has come to be described as a degrading 
instrument of oppression.” “Attacks on development are a fallacy; no one has the right 
to renounce the economic well-being of those who in many cases have not achieved it 
to any appreciable degree.”  
 
30 Vid., in this sense, the summary of the “Conference of the Minister of Agriculture: Unequal distribution of rustic wealth”, 
ABC, Wednesday 19 October 1955, p. 49. 
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To each his own, though: “The technocrats, so influential in recent years, have 
prevented attempts at tax reform to improve the distributive equity of Spanish 
income. If we were to suffer serious consequences as a result, we would have to hold 
them responsible not only for not protesting but also for taking advantage of the 
situation” (1977): 54, 55, 92). 
And despite the efforts he made to become chairman of the Mutua de Seguros 
Agrícolas in 1955, he would not lose sight of that aspect—that of justice—when 
governing what soon became MAPFRE. Forty years later, Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi noted another affinity between the two: Dionisio Martin strove to “avoid 
inbred influence and deviations of managers from their own comfort, and 
compensation of decisions between them” (1995:21). What did this last sentence 
mean? Perhaps that there were leaders of the Mutual Society who made decisions for 
their own benefit and, sometimes, for the benefit of leaders who acted reciprocally. 
In any case, that implied a third affinity, and that is that both had very much the 
corporate articulation of the community; although they conceived it in a substantially 
different way. 
THE PRIORITY OF SPEAKING FACE TO FACE AND SEEING GESTURES (OR AT LEAST HEARING 
THE VOICE) 
When Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi was giving free rein to his memories, one 
thing that drew attention—because it was repeated—was that he often included in the 
story the people he met and dealt with as a result of the specific event he was talking 
about in each case. For example, more than sixty years later, in 1999, referring to 
several people he met and dealt with in San Sebastian during the war (1936-1939), he 
wrote that he mixed with the secretary of the AET, “a man from Navarre who I never 
saw again, Miguel Ángel Astiz, and with the head of the AET, José María Olazábal 
Zaldumbide, from a very important Carlist family in Bilbao and with whom I had a good 
friendship, which I could not strengthen because he was part of the collaborationists 
and, in my family, we never accepted that position” (2000: 85; Olazábal, 1946). Often, 
it was as if I had the impression that I had found someone “valuable” and yet lost the 
possibility of being enriched by the kind of the benefit that friendship consists of.  
One might think that this is a criterion shared by many other businessmen, and it is 
true (although one would have to think whether, to be a businessman, one needs, 
among many other virtues, the one I have just mentioned); one of the things that took 
the longest to discover by the historian writing these lines is that, for businessmen, 
having friends is a part of the “human capital” that someone can offer. At least, that is 
what he deduced—the historian I am referring to—from the frequency with which 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi jovially reproached him for this or that fault 
committed “by that friend of yours.” The historian—a public official—reacted for a 
long time by making it clear that he did not select partners for reasons of friendship, 
but sought the best in each case. To which the businessman used to respond with a 
“Va, va, va”, typical of those who, at the same time, could be said to express that they 
do not give it any importance and that, moreover, they do not believe it. 
The latter, it seems to me, had nothing to do with lack of trust: it is one thing to 
value having friends who solve problems when necessary and another to trust them. It 
did not take long for the historian I mention to understand that Ignacio Hernando de 
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Larramendi did not trust him; so he chose to wait (I mean: to continue with his work 
and his criteria for selecting people while waiting for the day when he would trust him; 
a day that, indeed, came).  
This had relevant costs on some occasions; every time the businessman went out on 
a trip, the coordinator of the future Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 knew that, on his 
return, he would let him see that he had contrasted his opinion—that of the 
coordinator—with that of another historian and that the latter had let him know that 
they had chosen the worst on the market or that, at least, there were much better 
ones, whom he—the person questioned—knew well. The businessman would let him 
know with a jovial “I've been told that your friend...” and José Andrés—the coordinator 
I mention—would rush to defend his ethical criteria, until the day came when he chose 
to tell him to wait for the work of the person he had proposed and see if the solution 
was good or not. I will only give one example with a name and surname, given that the 
main protagonist—a French historian, Xavier Guerra—died years ago and, today 
(2021), the book he wrote for Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 has not only been reissued, 
but is a true classic of Americanist historiography, and that to the extent that I have 
just checked that there is even a pirate version that is offered for free on the Internet. I 
am referring to Modernidades e independencias. 
The coordinator of Colecciones guessed what happened: Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi had made a trip to Paris and had asked for an interview—a lunch or a 
dinner without a doubt—with a very relevant historian. He did not know that French 
historians do not tie up dogs with sausages either and what was to be feared 
happened; Xavier Guerra was not worth a penny. The coordinator of the Colecciones 
MAPFRE had already had experience in these projects, however, and this time he 
replied with the same joviality and, on leaving Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi's 
office, what he did was to make sure that the contract with Xavier Guerra had already 
left Madrid for Paris and that it was signed by the general director of MAPFRE. 
He was already experienced because Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi had told him 
some time ago that he wanted to personally meet the authors of the future books that 
formed Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 and that they would do so at lunches and dinners. 
When he heard such a proposal, the coordinator of Colecciones trembled; he guessed 
what was happening and what was going to happen; the businessman wanted to meet 
and deal with wise men, sure to have conversations with them that would open the 
doors of Olympus to him, even if it was only to hear stories and opinions from wise 
men, ways of being very different from those of the business world. And he was going 
to meet with many characters who would do one of these two things if they did not try 
to do both: first and foremost, pull a fast one, that is to say, assure him that he—the 
author—was carrying out another project of enormous magnitude and transcendence 
that would be no small feat on MAPFRE's budget. The second forecast was that they 
would ask for information about the books already ordered and would claim that how 
we had not counted on Tom, Dick and Harry, his friends, who would do it much better, 
or that we had forgotten a subject of incalculable importance and that we had the 
main specialist at hand.  
José Andrés realised the enormous workload that those dinners and lunches would 
entail: he would have to listen to what nobody could imagine and without the 
possibility of showing them up, due to being purely polite, and then, alone, he would 
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have to reveal, before Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, the plot that was hidden 
behind the comedy he had just witnessed. Well, it happened just like that and in 
spades.  
It was not only—that of the coordinator of the Colecciones—a fear raised by the 
time they were going to waste, but, above all, by the impression they were going to 
make on the businessman; an impression, he thought, so general, that it was going to 
seem really corporate. And that added, to the conversations alone that followed the 
dinners and lunches, a reiterative message that was an ultimatum: it was to assure him 
that things were so, but that those same people would write a good book and, in some 
cases, an exceptional book. 
It was quite some time before Ignacio Larramendi called the former coordinator of 
Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 to his office and told him briefly: “I know what's wrong with 
you; we businessmen have the compensation of money, but your only compensation is 
ego.” The historian nodded with a smile and did not add any more comments; 
everything had been said. 
Everything is understood, of what Ignacio Larramendi had thought then. Episodes 
like that would happen from time to time, but they did happen: one day he realised 
something that consisted mainly of getting to know a person better or unravelling 
what, for him, was an unknown and the procedure was repeated. I can testify that he 
did it several times with the coordinator of Colecciones and I suppose he would do it 
with other people. The coordinator was able to deduce, without fear of being 
mistaken, that he trusted him when he first told him to convince him on a sheet and a 
half that he should accept such a project that someone had proposed to him. It was 
not the only time; it became something normal—I do not say very frequent—which, 
from one moment on, Ignacio Larramendi came to the astonishing conclusion that the 
historian I am talking about knew everything. Thus, some projects of true cultural 
importance came to fruition, such as the inventories of Colombina Library or the 
Documentary Collection of the Discovery, which would become an instrument used by 
several Spanish ambassadors to inform their peers in Ibero-American countries of the 
reasons why the Discovery was not something that should be celebrated with the 
Italian ambassador as a representative, at least symbolically, of Christopher Columbus. 
The good reputation that Ignacio Larramendi sowed in favour of the historian and 
coordinator of those projects resisted even the day he asked him who El Tudense was. 
Many years ago—perhaps when he was studying his degree—the Chronicon mundi by 
Lucas de Tuy had crossed his path, but he simply failed to remember and told him so. It 
does not seem that this failure influenced Larramendi too much, judging by the same 
emphasis he placed in those days on commenting to others that he had finally 
discovered that there were things he did not know. In fact, there was another day 
when he called the historian back to the office and told him a new conclusion he had 
reached: “I know why you're not a history scholar;” after a slight pause, he added the 
reason. The historian smiled and answered with that tone that is not just a question or 
a statement, but both at the same time: “You've realised...” He nodded his head in 
affirmation and each went about his business, which was the task of the day.  
In his relationship with the businessman, he had, it is true, received lessons from 
another sign. That Larramendi was particularly interested in the Hispanic world is 
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clearly seen in the process of international expansion being studied elsewhere. It is 
sufficient to review the chronology of the penetration of the mutual society in 
countries other than Spain. That, in that preference, he included without any 
reservation the Portuguese-speaking world is easy to verify too. However, in the old 
Hispanic baccalaureate teaching, the Portuguese-Spanish treaty signed in Tordesillas in 
1494 was studied as a major milestone in the relationship between the two worlds, 
simply because the treaty consisted of dividing the world into two halves, and Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi knew perfectly well that this milestone was seen differently 
in Portuguese and Spanish historiography. 
So he thought that it was the most propitious occasion that could be found to 
gather both visions in a single volume, of course both dealt with by first a Portuguese 
outstanding scholar and a Spanish outstanding scholar. He told the project coordinator 
about this, who wrote to a Spanish academic, since they already had the Portuguese 
academic. He received the answer in a few hours, maybe a couple of days (there was 
no e-mail yet): he did not usually consider works of that nature, replied the guest 
historian. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi's comment was quick and direct: “Of 
course, you've written to him, and there are things that you must do face to face 
whenever you can. When you talk to someone, you see them coming.” 
The case contains more substance than it may seem and lends itself to very 
different interpretations. Mine is this: as a confident man, he was not shy; he liked to 
meet people and talk to them. Without a doubt, the results of that preference 
extended to very diverse aspects, which were perhaps consequences, but which were 
not unimportant. When you talk to someone, it is true, you can “see it coming”; we all 
do it, even if it is unconsciously. Conversations are forms of communication that are 
habitually constructed in such a way that the speaker arranges the ideas, sounds, 
gestures and everything else in human speech, and arranges it in order to convince. To 
“see” the other person coming, in that case, is to anticipate knowing—by sound, by 
gesture—if you have convinced him or, if not, what you can add before he replies (or 
after). 
Then comes the agreement, if there is one, and, in that case, the priority criteria are 
then others. We have talked about the way Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi tended to 
trust others and about the precautions he took, which, in spite of everything, played 
tricks on him. Let us now say that, reciprocally, when someone trusted him, he 
considered that he acquired a “moral obligation, even if it was not legal; for me, he 
would explain years later, both have always been of equal value” (2000: 328). 
But it was not just a negotiating tool; it had a lot of what he called “human 
treatment” in itself and, because he liked it and enjoyed it, he tried to make it part of 
MAPFRE's style as well, both in the relationship with policyholders and in the 
relationship between the people who worked in the mutual society. “It also seems to 
me,” he wrote at the end of his life, “that because of my influence, which is very 
personal, a spirit of affability and simple and not tawdry comradeship has dominated 
in MAPFRE. The treatment between “hierarchies” and between equals and non-equals 
has been informal and I think human. This is what my instinctive way of being has led 
to, in no way mixed with favouritism” (2000: 196). 
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“Channels” were built, of course, so that this attitude would flow everywhere, in 
the mutual society and outside it; this sense—perhaps among others—gave way to 
“conventions” and publications. “Regular conventions of different characteristics have 
been very valuable in developing the MAPFRE culture, as they create friendship 
between everyone, those at the top and those at the bottom, not simply that of a 
colleague in the partner’s office or at the table opposite.” “In the conventions, the 
“human treatment” to which I have referred was particularly widespread, and this has 
contributed to the creation in MAPFRE of a set of friendships, those of Gerona with 
those of Huelva, etc., and those of one MAPFRE with another or with others” (2000: 
199-200).  
But it cannot be considered that this was the development of a project for the 
promotion of relationships, but rather the opposite of what it seems: it was perhaps 
the principle that “human treatment” should be encouraged in all senses, which led 
different people—with the means and authority to do so—to begin with this type of 
meeting. “They were Juan Fernández-Layos' idea,” said Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi, underlining the importance of conventions, “and I do not know exactly 
how it came about; I did not participate. Their purpose was to reward those who sold 
life insurance, a modality in which this is very important. It was also thought that by 
involving their family, the efforts required for the sale of life insurance would be better 
acknowledged. This is true, but at the same time the company culture was being 
created and promoted, which also extended to families. The first convention was held 
in 1970, in Paris, and 25 people attended, without wives. One objective was a visit to 
the SAFR, with which we had an excellent relationship. MAPFRE Vida permanently 
established the conventions, thus expanding the inter-company relationship. The 
success of the conventions was such that other “MAPFRE companies” were envious or 
interested in something they considered very positive” (2000: 200).  
Also the publications: “Everything that was obtained in quality improvement and 
training has been disseminated and the consequence is the “wave” of regular 
publications of different types. Simply communication, improving relationships 
between the different people who work at MAPFRE. But others are also highly 
specialised” (2000: 198).  
I know that the latter—the quality of the books on the insurance sector published 
by Editorial MAPFRE—was decisive in opening up new markets. And I am afraid it is 
not going to take up the place it deserves in this research. The publishing house was 
created in 1970 and today it is justified in this way: “in the absence of technical 
literature in Spanish on insurance and safety.” The Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 were 
undertaken under this same label, but I think it is important to emphasize that this 
preceded them, as can be seen, by more than twenty years and that its effectiveness 
was enormous for an infinite number of insurers. I feel that the introduction that can 
be read (2020) on its website is no exaggeration, where it says that “since then [1970] 
the work published by Editorial MAPFRE is an obligatory reference in the Spanish 
speaking world in publications about private insurance, prevention and protection 
against fire, security and hygiene in the work place, as well as about environment and 
medicine.”31 
 
31 On https://www.mapfre.es/seguros/mapfre-espana/publicaciones/editorial.jsp. 
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LARRAMENDI'S PRIVATE INSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
MAPFRE CULTURE 
It is important to emphasize that the “human treatment” we spoke of earlier was 
strictly that: what he himself expressed in the terms we have just described; it was a 
treatment that generated “a spirit of affability and simple and not tasteless 
comradeship”. Friendship could become intimate; but that was not what was intended 
nor—it seems to me—what was usual. It is more than a mere indication that he 
himself—Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi—spoke to all MAPFRE employees, in 
principle, using the formal you: “I have generally treated all my closest male 
collaborators with the formal you, and only the informal “you” with those I have had 
old relationships outside of work, without this representing an advantage for anyone, 
nor deteriorating my authority; this attitude does subsist and I celebrate it”, he 
declared in 1999. Was it another inheritance from his father? Without relating it to his 
own criteria, much less giving explanations of any kind, his son Ignacio remembered 
Luis Hernando de Larramendi who had carried out his baccalaureate schooling at the 
San Isidro Institute in Madrid, “where he had the only friends with whom he would 
later address with the informal you, [...] which he did not do with those of his 
adolescence or with those of his political activity” (2000: 28).  
Since he never “theorised” that fact, there is room for very different hypothetical 
explanations; one is that he did not want to be carried away by the spread of using the 
informal you that was imposed in Spain in the 1960s; he simply saw no reason to 
accept what, in his opinion, was probably an impoverishment of the language that, 
deep down, distanced the person using the informal you from the person the informal 
you was addressed to; the treatment “of the formal you” allowed him to express 
degrees of rapprochement even unconsciously. Strange as it may seem today, it could 
be (and I think was) a manifestation of respect.  
We said earlier that Larramendi would go so far as to say that he devoted “a major 
part” of his life to defending the truth against lies; but now we must add that, in the 
same grammatical sentence, he included two more things: “respect for men” and 
“obsession with quality”; the latter trait was better understood if it was related to the 
one immediately preceding it, that is, “respect for men [sic], demanding from them but 
not overwhelming them.” 
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And he added, once again confident even in the face of the possibility of being 
judged vain: “I have been told that I am a humanist manager; I have tried to be one 
and on many occasions I have succeeded, although I have not spent much time on 
what we would call the individual lives of my collaborators; my wife usually reproaches 
me for it” (2000: 19) (and of this last thing, once again, I bear witness; the first time 
that one of his collaborators spent a Saturday with him and, at the end of the 
conversation, Ignacio Larramendi made a reference that “tomorrow” they would 
continue, the collaborator exclaimed: “But tomorrow is Sunday...”. Luckily, this 
happened in his house and his wife, Lourdes, was in front of him, who immediately 
argued with him: “See? People rest on Sundays” and added something about family 
life; he made a joyful gesture of acceptance and repentance as he said “All right, all 
right...” as if to ask that his comment be considered as if he had not made it). 
For this purpose, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi was one of those people for 
whom working hours did not count; at the MAPFRE that he managed, they certainly 
counted for the employees; but, as they did not count for himself, his “invasions” of 
extra—working hours were frequent for the mutual society’s managers. He did not 
consider it a remarkable part of the “MAPFRE culture”, but it certainly was. The 
employees themselves felt that the salaries of MAPFRE's managers were not 
commensurate with their dedication. “Now I think—he wrote in 1999—that MAPFRE 
should establish, except for very special cases studied expressly, adequately 
remunerated retirement from the age of sixty for territorial executive positions, 
especially provincial, with great friction of wear and tear and tension; in the last years 
of my actions I proposed it informally on several occasions, but I did not manage to 
impose the formula.” 
And he added in an unexpected way, as if he were talking about the same thing: “I 
also think it would be appropriate [...] to create a “Council of Emeritus”, under 75 
years of age, to intervene in certain circumstances and favour the line of continuity; 
not having established it was a very negative aspect of my action, although after I 
retired I proposed it and it was not accepted” (2000: 152). This had to do, no doubt, 
with what he designated as “MAPFRE culture”. 
Not only did he certainly talk about the existence of a MAPFRE culture, but he also 
thought it was fundamental for every company to have a “culture”: “A company has 
culture when its components are considered to be adhered to by more than a simple 
labour or service contract. [...] A company's culture requires that competition be 
oriented towards the quality of products and services; without this, workers and 
employees cannot feel that they are adhering to it, and the same goes for their ethics 
and the equity that this implies, and of course, as I said before, it must be a “culture of 
truth”, which seems impossible in a competitive market, although MAPFRE shows that 
this is not true” (2000: 195). 
What exactly did he mean by giving the name of culture to that which he valued in 
this way? Culture—all culture—is a group of habits that allows the coexistence of 
those who share them and, therefore, gives continuity to the group that coexists as 
such. Note that I say “share them”, not that I say “think them”. Extracting, from the 
reality of any human group, the habits that shape their culture and make it possible for 
them to live together is very difficult. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi would expressly 
point out four “aspects that have been factors in the creation of the MAPFRE culture” 
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(2000: 197): truth, training, quality, and service. And it was probably like that. But one 
would say that culture is diluted—it escapes our knowledge—as soon as one tries to 
define it by means of precise concepts (and truth, training, quality, and service are 
these). 
It is not that such concepts are alien to reality; what happens is that, from this 
exercise of conceptualization, culture is something else: it is a conscious task, 
belonging to those who strive and can do it, to inculcate attitudes that correspond to 
the consciously defining concepts, and that to the extent that it succeeds in 
informing—even unconsciously—the habitual behaviour (again, habits) of the people 
who form the group. 
Perhaps that is why Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi made such a surprising 
comment on it: “In a company with culture there is always a high dose of paternalism, 
which I claim to be positive, because only in those that it exists, if it is sincere, will 
permanent business action be possible” (2000: 195). Is he talking about his own role? I 
think so, and that it was his activity in that sense—that of instilling truth, service, 
quality, and training—that demanded a further step and a realisation that his concept 
of business culture had a very important intentional charge; it was a matter of getting 
people to embody those four values—at least—until they became a reality. He was 
fully aware of what it meant for the businessman and the company, and so he added: 
“I would dare to say that company culture is an ideal, an objective that is not always 
fulfilled but is always dreamt of” (2000: 197).  
The businessman dreams it, in short: he dreamed it in the case of MAPFRE. 
And let us note that all this refers to one of the main and most difficult 
characteristics to explain as a historical fact: that which he designated as “MAPFRE 
culture” came to impregnate the behaviour of the more than two thousand people—
quite a few more—who came to work with him. Of course there would be 
exceptions—and simulations—but the “climax” was perceived without any further ado 
by any employee. 
I confess that this is—of all that has gone before and what follows—the matter that 
will leave me least satisfied in drawing up this outline of a semblance: to know—and to 
say—how Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi's enthusiasm—because he was an 
enthusiastic man—managed to infect the vast majority of his employees, including 
those who had only heard of him. I think it was a phenomenon of osmosis; but that 
does not answer the question: how did you get a phenomenon like that to spread until 
it sealed the life of a group that coexists. 
And I am afraid that the answer errs on the side of being simple: there are people, 
simply, who convince and drag; they are natural “leaders”, we could say. He once 
called it—talking about himself—“charismatic dictatorship” and it can be assured that, 
in doing so in a public act, the general laughter that followed that definition was the 
most eloquent way of agreeing with him. What he said was done. There were times, of 
course, when he was wrong. He accepted the error, whether he said so or not; he 
rectified it and moved on. 
This was what made possible, for example, that very relevant part of his cultural 
activity which was the collection of “Clásicos Tavera”; he set out to ensure that, 
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throughout the Iberian world, people who were well acquainted with the existing 
bibliography would select the main works that were difficult to access, almost always 
because it may have been a century since they had disappeared from the book market, 
apart from specialists in precisely antique books. A library would be located where 
there was a copy, it would be digitized and published on CD-ROM, which was the best 
technique at the time. For the specialist's geographical or cultural field, it could be a 
collection of little use; but, as a whole, it meant forming a virtual library of over a 
thousand works and offering the possibility of knowing and, therefore, comparing the 
most diverse realities of the Hispanic world, especially from the point of view of their 
history. Basically, it was an attempt to take another step towards breaking the rigid 
“national” division of historical consciousness of all the Iberian-speaking communities 
and to promote a reflection on each of them and, at the same time, on the whole. It 
was, in short, an effort to bring out the cultural unity of the Hispanic world and to 
make those who, by profession, could spread it in their respective fields aware of it. 
In fact, this had perhaps been the main intention of the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492. 
It is significant that, when they were thought of, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi set 
the criterion of doing so by “states”, that is, by each and every one of the sovereign 
political units that existed in America. Proof that he wanted to do that—to provoke a 
gigantic reflection—was that the person he entrusted with coordinating the 
Colecciones tried to make him understand that, from a scientific point of view, it did 
not make sense to produce a book about the indigenous people of Peru, for example, 
and another about those of Bolivia. The ethnic divisions that the Spaniards 
encountered and, in part, survived did not conform to the administrative boundaries 
that were eventually imposed. The correct thing was to dedicate a book to each ethnic 
or related group. 
The response to the observation was stark: Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi 
wanted to talk about the indigenous people of Bolivia in Bolivia and those of Peru in 
Peru (with the addition, no doubt, that by putting all the Colecciones MAPFRE in the 
hands of the Bolivian indigenous people—I am following this example—he would have 
the possibility of comparing the situation with that of the rest of the American states). 
No, it was not only a question of advancing in the knowledge of these ethnic 
groups, but of putting before the eyes of Bolivian readers (and the same in all other 
cases) the reality of this aspect in their own country and of provoking the necessary 
reflection in each and every one of the countries, precisely as political units governed 
by legal systems that affect—well or badly—these people, the indigenous people. And 
the Spanish as a human group that was in contact with these people on a continental 
scale? For them, he had another remedy that he expressed in a very practical way in 
the book with which he contributed to the very Colecciones MAPFRE 1492, Utopía de 
la nueva América (1992): in the general budgets of the Spanish state of each year, a 
substantial item should be allocated for the development of the indigenous peoples of 
the Hispanic world. 
Again, the coordinator disagreed and, of course, it was useless. At times like that, he 
did not usually challenge other people's arguments; he used to say, firmly, that he 
wanted to do it that way. 
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Well, when it came to launching the project that was Clásicos Tavera, he brought 
together the few people (two, three, maybe four) who would have to carry it out. 
Among them was the coordinator of the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492, who, once he had 
heard the explanation and the first steps to be taken, did not hesitate to say what he 
thought; letting “loose” a specialist to design the ideal minimum library, and that 
multiplied by fifty or sixty, meant that many of the books were unique copies 
preserved anywhere in the world, from Spain to the antipodes on either side and from 
the North Pole to the South Pole. And the “digitizer” would have to go to each one of 
them, since it was a question of making reproductions of the best possible quality, and 
this would be followed by the problem of the infinite number of librarians who, all 
over the world, thought they were custodians of their libraries and refused to allow 
their precious unique copies to be handled or—as happened in one case—asked for a 
million pesetas for the reproduction of some fifteen of their books. 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi listened to the coordinator—that and the other 
objections he made—and did not comment; henceforth the coordinator observed—
with the greatest understanding in the world—that he was not called to the meetings 
of the small group destined to carry out the project. There was no prior discussion; 
Larramendi simply dispensed with it for a task that he saw as unachievable before he 
began it. 
It could have been 1996 when that meeting took place—I cannot say for sure—and 
it seems to me that it had not ended in 1998 when he called the reluctant coordinator 
into his office to tell him plainly, without harshness or softness, simply as a fact: “You 
have to take over the management of Clásicos Tavera.” The coordinator was not stupid 
in asking him why, let alone chanting “I said so.” He said something like, “Okay, all 
right, I'll see how things stand right now and think of a plan of action that I'll pass on to 
you.” He studied what had been done up to that point, rearranged things as he 
thought they could be done; he presented it to him at the time and, three or four years 
later, the “CD-Rom” volumes published had surpassed sixty; surely, they contained 
more than a thousand books unjustly buried up to that moment (although, according 
to my bibliographical archive, they are more than one thousand seven hundred and 
seem to me to be too many). No explanation was ever found between them; they both 
knew perfectly well what had happened and that, fortunately, the project—which was 
worth the trouble—had finally proved to be feasible (and that this was not the merit of 
the two alone, but of the effectiveness of the work carried out by all those involved). I 
do not know if I am wrong when I say that it was the first major work carried out at 
Digibis and that it probably contributed to the development of the technique that 
would make that company one of the most prestigious in the digitization sector. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF COHERENCE BETWEEN BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND THE WAY OF 
CONCEIVING LIFE 
Previously, we have linked the obsession with quality, which Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi acknowledged to have, with respect for others. It is true; “in all the 
services and work of my unit and also in other activities outside MAPFRE, I have tried 
to ensure that they are done with quality and that this characterises MAPFRE, although 
in many aspects I am what some call mayhem”. But then he takes an unexpected turn: 
“Quality comes from the love of God, love of truth, which a company needs, even if 
255 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
The Basis of Humanist Differential at MAPFRE 
 
 
some think it is inconvenient; in the long run, I believe that not only this is not, but it is 
the only possibility of success” (2000: 19-20). 
If one rereads this sentence, one comes to the conclusion that there is a leap in his 
reasoning: it means—or so it seems to me—that the only possibility of success lies in 
quality, whose roots—here begins the main thing—are in the love of truth, which is, in 
turn, the love of God. In other words, it does not say that one must govern a company 
with God's love, among other things because the phrase would lend itself to confusion, 
and Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi was completely unaware of what we call 
“religious bigotry”. It was frequent that, in the conversation with someone who had 
just been introduced to him, when some matter bordering on religion was outlined, he 
would transfer this to Lourdes; “My wife is very religious”, he used to say in those 
cases (when the conversation required it). But there were exceptional occasions when 
he expressed the relationship between business activity and Christianity with no other 
concern than to make clear precisely what I said, that it was not religious bigotry or 
softness in the exercise of authority; he thought of the Christian aspect of his work, I 
think, as if it were the foundations that could make a company unshakeable. In fact, 
and although the contrast with the mention made of God may be surprising, one of the 
criteria that he expressly included in MAPFRE's articles of association was the 
prohibition of dedicating resources to political, ideological, or religious institutions or 
activities, since it is an association of people with different thoughts and ideologies, 
who must find a neutral field in this.” 
He adds in the next line—and it is only fair to state this, to exhaust the truth—that 
“the exception to this principle was only admitted, in very small quantities, from 
twenty-five to fifty thousand pesetas, for cloistered convents and very poor religious 
orders, but always with special authorisation and inclusion in a register of the 
Institutional Control Committee” (2000: 91). 
That, in spite of the latter, he considered coherence—a form of relationship—
between belief and professional activity as the foundation of economic reality—it is 
understood that as with any other reality—it suffices to return to Tres claves de la vida 
inglesa to have proof of this; in that book, he expressed what, at that time, nobody in 
Spain said (neither before nor after nor even today): that the professional and judicial 
system of England was the most notable consequence of the application of 
traditionalist principles to the world of business and that a private company can 
provide a public service and must be recognised as such precisely so that it is 
maintained and serves as an example. But it included a critical chapter that was 
ultimately summed up by this other observation: in his English stays, he had observed 
to what extent the profit motive was gaining ground as a priority at times in the 
English economic order. And he had linked it to the decline of Anglicanism, which must 
also have been drawn to his attention. The conclusion was clear (or so it seems): 
Christian nonsense (very practical and real), a system that aims at making private 
management work for the public good has no future. 
The quotation that proves this interpretation—taken from the farewell speech he 
gave at the General Shareholders’ Meeting of MAPFRE Mutualidad in mid-June 1990—
is long, but it is also the most explicit one I know in all the aspects I have just indicated: 
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“You all know my background, Christian and specifically Carlist. In my almost 35 years at MAPFRE, I have tried to 
create a company inspired by Christian principles, which has nothing to do with making ideological politics or 
discriminating against those who think differently, which has never been done at MAPFRE. MAPFRE has been, in 
everything that has depended on me, a company that has emerged from the application of those principles; and, as 
a company director, I have always acted as I have believed that those who call themselves Christians should act. One 
of the satisfactions of this 16 June is to proclaim this without blushing or with “shifted shame” that some who think 
like me have; in saying this I am not harming “my cause”, since I have demonstrated with the facts that with those 
principles one can accomplish things and perhaps only with them can one have permanent success. In any case, 
without what I have just said MAPFRE and my performance in it cannot be understood” (in 2000: 115). 
That these words spoken at the end of his business life were so similar in meaning 
to those he had written about England in Tres claves de la vida inglesa almost forty 
years earlier, in 1952, suggests that we are dealing with one of the most intimate 
specifications in his view of life.  
Perhaps it is pointless to further clarify the matter of which we speak—the 
coherence between belief and professional activity as the foundation of economic 
reality—and an accusatio manifesta the excusatio non petita that we can now add; but 
the intention of what follows is not to excuse or excuse ourselves, but to note that I 
have measured the words very much in enunciating the principle of which we speak. 
He also tempered these assessments by considering himself to be a lucky man; he had 
been lucky in everything, he admitted. But I attributed that to the same thing we have 
just seen: “God has been magnanimous with me and that is why I have tried to 
compensate him and contribute as much as possible to the whole of Spanish and 
Ibero-American society”, he said publicly in 1998, upon receiving the cross of the Order 
of Civil Merit (2000): 120).  
Once again, he referred to his father's way of thinking; Luis Hernando de 
Larramendi, “he always considered himself within the social doctrine of the Church, to 
which, in one way or another, the Carlists have been linked, especially those who, like 
me, have had no specific political action, no ambition, no possibility of seeking any kind 
of power” (political, we understand) “and who, therefore, have not been forced to 
fight for it, for [which] many deviations and transactions may be necessary” (2000): 
50). He was referring, no doubt, to politics in the noblest of words, which is the one 
that refers to his own linguistic origin, the Greek polytheia, not to party politics.  
Luis Hernando de Larramendi, in fact, had devoted part of his early years as a 
lawyer to a group of Carlists who were to lead, at the beginning of the 1920s, to the 
creation of the first Spanish Christian Democratic party, the Partido Social Popular 
(Alzaga, 1973). In Zaragoza, a group of Jaimistas (that is, supporters of Don Jaime, 
Carlist pretender to the throne in those days) had decided to focus their “political” 
activities on social action. They were few in number, but some of them had notable 
professional prestige; among them was the historian of law Salvador Minguijón and 
the also professor Inocencio Jiménez; although the man of action par excellence was 
the also Jaimista Severino Aznar, doctor in law, who presented himself as a 
“sociologist”, a word that had been imposed for these cases in the Latin world since 
the end of the 19th century. Among other things, they created a Centre of Catholic 
Publications—a “seal” more than anything else—from which several translations by 
the also “French sociologist” Luis Garriguet emerged, also some by Roguenant, several 
of which were taken over by Luis Hernando de Larramendi.  
It was the last years of the first decade of the twentieth century and the young 
lawyer who was Luis (born in 1882) had drawn special attention by two legal actions as 
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disparate as attractive so that they were talked about in all political circles in the 
country. The first had been a prudent request to the Courts to open the corresponding 
process for the Minister of Grace and Justice, Count of Romanones, for the publication 
of a royal decree on civil marriage and to urge the authorities to proceed against the 
Bishop of Tuy. It was the matter that, in the decree, the judges were urged not to allow 
(nor to allow themselves) to ask the spouses if they were Catholic, as the current 
legislation required of those who did not wish to marry in the Church, but in the civil 
sphere exclusively. With that, Romanones intended to better respect religious freedom 
in matrimonial matters. And the bishop of Tuy had responded by warning that, in this 
way, Spanish couples who were Catholic merely because they had been baptised at 
birth could be allowed to engage in pure and simple “concubinage”, expressed in this 
way.  
It was an old issue in all the majority Catholic countries where civil marriage was 
introduced. What attracted the attention of Luis Hernando de Larramendi's petition 
was that he did not go against that, but against the invasion of the judicial power that 
implied urging judges to act in that way and, in the case of the Bishop of Tuy, to do the 
same so that he could be brought to trial for calling the above-mentioned marriage 
“concubinage”. In “the young Carlist lawyer”—as he was quoted in the press of those 
days—in October 1906, it was clear that it was a matter of giving a political and legal 
lesson to the minister and—perhaps—of arousing surprise when a Carlist lawyer had 
to remind liberal jurists of the respect they owed, by law, to the division of powers. I 
say this because the request included this paragraph: Larramendi had “not the least 
unjust attempt to annoy or offend the personality of the most excellent minister of 
Grace and Justice, to the extent that, after the restoration of the right, if the Senate 
declared that it had been disturbed, my humble voice would be the first to ask for a 
pardon.”32 
"Romanones to the bar!" headlined the news in the Carlist newspaper El Correo 
Español. "Success has exceeded our hopes." "The vox populi has already reached the 
Palace of the East. Yesterday there was no talk there of anything else but the 
"Romanones process"".33  
In June 1907, not a year had passed when “the young Carlist lawyer” managed to 
get the anarchist Aquilino Martínez Herrero acquitted of the alleged crime of hiding 
the also anarchist Mateo Morral after the latter made an attempt on Alfonso XIII and 
María Eugenia de Battenberg, who were returning from their wedding in the Madrid 
basilica of San Jerónimo on 31 May 1906. He did not deny that he had taken him in, 
but was unaware of the reason for the attempt to hide it.34  
In these works by Garriguet—and in all the rich content of the first five years of 
publication of the magazine La Paz social—they addressed “social” issues with a 
consistency—with their own convictions, it is obvious, that the liberal politician, 
Catholic by the way, José Canalejas, did not hesitate to call as “socialists” in the 
 
32Transcribed in "El conde de Romanones, acusado", El Lábaro: Diario independiente , x, no. 2928 (Salamanca, Wednesday 24 
October 1906) 1,  
33 Reproduced in La Cruz: Diario católico, vi, no. 1534 (28 October 1906) 2. 
34 According to "Ferrer, Nakens, etc: The great process", Tribuna libertaria: Published by the Centro Internacional de Estudios 
Sociales, i, No. 2 (Montevideo, 23 June 1907) 1. See the acts of the Causa por regicidio frustrado (1911). 
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Congress of Deputies. Property, wages, labour relations and other matters within the 
framework of what was then called the “social issue”, all of which were explicitly 
Christian in inspiration, appear in these pages, and it could be said that they make it 
possible to understand that a person trained in these readings—and, even more so, in 
conversations with his father—would be in a position to see, in the British economic 
order, an acceptable alternative and even understandable as a strictly traditionalist.  
Luis Larramendi did not follow this Aragonese group in 1919, when they decided to 
leave dynastic legitimacy aside and formed the Christian Democracy Group, from 
which the Social People's Party emerged a few years later. The expression “Christian 
democracy” was misleading according to Leo XIII, who had devoted one of his last 
encyclicals, Graves de communi (1901), to this concept; in France the expression 
“Christian democracy” had been used not only to promote actions linked to 
distributive justice, but also political participation, and in this way positions had been 
taken rejected by previous pontiffs. Specifically, and as explained by Leo XIII, the 
denomination “Christian democracy for many is offensive because it is supposed to 
contain something ambiguous and dangerous: fearing, to this effect, that by this name 
under cover of interest the popular regime is promoted or democracy is preferred to 
the other political forms, that the Christian religion is restricted by reducing its aims to 
the usefulness of the plebs, without paying any attention to the good of the other 
classes, and finally, that under this specious name, the purpose of subtracting itself 
from any legitimate government, whether civil or sacred, is concealed” (No. 1). He 
intervened, therefore, to recall the correct doctrine on such matters and concluded in 
these terms: 
“It is not, however, lawful to refer to politics as Christian democracy; for even 
though democracy, according to its meaning and the use of the philosophers, denotes 
a popular regime, it must nevertheless be understood in the present matter in such a 
way that, leaving aside all political concepts, it means only the same Christian 
charitable action in favour of the people” (No. 6). 
This is undoubtedly how it was used by those who, for this very reason, called 
themselves the Christian Democratic Group. Of course, they did not understand 
“charity” to mean “beneficence” in the conventional sense; charity was fighting for 
justice, promoting the enactment of labour and worker protection standards and, of 
course, forming class trade unions. And we will be told how this charity can be 
defended without this activity being political, in the noblest sense of the word. From 
the years immediately following until more than the middle of the 20th century, the 
term “Christian democracy” was used in a misleading way, which meant that, in 
important circumstances, Christian democrats who adhered to Graves de communi 
acted together with Christian democrats who understood this name—at least—as an 
inspiration for a political party.  
Luis Hernando de Larramendi did not follow them when he took the step of setting 
up the Christian Democracy Group. Nor did he give it to another more numerous 
fraction of the Jaimismo who, in the same year 1919, disengaged themselves from the 
dynastic cause and, following Vázquez de Mella, formed the Traditionalist Party. On 
the contrary, in the latter case, Ignacio Larramendi's father did not hesitate to attack 
them. See his Omisiones y desvaríos de Mella (1919). 
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THE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE SCOPE OF THIS FACT 
Manuel Marina—the judge and journalist involved with the Jesuits whose analysis 
we used when assessing the “building” constructed under the name of National-
Syndicalism—does not have any historical study that has taken charge of his work, to 
my knowledge, despite the quality of his legal analyses, especially in the relationship 
between the legal order and distributive justice and also despite the government work 
that he carried out in the Society of Jesus. The manuscripts preserved in the Archives 
of the Jesuit province of Aragon are only a starting point and here we must take 
another step towards understanding what type of humanism—in more technical 
words, what philosophical anthropology—underlay the business activity of Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi, of which Marina's legal solvency would surely serve as a very 
appropriate counterpoint. 
We could continue the reasoning that began with the criticisms that the two 
attempts to articulate a trade unionism that Sanz Orrio did not want to call 
corporatism, but which contemplated, among other things—we have seen it—the 
existence of a National Trade Union for Insurance and the consequent geographical 
pyramid, in whose various seats producers and businessmen would have to be 
integrated. However, perhaps more new things will come out if we continue in the 
opposite direction and, instead of asking ourselves how Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi came up with the mutual society, we ask ourselves how he came up with 
the mutual society he took over in 1955 and which he named MAPFRE with a chance of 
cash and discreet “sleight of hand”. Without further ado, he chose that name and no 
one objected. Then, there must have been a peculiar and very revealing phenomenon 
of what we superior bipeds are: someone deduced that it was an abbreviation and, we 
do not know if imagination or some other virtue we do not know, it was concluded—
and repeated—that the original mutual society was called Mutualidad Agropecuaria de 
Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España. 
At the end of his days, Larramendi was very clear about this: he came up with the 
company as an initiative that has to emerge from below in order to provide a service to 
the community and that must therefore be considered a strictly public service, in the 
legal and political sense of the word: “It is not possible to understand the depths of 
MAPFRE without its institutional character,” the businessman would write. 
What character was it? “The institutional is in a company that considers its 
objective the general benefit of society, unlike the “ordinary and grinding” companies 
dominated by a cold capitalism, of pure economic results, ideal for some, but not for 
me, and which rarely achieve effective and permanent results. From very early on I 
wanted [...] to create an institution with a business character but without being 
dominated exclusively by profit. One of my satisfactions is that today MAPFRE is 
considered to be providing a public service despite its private nature” (2000: 135). 
It seems clear that, here, in what was his farewell speech at MAPFRE's General 
Shareholders’ Meeting held on 16 June 1990, by institution he means the permanent 
organisation that is articulated in a structure that supports the social fabric, and this is 
important for anyone who is used to reading English texts on these subjects, in which, 
often, institutions are the set of specific habits through which, if certain conditions are 
met, there is a type of actor that tends to act in a specific way as well (Berger & 
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Luckmann, 1966). In this case, institutions could be defined as behavioural structures, 
in contrast to Larramendi who gave them the sense of permanent structures that 
usually channel behaviour. In the Anglo-Saxon form, the institution becomes a typical 
activity (in the sense of “typified”); in the latter, the institution does not act, but 
channels human activity. In this last sense, "MAPFRE—Ignacio Larramendi would 
conclude—more than a company, is a concept of social structure that has always 
existed” but that, in this time, contrasts with Statism and Liberalism, whose followers 
believe “that only the market increases wealth and direct or indirect welfare” (in 2000: 
115). 
In order not to confuse even more with what I am trying to avoid just that, 
confusion, I must warn you that, in fact, the two meanings of “institution” that I have 
just recalled are accepted in the two languages mentioned. In English, they are usually 
distinguished by an adjective: “Informal institutions” are what Berger and Luckmann 
point out and “formal institutions” are what Larramendi proposes. I say no more; 
because it is not a matter of wondering if, in the language of Hispanics, “formal” and 
“informal” really serve in this case (and it seems to me that they do not). 
For Larramendi, it is the distinction between the private and public sectors that 
should be put to the test. Not that I would deny that both sectors exist, nor the clarity 
of the difference between them from a legal point of view, at least as far as ownership 
is concerned. What was envisaged—perhaps—was that a distinction should be made 
between legal personality and the purpose of personal legal activity: a private legal 
person can perform a public service or a private service. This was the novelty. 
And he defined the latter, of course, in his own way, on that very occasion in 1990: 
“Public Service. Companies that manage large assets, regardless of their own 
operational area, are obliged to care about the public service. Some say that, in today's 
capitalism, the only important thing is the market and profit. They are totally wrong, 
and just as Marxism has failed, that capitalism will fail. MAPFRE has been and will be 
successful because it seeks service in institutional relations and considers social sense 
as a basic element of its action. If my successors forget this, it will be very difficult for 
MAPFRE to be what it could be in the future” (in 2000: 115). 
It is this concern for public service that entails placing emphasis on the legal 
concept we have seen—that of “formal institution”—perhaps as a way of overcoming 
the disjunction between the public and the private. Expressed differently, we could say 
that, in their view, public service is ensured by means of a permanent institutional 
structure that must be considered above the distinction between the public and the 
private. Now, if we were to ask his opinion on this last binomial, he would surely be 
inclined to defend the private, without annulling the need for the public. 
Only this forces us to ask if his vision of the company was not only related to his 
vision of politics, but also consisted—in part—in a way of understanding politics in 
which the company became a corrector of Statism (from fascism to communism) and 
also of liberalism. In valuing this institutional aspect of economic organisations, I not 
only understood it as something that, preferably, has to emerge from “below”—that is, 
the private sector—but, wherever it arises, it cannot be satisfied with what we usually 
understand as commercial gain. In the end, the latter prevails in all cases, he 
concludes: “The reality is that there is never any absolutely collectivist or absolutely 
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capitalist organisation, because companies apply pragmatic principles, although they 
do not always declare them” (2000: 136). 
However, seen in this light, his approach went beyond what we consider 
“economic” in its conventional sense; it was not that MAPFRE “made politics”, but that 
MAPFRE “was politics”. Here we must hasten to say that, on the second occasion, I use 
the word “politics” in the original Greek sense, that of polytheia, which refers to the 
ideal organisation of the city (the polis) as a community. But, that said, the matter is 
too important for us to try to explain it as it deserves. 
This was what he had projected onto the British judicial and insurance organisation 
when he discovered that it was “applied traditionalism”. We now add that, 
consequently, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi gave a very particular scope to the one 
he himself mentioned as the basis of his own approaches. He referred specifically to 
the traditionalist Vázquez de Mella tribune, “who develops the basic idea—he said—of 
the need for societies that are intermediate between political power and the citizen, 
who defend the latter from the excesses of the former” (2000: 58). So far, the phrase 
we have just quoted refers to an idea shared, with Mella, by almost all Spanish 
traditionalists who thought and wrote or spoke about such things. But that phrase, in 
Hispanic traditionalism, this pointed to the guilds, which were, it is true, business 
corporations after all and did count as “intermediate societies between political power 
and the citizen”, especially when it came to regulating working conditions and prices. 
They were thus “corporations” and they were so in the sense that they united in one 
“body” apprentices, officials, and masters; in short, it was the alternative to the trade 
union, not the company.  
Now, if the phrase quoted about intermediate societies referred to political 
corporatism, the issue also had notable consequences; the phrase implied—it seems to 
me—the participation of the subjects in the exercise of authority as professionals of 
what the politicians were dealing with.  
It was a question of taking a step beyond what we have said about Roa Dávila. In 
Roa Dávila, it is true, the subjects must not only be free to make themselves heard, but 
also to create institutions that contribute to defining the way in which the common 
good and coexistence are sought; they must be free to create them, to preserve them 
and to change them, and this even if the result is not the most perfect. In his time 
(1591), it was not usual to distinguish between the public and the private from the 
legal point of view; but, basically, it was not that it was confused, but that almost 
everything was private. In this sense, in the Italian political thought of the 14th and 
15th centuries, the word equivalent to “state” had begun to be used, in which a 
reference to public institutions could be guessed (Kirshner, 1996), and that expression, 
“state”, already appears with that meaning in some Spanish writings of around 1500; 
but it was not usual until the 19th century. Until the opening of the Cortes de Cádiz, it 
was usual to refer to “the Monarchy” or “these Kingdoms” when some Spanish spoke 
of the public thing. 
The addition that we find in Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, is to link the two 
aspects that we have just distinguished: the freedom to create companies and the 
right to intervene in the government. In other words, he spoke of a participation in 
politics that resided in the fact that a company's own organisation was oriented 
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towards public service. But not only that: also the duty of those governing to take 
advice from businessmen who managed to set up such a private company, which was 
decisive for the provision of this public service. 
If we interpret Larramendi well when making such reasoning, his proposal became 
unexpectedly more ambitious than it might seem at first, when we were talking about 
Tres claves de la vida inglesa as the basis of his long business reflection. Now we are 
faced with the possibility that this step of his, whether he was aware of it or not, 
involved the economic and the political and, therefore, the social and the cultural. In 
short, it was close to a major global proposal. 
It is another thing that he expressed it himself as such. At the end of his life, yes, it is 
clear that he tried to draw attention to these new perspectives. His works, from 1992 
onwards, are basically aimed at this objective. However, there is a need to know to 
what extent he was aware of this—and wrote or said it—or whether what he managed 
to do was to outline a proposal that, in the end, went beyond the businessman's own 
field to that of statesman's. 
I will first try to summarize it as I think it could be expressed and then go to the 
facts and texts that can support it: 
FROM THE BASE: A DECISIVE CONVERSATION AND HIS PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Everything we have said formed, of course, a unity that we could call existential, 
even if it sounds very strong, and, if so, it is enough to change the adjective for another 
one, not less clear but less disturbing as it can be “phenomenological”. In short, all this 
was projected, together, in a multitude of circumstances and it occurs to me that 
examining one of them can help us see all this in another perspective and thus enrich 
our vision. Ultimately, it is a question of starting from the almost minimal and seeing if 
there is a solution to the larger scale. 
We know that, in 1972, Dionisio Martín Sanz foresaw—like so many others—that 
the Régimen would die with Franco and that he could not delay and had to consider 
the possibility of using MAPFRE itself as a political instrument to intervene with some 
force in the political crisis which that political change would entail. Well, in 1972 and 
since 1955, Dionisio Martín Sanz was still Chairman of the Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas 
which had become MAPFRE, managed its important agricultural heritage and did not 
neglect politics. Raimundo Fernández Cuesta—the Minister of Agriculture whose 
Under-Secretary was Martín Sanz—would remember years later that, when Franco's 
first government was formed and he took over the Ministry of Agriculture (1938), the 
offices of the General Secretariat and the Ministry had been installed in the Burgos 
Town Hall; “we moved—he adds—with great difficulty, since the premises we had 
were very meagre.”35 In 1972, from that point of view, Dionisio Martín Sanz's scenario 
was less precarious: he sat on no less than a seat in the building that had housed the 
Spanish Cortes for more than a century. (It had been inaugurated in 1850, built 
 
35 In ABC, 30 September 1955, p. 15. He goes on: “My most immediate collaborators in the General Secretariat were, first, 
Agustín Aznar and Fernando González Vélez as vice-secretaries; then, Juan Manuel Fanjul and Julián Pemartín. The Under-
Secretary of Agriculture was occupied by Mr. Dionisio Martín, and my general directors were: for Livestock, Mr. Mariano 
Rodríguez de Torres; for Forestry, Mr. Florentino Azpeitia; for Agriculture, Mr. Juan José Fernández Urquiza, today director of the 
School of Agricultural Engineers, and for Agrarian and Social Land Reform, Mr. Ángel Zorrilla. I appointed Mr. Manuel Goytia to be 
the head of the National Wheat Service”. 
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opposite the one that had hosted them until then, since 1834, which was the church 
that was disentailed and without worship of the Holy Spirit) 
If we go a step further and try to place him outside the Cortes and his own home, 
where he lived with his family, we will see that—like Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi 
and so many others (almost all men, as well as many women)—he not only attended 
this type of “social gathering” in which one simply “has to be there”—that is, one has 
to be present—but also belonged to the most select group according to the criteria of 
the journalists who wrote the news of these events.  
“In the church of the Holy Spirit” (and it is already striking that it was this one, built 
on the site of the Junta para Ampliación de Estudios and as the main part of the 
Spanish National Research Council, perhaps the main creation of the Régimen for the 
long-term promotion of culture of greater scope), “the marriage between Miss Plañol-
Roda and Mr Javier Fernández Cid de Temes took place. [...] Signed as witnesses [...] on 
the groom’s behalf, Mr José María Bru, Mr Dionisio Martín, his uncles Mr Luis and Mr 
Joaquín Calvo Sotelo, his brothers [...]”, we read in a 1955 newsletter, in the days when 
he became chairman of the Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas.36 
And that, a month before, “marking its unity once again, a representation of poultry 
farmers from all over Spain” met “for an intimate lunch with the three poultry farmers 
who have been elected as legal representatives of the Cortes: Mr Dionisio Martín, Mr 
Carlos Luis de Cuenca and Mr Tomás Allende García-Báxter”. The cards could be picked 
up at the Madrid premises of the National Poultry Group or at the premises of the 
National Poultry Cooperative.37 
Without a solution of continuity, he could not miss either the meetings where that 
same character of “social event” directly connected with the problems of wider 
perspective; for example, the conference given by the then Minister of Agriculture 
(1955), Rafael Cavestany, on Tuesday 18 October and at the Instituto Nacional de 
Previsión on the very expressively titled issue Less farmers and better agriculture. “The 
hall was full of agricultural engineers and experts, and among the personalities who 
came to listen to Mr Cavestany were the Minister of Industry, Mr. Planell, and the 
Secretary General of the Movement, Mr Fernández Cuesta; former Ministers Rein 
Segura and Suanzes; Undersecretary of Agriculture, Mr Cejudo, and General Directors 
of the Department; National Delegate of Trade Unions, Mr Solís, and Mr Dionisio 
Martín, Navarro Canales, González Bueno Mr Pablo) Echegaray”.38 
The effectiveness of this aspect of life can be seen, perhaps in a very simple way, in 
the election of a court lawyer in the Cortes. He was already one—we said—since 1943; 
but he had been re-elected in April 1955, in the vote to appoint the 32 court lawyers 
who corresponded to the so-called “last group of the tercio sindical.” The voters were 
the 56 ex officio court lawyers who were covered by the legal system and the 82 who 
had already been elected in other groups of the tercio sindical. The range of results 
placed Dionisio Martín, with 81 votes in his favour, halfway between the 118 of Eliseo 
 
36 ABC, Wednesday 11 April 1955, p. 29. 
37 ABC, Wednesday 17 May 1955, p. 47. 
38 ABC, Wednesday 19 October 1955, p. 49. 
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Sastre Blanco, who obtained the most votes, and the 59 of Agustín Pujol Sevil, who 
obtained the least.39 
We can ask ourselves why he was interested in chairing the Mutua de Seguros 
Agrícolas when he achieved it in 1955. But we do not know that he said it. It was 
clearly not “his thing” if Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi was right when he wrote 
almost half a century later that Dionisio Martín had no idea about insurance. That, 
despite this, he was interested in that position is proven by the manoeuvres he had to 
carry out to achieve it. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi would express it years later in 
measured words: “he had obtained a majority at a meeting of members of the mutual 
society by procedures that were criticized, in what was a modest scandal of the time 
(1995: 23). It was simply not clear what had happened to the votes committed to 
Castaño, which in the end turned out to be in favour of Dionisio Martín, according to 
the memoirs of Ignacio Larramendi (2000): 235). 
Let us say that the uniqueness of the party that presided over the Régimen actually 
favoured the weight of the other elements from the combination of political, 
institutional, economic, and family relations that were behind the appointment of 
Dionisio Martín as chairman of the Mutual Society in 1955. Let us now add that it 
favoured it to the point of breaking the very framework of the Régimen and that this 
was one of the reasons why Dionisio Martín hired Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi as 
the Mutual Society's managing director; the chief executive of the former's companies, 
Emilio Pérez Adsuar, had married a cousin of Ignacio's wife, Lourdes Martínez, and it 
was he who informed Larramendi of the announcement that Dionisio was in search of 
a managing director. Emilio was “the main director of Dionisio Martín's companies” 
and, at the same time, Ignacio's old schoolmate, who had married a cousin of Pérez 
Adsuar's wife, Lourdes Martínez, all of this, according to Larramendi's own memoires 
(2000): 244). 
Historians usually call this type of events, so frequent, in which friendship and 
kinship become decisive to achieve better positions, as “endogamic”. Perhaps it should 
be stressed that, despite their frequency, they are not always intentional; they are 
merely the result of a normal dynamic of human relationships, which give rise to 
friends and which are based on kinship. Precisely because, in spite of this, there are 
those who make them intentional, Ignacio was careful to introduce into MAPFRE rules 
that would prevent what he expressly considered “nepotism”: 
“There can be no successful business without some rule to protect against internal 
corruption, which in one part means diverting for one's own benefit, directly or 
indirectly, what has to be collective. In an eminently family business like Banco de 
Santander, nepotism has not entered, even though people from the same family 
maintain power. There is a difference between family power and nepotism, which 
occurs when decisions of that kind are irresponsible, while “family shareholding 
power” is not. The opposite and absolutely negative is what happened in a company 
with historical content, such as Tabacos de Filipinas, which, due to circumstances I am 
not aware of, was dominated in this century by the interests of families of directors 
who put themselves before business objectives”. 
 
39 Vid. ABC, Wednesday 22 April 1955, p. 35. 
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We will stop as little as possible to comment on the example he gives, because it 
tacitly establishes a relationship between nepotism and the institutional character that 
we have said companies should have which, in the strict sense, provide a service that 
can be described as “public”. In this case—very significant indeed—that public service 
to which Larramendi referred shows the breadth of the concept in question—that of 
“that which is public”—which is nothing less than its character as a permanent 
battering ram to ensure the presence of the Spanish in the antipodes. “To those of us 
who know the Philippine nation well,” the quote goes, “it came to seem like treason 
that, as a result of these abuses, a company that would have been a spearhead for 
Spanish penetration of the Far East has disappeared.” It does not say what they were 
or could have been. Let us only remember that the officially named Compañía General 
de Tabacos de Filipinas was one of the jewels of the holding company constituted by 
the Cantabrian Antonio López y López, the first Marquis of Comillas. Established in 
1881, it had come to form a network of factories, especially in the Philippine 
archipelago; it had diversified the raw materials it produced and exported and had 
achieved a significant presence, from Manila and Barcelona, in the markets of 
Portugal, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. Recovered from the 
effects of the Second World War (1939-1945), it had begun a decline that would 
continue for the rest of the century until it was reduced to the tobacco market and, in 
this situation, merged with the Dutch tobacco company Lippoel Leaf in 2007 and with 
the American Hail & Cotton in 2011; at which point it was definitively converted into a 
Philippine subsidiary of the United States company.  
 “In 1955”, continues Hernando de Larramendi, “there were cases of nepotism in 
MAPFRE, which were actually modest, as they were not relatives of directors or senior 
managers, but people recommended in junior positions, mostly by Máximo Sánchez, 
the General Management's mechanic, who, because of his contact with managers and 
his acknowledged goodness, was in a position to have an influence for people in his 
family or friends, who were also good employees in all cases. With the current 
complexity of the MAPFRE System, I believe it would be appropriate to seek formulas 
to maintain this spirit but modify the text in the rules of kinship”, he wrote in 1999. “I 
believe that these rules should be relaxed, while maintaining the principle and, above 
all, registration with the Committee on Institutional Control so that these situations 
can be officially recorded” (2000): 151). 
He had also realised that the presence of family members, as heirs to a lifestyle and 
a conception of the company, precisely ensured the institutional nature which he 
believed was MAPFRE's main contribution to the economic order of the countries 
where it was established. “This line of continuity has an example in the Mutua 
Madrileña, which I consider to be extraordinarily effective and which is contrary to 
what could be considered mine, but which is the logical line in a company 
characterised by absolute respect for the interests of members of mutual societies” 
(2000): 152).  
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IN THE END, THE OPTION FOR TRANSFORMATION FROM THE BOTTOM INSTEAD OF 
REVOLUTION FROM THOSE ON TOP 
With all this, we can still ask ourselves how to explain that a person in the political 
position of Dionisio Martín Sanz not only chose to chair an agricultural mutual society, 
but also to hire for it another person who thought so differently. 
Let us say, for the moment, that the even lexical expression of what Franco's 
political regime was had been softened as much as necessary to make that at least 
possible. Remember the first political affiliation of Dionisio Sanz, together with 
Onésimo Redondo; then his integration in the first group of the Falangists who 
supported the Régimen and carried out government tasks. But we can assure you—
after reading all the essentials of his bibliography—that, in 1955, he was on a different 
wavelength. Not to mention in 1972. 
This does not mean that he would have abandoned the essentials of his way of 
thinking (of course, with the change that comes with the passage of time and living 
together in a community—Spain—that also changes); what we are trying to say is that 
the priorities were very different, and that was in both Dionisio Martín and Ignacio 
Larramendi. Let us repeat the expression “like it or not” to affirm that they had the 
same fundamental beliefs, also the same enemies; they belonged to the same network 
of social relations and, in the end, their activity, however distant it might be, did not go 
beyond the range of positions allowed by the current legal order, including those that 
were not strictly legal, but were tolerated, as was the case with Carlism.  
They were not an exception; this was one of the dominant characteristics among 
the directors of the Mutua de Seguros Agrícola, whose political affiliation had been 
more inclined towards the CEDA in the 1930s, but there was no lack of Falangists. 
After all, it was not all politics, and one must necessarily think that Dionisio Martín 
Sanz chose to hire Ignacio Larramendi in 1955 because he took it for granted that the 
young law graduate, an insurance inspector with work experience in English insurance 
companies, would be a good instrument for managing the mutual society. What he 
could not imagine—that is also true—was that he was germinating an idea of the 
company that had nothing to do with his own. 
We know that Dionisio Martín Sanz was also a businessman and not only a 
politician, but also an important rural landowner. And we can still add that he was an 
agricultural engineer who was particularly concerned about the chronic wheat deficit 
in the Spanish economy—bread being, in those days, the main element of the diet for 
most Spaniards—and saw as his main objectives the increase of productivity and the 
improvement of working conditions. As Under-Secretary of Agriculture, he had 
managed the main body that his project required: the National Wheat Service (1937), 
undoubtedly one of those “official institutions not integrated into the regular public 
administration,” but no less important for that reason.  
It is clear that this chronic deficit required an increase in productivity and, to this 
end, he had the best laboratory (and the greatest personal interest) that could be 
desired: his own family assets. As such, he was one of the main members of the 
mutual society—in the Agricultural Insurance division—in the provinces of Valladolid, 
Salamanca and Jaén; he himself managed the group of family properties with which he 
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had created the firm Autocampo (1940), whose speciality I do not know how to define. 
I have found it in very diverse sectors and even today; it is possible that it was precisely 
that, a legal firm for doing all kinds of business.  
In addition, in 1955, his estate in Torrubia (Girona), which he owned with his 
brother, won one of the Ministry of Agriculture's awards for “exemplary agricultural 
exploitation”.40 His twofold source of knowledge—engineering and the administration 
of his own companies—had led him to devise his own ideas on the various problems of 
the Spanish countryside—including insurance—and he had written down into 
numerous documents, some of which are a valuable source for understanding the 
situation of rural workers and the primary sector as a whole in Spain in those years. 
He was a man, therefore, of broad perspectives; let us just say, as a significant 
example, that he had taken a major part in the creation of the Empresa Nacional de 
Celulosas (ENCE) (1953) and—why not—that he would be appointed vice-president of 
the Spanish Football Federation in 1956.  
We said he was a “public man”; let us add that he was, specifically, a man of the 
Régimen (the regime par excellence for Spanish people of his time, Franco's political 
regime) and everything said about him until now, gives an idea that his way of being 
corresponded to a kind of “man of the Régimen” who believed in priority of efficiency 
over representativeness and, even more, over participation of subjects in the exercise 
of authority. If anything, it seemed to him that everyone had to participate in what 
they were good at.  
He was, in other words, neither a democrat—in any of its possible forms—nor a 
traditionalist like Ignacio Larramendi. He believed in “revolution from above”—a stale 
form of the more recent Spanish political tradition, the one mainly focused on 
Maurism—only carefully chosen by the novelty of fascism in the period when it was 
formed, “between wars” (in Spain, 1918-1936; worldwide, 1918-1939). 
At this point, there is no need to explain why Ignacio’s attitude in that order of 
things had to be expressed in exactly the opposite way; his was not “the revolution 
from the top” but “transformation from the bottom”. Here, “top” is “the State” and 
“bottom” is the community.  
We do not know, of course, what role Dionisio Martín gave to MAPFRE in his 1972 
political project. It is likely that it had to do with the geographic network of agents he 
had. We cannot say for sure. It is possible to say, however, that Ignacio Larramendi 
was opposed to this proposal because he did not believe that the Régimen would 
change or that, whether it changed or not, it would be in MAPFRE's interest to have a 
partisan connotation. We also know what his idea of the company as an institution 
was. So he faced it without beating about the bush; “I thought a direct conversation 
with him was indispensable”, he later recalled.  
When I left Dionisio Martín's office, in a cafeteria very close to calle Sagasta in 
Madrid, “I phoned my wife, whom Dionisio liked very much, and I thought he might 
have said something to her,” Larramendi would remember. When I spoke to her, he 
had already done so, saying he was worried about my insolence. From then on, a real 
 
40 Cfr. ABC, Wednesday 09 December 1955, p. 42. 
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war broke out, which I thought was necessary for Mapfre's defence and I admit that it 
was also necessary for my own defence, as I was convinced that, if I lost, I would have 
cut short my business life and it was not even difficult to be accused of criminal 
actions, exaggerating my management errors, which no doubt there were” (2000: 325-
326). 
This no longer had anything to do with the unification decree that gave rise to FET 
and the JONS or, better, it presented this action, also human, in a very different 
perspective from politics understood in its sad colloquial sense. Ignacio and Dionisio's 
was a professional battle between two families of friends who were related to each 
other and who, as such, dedicated much of their time to living together and talking. 
However, in order to speak in all possible (and necessary) ways, courage was 
needed, and both had it; Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi himself would say this about 
both of them a quarter of a century later (2000: 207); they were men of “mettle” and 
no doubt they thought it was necessary to be like that to face life as it was. 
Dionisio Martin told him that if he wanted a battle, he would have it, and indeed 
the matter was raised in the upper echelons of the Mutual Society. Ignacio Larramendi 
received majority support and was able to continue what, it seems, could have been 
the final moment of his business career, at least in MAPFRE. Dionisio, however, had 
thirty years left in which he would lead many more companies and prove his capacity 
to adapt to the political circumstances of each moment. Whether he shared with 
Larramendi the idea of the “private institutional enterprise” we cannot be sure, 
judging by what we know about it. It seems rather the opposite (Camprubí, 2017). 
TWO DIFFERENT THINGS, BUT INTIMATELY LINKED: THE ECONOMIC ORDER AND SOCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
If we now try to go a step further and link all this to an unexpected idea that we left 
behind as if we were skinning over it—that corporate governance has to do with truth, 
and truth with God's love—the result could be this: 
It is obvious that this surprising relationship would please—or so it seems to me—
the author of the encyclical Caritas et veritate. Only I identify it as such because, in that 
text, Pope Ratzinger makes a statement that has perhaps not received enough 
attention in the field of economic theory and applied economics; he says there, of 
course in his own way (and we in ours), that no economic order—we deduce that 
neither capitalist nor collectivist nor ultra-liberal nor materialist nor traditionalist—can 
be such, or simply exist, if there is not a sufficient margin of free benefits and of what 
has been called “fraternal reciprocity”, that is to say, asymmetrical: which is not strictly 
equitable. In other words, it is not that we have to add free and asymmetric reciprocity 
to the economic order in order to make it better, more united, but that, without it, 
there is no economic order that can be sustained.41 
This has to do, I believe, with the conclusion of the penultimate Habermas, he who 
ended up asserting that what he calls “natural reason” is not enough to impose a just 
 
41 This and everything that follows about it, I have tried to explain in Caritas in veritate: Lectura crítica, in Rafael Rubio de 
Urquía and Juan José Pérez-Soba (eds.): La doctrina social de la Iglesia: Estudios a la luz de la enciclica Caritas in veritate, Madrid, 
Biblioteca de Aurores Cristianos, 2014, pg. 1203-1292. 
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order; something else is needed that the German finds paradoxically, from his 
“methodological agnosticism”, in the contest of religious principles, without, of course, 
any hint of dogmatism, as one more—but indispensable—element of “reflective 
circularity”. It seems to presuppose that this contest guarantees the presence of 
gratuity and asymmetry in the consideration (McLain, 2002).  
It could be said that all this surpasses the insistence of one of the fathers of the 
social market economy by a point—specifically, Eucken (2017 [1952]; Garcia 
Echevarría, 2018)—when, in the years of Larramendi's professional training, the 1940s, 
he insisted on a principle that was, in his opinion, capital: that no natural or legal 
person should have so much power (including the state, of course) that it could harm 
the free play between supply and demand.  
There is more to Ignacio Larramendi's approach (although we must be quick to say 
that it is not a question of making an Eucken of him): businessmen and investors must 
not give priority to obtaining as much monetary profit as possible, but must be 
prepared, if not to lose, to gain less, when the stability of the community (or what is 
implied by the same thing: the economic order) depends on it.  
What Larramendi was warning of—and this is also true of the social market 
economy, in the post-war period of 1945—is that this must be institutionalised 
precisely so that the result is stable and, in this respect, he proposes several types of 
what is usually called an “independent institution”:  
(1) The “official institutions not integrated in the regular public administration” we 
already spoke of; 
(2) “Independent social institutions, created from the bottom or by segregation 
from an official institution or a department of the Administration”, for example, in 
Spain, the Church in its precisely institutional facies. No example is given, however, of 
such institutions being segregated from an official institution or from the state; it does 
state that “the university should be a social institution, and even the whole of 
education, although this is not the case now [in 2000 and in Spain].” The institutional 
Church, for its part, is a public law body within the state and supranational framework. 
They are two different forms of public, no doubt, but they have a certain similarity, at 
least in that respect. Private educational institutions, however, would be better suited 
to the third group, which is: 
(3) “Private institutions, completely autonomous from the official, but with a public 
interest purpose”, and here distinguishes five types: 
1. “Associations of legitimate interest”, such as professional associations; 
2. “Trade unions and workers' associations;” 
3. “Foundations” such as the Juan March, the Ramón Areces, Fundación BBV, 
Fundación MAPFRE or Fundación MAPFRE Guanarteme; 
4. “Entrepreneurial institutions, that is, companies with a desire not to be a mere 
profit centre and that maintain fields of institutional activity”. This is the case of 
MAPFRE. This is not the case of companies that recognise and exercise the so-called 
Corporate Social Responsibility but give priority to profit if there is a conflict between 
the two. It does not, of course, stop at those where profit marginalizes or even 
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disdains that responsibility. It does cite, however, those others in which activities are 
recorded, let us say altruistic, which have, clearly, no other purpose than that of 
“creating an image” (2000: 137-138).  
In Spain at the end of the second millennium, Larramendi saw this model of 
“business institutions” not only in MAPFRE, but also in El Corte Inglés, Mondragón 
cooperative, Alcor cooperative, Mutua Madrileña and savings banks in general. He 
finds in all of them what he is looking for, which is “market freedom with a social 
sense” (2000: 136), and we would even dare to add from our own part that, if the 
scope of the Mondragon experiment is sufficiently known (which Larramendi 
frequently stressed in his talks), there is a lack of a study of what the savings banks 
represented in the Spanish post-war economic order and, above all, in the 
development of the 1960s and 1970s. Many substantive contributions have been 
published; what I am referring to is a study designed in such a way that its institutional 
role in the sense given by Ignacio Larramendi could be verified, if appropriate. There is 
an indication that, when negotiating Spain's incorporation into the European Common 
Market, the representatives of the latter institution began to demand that the savings 
banks be placed on an equal footing with the banks from a legal standpoint. It is 
significant, in relation to their character as a “business institution”, one of the reasons 
given by the foreign negotiators was the ownership of the savings banks, which were 
neither public nor private (García López y Hornillos, 1976)  
Now remember what the “returns” of Spaniards who emigrated to central Europe in 
the 1960s and supported their families in Spain from there meant, without realising 
that they were also making a decisive contribution to the change I have referred to, 
given that they preferred the savings banks to the current system of channelling these 
savings. The so-called “technocrats” would be correct in the use of these and other 
resources; but we should insist more, in my opinion, on the anthropological 
background—including ethics—of the enormous effort of those who sacrificed their 
lives in this way hundreds and even thousands of kilometres away from their family 
(Actis et al., 1998; Sanz, 2015; Rodríguez González, 2020). 
It is clear that MAPFRE was something else in those years, but perhaps this is the 
point where we should value its character as a mutual society. It may be that it 
happened differently; but, even as a hypothesis, we would say that Ignacio Hernando 
de Larramendi entered the world of insurance for what we could call random reasons 
and that the same must be said of his choice of the Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas. 
Moreover, the first years of his management were aimed at making it viable, given the 
difficult situation it was in. There came a time, however, when MAPFRE was already 
consolidated and offered the possibility of doing things differently from the mere 
management of an insurance company. And by then—we do not know since when—he 
should have realised that the mutual legal formula had an enormous advantage, and 
that was that a mutual society cannot distribute dividends; it has to reinvest its profits 
for the benefit of the members of mutual societies. 
He repeated the phrase we have just “composed” very often, and now I would dare 
to say that, by then—in the 1980s—it was clear to him that this was the cover which 
made it possible for the reinvestment of profits for the benefit of the members of the 
mutual society, to be understood with the institutionalising criteria we have seen; 
nothing better for the members of the mutual society than to make MAPFRE one of 
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the many institutions which were needed to give stability to Spanish life (and, as far as 
possible, to that of the rest of the Spanish-speaking world). The nature of the mutual 
society saved him explanations when he made a proposal that involved investment in 
something that was a public service and was, in the end, for the common good. 
It would be necessary to know more in order to study one by one the companies 
that MAPFRE acquired as a legal entity or in which it participated and to see to what 
extent all or some of them could respond to the intention of expanding the 
institutionalising effort that we are talking about. No doubt it would be worthwhile to 
do so; reading his writings that he drafted with a different intention and, above all, 
when he alludes to the failure of some of these investment initiatives, it is frequent to 
observe that he adds an expression of it being a shame for what he hoped it would 
mean in real life and, without forcing the sentences, one would say that, deep down, 
the principle that we have seen up to now is palpitating: the possibility that this 
company would have given permanence to a specific social service.  
In some cases, this is perceived; perhaps more often—because it is not reduced to 
failures—what is noted rather is the desire to shore up the institution that he wanted 
MAPFRE to be. These roles—and the organisations that were necessary to channel the 
corresponding action—are studied in various places in this work; here we would only 
like to point out that the institutional purpose that he wanted for MAPFRE was not a 
more or less brilliant idea, but rather it involved providing the company with bodies 
that would make it possible to achieve this because they provided what was essential 
to achieve it.  
Between these bodies and the foundations that were also created, the 
differentiation was not always, nor is it simple, because these actions depend, on the 
one hand, on the “opportunity” to carry them out and to close this gap and, on top of 
that, they are sometimes ambivalent; specifically, the figure of the “foundation” is 
especially propitious for carrying out roles that should have an institutional nature on 
their own, but which, at the same time, result in the solidity of the institution that is 
MAPFRE (of course, in the sense that he gave to this adjective). 
What I wanted to say in the previous paragraph was expressed by him in his own 
way and is probably better understood: those he calls “business institutions [...], being 
created from the bottom, gradually acquire this quality until they are recognised.” It is 
the first paradox; because it is a matter of achieving a stable quality in the service 
provided in such a way that it is recognised as such—as a stable benefit—and the 
recognition—which is, after all, social—cannot be less institutional; the recognition of 
the institutional nature of the company consists exactly of what is not and cannot be 
institutional; the recognition exists if there is someone who thinks that that 
company—or whatever it is—deserves to be “recognised” and disappears at the very 
moment when people stop thinking of it, of the company, like that. A philosopher 
would call it “ekstatic” reality, in the sense that it exists as long as there are those who 
think it and will cease to exist when there are no longer enough people to think it. “Its 
nature,” Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi explained about the “business institutions”, 
"is largely given by the people, by the citizens, and not assigned by a ministry official.” 
This on the one hand; on the other hand, “they need profit”; they have to generate 
financial benefits; first, to become sustainable as companies that offer services in 
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exchange for remuneration, like all the others, and, furthermore, because only with 
profits is it possible to attract funding to sustain the foundations. 
And he warns about this last one: “these contributions are also useful for their own 
“creation of image”. That is why I have always believed that, at MAPFRE, its 
Foundations do not reduce its assets, but rather contribute to increase it” (2000: 138).  
FOUNDATIONS AS AN ARTICULATION AND EXTENSION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE 
INSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 
This last warning can be understood as a certain “excuse” to convince that, in the 
end, this profit deduction was not a useless expense from a business point of view. It 
would make sense; he probably knew that some of MAPFRE's directors believed the 
opposite, and that was precisely because the results of those Foundations were not in 
MAPFRE's interest. In thinking that way, they were obviously acting like the real 
businessmen they were; they simply did not “see” what Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi had discovered and perhaps had not explained it in a way that they could 
understand or, more simply, it seemed so relevant to them. That and nothing more 
than that is the meaning that this historian gave to a phrase that was said before him 
by one of the most faithful and competent directors of MAPFRE on the evening of the 
day when the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 were presented at the Universal Exhibition in 
Seville in 1992: “Well, and all this has cost us no more than half a billion...”, it is 
understood that this was pesetas (said as if to say that we have allowed ourselves to 
throw that money away on something whose meaning we have not yet seen). 
Well, there are some twists in the writings of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi that 
could be interpreted as something more far-reaching and, indeed, capable of confusing 
us. I refer to this statement of his, inserted in the “Epilogue” of Así se hizo MAPFRE 
(2000: 761): “the important thing in my action” (we can adjectivize it, without a doubt, 
“business” or, perhaps better, “professional”) “has been the annual contributions that 
are destined to Foundations for actions of general, not business interest.” To put it this 
way and understood to the letter, one would deduce—at least—that, from a moment 
in his life that we cannot specify, he came to the conclusion that MAPFRE's greatest 
success was not the provision of quality services, without denying, of course, that this 
was the necessary starting point; the main thing would have been the possibility of 
withdrawing, from the business profits, a significant part of them to return them to the 
human communities in which he had worked, only converted into the common good 
(in the most rigorous and, at the same time, broad sense of this expression).  
It is as if a reflection on his own life had convinced him that the main thing he had 
done as a businessman was not to turn a poorly situated agricultural mutual insurance 
company into a multi-national, nor was it the common good—precisely—of providing 
quality services on an international scale. By itself, the opposite had been imposed: 
what, in business terms, was an adjective had become the most substantive thing for 
others. 
It is thus better understood that the capital he received upon retirement was 
invested in the Fundación Luis Hernando de Larramendi, which he had created in 1986, 
and which was not owned by MAPFRE, but by his family, so that, to his children, in 
such a practical way, it could be said—with all cordiality and affection and even 
without wishing it as an end in itself—that he disinherited them. After his death, the 
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Foundation took his name—Fundación Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi—by decision 
of his wife and children.  
However great the rhetorical burden, it is also understood that, in affirming what 
we have said that he came to consider “the importance of my action”, he concluded: 
“This is my true legacy, the work of a “poor retrograde Carlist” who wanted to 
collaborate with his national and Ibero-American environment”. 
It was not a boast disguised as humility; he had put forward this other summary of 
his life: “I have lived very well, without any sacrifice, with clear satisfaction, practically 
without problems, at ease with my way of being”. 
The reader may or may not conclude that one can thus summarise the life that is 
lived as “a poor retrograde Carlist”. No one would have said it (nor would they have 
said it or will they say it); Aristotle would have related it to the classical Greek concept 
of “good life”, which is not the Spanish “good life”, but that of one who is at ease with 
the gods, is virtuous and has friends; but he would have blown a fuse if he had been 
told that, for that, you have to run a business that makes money. Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi would have explained to the Stagirite that it is one thing for the 
businessman to earn money, and another for the company to earn it, on the 
assumption that the company has other people as owners, only as “members of the 
mutual society”. I do not continue with the hypothesis because it is useless; I am sure 
that Aristotle would not only have understood it, but would have developed better the 
economic thought that appears in his works and that, the truth, is too elementary. He 
says that just as the grain that is sown produces many more grains by itself, you sow 
an ochena or any other coin, and no matter how much you water it and weed out the 
environment, it never goes beyond being that coin and may even get spoiled over time 
and lose the value of when you sowed it. Therefore, the philosopher concludes, 
making money only serves to have more and not to be more. Hence, as is well known, 
the reluctance of theologians towards the banking business and the persecution of 
usury (which was still in force in mid-20th century Spain). 
We will not go on with the comparison; if anything, we will add that Aristotle never 
even used the concept of “common good,” which was coined in the first centuries of 
the Christian era and rightly so by Christians. Not only that; perhaps he did not even 
come close to that concept because he saw the perfection of coexistence as possible in 
the “polis,” that is, in the Greek city as it was in his time, and he understood that the 
perfect polis was characterised by what we now call a closed economy, an autarchy. 
The retrograde Carlist was satisfied to have collaborated with his national and Ibero-
American environment with the good we are talking about. Possibly it was again his 
father who, perhaps unwittingly, had instilled in him what he would call an “obsession 
with America”. 
Before explaining the latter, we would like to ensure that this dynamic relationship 
between institutional enterprise and foundations supported by it is understood. The 
concept of “institutional enterprise” is, I believe, clear enough, within the difficulty 
that arises when coining a definition whose limits are clear; which—in my opinion—
does not happen in this case; we have already said that it is not always easy to know 
where the business management that generates profit ends and the action that is 
conventionally considered to be the creation of “common good” begins. The MAPFRE 
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Institute for Road Safety, for example, had been created in 1996 as a “social work” of 
the Fundación MAPFRE and, to be more specific, as “a clear reflection of the expressed 
will [of the directors] of the MAPFRE System to increase and strengthen the social 
prevention activities carried out by the Foundation”. It is easy to understand that 
“road safety”, insofar as it was translated into specific actions, was among the “social 
prevention activities” of the Foundation. The problem lies in knowing how road safety 
can be improved with specific actions. Well, the answer could only be this (or 
something similar): first of all, we must know what can cause “lack of road safety”, and 
that implies a real research task. Hence, at the MAPFRE Institute for Road Safety itself, 
a “driving simulator” was developed that was capable of examining the characteristics 
of drivers and the conditions in which they drove. This is also why calls for grants on 
road safety were made, giving due importance to the influence of drugs and caffeine 
(and, of course, drug addiction). 
Hence, in short, all this was coordinated with the results that emerged from 
CESVIMAP (Centro de Experimentación y Seguridad Vial MAPFRE), located in Ávila 
since 1983, where traffic accidents were simulated and the importance was given not 
only to driving but also to the fact that was the accident itself and its consequences. 
And this certainly included those affecting the vehicle, and this not only in terms of the 
immediate effects of the event, but also in terms of the repair and the safety resulting 
from the repair itself. 
It was, as can be seen, the way to generate “knowledge about driving”; then, in a 
logical order , an effective way had to be found to disseminate that knowledge so that 
it would really result in the safety that was being sought. And, for this purpose, the 
“Autocentro” of Alcalá de Henares was created, in which—summarised in 1999 by 
Larramendi himself—“theoretical and practical road training is offered to 
schoolchildren and from where distance learning is promoted through the didactic 
units that are prepared and distributed to more than five thousand schools” (2000: 
748-749). 
The knowledge acquired in CESVIMAP, on the other hand, in relation to the physical 
effects of the accident and the repair, encouraged in 1997-1998 to contact the rector 
of the Catholic University of Avila to design an industrial engineering course with that 
very specific profile—unprecedented in Spain, at least at that time—that implied, plain 
and simple, the training of the people who carry out the “expert opinion” following the 
accident (2000: 748). 
Of course, if MAPFRE needed experts, it is likely that the best in each year would be 
offered a job in the mutual society itself and that, therefore, it could be deduced that 
the common good was reduced to that which redounded to MAPFRE itself as a 
company. But it is no less obvious that each year would be made up of considerably 
more people than could have a place at MAPFRE and that, therefore, an important 
part of the common good was generated, which was directly “common”, and not 
mediated by the company. 
Insofar as this formula was taking hold in various sectors of the Mutual Society, 
coordination became necessary and this led to the creation of the Fundación MAPFRE 
Estudios, and it was when Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi spoke of this attention that 
he had no hesitation in considering it—with an adjective whose scope we already 
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know in his case—“a new institutional unit”. It would be an understatement to ask 
whether Fundación MAPFRE Estudios was an institution in its own right—in the sense 
he gave to that word—or whether that status depended on its relationship with the 
institution that was MAPFRE Mutual Society. It was—all of this—a living reality whose 
existence as a source of services required permanence, continuity, and this is how it 
could become part of the—let us now say the “structural”—fabric of the community it 
served; the institutional nature that Larramendi wanted for the Mutual Society and for 
that Foundation included, without a doubt, the name, that is to say, the continuity of 
the name that allowed those who sought it to recognise it. But it was the latter that 
had to be achieved, not the rigidity of an immutable institutional structure. Life had to 
be allowed to rule. 
This did not detract from the importance of the undertaking; he himself thought 
years ago, in 1990, that the Fundación MAPFRE Estudios would be “extraordinarily 
important for the MAPFRE system in 2000, once the Fundación MAPFRE had been set 
up and capitalised”. He conceived the Fundación MAPFRE Estudios as a “basic piece of 
the foundational policy of the future”. It should become the hub of several MAPFRE 
entities that could be considered “peripheral”, in the sense that, not being 
foundations, they also had “an institutional purpose”; this referred first and foremost 
to ITSEMAP Fuego, ITSEMAP Ambiental and CESVIMAP. In the end, it would seem that 
the problem we posed—the need or contingency for each “institutional” unit to have 
its own legal personality—was eliminated by overcoming it. What we have just 
described could be seen as the planned development of a “structure of institutions”; if 
the union makes the force, not the dissolution of some institutions into others (which, 
however, could be advisable at some point), but the articulation of all of them as a 
whole is what really matters, if, as can be supposed, it makes them more effective. 
He attributed to the Fundación MAPFRE Estudios a future similar to that of the 
Fundación MAPFRE Medicina, which had not yet become a reality in 1990, when he 
made these assessments at the Board of MAPFRE Mutual Society on 16 June of that 
year, the last one in which he took part. That had begun by “taking advantage of 
certain areas of the Fundación MAPFRE and former studies of the Mutual Society”; it 
was already possible to follow The “Insurance Degree” in MAPFRE Estudios, the 
teaching activities of the Integral Security Institute and work was being done on the 
design of International Management courses. But it was clear to him that it was called 
to be “an academic institution which, in 2000, provides/would provide a useful 
teaching service to Spanish society as a whole”. 
THERE WERE FAILURES 
On that occasion in 1990, he tied even more of these institutional structures 
together and mentioned the Centre for Bibliographic Documentation, Editorial 
MAPFRE and the Centre for Studies and Research.42 But no one should think of a mind 
that foresaw the future to unsuspected limits and that, in the end, already had a 
precise idea of the whole framework—once again, “institutional”—so that most 
remarkable part of his work as a businessman consisted of waiting, seeking or 
 
42 “Considerations to the Board of MAPFRE Mutualidad de Seguros on 16 June 1990, the last time I participated”, annex 1 to 
HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI, 2000: 115-116. 
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promoting the circumstances to make it a reality. That he “waited”—in the sense of 
paying attention to what happens in case the opportunity arose—there is no doubt; 
that he sought and even promoted the circumstances, too; but all this as long as it is 
not understood precisely as it has just been said, as a totally finished project of a huge 
institutional building. True, he was something of a “visionary”, in the sense of the 
person who sees a long-term future; but, if he deserves that adjective—of which I am 
not entirely sure—his realism was no less relentless. He knew well that his initiatives 
depended on the actions of others; that, in addition, risk is inherent in the company, 
and more so in large projects; that, of course, he could and did make mistakes more 
than once and that, in these and other cases, one must have the courage to cut your 
losses point blank. 
Is it necessary to give an example? The main one, he himself states in his final 
report Así se hizo MAPFRE: he did not use all the means at his disposal to ensure that, 
in the future, no MAPFRE director would have an excessive share of power. A mistake 
related to his patronage? For example, having accepted the option proposed by some 
of the mutual society’s directors to develop Editorial MAPFRE and make it capable of 
publishing everything that was going to come out of the Fundación MAPFRE América, 
and this when he and the main one of those directors (who made the decision) had 
been offered another option that was much cheaper and of higher quality. Proof? This 
is better explained by an example: the book Navarra y América, published by Editorial 
MAPFRE in 1992, has still not been distributed in any bookshop in Navarra, despite the 
fact that by 2000 the edition had already sold out (!). Since the explanation is so small 
that such nonsense cannot be understood, I will give the key to such an enormous 
paradox: more than a thousand donations were made from that book—and from all 
the others in the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492—literally all over the Spanish-speaking 
world, from Madrid to Manila, including Navarra. Meanwhile, the distributor was 
trying to sell it in Bilbao, where he lived. Navarra, for demographic reasons, was a 
smaller market and it is possible that this market was not worth his while. 
In this very specific situation, the option to reinforce the donations was the most 
realistic way to cut the losses, and also the most expensive one. 
The printing of the books also became more expensive. For all this—from layout to 
distribution—a person from outside MAPFRE had been hired with a team of seven or 
eight others and simply did not demonstrate that they knew what was necessary to 
move forward with a project as big as the one that was being undertaken under the 
direction of Ignacio Larramendi. And it is obvious that the editorial function was simply 
decisive; it was about books.  
It should be remembered that Larramendi had brought forward his retirement to 
1990, and the contracting that I say was not made by him, but was agreed and 
specified among his successors in the management of the different branches that 
already comprised the tree that was MAPFRE Mutual Society. I can testify that Ignacio 
Larramendi did not like the choice they made; but it was no longer up to him (we mean 
his competence).  
I am cutting short here due to this last reason, but I cannot resist telling you an 
anecdote. The editor hired for this purpose made the decision to print the volumes 
without giving the authors the normal option in any publishing house, which is to 
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correct the proofs. There was no way to force him to do it. As a result, there were 
some volumes—very few—in which, when they arrived at the Fundación MAPFRE 
América already printed and bound, errors were found that forced that edition to be 
destroyed and the books had to be reprinted once they had been corrected (I fear that 
this was at the Foundation's expense). In one of the cases, I do not know how (for 
what I am talking about happened), the texts of two different books by different 
authors were mixed up, one of whom had dedicated the book to his wife, calling her 
by name. You can already imagine what happened; one day, the other author called 
very distressed from the other side of the Atlantic to explain that this was impossible, 
that he had never betrayed his wife, who, unfortunately, was not named like the one 
mentioned in the dedication of the book. 
José Luis Catalinas, whom we left behind as the general director of the Fundación 
MAPFRE América, immediately summoned the editor we spoke of and the coordinator 
of the Colecciones, and the editor downplayed the mistake and its threatening effects; 
he said that a kind of eraser had been invented that was capable of making the 
dedication disappear without a trace. The coordinator—who had been working in 
“editing” duties for a dozen years—expressed surprise; he had been coordinating 
editorial projects for more than twelve years and had no news of such an important 
invention. The party questioned insisted with such seriousness and such aplomb, 
however, that the Foundation's general manager left the remedy in his hands.  
It was 1992 and there was no such method. Thirty years after that event, in 2020, 
the former coordinator of the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 went on the Internet and 
wrote: “how to erase texts from a printed book” and found these systems (which I 
copy in case the same or similar thing happens to them): 
“The first to be marketed (in 2013 in Spain) is the machine known as the 
Toshiba eStudio 306LP, which can erase an ink (blue and heat-sensitive [sic]) specially 
designed to be erased.” 
It therefore does not work for us; Colecciones MAPFRE 1492were not printed with 
blue, heat-sensitive ink specially designed to be erasable. We can say that, with time, it 
was possible to verify that they were printed on recycled paper; but we do not think 
that is enough to erase that page. 
Let us go to the other one: 
“There is now another system for erasing ink and reusing paper. It is being 
investigated by a group of engineers from the University of Cambridge and they are 
trying to carry out their prototype. Its method, like that of Toshiba, allows the ink to 
be erased by means of heat. But, unlike the Japanese device, this system erases the 
ink by evaporating it in laser printers. The laser eraser (4,000 microsecond laser 
injections) hits the thin layer of ink until it evaporates. The study states that with this 
method the paper does not yellow or suffer any other kind of damage. They work with 
conventional papers and inks and ensure that no special ink such as Toshiba's so-called 
e-blue is needed. The result is a paper with faint shadows where there used to be text 
but which is perfectly reusable.”43 
 
43 https://www.impresum.es/blog/la-desimpresora-que-borra-tinta/ 
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Nor does it seem to be of use to us, as it seems, it deals with loose papers, unit by 
unit, and not finished books. In fact, both systems make it seem as if they are intended 
to reuse paper, not to correct or remove a very small part of the text. 
The bad news is that all this had a decisive influence on guiding Ignacio Larramendi 
towards digital publishing and, when he tried to do so at the Fundación MAPFRE 
América itself, the trustees who had bet on that eraser editor did not support the 
project that Larramendi set out for that purpose. He would tell it like this:  
“In 1995 there were profound differences of opinion between me and the MAPFRE 
representatives in the Foundation, as opposed to some of my projects, precisely those 
to which the Fundación Histórica Tavera has been most devoted. As a result, I 
requested that the Fundación MAPFRE América continue with the objectives that 
MAPFRE wanted and that the Fundación Histórica Tavera be created, transforming for 
this purpose the Instituto Histórico Tavera, without the burden of a “commercial” 
name and which could be a vehicle for the participation of other Foundations, as 
perhaps they would not have done in a Foundation with a company name” (2000: 
167). 
These were the days of the CD and, from then on, this is how the vast majority of 
what resulted from these activities was disseminated, not excluding the Colecciones 
MAPFRE 1492themselves, whose books were further disseminated—and at a very 
small cost—in digital format. It started out that way and with Clásicos Tavera, and that 
already demanded mastery of the still emergent facet of document digitization and, in 
the end, the effort was such that it led to the creation of the Digibís company in 1997. 
It was no longer just a matter of channelling those projects supported by the 
Fundación MAPFRE América, but in a way it became an end in itself, of course only in 
the sense of opening its doors to all kinds of projects from all kinds of entities. In 1999, 
Larramendi could write: “It is very important for me that the last business activity I 
have undertaken in my life, of an original and innovative nature, is successfully 
developed and constitutes my last action in the business area to which I have 
dedicated myself since 1952” (2000: 130). 
What we have just said reveals one more trait in the person of Ignacio Larramendi: 
his realism. Ultimately, we can conclude that, throughout his life, he changed 
everything that was necessary in his professional work except two things: one and 
fundamental, the idea of the private “institutional company” as we have seen it; the 
second, the call of America. 
If this assessment is not made—or if I am wrong in doing so—we would have to 
accept that a businessman has, or should have, the possibility—probability rather—
that the development of his project will force changes in it until it is distorted. And, in 
that case, say the experts, the businessman is forced to “legitimize” what comes out at 
the moment of truth. 
One would say that we all do that (or that we all, at least, tend to do it). When that 
word is used—which is frequent in the Anglo-Saxon world (and of course in English)—
one gets the feeling that experts give that expression—that of “legitimizing” the real 
results—a certain sense of totally voluntary and free action that aims to disguise 
reality. And, no doubt, that often happens. Deep down, you might think that is what 
the editor did with the eraser. In Larramendi's case, however, I am not so sure that he 
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felt obliged to act in this way. First and foremost, he did not have to. Since his 
retirement in 1990, he saw how MAPFRE was following the paths indicated by its new 
directors and possibly thought at many times that he would do things differently. But 
let us just say he had a “buffer” that we would have liked to talk about more. I mean 
his family. It is difficult—I would not say impossible—for a man who maintains the 
union with his wife until the end of his days and knows that, in his children, he has—
more than a support—a bulletproof shelter if he feels lonely or a failure (apart from 
specific moments when we are capable of considering anything). 
If we now test him backwards and look at texts that predate the 1990s, in how 
Larramendi expressed his business project, perhaps we will see what I am saying more 
clearly. In texts from the last phase of his life, he states that he wanted to do it this 
way from the beginning. But we must ask ourselves what it is that, desired rather than 
projected at the beginning, came to be effective. 
Often, we observe that the changes between what is intended and what is achieved 
occur in “speech”; sometimes because the words are changed to express as 
continuous novelty what, strictly speaking, is the same as always; at other times, on 
the contrary, the person has the feeling of a continuity that the words do not support. 
But, in this last case, one cannot rush to deduce that where he said Diego, he says I 
say; the change in the speech—the “legitimization” in question—throughout thirty-five 
years of working in the same company can be imposed by the mere succession of very 
different circumstances that have to be dealt with in any case with what Rafael Rubio 
de Urquia calls “alternative plans” (2003). Besides, there is the fact that language is 
historical, just like everything else, and a history can be made of these changes. 
If we were to test Ignacio Larramendi and ask when he started to make MAPFRE an 
“institutional” company in the sense he gave to this word and we have already seen, 
we would find this: first, late texts—if you prefer, late “legitimations”—that speak 
lately—let us say redundantly—of the origin; this is what could be in his mind, even 
without being aware of it, when he said that this way of conceiving the company was 
learned in his family and in the approaches of Vázquez de Mella. If we do not accept 
this precisely because it is late and unverifiable, and if we seek to verify whether or not 
it is late, we find it initiated where he would later point out: the Articles of Association 
of MAPFRE Mutualidad approved at the General Shareholders’ Meeting on 10 June 
1965; in these, it was stated that “in accordance with the public social spirit that 
should inspire the operation of the “Mutual Society”, it should allocate part of its 
income each year to promoting two public interest Foundations: one for the 
improvement of Spanish agriculture and especially agricultural cooperatives, and the 
other to promote the defence of consumers and the development of their functions 
for that purpose” (2000: 163). The first—agricultural cooperativism—could be the 
reason for the concerns of Dionisio Martín, who continued to preside over MAPFRE; in 
the second, there is no doubt—due to its own generality—what was later done at the 
initiative of Ignacio Larramendi. 
MAPFRE'S FOUNDATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS LIMITS 
It did not take long for things to happen that forced the introduction of relevant 
changes and, therefore, new solutions, which perhaps had not been thought of. In 
1969, MAPFRE Mutualidad had to split up by law, obliged to separate employer's 
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insurance from what was known as “private insurance”, thus giving rise to MAPFRE 
Mutualidad de Seguros and MAPFRE Mutua Patronal. It was the latter that provided 
the opportunity for the two resulting mutual societies to remain linked in fact by 
jointly setting up a Foundation that would be called precisely that, Fundación MAPFRE, 
and thus leave no doubt as to what all this really was: one and the same reality in 
short. However, we do not know if Larramendi and the other directors of the Mutual 
Society realised what this last solution entailed. First and foremost, the legal figure 
chosen—the foundations—was perfectly suited to the nature of the mutual societies, 
whose benefits, if any, must accrue to the members of the mutual societies 
themselves. But, at the same time, in the case of the mutual societies too, the 
mediation of Foundations made the benefits accessible to many other people and, 
from there, for MAPFRE to be an “institutional company” as Ignacio Larramendi 
understood it, the key was to choose the Foundation's activities properly. They had to 
be channels for potential benefits to be passed on to members of the mutual societies 
so that they could be enjoyed by others. 
Its objectives—as stated in the preliminary draft of the Articles of Association of 
Fundación MAPFRE approved in February 1970—consisted of “the protection of 
cooperatives and other similar activities, [the] contribution to training and technical 
improvement, [the] improvement of the Spanish business structure and [the] 
stimulation of measures for the prevention of accidents”; also, attention, the 
“development of a new line of concern for public and social interests and other 
purposes”. 
In this last area and in the one of “the improvement of the Spanish business 
structure, there was already the “institutional” idea that we talked about. “It was also 
understood—Larramendi added much later, recalling this gestation—that it should be 
extended in the Ibero-American countries to describe the ideas and activities 
determined in the Articles of Association” (2000: 164). 
The changes in the Spanish legal system continued to impose their law, however, 
and required the rethinking that was reflected in the new Articles of Association of the 
mutual society, thus reconstituted in 1975: it was declared a “Private Cultural 
Foundation” and proposed, as its corporate purpose, “to contribute to the satisfaction 
of needs related to safety in all its forms through studies and research and the 
provision of services and activities, aimed at the prevention of accidents at work, 
protection against fire and other material risks and the promotion of the physical and 
professional rehabilitation of victims of accidents of all kinds and the improvement of 
prosthesis systems, the promotion of preventive medicine and others determined by 
the Board of Trustees” (in 2000: 164): everything that would later be included in the 
activities of the Fundación MAPFRE Medicina and the Fundación MAPFRE Estudios, 
both created in 1989. 
It is in this chronological framework that the formation of the Fundación 
Guanarteme in 1984-1985 (converted into the Fundación MAPFRE Guanarteme in 
1992) and the Fundación MAPFRE América in 1988 must be situated.  
At the end of that same year (1988), it had been decided to create the Fundación 
MAPFRE Vida, whose cultural nature—in the conventional sense of the word—was 
highlighted for the first time in the panorama we have tried to present. Its purpose 
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was “to carry out activities aimed at promoting and disseminating culture and art, by 
calling for and awarding artistic and literary prizes, organising exhibitions of paintings 
or sculptures and organising meetings of an artistic and literary nature, and 
disseminating studies on art and literature” (2000: 168); all of these purposes could 
not be considered as alien to the Canary Islands and America, much less to the 
members of the mutual society. 
However, we would like to point out that those in charge of this Foundation did not 
lend themselves to at least being compatible with those that would emerge from the 
Fundación MAPFRE América. In 1992, when the books from the Colecciones MAPFRE 
1492 began to arrive in print, it was thought that it would be worthwhile to start “to 
show” them publicly and it was thought that the Fundación MAPFRE Vida would be the 
priority place to exhibit the books to the public and organise the presentations as 
appropriate. And lo and behold, both proposals were rejected, without further ado, by 
those who governed that Foundation. They were only willing to rent the premises for 
any public events for an amount of money that was considered excessive, at least for 
the initial budgets of the Fundación MAPFRE América. 
The refusal to put the books in the shop window where they normally displayed 
theirs—those of the Fundación MAPFRE Vida—was accepted without further ado. In 
his memoirs, Larramendi explained that MAPFRE Vida—the company so called, not the 
Foundation it would later generate—was created for reasons that we can consider 
linked to the legislation in force and the need to comply with it effectively for 
members of the mutual society; years before joining the Mutual de Seguros Agrícolas, 
when he was working at the Directorate General of Insurance, he had a discussion with 
“the great actuarial guru of that time, Antonio Lasheras Sanz”, who came to visit them. 
“I contradicted him on one occasion because my opinion was that the mathematical 
reserves in life insurance were owned by the insured and not by the insurers; he 
maintained the opposite. It was a public discussion and my colleagues told me how I 
had dared to oppose him; yet despite this we became friends. Several years later I 
realised that I was right and that the reserves had to belong to the policyholders so 
that they would not be harmed, and that is how MAPFRE Vida came about, offering 
90% of the financial benefits, when what dominated in insurance was the opposite, 
and that is how great fortunes had been made by paying the policyholders depreciated 
capital and retaining the buildings with a lot of appreciation”. 
From Larramendi's account, it can be seen that this may have been the reason why, 
in 1957, authorisation was requested from the competent authorities to set up what 
was to become MAPFRE Vida, but for almost a decade it was not able to get on its feet: 
the Spanish—Ignacio would explain—had a negative image of life insurance, which 
they associated with death and misfortune; their attitude to it was therefore one of 
indifference if not rejection, and this and the high rates of inflation shaped a “scarce 
and meagre market”. In a logical order, even before the difficulty of obtaining 
contracts, the first difficulty was in finding “sales people”.  
 Several people were put forward to manage MAPFRE Vida, who were not able to 
overcome these obstacles, until Juan Fernandez-Layos was appointed, in 1965, who 
would also have the support of Sebastian Homet as an actuary from a later date that 
we do not know, perhaps 1967. What Larramendi saw them do from now on was this: 
“to change the image of life insurance, to avoid negative, macabre connotations of 
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death and talk about life, hope and enjoyment; to increase the network of Life sellers; 
renew products; renew commercial and marketing lines; and to introduce a new style” 
(2000: 92, 265, 283). 
However, the latter adds one more feature to the characteristics of Ignacio 
Larramendi's business management, which is the extreme degree of autonomy he was 
able to give to a person who depended on him when he thought that was how that 
person acted best. When he was commissioned to run MAPFRE Vida, he first realised 
that Fernández-Layos had his own way of thinking and acting and chose to let him do 
so to the extent of respecting his autonomy in decisions that he would not have taken 
and whose results, however, he expressly described as “extraordinary successful”. 
“The action of MAPFRE Vida has been organic, permanent, maintaining a continuity 
that I consider partly mine as soon as I supported it, but which I would no longer have 
been able to maintain directly. I knew how to let those who deserved it do without this 
“jealousy”, without pretending to have a monopoly of power, since this would have 
paralysed effective actions. MAPFRE Vida has acted in a more centralized way than the 
Mutual Society and wanted to always maintain its autonomy; sometimes it did not 
seem appropriate, but at other times I have seen that it was right. I attribute the 
difference to Juan Fernández-Layos' character in relation to mine, as well as to his 
management perception style. The only thing I can regret is that he always defended 
his area more than the general one, and that I thought it limited him to be my follower 
in the whole or MAPFRE System" (2000: 108).  
The autonomy was extended to the Fundación MAPFRE Vida, which was set up in 
January 1989, the following year from the Fundación MAPFRE América, and three 
years later did not lend itself to contributing to the dissemination of the latter's results. 
Was he marking distances? I think so, although my opinion this is based on facts 
observed after the death of Ignacio Larramendi. I have no doubt that, at his death, the 
heights of cultural work and others of the mutual society were marked by radical 
distances. But the matter does not concern Larramendi's business management.  
I can only add one thing of my own, having followed the activities of the Fundación 
MAPFRE Vida very closely—in what allows me to be an external but well-informed 
spectator: among the cultural projects of the Fundación MAPFRE Vida and those of the 
Fundación MAPFRE América, there was a capital distinction (which I never heard or 
read about Ignacio Larramendi seeing; it is pure perception on my part); remember 
that he defined as “business institutions” those that were run with a profit motive in 
mind and invested part of their profits in fields of institutional activity. It therefore 
excluded those others in which activities are recorded, let us say altruistic activities 
whose purpose, in reality, is to “create image”. What I know about both of them 
makes me think that MAPFRE América was part of the former and that, on the other 
hand, in the Fundación MAPFRE Vida, priority was given to the image it contributed to 
create. On that basis—which would require a detail that has no place here—one would 
have to ask what happened next and what happens and—I fear—act accordingly. But 
what we would add about it has nothing to do with our case, which ends, in the best of 
cases, with the death of Ignacio Larramendi in 2001. 
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THE “OBSESSION WITH AMERICA”  
Let us return, then, to the years when he remained active even though he was 
retired. In 1990, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi publicly created the Fundación 
MAPFRE as a “holding” of all the MAPFRE44 foundations and it was certainly on its way 
to being this. But what we know happened next imposed the need to reorganise the 
different elements that could lead him to consummate his project, which was already 
clearly cultural (but always institutional).  
We have already said that, in 1992, the Fundación Guanarteme, created in 1984, 
was renamed the Fundación MAPFRE Guanarteme; it was (is) an exception among the 
Foundations in its territorial nature, restricted as it is to the Canary Islands, although 
with Cape Verde and the Azores permanently in sight. The origin of the singularity lies 
in the fact that it was the result of the incorporation of Mutua Guanarteme into the 
MAPFRE system and that, in short, it was a mutual society of similar origin to the 
Agricultural Insurance that gave rise to MAPFRE; it had been set up in 1933 by 
agreement of more than one hundred employers in Gran Canaria, many of them from 
the Arucas area. Its first name was Mutua Agrícola del Norte de Gran Canaria and, in its 
foundational projection, carried the imprint of Julio Caubín until his final retirement in 
the first years of the third millennium. 
The uniqueness of this process would be further accentuated by the sequential 
nature of two other creations: that of the Instituto Histórico Tavera (1991), within the 
Fundación MAPFRE América (created in 1988), from which the Institute broke away in 
1996 to become the Fundación Histórica Tavera and, in 2002, the Fundación MAPFRE 
Tavera.45 By then, in 1997, the Fundación MAPFRE América itself had been diluted into 
the Fundación MAPFRE Estudios. It was its death certificate. 
It goes without saying that the uniqueness of the Canary Islands we have just seen 
had roots and could have a scope no less peculiar due to the strategic situation of the 
three archipelagos in relation to Europe and America; a vision that Ignacio Hernando 
de Larramendi shared with Caubín. “Since I had the chance to prepare the future of 
MAPFRE, the former would recall many years later, the Canary Islands was one of my 
objectives; I believed that MAPFRE needed to be there, even though I did not think 
then that achieving it would be so far ahead in its market. It was an antecedent of 
what I thought we would have to do in Portugal and in America, as in many other 
aspects. The Canary Islands have been the antecedent of the American adventure in 
Spain. Our history is intertwined and in many aspects we take up again what began in 
the 15th century with the Portuguese navigators and later with the Spanish” (2000: 
478).  
After all, it was the “obsession with America” that he confessed to and he himself 
boasted about. 
He shared it with many other Spaniards of his time, some of whom were perhaps 
too intent on highlighting “the work of Spain in America” and presenting it as the ideal 
and sublime reality that it was not. One believes that enough “work” has been done 
 
44 “Considerations to the Board of MAPFRE Mutualidad de Seguros on 16 June 1990, the last time I participated”, annex 1 to 
HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI, 2000: 115. 
45 I cannot find the date of disappearance of the Fundación MAPFRE Tavera. 
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well, despite what was done badly, and that both of them have resulted in one of the 
four or five cultures of universal scope that have existed in history today. The fact that, 
in other cultures, the Spanish is appreciated mainly and in an extremely realistic way as 
the geriatric paradise does not tarnish its importance; if anything, it generates an 
especially vulnerable economic order; but there is no better expert than the one who 
wonders where he wants to end his days. 
I am not sure that Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi fully agreed with this way of 
valuing the Hispanic; but, without intending to, he expresses it in a way that goes much 
further—let us say “phenomenologically”—than merely sharing a rhetorical 
idealisation. He wrote in 1999: “Within my impatience there has been an irresistible 
tendency, to call it something, not to be satisfied with a comfortable routine; perhaps 
this was due to my permanent concern for America, to do something with regards to 
its improvement, to contribute in some way to make the American phenomenon 
better known and the generous contribution, even sometimes cruel and contradictory, 
of Spain throughout that continent” (2000): 104). And its islands, we would add; it was 
frequent that, when someone used the toponym Latin America as a way of referring to 
that human group on the other side of the Atlantic and the Pacific, he would point out: 
“And the Caribbean”. He did not expressly include the Philippines, in that toponym; 
but there is no doubt that, for him, this other archipelago was part of the Hispanic 
world (better said, of the Iberian world; because, by the way, he used the toponym 
“Iberoamérica” when referring to that group of countries). 
In the phrase I have just transcribed—specifically in the reference to "Spain's 
generous contribution, even at times cruel and contradictory, to the whole of that 
continent”—the idealisation of the Hispanic is tacitly rejected not only in the allusion 
to cruelty, but also in considering that what awaited it on the other side of the ocean 
was not precisely something that could be faced as a “comfortable routine”; he was 
aware that it was a matter of entering a world that had enormous deficiencies from all 
points of view. Only, for the same reason, it had enormous possibilities. 
A different thing is that he felt an “irresistible tendency”. In this trend, there was 
already something else, which can be deduced from the “results balance sheet” of his 
actions in America in 1999. It is mere conjecture, but from that later assessment, the 
following could be deduced.  
First and foremost, the idea was to set up MAPFRE on the other side of the Atlantic. 
The way in which he did this and the technical and rigorous assessment of all this is set 
out in other chapters of this work. But, at least, it can be said here that to set up 
MAPFRE was in itself equivalent to transferring to America his idea of the “institutional 
enterprise”. And anyone who knows Hispanic America can well understand the scope 
of this fact, precisely because these are countries in which the weakness of the 
respective economic order begins with legal insecurity, and this concept—that of legal 
insecurity—leads directly, as a result, to institutional insecurity.  
This is so important for the Hispanic world that it would not be necessary to say 
more; but the truth is that there was more and that, in 1988, he created the Fundación 
MAPFRE América, and that was no less than “with the desire to dedicate myself 
exclusively to its objectives”. He was looking forward to his retirement in 1991, which 
we know he brought forward to 1990. The fact that all this coincided with the fifth 
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centenary of the Discovery certainly gave him sufficient reason to take the initiative in 
setting up this Foundation, which initially focused on the preparation and publication 
of some sixty books that were due to be published in 1992. 
We will not detail here what that Foundation or any other did; that would turn 
these pages into an inventory that would have no more effect than to impress (and 
perhaps bore) anyone who reads these pages. In addition, those who wrote and 
collected testimonies of his Cultural Patronage in 2002 have already done so. The 
space and time available to us leads us to opt for something that is perhaps more 
important as a reflection of the more in-depth background perhaps that the initiative 
had.  
We shall put it succinctly: Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi wanted to contribute to 
making the Fifth Centenary an occasion for reflection on themselves in all the Ibero-
American countries. 
He himself took part in this reflection in the book Utopía de la nueva América 
(1992), which was part of the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492. He understood that the 
future of the American continent was that of the Iberian world, which occupied more 
than half of the territory. He understood that the United States of America would be 
“invaded” by Hispanics, who would open up, in North America, “a less selfish society, 
with more solidarity and [with] less sense of superiority”. But the fact is that Ibero-
America would be invaded by the culture of “the Anglos”, he said, with obvious 
reference to the United States of America.  
He saw in it a necessary “invasion” for the Ibero-Americans themselves; but he 
undoubtedly perceived what others were observing, and that is that those who went 
from Ibero-America to quality North American universities later returned with a, let us 
say, “self-importance” that could lead them to form a kind of aristocratic social class in 
which the “aristocracy of knowledge” was confused with that of money and property, 
and both contributed to all those people moving further away from the reality of their 
respective countries. He was afraid that they would disregard—let us be clear about 
this—ordinary people in everything that did not benefit them economically. 
Larramendi thought that this could lead Ibero-America to the situation in South Africa 
(1992): 30), that of apartheid, we understand.  
It is possible that he knew that in the most cultured world of Ibero-America there 
was certainly this last word, apartheid. He knew Cuba well when the Afro-Cuban poet 
Nancy Morejón published Baladas para un sueño (1989); in them, she had managed to 
unite the racist America of the early 19th century—from which she herself 
descended—with the fin-de-siecle South Africa of apartheid; she saw them as similar 
realities; in both cases, the human interracial relationship ran along the paths that 
slavery had propitiated, she supposed.  
Nancy Morejón did not get to know South Africa, however, until 1992, the same 
year as Utopía para la Nueva América, and three years later, at the request of the 
editor of Casa de las Américas magazine, she published her memoir of that trip 
without any concession to poetic language, which was her own: “Overcrowding, 
concentration camps, no right to education or health, implementation of external 
values as one's own, deep-rooted hatred towards the racial and cultural identity of the 
subjugated, are, in broad terms, the hallmarks of the apartheid system”; “I have been 
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given to contemplate a possible hell” (1995): 130, 129) (Gabbay, 2019: 262, 268). 
However, to foresee this for America, as Larramendi insinuated in 1992, stood as a 
warning against any optimism. The liberation of 1968 and the collapse of the Soviet 
regimes in 1989 had been left behind. 
In such a context, the necessary goal he saw for the two Americas, the Iberian and 
the Anglo-Saxon, also had a greater scope: “Both areas of the continent need to reflect 
on how to exchange and join forces in order to arrive at politically coordinated 
structures, in which their technological knowledge, natural resources and different 
mentalities are integrated politically and socially, while preserving their own original 
traits”. 
With an added bonus that those who spoke or wrote about such things did not 
usually fall into: “Something similar should happen in the New Europe that reaches the 
Arctic, and in Africa, penetrated by Islam”. 
And even more: “The crisis of the 21st century will not only influence the specific 
areas of Christian and Muslim culture, but also the Far East, with Japan, India, China, 
and countries with ethnic and economic influence from the latter, which”—attention—
“despite internal divisions, will increase its relative weight in humanity”. The Orientals, 
in his opinion, had known how to adopt Western techniques in such a way that they 
were fertilized by their “capacity for individual sacrifice, collective sense and 
willingness to work.” 
It was not going to be sunshine and flowers; the experience of German and 
Japanese imperialism in the 20th century had been based on the conviction of its 
greater socio-political efficiency, and that could happen—he did not even use place 
names, which I am adding only on this point—with China (1992: 30-31). 
In Utopía de la Nueva América, he was only trying to point out facts and possibilities 
that would allow the necessary individual and collective reflection. It is well 
understood that, for this, humility was needed in everyone; “a society that is not 
humble enough to recognise that it is not omnipotent has less possibility of long 
survival than those who know how to suffer, sacrifice themselves and recognise their 
limitations” (1992): 118).  
MAPFRE AND THE FIFTH CENTENARY AS AN OCCASION FOR REFLECTION 
The idea was that the Ibero-Americans should reflect on this (in addition to the fact 
that it would be convenient for the Anglo-Americans to do the same), and this had a 
first consequence in the design of what the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 were: in the first 
meeting held with the historians (two) who were going to coordinate them, he made 
clear a first criterion that was a sine qua non condition: the authors of these books 
would not be Spanish, but Ibero-Americans from the country in question in each case.  
This did not lead him to hide the fact that, in his own reflection, the first thing to 
take into account—in his opinion—was that “America cannot be understood without 
Spain, neither in the past nor in the future. This reflection helps the real knowledge of 
what can be, and even will be, the New America in the next centuries” (1992: 121). 
But this also concerned the Spanish and their attitudes (and also the Portuguese); in 
the 21st century, he said, less than five and perhaps less than four out of every 
hundred people who spoke languages that originated in the Iberian Peninsula would 
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live on this side of the Atlantic; “there will have been, with tensions, defects and 
virtues, the transfer of the centre of that civilisation, from one geographical space to 
another. Spain has created its part of America, but it will be surpassed and absorbed 
by it. It is not a retrospective imperialist concept, as the Italians may have about the 
Roman, but the reality of a future; the real Spain of the next centuries is overseas.” 
The quote is long (as some others in this research will have to be) because it is not 
easy to pick up with our lexicon what Larramendi wanted to express with his:  
“My views come not only from direct observation, but from instinct, and in these lines I realise what this means. That 
is why I am promoting the concept of the “Ibero-American Multicultural Community”, something new that goes 
beyond the influence of what has been done from Spain and Portugal and that integrates what other human groups 
have created, starting with the indigenous people, followed by the African Americans and also by European peoples, 
especially Italy. And by Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina which, among others, will have in the next century an 
extraordinary global influence, greater than that which we have today.  
“These ideas and impatience led me to dedicate the rest of my life to Ibero-America. I do not know whether it was a 
passing fancy or a relic of something earlier that made me at that time prematurely terminate my business career 
and dedicate my time, my thoughts and my will to it. This does not justify my haste, but it helps me to explain it” 
(2000: 104-105). 
In the “Epilogue” to Utopía de la Nueva América (1992: 288-292), he insisted on the 
need to carry out two specific proposals to which he had already referred in previous 
pages, read by friends and collaborators some of whom—he said—were surprised and 
opposed to them: 
One, the foreign debt of the Ibero-American states (and of all the others, I 
understand, in the world) whose per capita income in 1991 would have been less than 
three thousand dollars, had to be totally and immediately cancelled. 
Second, the rulers of the country called Spain—his country—had to establish “a 
compensatory fee for errors and abuses against indigenous peoples in the conquest 
and colonization, with admission of guilt and giving reason to those who attack us and 
oppose the celebration of the 5th Centenary, generally politicised activists”. That, in 
their time, the Incas and Aztecs had exploited other indigenous peoples was no reason 
for the Spaniards to do so as well, precisely because their conquest and colonization 
was justified by evangelizing intentions. 
Thirdly, the scope of national sovereignty (which the historian coordinating the 
Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 claimed was an alienating fallacy to be eradicated from its 
origins in central Europe in the 17th century) had to be substantially changed and 
reduced.46 
Fourth, it was almost necessary to make “a new map of Hispano America”, with 
groups of countries that would be more easily viable. 
As for the future Colecciones MAPFRE 1492, the idea was to produce some sixty 
books, which are the result of dedicating two to each republic and one more to those 
that had a megalopolis. As his and some other problems would be added that were 
 
46 I tried to explain it, above all, in Diez años de reflexión sobre el nacionalismo, el estado, la nación, la soberanía y lo hispánico 
(2008), already cited, and in “Nación: Historia universal de una palabra”, in Europa: Patria, nación, estado en Europa: Política y 
religión: 6th Simposium of ADEISE, Mendoza, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo (Faculty of Philosophy and Letters), 2012, pg. 11-84., en 
https://ia601500.us.archive.org/23/items/nacionhistuniversaldeunapalabra/NacionHistUniversalDeUnaPalabra.pdf.  
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common to all (here, genocide and liberation theology), the sum would be around 
sixty. 
Of the two books on each country, one was to deal with their respective indigenous 
populations and the other with their political independence and the creation, 
consequently, of the state that it was in 1988-1992. We know that the historian who 
thus began to know what he would have to coordinate put forward the irrefutable 
scientific objection that the geographical limits of the current Ibero-American states 
did not respect the real limits of the corresponding indigenous ethnic groups. Well, it 
was one of the first times he heard from Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi a phrase he 
was going to hear many more times: “Yes, but I want you to...” In this case, talk about 
the indigenous people in each state.  
It was one of his ways of exercising authority, even if he only used it when he would 
otherwise be obliged to give long explanations which, moreover, he preferred to keep 
to himself, at least until his interlocutor inspired confidence in him. He pronounced 
that phrase (“Yes, but I want you...”) in a tone that combined with some precision the 
kindness with the “unappealable nature” of what was thus definitively established and 
concluded. 
There is no need to explain why, in fact, provoking a reflection on these two specific 
aspects could help them to ultimately reflect on their own identity. There were no 
previous hypotheses, of course (I mean in the project). The chosen author would have 
complete freedom, as was otherwise required. 
In his travels through Ibero-America, Larramendi had also observed the particular 
tendency to form megalopolises and what this implied for the most different aspects 
of Ibero-American life and, above all, for its future. Not all of the 21 countries that 
make up Ibero-America have a megalopolis, certainly; but that third item was added to 
the two books required by all of them. In this case, it seems to me that the concern for 
identity no longer predominated, but rather the need to face the future on the basis of 
the historical explanation in which this phenomenon had occurred. 
Whoever now looks at the list of almost two hundred and fifty books that those 
sixty became will find gaps. I mean, you will see that there are countries that do not 
have a book on independence or a book on their indigenous people. This, in part, could 
not be avoided in such a large human group (the authors of the Colecciones MAPFRE 
1492 numbered close to five hundred); there were even deaths in between. But 
reflections were also discovered that were already in the minds of historians in some 
countries and that inclined them not to touch on matters whose “truth” did not 
coincide with what was studied in the corresponding textbooks. Take, for example, the 
remarkable case of Mexico. The proximity of the Fifth Centenary sparked off 
predictable debates about how that event should be assessed, and it was not long 
before it was referred to as “genocide”. Well, in the face of this and other similar 
cases, Larramendi's criteria did not change: the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 had to 
address this concept—that of genocide—and a historian who, in this case, was 
Mexican, had to do so. Names were considered and the one who, in those days and on 
that, was pointed out as the first standard-bearer of the cause of the indigenous 
people and, at the same time, as a rigorous and prestigious man, was chosen: Miguel 
León Portilla, from the Mexican Academies of History and Language, El Colegio 
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Nacional and the National Academy of Sciences in the United States. He was, for many, 
the “guardian of the old word” (Hernández Torres, 2004). His studies on Nahualt and 
other pre-Hispanic languages had earned him the highest recognition. In his younger 
years, he was a philosopher and, in particular, had begun to work on a doctoral thesis 
on the sources of morality and religion in Henri Bergson; but the reading of the ancient 
Nahua texts that the priest Angel Maria Garibay had begun to rescue made him 
consider the hypothesis that religion and morality had different sources in the most 
developed cultures and that the Nahua was a case to be examined with special care. 
The writings of the ancient sages and poets seemed to prove the existence not only of 
aesthetics of their own, but also of a true world-view and, after all, of a different 
philosophy from the one that had been imported by the Spanish sages who 
accompanied the conquerors. And from there would emerge what was really his 
doctoral thesis under the direction of Garibay, La filosofía nahualt estudiada en sus 
fuentes (1956). 
There was certainly a philosophy, a world-view and a pre-Hispanic history, with 
whose knowledge he enriched the successive editions of the Visión de los vencidos: 
Relaciones indígenas de la Conquista, compiled by Garibay (1959-1997). 
Well, said and done: León Portilla was undoubtedly the necessary man; the 
coordinator of the Colecciones spoke to him and made it so clear to him that it was a 
matter of spreading his arguments on the scale of the genocide perpetrated at the 
beginning of the 16th century, that, with no less clarity (and sympathy): Miguel 
answered him: “Man, the Spaniards weren't so dumb that they wanted to exterminate 
those they wanted to use...”  
For several years, he was a generous advisor and counsellor to the Colecciones 
MAPFRE 1492; but he did not write the book. He had, however, the happy idea of 
advising us to divert the search for an author to the men in exile, the “exiles,” whom 
his own wife was studying precisely in those days, and it was the anthropologist Claudi 
Esteva-Fabregat who joined the project as an advisor.  
It is well understood that the Catalan anarchist who was saved by the way of getting 
involved in the Trade Union Organisation of the Régimen—as he once told me—did 
not write the sought book either, but a valuable Introducción a las fuentes etnográficas 
y la América indígena (1995). 
In the end, it would be a very different indigenist from the two mentioned, Luciano 
Pereña, who would write the long-awaited volume Genocidio en América (1992), 
which, of course, came much closer to a history than some illustrious Spaniards, from 
Francisco de Vitoria onwards, denounced that other Spaniards who did not think or act 
like them were doing in America. It was not what was desired at first; the intention 
was to really listen to the arguments that could lead to the use of the term “genocide”, 
of course developed sine ira et cum studio. And this was not achieved. 
That whole story of looking for a genocide expert thwarted some other effort and 
had other consequences. I would especially point out Larramendi's desire that the 
theology of liberation be studied as well, and not precisely to sink it, but to rescue 
whatever was valuable in it. Never one to miss a trick, the general coordinator of the 
Colecciones MAPFRE 1492 took advantage of a trip to Argentina to ask, at the 
Foundation, for a credit of one hundred thousand pesetas that would allow him to visit 
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the old bookshops he knew in Buenos Aires. He was sure that he would find there 
those direct and easily intelligible booklets that usually constitute one of the steps that 
were then built to save the long step from the most relevant philosophers and 
theologians to the common people that are not relevant. Said and done. The volume 
of literature he gathered was so large that he could not take it on the return trip 
without paying almost more than it had cost him.  
So he asked the MAPFRE representative in the former viceregal court to send them 
to him via travellers who crossed the pond. 
And they began to arrive at the same time that Miguel Leon Portilla was turning, 
from genocide (due to knowledge), into an advisor and the attempt was being watered 
down. The failure affected the project in such a way that, since there was a lot of work, 
the search for a theologian who would tell us that, the Spaniards were not going to be 
so stupid as to prepare a theology that would free those who were not killed either 
because what they wanted was for them to work for them was abandoned. 
The books acquired in the old bookshops kept arriving in spite of everything, 
brought from Buenos Aires by MAPFRE managers who soon began to ask José Luis 
Catalinas—then general manager of the Fundación MAPFRE América—who had the 
idea of filling the former Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas with pamphlets that insisted on 
the revolution with such zeal. They said it—as the coordinator of the Colecciones did—
as a kind of unknown that, as it subsisted and went downhill, like a snowball 
abandoned to its own fate, was acquiring an alarming character at times. It was José 
Luis Catalinas, after all, who insinuated the coordinator to get out of there all that 
mayhem of libels that only served to unsettle the people of order and government 
who arrived at the Paseo de Recoletos, then the headquarters of the Mutual Society.  
THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE BOOKS 
Perhaps it has something to do with that—I am not saying that the search for an 
author for the genocide has failed, but rather that the reflection that was intended to 
be revived had already begun to spread among Ibero-American scholars themselves—
something that seems to have come out of the memoires of Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi, and that is that, after a dozen years dedicated to the knowledge of Ibero-
American history and life as seen by them, his own idea of “the work of Spain” was less 
critical than when the project in question was proposed; “I have believed 
retrospectively and objectively that Spain's performance in America has been highly 
commendable; I have had the illusion that it was even more important than it seemed, 
without denying its deviations. Spain, in its profound defence of Catholicism, made a 
unique contribution to the history of humanity and created a civilisation integrated 
with its own, a truly mixed race one, a premonition of the Catholic Kings, which the 
whole of Spain joined, with ambition and selfishness, but with generosity, which 
continues in the hundred years of this 20th century, in which if there were moments 
when we were very far apart, a new line of integration has appeared with business 
investments underway that will have repercussions throughout the next century” 
(2000: 104-105).  
This is more than enough to show that he did not understand that which is Spanish 
as a stone guest in the Spanish-speaking world. I do not think, however, that with the 
initiatives we are talking about, he tried to provoke a parallel reflection in Spain. First 
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and foremost, many reflections had already become reality, especially since the 17th 
century, and it was not a matter of going back to that; although, in fact, it was 
impossible to get the Ibero-Americans to question their own identity without the 
Spaniards saying something. However, what the Spaniards said also had its own ideas, 
which related above all to the future.  
I am not suggesting that he was not interested in the past; we have already seen 
how everything he did in those years in relation to the history of the Hispanic world 
overseas led him to soften his criteria about “the work of Spain”. He rejected the idea 
that Spain and the Spanish had to recover the role of the past (he could not ignore 
that, in addition, the role of the Spanish in Ibero-America in the second half of the 19th 
century had been very different from that of the 16th-18th centuries); but he affirmed 
relatively often that Spain had to fertilize Ibero-America from time to time. 
It is not easy to explain such a conviction, even less so if we try to defend it so that 
it is not misunderstood. I never heard him explain why he thought that way; but, at 
least for a start, I would venture the idea that, in his opinion, the relationship between 
Spain and Ibero-America had been forged from the beginning with a specific profile 
and that the results, after five hundred years, were a joint historical reality that simply 
worked like that and, moreover, “had to” work like that for things to work. It will be 
said that this could mean the negation of the 19th century, that of independence, and 
the resumption of “dependence”. To this, if he had been told, he might have said no, 
but neither should he forget what came out of independence. Precisely to make them 
think about it, he focused the above-mentioned collections on those two main 
subjects: the independence of each of the twenty-one communities that had been 
formed with the separation from Spain, on the one hand, and the reality of the 
indigenous people who survived in each of them, on the other. 
This other thing—affirming the need for this fertilization to take place from time to 
time—probably arose from a deeper reality, which is what I am trying to define (and I 
am finding extremely difficult). 
The first and perhaps main difficulty is precisely that it would be said that this is a 
fact, without further ado; before any affirmation of superiority or inferiority of any 
kind, his direct experience of the American reality had convinced him that it was so; 
here, this “was” (so) must be understood as the mere discovery that it is there and is 
so, without further ado. Then we can think why it is so and if it is good that it is so; but 
the pure fact is there it is and—if it is not a mistake—it is useless to deny it. (One is 
tempted to put it in relation to Heidegger's eagerness to capture precisely the pure 
“being there” that is the real, the famous Dasein, and it might be worth it if, as some 
experts claim, Heidegger failed; pure perception is already intentional, Brentano dixit. 
We would be betraying, however, the purpose of these pages if we were to make 
philosophy out of what, in Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, were simply intuitions) 
By the same rule of three, one has to admit that intuitions too are, after all, 
intentional, even if the person who has them is not aware of it, and that does seem 
relevant to me in this case. 
In the first meeting of Ignacio Larramendi with the two historians who were going 
to coordinate what would be Colecciones MAPFRE 1492, Ignacio Larramendi not only 
put that fundamental condition, that the authors of the books should be natives of the 
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respective country, and not Spanish historians, Larramendi said something else; I think 
it was he who spoke of each author receiving a million pesetas gross and that he had 
thought that it could be the work of young historians, who would see in the project a 
good opportunity at the beginning of their career. The one who was to be coordinator 
asked him if the latter were a priority for him or if it were possible to give entry to 
“established” historians who would lend themselves to it. Ignacio responded that he 
feared that an established historian would ask for remuneration that would go beyond 
the cost he had calculated for the project. The future coordinator replied that he was 
not so sure—that they did not want to—and that he thought it was better to at least 
try.  
We know that the historian we are talking about had been working in “editing” 
duties for a dozen years and it was a fact that the first work he coordinated had almost 
as many co—authors as the Colecciones MAPFRE 1492; it had been Historia general de 
España y América (twenty-something volumes with just over four hundred co-authors), 
and in that post, which he left around 1982, he received the comment that Gonzalo 
Anes, then chairman of the Spanish Academy of History, thought that the work of 
historians should be rewarded with a sum very close to one million pesetas in the case 
of a book of some three hundred pages. 
The problem, therefore, was not that, the economic one. Although the now 
multinational called MAPFRE was not governed by counting with one’s fingers, the 
truth was and is that one million pesetas for three hundred pages puts the page, I 
believe, at 3.333 pesetas purely on a periodic basis. In the insurance sector, this was 
already a trifling amount; but remember that discovery that Larramendi would make 
later, when he had the idea of having lunch or dinner with all the historians, 
anthropologists and linguists who were joining his project; I am referring to when he 
told the coordinator about the ego (that company men have the compensation of 
money and, on the other hand, the compensation of “humanists” is ego). 
One might think that this is precisely because they were paid poorly; but the 
coordinator had the feeling that this was not the main thing, but that the ego itself, 
once it was assumed as the centre to be fed, made the smallness of the remuneration 
melt into the background. I would mention one of the world's leading Hispanists in the 
1990s—an eminent Swede who was already in his hundredth year—who wrote in 
alarm to the coordinator of the Colecciones because he was going to be left out of the 
project. Exactly that, “to be left out”, I do not know if that meant a sacrifice or a 
humiliation for him. It could be both. 
This was also due to a serious setback, because nobody cared to know—nor did 
they have to—that the initial project was for some sixty books and that it was on its 
way to more than two hundred and forty, as it happened. As a result, the recipients of 
the donations that were made throughout the Americas and Europe, found a fairly 
balanced and complete set. So much so that, in Sao Paulo, I believe, probably in one of 
the most important universities in Brazil, a loud and brilliant reception was organised 
for the representatives of the Fundación MAPFRE América—including Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi and the coordinator of the Colecciones, who had travelled 
there for this purpose—and a philosopher of the house had to be commissioned to 
gloss over what might be the theory behind that gift. Well, the philosopher excelled 
himself; he went so far as to say that those Colecciones could only have come from a 
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gifted mind, really brilliant, and he designated the coordinator as the bearer of such a 
brain. 
This was not the case; the Colecciones had become what they were because of 
Ignacio Larramendi's uncontrollable desire to talk about everything that seemed 
relevant to him and the consequent warning by the coordinator that accepting this or 
that issue as the subject of a new book was a comparative offence for many other 
people. In the face of this, Larramendi did not take a step back, but several steps 
forward. I will give an example that actually happened: on the occasion of a trip to 
Argentina, he surely asked for an interview with some expert in any of the great issues 
we have already seen (indigenous people, independence and megalopolis) and one of 
the people chosen did the same as happened in Madrid in those lunches and dinners 
we talked about at the time: he must have said to him that he missed, in the project, a 
book about the language spoken by the Tehuelches, he must have argued with the 
firmness and seriousness of the eraser editor and, on his return, that was one of the 
things Ignacio talked about with the coordinator of the Colecciones. The latter did not 
hesitate to tell him that, if a book were published on Tehuelche, what would those 
who studied Nahualt or Quechua, which were the two “imperial” languages in the 
America of 1492, think and say about it, and that the fuss could be enormous because, 
in New Spain alone, the Spanish found more than fifty different languages. Well, let us 
create a collection on “Indigenous Languages”. And that is what happened. 
The coordinator even allowed himself to tell him one day something of what would 
come about if they continued like this. He told him that his father—the coordinator's—
was a man of great creativity and no sense of economic opportunity, and that this had 
turned him—the coordinator—into a son who was on the lookout for his father's next 
invention in order to prevent him from undertaking it. “And here, I see,” he added, 
“that I have a similar role to play”. 
Ignacio Larramendi smiled as if he could not believe his ears, and repeated in his 
own way what he had just said to make sure he had not misheard; he asked him if he 
meant that his role—that of the coordinator—had become the person who had to 
dissuade him from adding new things. The coordinator responded with the utmost 
caution that yes that was the case. Larramendi laughed at the circumstance and, as in 
so many other matters, they did not speak of it again. 
He would add more initiatives until the time came when he asked the coordinator if 
he thought something was missing to complete what was wanted.  
On the occasion of Sao Paulo, for the same reason, the coordinator was perplexed 
by what the philosopher said; it was false and unjust, even though it was a work of 
good will. From now on, he would not go to those events. It happened again in Mexico 
City, in his absence. But things were gradually put on track with regard to this issue, 
which was eventually forgotten. It was already 1992 and, on the plane that took them 
out of Sao Paulo, Ignacio Larramendi proposed three topics on which he would like 
them to work, once the Colecciones were closed. It was the Tavera Historical Projects. 
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TOWARDS A SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE BUSINESSMAN AND THE 
COMPANY FROM AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, WHICH WE WILL 
SAY IS UNIVERSAL 
THE MANY PERSPECTIVES OF CORPORATE HISTORY 
In the first part of this research, I have tried to explain the roots of the founding of 
the company in Ignacio Larramendi; in the second part, I have tried to draw a profile of 
the businessman we are dealing with; in the third part, I have tried to focus on the 
concept of “institutional company” in Larramendi and how MAPFRE became just that. 
In fact, the first part had no more than a little semblance, and the second, no more 
than a little root, and in the third, the same thing. In what I have started with these 
lines, I intend to consider all that in reverse: there it was a matter of reflecting the 
idiosyncrasy of a person in relation to his business action and now I am going to try to 
make the starting point of what, among the experts, are considered general factors—
in the common sense—to the company's tasks. The reason for adding this last part is 
this: once we know the conception of the life of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, 
tracing his profile and summarising his business work, let us now start from economic 
theory and history to see if the study we have just summarised is of any use to us, in 
relation to this other plan. 
It is not a question of reinterpreting his career path with the patterns indicated by 
the experts, but the opposite: starting from these patterns and projecting on them the 
business trajectory we are talking about; now I will add why: because, in this way, 
perhaps we will discover how much an infinite number of business processes have in 
common and, at the same time, in what way that which is common can offer the 
possibility that human action leads to a creative and effective work (and that, fleeing 
from apologetics as from the devil). 
Well, the first thing we come across is that not a few experts in business history also 
run away from individual careers like the devil, and that is because they assume that 
the businessman's task is similar to that of an orchestra conductor; he does not create 
the company alone; what is decisive in his endeavour is what is called “human capital”. 
And you know that human capital is not the number of people who come together to 
obtain a result, but the set of their knowledge, information, ideas, skills, competences 
and also their health; in short, everything that is required to achieve the specific 
objective that is sought in each case (Hippe, 2014).  
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But, in addition and above all, the human actions that are developed within a 
company and in relation to the production or distribution of resources must 
necessarily be adapted to the results of the business initiatives (and, often, to those of 
the non-business ones) of other people.  
However, to arrive at an interpretative “pattern” of empirical data that brings 
together all this and much more (to contrast it later with the career path of our man) is 
not an easy task. It is not, firstly, because the methodological literature is enormous 
and, secondly, because, also among experts in business history methods, the adage 
that there is more than one way to skin a cat is a good one. 
I must take a risk, however, and I will only claim, to begin with, that I have tried to 
find proposals for a method that is, above all, inclusive of the most diverse visions and 
perspectives. And yet, I will have to commit the audacity to bring them together to the 
extent that they allow me. At the end of this effort, I would dare to summarize in an 
elementary outline the set of methodological points of view that I have tried to know 
first in their current state of the issue, and then to approximate them so that, 
together, they constitute a theoretical proposal but one that can be expressed 
graphically here, as I will try to do. I am aware that all this will make the proposal more 
vulnerable; but everyone knows that wounds, if they do not kill, teach. 
I first outline the outline offered and I use, for this purpose, a set of concepts that 
we can consider “established” among scholars of these things. After each of them, I 
will note the author or authors whose contributions have been most useful to me. 
Whether they are the best or not, I shall leave that to other people's judgement. They 
are the ones that have served me best: 
 
1. Business history 
a. Classical business history 
i. Walter A. Friedman and Geoffrey Jones, “Business History: Time 
for Debate”, Business History Review 85, no. 1 (2011) 1–8.  
ii. Walter A. Friedman and Geoffrey Jones, Business History 
(Cheltenham and Camberley, UK, 2013).  
iii. Mark Casson, John S. Lee, “The origin and development of 
markets: A business history perspective”, Business History Review 
85, no. 1 (2011) 9-37. 
iv. Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Economics, history, and 
causation”, Business History Review 85, no. 1 (2011) 38-63. 
b. Organizational business history:  
i. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).  
ii. Thomas K. McCraw, “The challenge of Alfred D. Chandler Jr: 
Retrospect and prospect”, Reviews in American history, 15, no. 1 
(1987) 160-178. 
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iii. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of 
Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). 
iv. Mercedes Arroyo Huguet, “Alfred D. Chandler Jr y el debate en 
torno a su obra”, Biblio 3w: Revista de geografía y ciencias 
sociales, 4 (1999): http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/b3w-141.htm. 
v. Oliver E. Williamson, “Alfred D. Chandler Jr 15 September 1918—
9 May 2007”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 
153, no. 2 (2009) 225-228. 
vi. William Lazonick and David J. Teece, Management innovation : 
Essays in the spirit of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr (Oxford, 2012). 
vii. Adoración Álvaro Moya, Pierre-Yves Donzé, “Business history and 
management studies”: Journal of evolutionary studies in business 
1, no. 1 (2016) 122-151. 
c. New institutional business history 
i. Douglass C. North, Estructura y cambio en la historia económica 
(Madrid, 1984). 
ii. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and 
Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990). 
iii. Ilkka Mäkinen, “New institutional economics and information 
history – Is there a point of contact”, Library Histor, 24, no. 2 
(2011) 117-127. 
iv. Helge Peukert, “Bridging old and new institutional economics: 
Gustav Schmoller and Douglas C. North, seen with 
oldinstitutionalists’ eyes”: European journal of law and economics 
11 (2001) 91-130. 
v. Susana Valdivieso Canal, “North y el cambio histórico: Luces y 
sombras de la Nueva Historia Institucional”: Revista de economía 
institucional 3, no. 4 (2001) 157-172. 
d. New entrepreneurial history 
i. Jesús María Valdaliso, “La historia empresarial en España: 
Orígenes, desarrollo y controversias respecto a una nueva 
disciplina”: América latina en la historia económica 4, no. 7 
(1997) 103-132. 
ii. Youssef Cassis and Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou, eds., 
Entrepreneurship in Theory and History (Basingstoke, 2005).  
iii. Mark Casson, Entrepreneurship: Theory, Networks, History 
(Cheltenham, 2010).  
iv. Mark Casson and Catherine Casson, The Entrepreneur in History: 
From Medieval Merchant to Modern Business Leader 
(Basingstoke and Hampshire, 2013). 
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v. R. Daniel Wadhwani and Geoffrey Jones, “Schumpeter’s Plea: 
Historical Reasoning in Entrepreneurship Theory and Research”, 
in Organizations in Time: History, Theory, and Methods, ed. 
Marcelo Bucheli and R. Daniel Wadhwani (Oxford, 2013) 192–
216. 
vi. R. Daniel Wadhwani and Christina Lubinski, “Reinventing 
entrepreneurial history”, Business History Review, 91 (2017) 767-
799. 
2. Human action in the business process 
a. Business strategy 
i. Pankaj Ghemawat, “Competition and business strategy in 
historical perspective”, Business Historical Review 76, no. 1 
(2002) 37-74. 
ii. Richard R. John, “Business historians and the challenge of 
innovation”, Business History Review 85, no. 1 (2011) 185-201. 
iii. Anandhi Bharadwaj et al., “Digital business strategy: Toward a 
next generation of insights”: Mis Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2013) 471-
482.  
b. Human action / Instrumental reason 
i. Félix-Fernando Muñoz Pérez y María Isabel Encinar del Pozo 
(2007): "Teoría económica y acción humana: Su integración en la 
obra de Rafael Rubio de Urquía": Revista empresa y humanismo 
10, no. 2: 117-160. 
ii. Urbano Ferrer Santos et al. (2017): Ideas 7 sobre Acción, deber, 
donación de Urbano Ferrer, Madrid, Ideas y Libros 
iii. Juan José Sanguinetti, “El mundo como objeto de acción y 
teoría”, Studia Poliana, 18 (2016): 27-50. 
iv. Matthew Babb, “The essential indexicability of intentional 
action”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 66, no. 264 (2016): 439-457. 
v. Cecilia Coronado Angulo, “Sobre la instrumentalización de la 
familia en Max Horkheimer”, Revista Empresa y Humanismo, 21, 
no. 2 (2018), 39-58. 
c. Business Leadership 
i. Delbeck, André L., “Christian spirituality and contemporary 
business leadership”: Journal of organizational change 
management 12, no. 4 (1999) 345-349. 
ii. Joan V. Gallos (ed.), Business leadership: A Jossey-Bass reader 
(2nd ed., San Francisco, CA, 2008). 
iii. Marcela de la Sota Riva Echánove y Eduardo Zainos García Cano, 
“Liderazgo basado en el personalismo: Una propuesta de 
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investigación”, Revista Empresa y Humanismo 21, no. 2 (2018), 
91-122. 
d. The business process as development over time 
i. Christopher John Medlin, “Interaction in business relationships: A 
time perspective”: Industrial marketing management 33, no. 3 
(2004) 185-193. 
ii. Joâo Ferreira and Nicolas Gravel, Choice with time 
(https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01577260, 2017). 
e. The institutional company 
i. Bazzoli, Laure, & Dutraive, Véronique (2002): “L’entreprise 
comme organisation et comme institution”: Economie et 
institutions, no. 1: 5-46.  
ii. Santiago García Echevarría (2020): Economía y sociedad, en 
búsqueda de un ordenamiento económico social eficiente: El 
empresario y la sociedad, Madrid, Díaz de Santos.  
 
BUSINESS ACTION AS A PROJECT AND PLAN 
From reading these and other experts in business history, I was struck by their 
insistence on defending their plot as something original; they do not accept the 
possibility that every creative process is a “business process”. But the truth is that this 
one is usually assigned three fundamental duties, which one finds, in fact, in any 
creation that is the result of an intentional process: (i) to imagine and value 
opportunities, (ii) to allocate and reconfigure resources, and (iii) to legitimize the 
novelty achieved... which need not be the one intended at the outset. The question is, 
however, whether these three requirements are not met, at the moment of truth, in 
any human “procedural” action, whatever its objective. This is the first hypothesis I 
dare propose:  
✓ Every business action is a human action in the sense that it has all the 
characteristics of human actions. What is debatable is whether all human action 
can be described and understood as corporate action. Otherwise, one would 
have to know where the uniqueness of the latter lies. 
✓ I am referring to what is usually called “human action”, without further ado. If I 
were asked to add the adjective “economic” instead of “business”, I would be 
forced to explain why I believe that all human action is economic, at least as a 
producer, distributor, or consumer of resources. 
I would even encourage myself to graphically link the different elements and 
functions common to these various forms of analysing business activity as a human 
action, let us say “process”. I would do it like this: 
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In Así se hizo MAPFRE (2000), Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi recalls that he joined 
what was then known as the Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas somewhat later, but in the 
same year (1955) when Dionisio Martín Sanz, whom we know mainly as the decisive 
promoter of the creation of the Servicio Nacional del Trigo (National Wheat Service), a 
work of the Franco Régimen which attempted to put an end to the insufficiency of 
Spanish wheat production; an endemic problem, dragged along for centuries and 
extremely serious in times like those when bread was the main component of the 
common diet. That he was also a member of the Seguros Agrícolas—a private 
company—was due to his status as an agricultural owner.  
We know that Larramendi implies, without going into detail, that in order to 
become chairman of the Mutual Society, he used methods that cannot be considered 
impeccable. Here we would like to draw attention to the fact that all this we are 
saying, insofar as it was consciously decided, corresponds to what philosophers call 
“action”, which, at least in the philosophical lexicon of the Hispanics of the time we are 
talking about, meant “free human act”, given that “act”, on the contrary, is doing 
without further ado, freely, consciously or unconsciously, and, in such a case, without 
freedom, let us say “actual,” even if it sounds redundant. Doing what one consciously 
decides to do, doing it out of habit—routinely—and doing it without realising it are 
not, as we can see, acts of the same type; clearly, only the first is a clear human action; 
the second too, but it dispenses—in the definition—with a substantial element that is 
reflection, and the substance of reflection lies precisely in the full exercise of freedom. 
Acting due to routine, even deciding, is a human action, no doubt, but it adds nothing 
new (and good) to reality, at least, by itself (I mean the action). 
If we were now to project the “template” of this “philosophy of action” onto the 
important conversation that Dionisio Martín Sanz and Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi 
had in 1972, we would discover that they did indeed talk about actions that had 
become effective and which then had to be carried out. The fact that there was no 
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attempt to reach an agreement if one of the two did not give in is a consequence—
among other things—of the disparity in the aims pursued by each: Dionisio Martín 
Sanz, a trade unionist and court lawyer at the Cortes for many years, tried to lead 
MAPFRE into the political arena (Larramendi tells us again and does not explain what 
he was; but we know that, a few years later, Dionisio was defending a “transition” to 
“trade union democracy” [1976]), while Larramendi had been trying for twenty years 
to make MAPFRE not only legally private, but also politically independent, or rather, 
independent in all respects. Not only was Larramendi not a man of the Single Trade 
Union, but he saw it with a dim view, as something fictitious, useless and therefore 
very expensive. He had written it down, with the caution that censorship required, at 
least in 1952, in the book Tres claves de la vida inglesa. Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi was a Carlist. And he was so much so that his Carlism—his traditionalism—
led him to reject precisely what he would have considered mixing apples and oranges: 
to turn the mutual society into an instrument of the party. I use the apples and 
oranges metaphor as an idea, which I used when explaining that traditionalism joined 
the Falange in April 1937. 
In order to understand why they did not reach an agreement in 1972 and, in the 
vote on the Directive, the option proposed by Larramendi was accepted, we have had 
to “contextualise” that 1972 “action”, although it was only the minimum necessary. If 
we return to it, we will see that it supposes two fundamental things: one, that the 
business action is not a human action different from any other action—I mean, of 
course, as such, that it is as the human action it is—and the second thing is that the 
action of constituting, maintaining and directing a company implies—like any other 
action—to decide to achieve something (this is: an end) which requires resources and, 
therefore, actions to achieve them and actions of allocation of those resources to 
achieve that end. We know that, in the two final decades of the 20th century, MAPFRE 
Mutualidad made significant donations to maintain the activities of several 
Foundations in whose creation Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi played a fundamental 
role; this involved cultural patronage in some cases and the use of the experience 
acquired in the various insurance branches since 1955 to train specialists in each of 
them. In Larramendi's mind, the main one should be the Fundación MAPFRE, which he 
designed as the future holding company for all the other MAPFRE Foundations or 
those related to the mutual society. A small multitude of own and—attention—other 
people's actions prevented that idea from becoming a reality, and all this constituted a 
process that, in about fifteen years, implied a frequent reallocation of resources (those 
required by the group of Foundations). 
But let us be clear that—functionally—it was also a reallocation of resources that 
Larramendi had to direct at the starting point (1955), although it was much more 
modest. There is no doubt that the 1933 promoters had a purpose (an aim) in creating 
the Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas, to provide themselves with an instrument to deal 
with industrial accidents suffered by agricultural workers hired by the members of the 
mutual society; they raised resources precisely by choosing the mutual society as a 
legal form and allocated them for the purpose indicated. Then they did more, many 
more things, including insuring the crops and productive infrastructure of each 
member of the mutual society against the danger of fire. In other words, they 
broadened the purpose and reallocated resources, as happens not only in any other 
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company, but in any other action: the results of decisions and unforeseen events, 
mixed up despite all the actions that one wants to carry out, usually do not strictly 
conform to what one intends and, in the face of the new situation, it is necessary to 
introduce the necessary changes. We have seen it in different situations when drawing 
the profile of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi. 
The directors of the Mutual Society, created in 1933, had also been confronted with 
a war to begin with, that of 1936-1939, and this affected them fully no matter what 
actions they decided to take. They had developed a network of representatives over a 
good part of Spain and many of them were killed. Perhaps that is why Larramendi 
could say that in June 1939 the staff of the Mutua de Seguros Agrícolas was reduced by 
forty per cent (2000): 231). There is no better example than this tragedy to illustrate 
how what scholars of corporate history teach can happen: that the results of any 
company depend on a combination of specifically corporate decisions and unforeseen 
events. We now know, moreover, that unforeseen events can come from the 
effectiveness of competition, when there is any, but not only from it, but from 
anything that may happen, and that every businessman has to grab the bull by the 
horns and take decisions that are followed by actions. 
This implies something else that is no longer easy to define, and that is the capacity 
to generate allocative actions (of resources) that are alternatives to those carried out 
until then (Muñoz and Encinar, 2007). In other words, in companies what is common 
to all human action and not only to business happens: every person makes “plans” 
(again the purpose), seeks resources and allocates them; but he cannot be sure that 
the results of human actions other than his own—which may or may not be business 
actions (for example, a war)—do not come about and affect his decisions and actions 
in such a way as to cause him to fail.  
And this reinforces, in business action, the role played by risk, the awareness of 
which induces the adoption of what some experts call “bundles of alternative plans” 
(Rubio de Urquia, 2003).  
That is why we Hispanics say that a man of foresight is worth two. But we also say 
that the one who hits first hits harder. (Please consider this another way and think 
that, by the same rule of three, the one who does good first is more effective in 
avoiding evil) Our man, Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, said it just like that, in his 
own way of course: "The entrepreneur justifies himself by risk, by adopting financial 
decisions, which affect the work of the people who support him, to promote the 
creation of wealth (1983). It was understood that this justifying fact was not limited to 
the private sphere; also the public company “operates with an autonomous assets, 
accepting risks and submitting its results annually to the public” (1982). 
Not only that; in addition, with the risk he was opening up to one more element 
that does not appear expressly in the table that we have drawn up from the literature 
on “Business action as a project and plan” and yet it must be counted on: someone 
who takes risks and, by taking risks, also puts the jobs of those who support him at 
some risk, must inspire confidence: “Those of us who feel that we are businessmen, 
because we dare to take risks, have an obligation to instil confidence and to not allow 
ourselves to be influenced by those who sometimes mix their negative attitudes with 
their own insecurity and their concern to hide untenable actions. (1982) 
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And this last one implies even more things: for the time being, ethics. And there is 
no need to remember that every human action (and, therefore, every business action) 
is moral. Here, yes, we are dealing with the concept of “Values”, which is found 
present in that picture. The inspiration of confidence could now be guessed—it is 
true—at the relevance that, in that graphic presentation, is given to “Persuasion”. And 
it does not seem risky to deduce that, at heart, this—the need to persuade everyone 
involved in the company, from investors to employees and consumers—Larramendi 
referred to “transparency” precisely as an attitude that increases risk by involving the 
“commitment” that comes from turning the cards face up. “I have linked my business 
life to transparency, to the risk involved in committing oneself and also in writing”; I 
considered it as an attitude “indispensable to be recognised as a boss in the human 
community that constitutes a company” (1982). 
CLOSER TO THE END: BUSINESS ACTION IN THE ECONOMIC ORDER 
What we have just said is so important that it should be carried out and even 
proposed in a different way, where it goes further. Not only would it be necessary to 
make the most of “Persuasion”, but it would also be necessary to know more about 
something that we said before and that is in the beginning, so that we find it undoing 
what we have been doing: the value arises because there has been a creative 
reflection that has taken into account the businessman's own experience, his values 
and, also, the “Opportunities” that the idea of creating this value raises. In other 
words, value seems to be found at the beginning and at the end, first as a source of 
criteria and, in the end, as what one is trying to achieve. Combining experience and 
values means that those who reflect on it have a story of their own that is not alien to 
the people who, in their opinion, could appreciate the value produced or distributed. 
And articulating all that is already beginning to look like a task that may be little less 
than “cosmic”.  
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi had been brought up in a middle-class family that 
many people would consider “conservative”, but which, in his specific case, it is only 
fair to call “traditionalist”, since he shared the ideas not only of traditionalism, but 
specifically of the Carlists of his father, Luis Hernando de Larramendi.  
We know, however, that the new chairman of the Mutual Society, Dionisio Martín 
Sanz, was an active member of “the Movement” (the National Movement, that is, the 
Régimen), which was opposed by the two Hernando de Larramendi we have just 
mentioned, father and son. Dionisio came from the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-
Sindicalista (Councils of National-Syndicalist Offensive) led by his fellow countryman 
Onésimo Redondo, and we can add that in 1955 the most influential managers in the 
mutual society were reproducing a range of trends—now conservative—that had 
come together in 1933 as the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas 
(Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights), or CEDA. 
That meant being Catholic and behaving like one, also in the capacity of a 
businessman, and that, in turn, in addition to family ties, that is, kinship, made possible 
not only understanding, but even the feeling that they were on the same side, as if it 
were another war.  
But if this had not been the case and their values had been different, the process of 
business action would not require any change in the picture I am referring to. Note 
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that it is an incipiently cyclical picture and that, therefore, the concepts located on the 
right of the image are highlighted in bold; this is intended to draw attention to a very 
simple fact, which is that they are repeated; they are some of the same concepts that 
can be observed in the left half.  
What does that mean? That business actions are chained and require repeating 
actions that aim to achieve the same purpose as the first time; the success or failure of 
the company (and those of many human actions carried out at the same time in whole 
or in part) have contributed to the “Change of reality”. The businessman has 
accumulated a little more “Experience” and may not have transformed his “Values” 
system. Or yes. The truth is that the “Perception” of all this is contrasted, again, with 
“Opportunities,” which can never be the same as the first time. Zubiri recalled that, in 
order to maintain the philosophy of life that the parents had, the children often had to 
overcome serious difficulties and, therefore, make decisions and act in ways that the 
parents—perhaps—could not even imagine, much less face. Things were different. 
Of course, Zubiri's argument is not typical of a business action and yet it “serves” 
us—it is “valuable” to us at this moment—and is pure human action.  
Finally, now “Persuasion” is needed again; but it cannot be the same. And yet the 
businessman cannot afford to ignore the results. In the end, he has to persuade so that 
he “legitimizes” himself. Now, that persuasive “Legitimation” may or may not be true. 
There is no need to insinuate that it means lying; there are many of us who show an 
unusual capacity to turn our past into the best offer for the future, and that, almost 
without intending it. Perhaps that is why (and, no doubt, other things), Larramendi 
insisted so much on truthfulness as a characteristic of the true businessman, It takes 
courage to sum up this aspect of their work as he summed it up in 1996, in his last, 
shall we say, institutional speech at MAPFRE. The date is not wasted: 
“I have not lied, except in cosmetic aspects, nor have I harmed any person with false information, either 
internally or externally; I have not broken my word, and for that reason I have had problems and 
difficulties, even with personal financial outlays; I have not made a decision to select, promote or dismiss 
personnel or other types of influence in my direct interest, or in that of my family, or by ideological criteria, 
nor that would cause, to my knowledge, harm to employees, partners or customers; I have not stopped 
accepting risks, personal, over and above managerial, if this attitude was in the company's interest; I have 
not consciously disregarded fairness in any of my decisions. I have not made any public proposal that was 
actually favourable to what I was managing, but always what I thought was good for everyone, nor have I 
induced actions that were convenient for the company but dangerous for those who had to carry them out. 
“This is how I see the ethics of the manager in the company, which has allowed mine and me to 
survive.” 
And attention to the final point: “Some will say that I was successful despite these 
limitations; I think, on the contrary, that only in this way can there be lasting business, 
institutional or political success, and that, therefore, such action is socially 
effective”(1996). 
The table summarising “Business action as a project and plan” is definitely not 
enough for us. We must tell the experts so that they can offer us something more than 
what was given to us by the authors cited in the outline I inserted before that table. 
But I would not want to leave this without asking myself whether it is not precisely 
the creation and distribution of value that differentiates corporate action from human 
action as a whole. And I do not think so. If necessary, the last speech I copied, that of 
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1996, would be enough to conclude the opposite: Larramendi's claim in that speech 
explicitly refers to continuous business action which is, strictly speaking and without 
exception, human action. 
And it cannot be said that it is a legitimizing ethical summary of a business action (in 
relation to that symbiosis between “Persuasion” and “Legitimization” that we talked 
about before). In 1996, the businessman who had converted the modest Mutua de 
Seguros Agrícolas into MAPFRE was speaking. But, without a doubt, Larramendi did not 
exclude what he had to do in the first phase of his management. In 1955, before taking 
over the management of the mutual society, he put his “Persuasion” skills and his 
prudence into play in order to find out about the situation in which the company found 
itself, and what he found was simply a precarious situation; the Mutual de Seguros 
Agrícolas was overstaffed, poorly organised in terms of efficiency in creating value (the 
value, for the time being, of giving real security to the members of the mutual society) 
and, between debts and non-payments, was approaching a situation of “technical 
bankruptcy”.  
This was so to the extent that he thought he had done wrong in accepting the 
running of the Mutual Society. In this case, however, “Creative Reflection” made him 
see the possibility of healing it; it was still a way of creating more value. But the first 
value consisted precisely in a reorganisation that led him to reallocate resources and 
reconfigure them with such painful actions as the dismissal of a good number of 
employees who were not needed or who were even a burden. There were doctors 
employed by the Mutual Society whose work was solved in one hour of work per 
week, and it was not because this work required this type of condition; it was simply 
that elements had been introduced that showed an organisation, I would dare say, 
that was flawed; perhaps it had served to solve specific problems for specific people, 
although neither the problems nor the people had any real relation to agricultural 
insurance, and twenty years later and one war in between, this could not continue. 
It was necessary to put an end to these faults, and that demanded persuasion, 
certainly, but also energy. 
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Now, let us expand the picture (with absolute freedom, without trying to save what 
I have shown in the first one. In this one, I try to outline what I find behind the so-
called “social market economy”. You know that this was what guided, to a large extent, 
the realisation of “The German Miracle” after the defeat in 1945. For years I have been 
reading and listening to Santiago García Echevarría, with whom Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi spoke more than once, and, some time ago, I was encouraged to 
conceptualize his thought and that of the economists, almost all German, whose 
interventions are usually published in the Institute of Business Management and 
Organisation that he directs at the University of Alcalá de Henares. 
My commitment was not so much to conceptualize Eucken's economic theory, as to 
count on everything that they counted on and told; that is: all the elements that they 
take into consideration, without necessarily entering into the solutions. The result, 
exhibited in a seminar of the Instituto Empresa y Humanismo, was the table that I 
insert in this page. 
I am not going to comment on it in detail; it would be too extensive; but I 
understand that everything it includes was part of the intellectual world—the business 
world-view—of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi.  
Let us see what it provides. 
THE ECONOMIC ORDER AS A POLITICAL ORDER (BUT OF POLYTHEIA) AND THE ROLE OF 
BUSINESSMEN IN IT 
What is represented by this second table is not a company, but the economic 
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order—one of the possible orders—of a whole “Community”. In it, the central role of 
the businessmen is that which, in the table, is called “Dialogical Coordination”. It 
evokes again the “Persuasion” that was included in the previous table; but it is not the 
same; if anything, both concepts have the need to speak in common (when it 
corresponds to one) and to listen (when it is the other who tries to explain oneself). 
“Dialogical coordination” refers, of course, to the factors that are considered duly 
“economic”, not only in the social market economy but also in other economic 
theories. But it should be noted that, in the middle zone of the table, three concepts 
are integrated which, with one (and only relative) exception, are receivers of influence 
(if we define in this way the arrows that are directed at them) but whose influence on 
the rest is not indicated (arrows directed at other concepts do not come out of them). 
They are: “Agreement & Reliability”, “Subsidiarity & Solidarity” and “Integral 
Development”. 
These are, of course, economic order objectives. But they overflow from it; rather 
they are objectives of the “Community” we are talking about. For the sake of brevity, I 
cannot stop to give reasons about it either; I will only say that it has to do with 
something that is not explicit in this second table, but is implicit in the concept of 
“Dialogical Coordination”: cohabitation. Every human community is a community of 
cohabitation, although, in this case as well, it is not only a community of cohabitation. 
This is what Larramendi contemplated, I think, when he spoke of “social harmony” and 
made a statement like the one below, taken from the conference on Concordia social y 
riesgo empresarial (Social Harmony and Business Risk) he gave in Santiago de 
Compostela on 21 June 1983: 
“In a very special way I would like to refer to harmony and its necessity in social, economic and business life. 
Apparently the world we live in is based on friction, which is no longer considered inevitable but desirable, on class 
struggle, commercial competitiveness, electoral life, and ideological conflicts. In the face of this belief, partly the 
result of the error of identifying harmony with compromise in the face of pressure on the weak or the cowardice of 
businessmen, the reality is that only peoples and companies with a high degree of harmony will prosper” (1983). 
The prediction with which he concluded is almost shocking. If anything, we can 
speed up this reasoning we are engaged in and ask ourselves if, in the end, what he is 
talking about is a prosperity common to peoples and companies and, if it is a question 
of it being so, how the relationship between both realities (each specific company and 
each community) can be channelled in a way that I dare to call “constitutive” and 
Larramendi called “institutional”. 
I shall explain it by sections. First, he understands by “institutional”, what is meant 
by “institutions” to speak of the network of entities and practices that ensure the 
continuity and, therefore, the stability of a political community in such a way that they 
do not hinder, but rather channel the human actions that seek the improvement of the 
community itself. 
Secondly, it is crucial that this happens within each company. I want to say that the 
company should also be a “community of cohabitation”. Larramendi expressed it this 
way in 1967: 
“Within the social framework, the company has a dual purpose, an instrument of economic service to the community 
and a group of people to which its components are linked, even more than any other institution. 
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“Perhaps for this reason, the relationship of the worker or employee with their company is an important field of 
sociological research; what it represents for their human trajectory, how it influences and conditions him, how it 
contributes to their education, how it protects them in their difficulties and how, in short, it contracts responsibilities 
to them that cannot be included in any contract that is merely bilateral such as that of salary or employment” 
(1967). 
In the framework of the economic order, this is widely represented, especially in 
two places: on the right, in what we will call a subset of elements framed under the 
title of “Individual and shared culture” and in that of “Individual persons”. The other 
subset is the one in the bottom left corner, which deals with the problem of exclusion 
and inclusion of people in the community.  
In the first subset, by combining the “Individual & shared culture” with the 
“Individual persons”, the starting point of the intellectual education of every man and 
woman is expressed, which is completely essential to “include” it in the community: 
from an “Inclusory Family” and an “Inclusory Education”. We know that Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi kept his father's figure as a fundamental reference until the 
end and we can say that his business activity was guided by what he believed should 
guide everyone's life: developing and making others develop, on the one hand, 
“Freedom & Responsibility” and, on the other, “Abilities & Competences”. We have 
just seen, in the last paragraph we quoted from him, how this was latent in his idea of 
the company as the main “community” of belonging of the employees as such. 
In the second subset, on the bottom left, it is about the need for the economic 
order (and, if possible, each company on its own) to maintain that “inclusory” function 
that we have seen in the starting point of the life of each man and woman, in the 
“Inclusory Family” and in “Inclusory Education”. Including this other—the final thing—
which involves education the Increase of abilities of each person. “This concern for the 
selection, education and recycling of the people who work at MAPFRE”, explained 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi in 1984, “has left a mark on the way in which all the 
people who have gone through this group and who are now at the head of other 
companies deal with insurance activity. To a certain extent, if it can be said that 
MAPFRE has been a school for managers, not only in insurance, but in other sectors of 
the economy and politics” (1984). 
All of it, ad intra. Ad extra, the most stable—institutional—relationship has to be, 
without a doubt, the effectiveness of the service provided by that company that takes 
it to the extreme of becoming part of the institutional structure that contributes to 
give stability to the community of which it is a part. In his case and as far as the quality 
of service is concerned, in 1982, Larramendi believed he had achieved this: 
“MAPFRE is a dynamic institution with a permanent tension for improvement, not for growth, but as a concern for 
perfection, for me of basic Christian roots. Those who know our internal mechanics will see that we are never 
satisfied with our products, nor with the speed of our claims settlement, nor with the quality of our service, and we 
always want much more than is possible, or at least possible for us” (1982). 
How did it become part of the institutional fabric? “I offer below—he said in a 
conference in Sao Paulo in November of the following year—I offer below some 
characteristics for the qualification of “leading company”, that is “the one that shares 
with others a function of influence within a competitive market, but with effective 
concern for the general interest of the community”: 
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✓ High penetration. Size is an important and stabilising factor, even if in some 
activities the purely internal or domestic dimension is not sufficient, but a high 
relative national dimension is always indispensable to allow its decisions to 
exert general influence and be taken into account in the market. 
✓ Vocation for growth and, if necessary, foreign expansion to participate in the 
objective of international presence  
✓ Competitive costs with regards to its colleagues, allowing them to offer reduced 
prices that contribute to lowering market averages and force other entities to 
follow the same line. 
✓ Operational agility to permanently adapt to a changing society, and with very 
rapid changes, which require preparation to support and face any unexpected 
changes in the market or in the country, even those that may affect its survival. 
✓ Anti-bureaucratic tension to avoid the internal creation of particular influences 
and interests. 
✓ Internal equity between the various personal elements that make it up so that 
there is a balanced relationship between remuneration and working conditions 
based on objective, justified reasons, without favouritism or pressure from 
interests unrelated to its corporate purpose. 
✓ Comprehensive transparency with frequent, reliable, and understandable 
information of its static and dynamic situation, which allows all those 
legitimately interested in its equity evolution and results to appreciate the 
deviations, completing this with an independent, objective audit system. 
✓ An efficient IT structure, which provides complete, automatic and immediate 
information on results; assists in relations with all its internal territorial and 
sales services, including customers; makes it possible to have constant 
knowledge of the financial situation; allows the creation of new products or 
innovative commercial formulas and, above all, supports sophisticated 
budgeting systems, in order to foresee results and immediately detect 
deviations so that those responsible, even in small units, acquire a managerial 
sense of action. 
✓ Business technology, as the art of bringing together in harmony the wills of all 
those involved in the company”. 
He did not expressly warn of this, but we have seen that he did not call a company 
“institutional”, but “leader”. In any case, in order for it to form part of the institutional 
framework that gave stability to the countries in which it worked (because it was 
already, in the case of MAPFRE, a multi-national company) “there are other aspects of 
a different nature, in a certain sociological sense, that are indispensable for the 
internal success and for the adequate insertion of the company in its socio—political 
community: 
✓ Ethical concern, in the certainty that the undisputed application of moral 
principles is an essential piece for the recognition of its own employees, 
suppliers, customers, the public in general, and that of other public or private 
institutions with which a company relates. Within a market regime and free rule 
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of law, actions that border on the individual ethics of managers, or that of 
business, or affect relations of coexistence, cannot be tolerated in leading 
companies. 
✓ Sense of social responsibility, understanding that large companies are not only 
obliged to efficiently provide their own service, but are also subject to 
institutional obligations derived from their influence on social life and their 
participation in national heritage. This social responsibility obliges it to be 
concerned about the impact of its actions on the general interests of the 
country, about the personal and professional improvement of those who 
provide its services, and about the interests, rights and needs of the public and 
especially of its customers with whom it has a more direct relationship. 
✓ Own culture, that is, a way of being, existence and external presence that 
impregnates all its activity, which makes its workers feel proud of their company 
and that the public recognises it easily and not only by massive advertising 
campaigns with an idealised image that does not match reality. One's own 
culture implies a special distinction with respect to competitors and is an 
instrument for customer loyalty and, above all, a sign of collective respect. 
Although there are many other factors, this one provides the recognition of 
what I call “leading company”, as it was given to former knights to recognise 
them as such; in both cases, it is a symbol of the general recognition of qualities 
obtained throughout the professional work”(1983b). 
PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 
It goes without saying that he was speaking at the height of the international 
economic crisis in 1983, since his opinion on it went far beyond the price of oil: 
 "We are faced with a crisis of substance and not just transitory or 
superficial. Our society is trying to escape from reality in order not to be forced 
to act accordingly, and it seems that we are in the low wave of a normal cycle 
of economic or sociological development. In Spain we all know examples of 
business situations “managed” as transitory in order not to bravely face them 
and that have led to irremediable and clamorous “cracks”. 
 I hope that this is not the case” (1983c). 
It was October 1983 and, in February immediately before, the Spanish Government 
had expropriated the holding company set up by businessman José María Ruiz Mateos 
under the name of Rumasa. It is possible that Larramendi thought about it; although, if 
that was the case, his opinion was perhaps light; Rumasa had been created and had 
grown, to a large extent, by acquiring, much below its value, companies in extreme 
financial situation (Gredilla, 2019). 
“This crisis”, added Larramendi on the same occasion, “is characterised by the fact 
that it affects the world's sociological and economic structure and even its legal 
system, and because it may also be a crisis of the concept and in any case of the 
unlimited freedom that many have believed to be possible and that some consider to 
be an individual objective, even though to achieve it, it is necessary to “destroy the 
temple” with all the citizens inside” (1983c). 
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 It was the opposite of the philosophy that drove an “institutional company”, a 
philosophy, incidentally, with which he had apparently already arrived at the Mutual 
de Seguros Agrícolas. Perhaps he saw it more clearly when he realised what the legal 
form of the mutual society entailed; it could be the provision of a public service and, 
moreover, ensure this provision by institutionalising it in the legal-political sense of the 
term. No matter how “Carlist” Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi was, or rather how he 
understood traditionalism (and he proved that it was fulfilled in England in the 1940s), 
this was the mission that at least one great company in each of the economic sectors 
had to carry out, he would later say. 
That it involved “doing politics”, no doubt. But again it must be said that in the most 
noble (and original) sense of the word polytheism, that referring to the dignified way of 
acting as a citizen, without the need to exercise power or by exercising it. Aristotle 
used that word, sometimes, in the sense of “political regime”, system of government. 
Larramendi was certain that “politicians” with common sense would end up taking 
advice from businessmen with common and also political sense. “The businessman”, 
he said in the closing speech of MAPFRE Safety Week in 1982, “is irreplaceable in the 
solution of economic problems and, if we are respected without helping or protecting 
us, since no true businessman needs this, our actions will be socially recognised and 
we will be considered as first-class interlocutors in the struggle for national 
improvement. This, I must say, refers not only to the typically private company, with 
the risk of its promoters and shareholders, but also to the non-capitalist association, 
owned by a community, like MAPFRE, and to the public one” (1982).  
Now, that makes “politics” the business action in the noblest sense of the word. 
Graphically, this aspect focuses on the fact that the exchange of goods and services 
(Exchange in the table) is regulated by the market and the policy itself (that from 
which mandatory rules emanate). The commitment, deeply rooted in Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi, to act subject to the positive law of the civil authorities has 
to do with it; the market will also generate its laws, let us call them endogenous; but 
the civil authority has as its reason for being the cohabitation of all the members of the 
community and, for that, it generates laws, which, in this case, are not endogenous—
at least, they are not usually so—and, moreover, they are supported by the coercive 
power that, like it or not, the legitimate authority has. 
It is important to expressly emphasize something of what I have just said: that the 
purpose of the company and that of the government of the community are not the 
same; the former concerns goods and services that are offered, distributed, and 
exchanged, and for the latter—the civil authorities—the priority is cohabitation. (I 
interpret St. Augustine on this point, when he states that the emperor had no duty to 
conform even to the natural law when this could make the remedy worse than the 
illness. Aquinas expressed it in his own way and offered some examples that are on the 
borderline, and perhaps this is why neither the Thomists nor so many others who are 
inspired by his philosophy speak of it; specifically, he went so far as to ask whether the 
emperor had an obligation to prohibit prostitution, even on the basis of natural law, 
and concluded that he did not, precisely because the consequences could be worse 
than the benefit [Carpenter, 2000; 2016; Widow, 2008]). 
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The political participation of businessmen, therefore, is not that of the parties, but, 
first, that of every member of the community, man or woman, whatever their 
profession or trade; second, that of those who govern the institutions—public or 
private—in which the community is articulated—as a political community (if any is 
not)—in order to achieve progress in the continuity and continuity in which progress—
always—occurs. This is what Larramendi meant when he combined this participation 
of businessmen—specifically those in the insurance sector—in politics with the need 
for the company to be independent of any servitude other than that of providing the 
best service: 
“MAPFRE, above all, is an independent company, which has known how to live isolated from the various social, 
factual or pressure forces that influence any human, socialist, liberal or conservative society and very specifically 
that of our country. Perhaps the origin of our independence is that in 1955 and 1956 no one believed we would 
survive and this isolated us and made us understand the advantages of this independence that forces us to rely only 
on ourselves, to sharpen our imagination and initiative and to dispense with having a complex that professional 
work is a “lottery”. I believe that if MAPFRE has been successful it has been precisely because it has been 
independent and that it will continue to be successful as long as it continues to be so” (1982). 
But was not his training and inspiration—that of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi—
Carlist even in the way he conceived his personal professional work, that of a 
businessman? Certainly, he himself affirmed this; what he meant and said, however, is 
that, in his case, it had been in the specific political choice of his family—that of Carlist 
traditionalism—where he had understood that companies had to be, among other 
things, independent of political parties and of any communities, even the merely 
factual ones, without legal backing. And from that independence, he certainly did not 
exclude Carlism.  
He was the same person who began to promote the creation of a Carlist Museum in 
the city of Estella through the Foundation that was then called Luis Hernando de 
Larramendi and of whom he said the following in his farewell speech on 16 June 1990 
when he left the chairmanship of the Fundación MAPFRE, of the Corporation of the 
same name and of its Control Committee: 
“You all know my Christian and specifically Carlist background. In my almost 35 years at MAPFRE, I have tried to 
create a company inspired by Christian principles, which has nothing to do with making ideological politics or 
discriminating against those who think differently, which has never been done at MAPFRE. MAPFRE has been, in 
everything that has depended on me, a company that has emerged from the application of those principles; and, as 
a company director, I have always acted as I have believed that those who call themselves Christians should act. One 
of the satisfactions of this 16 June is to proclaim this without blushing or with “shifted shame” that some who think 
like me have; in saying this I am not harming “my cause”, since I have demonstrated with the facts that with those 
principles one can accomplish things and perhaps only with them can one have permanent success. In any case, 
without what I have just said MAPFRE and my performance in it cannot be understood” (1990). 
Perhaps this can be further understood if you perceive the extremely realistic depth 
of what he wrote in the epilogue to the book Utopía de la nueva América two years 
after that farewell. Realism in his own assessment of “reactionary, forgotten and 
ridiculed Carlism, still respected, if not shared in principle, in a society hostile to its 
deep religious sentiment”.  
And that—I dare to deduce—because the fundamental relationship consists 
precisely in “tradition” as the transmission from parents to children of attitudes that 
do not leave aside either business or politics or any aspect of human life.  
From that point, and because he believed in what I have just said, in the text I 
quote, Larramendi transcribes an article by his own father written “for a clandestine 
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publication of a group of young Carlists, who met at my home in Velázquez, 100, and 
at the Mella Academy, in calle Barquillo, and who did not, and never did, accept the 
authority of General Franco, nor his Régimen”:  
“The hapless foundlings bear witness to their birth, but how will they be able to give 
that of their parents”? asked his father on that occasion. The relationship between 
parents and children involves "a language, and with the language, the faith of its origin 
and its purpose, the divine revelations, the wisdom accumulated by the efforts of the 
preceding generations, the history of so much self-denial and, with it, the veneration 
of the parents, and of the parents of their parents, and of their forefathers, from 
whom, by their blood, they preserve so many goods that distinguish them in their 
superior dignity from the irrational and oblige them to the duty and honour of 
deserving, by their own love and self-denial, to be worthy of the admiration of future 
generations. 
All that Tradition is a spiritual, rational, and political current, that runs through natural channels from 
the past to the future, over bonds of family origin, in the common and lasting interest of the Fatherland. 
“And that is natural political life, inviolable by law. When it seems to be violated, people suffer or perish, proof that 
the law is inviolable or indefectible.”(1992: 282--283).  
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE DYNAMIC BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND SUBSIDIARITY 
In the table below (the second one), we intend to express how “Politics” and 
business activities are two different realities that must be put into relationship based 
on the mutual embrace that the dynamic between subsidiarity and solidarity implies. 
What is unique is that—as far as I know—Larramendi spoke more of solidarity than of 
subsidiarity, and for years I have been struck by the extent to which the opposite is 
true: in private business circles and among people who have a stronger religious 
concern, in the specific case, at least, of the Catholic Church, subsidiarity is claimed 
above all, while in meetings of people who are more concerned with distributive 
justice than with freedom—without needing to exclude the latter—the word 
“solidarity” and its derivatives are heard many more times. In Larramendi's case, this 
last value was once expressed as forcefully as this one in his Utopía de la nueva 
América (1992): 29-30). The sentence and the quote are excessively long; but it is time 
to say that the uniqueness of the person we are talking about has led this historian to 
approach it as a dialogue with him and, therefore, he has to allow him to express 
himself as he sees fit: 
“The great tragedy of today's society is that it is structured for a “sectorial egoism”, sad to say, mainly of the white 
race, with centripetal movements in which excesses of individual rights and the primacy of personal interests are 
promoted, which immediately spread to those who lack everything, considering envy as the supreme basis of social 
construction, which may be tolerable and even useful for a limited area or people insofar as it stimulates the 
acquisition of material goods, but is intolerable in the whole of humanity or for a large part of it, which under no 
circumstances can “come close” to what is shown to it every day and from what is seen to be more distant at each 
moment. 
“There is a vicious circle, once again mysterious and unknown, and the question arises as to whether humanity will 
resolve this conflict by itself, between the destitution of some and the unlimited rights of others, not in small nuclei, 
as was the case in the Middle and Modern Ages, but as a whole. I know of no precise solution or panacea, but there 
is no doubt that in order to approach it some men should stop believing themselves to be superior and recognise 
that unjust inequality cannot be resolved by itself, as today's society seems to suppose”. 
This may lead one to think that it has nothing to do with the economy; but I will 
have failed if, at this point, I have not managed to show that Ignacio Larramendi did 
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not understand business in a conventional way; he saw it as an element of the 
permanent institutional structure that gives stability and, thus, continuity and, at the 
same time, the capacity to improve without breaking down, to every human 
community. 
I confess that I have gone back a hundred times to the first definition of “economy” 
that I came across half a century ago: I came to say that it is the art of producing and 
distributing scarce resources. And, right away, I objected that “resource” is all anyone 
is good for. For Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, the acceptance of that government 
position in a mutual society that already existed in 1955 served to advance the future 
of the family he had begun to form and, consequently, was a resource. Seen in this 
light, economic would be everything that can be constituted as a “resource” for 
someone, and therefore everything would be economic. What would almost never be 
is “only” economic; it would be at the same time ethical, aesthetic, religious, if we opt 
for Max Scheler's axiology. 
If this were the case, the specifically “economic” would be the “resource” condition 
itself.  
For that to be so and, moreover, to be somewhat better understood, it should be 
true that all human action is—in that sense—economic; something that goes further 
than asking not only if all business action is a human action, but if all human action is 
“business” action. The answer, I understand, would have to be that, if you produce or 
distribute “resources” and if, by “resource”, you mean everything that someone can 
“resort to” because it “serves” them for something and, in the same sense, is 
“valuable”, the answer must undoubtedly be in the affirmative. 
But do not lose sight of its scope: the employee or worker who “resorts” to his job 
because it “serves” him for whatever—even if it is simply to survive—is also a 
“businessman”; let us say a sort of “businessman of himself and his family”. 
But there is even more; when reading his writings, one notices that, in turn, the 
family from which Ignacio Larramendi came provided him with human relationships 
that came from beforehand (and others that began at that time) so that what was 
strictly family in origin also became a resource. One need only reread these texts to 
see to what extent the network of kinship and friendships of which he was a part had a 
bearing on the creation and development of MAPFRE. It would be very interesting if 
someone were to rework that network with all the rigour that such a study requires, as 
a personal historical phenomenon in which business creations are realities that 
emerge from that network, often without anyone being there to propose it; it would 
show how this and any other business is based on a network of relationships between 
men and men, women and women, and men and women which is, quite simply, what 
constitutes the specific channel that makes real history what it is and not what it could 
have been. 
In a conference on patronage that he gave in San Lorenzo de El Escorial in 1994, 
there is a confession by Larramendi that illustrates marvellously what I mean, because 
it shows that, in business itself—and without harming the company; on the contrary, 
even -, the human being acts from impulses that, sometimes, the others—and 
historians as professionals, which aggravates what I am going to say—interpret to give 
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them coherence exactly as I have tried so far (and I refer to the leading role I have 
given to the two tables we have seen so far). Here is the paragraph: 
“I have always had, even before visiting it, an Americanist vocation; my professional life has given me the possibility 
of applying it. I encouraged MAPFRE to set up in America. Many years ago, I thought that MAPFRE needed—and I 
perhaps needed—America. I do not hide that, together with the sentimental factor, there was another factor: this 
objective forced me to travel, to get to know new lands and new people, since perhaps my vocation has been more 
to make history than to study it, and the one I liked was created from personal and direct contact with new friends 
from other countries”(1994) 
Nothing more or less. We have looked for “important” reasons to explain his way of 
acting as a businessman and now we find that he likes to travel and make friends from 
other countries. 
Naturally, we could immediately turn to what we have done so far, which is to seek 
“transcendence” in his words. Fortunately, the great philosopher who was Max Scheler 
has given it to us determinedly; he recognised four great sets of values: religious, 
aesthetic, ethical and economic. Well, Ignacio's career is an ideal example of how 
business action involves everything, even if the businessman does not try (or even 
want) to do so. In his experience of English life in the 1940s and early 1950s, Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi found what he was not looking for without knowing it 
(remember that Brentano said that even our perceptions are intentional). What struck 
him—perhaps dazzled him—in the system of consolidation of British companies was 
not simply an “economic” phenomenon (if one accepts—even if only provisionally—
that the economic value is that of “serving someone for something”, that is, 
constituting and even becoming a “resource”); what he saw in England was a business 
and judicial ethic (among other things) and he did not miss the aesthetic that implied 
the liking of specific entities of the mid-twentieth century to maintain the character—
nominal if you will—of inn with which some of them had been created. Lloyds was the 
example that attracted him the most. 
The problem of defining the economy is resolved by some experts by introducing 
the condition in question—that is: that it be “economic”, typical of the knowledge 
called economy—that it be, I say, of something that can have a price put on it But that, 
which is not without interest, requires once again asking whether this “power” (putting 
a price on it) is ethical or purely functional. Because, if it is purely functional, we are in 
the same boat: you can put a price on everything. 
However, as I have just indicated, the requirement is not negligible; Larramendi did 
something—many different things—to which he put a price and, in that sense, he 
meets that condition without us needing to consider whether or not the “power” to 
put a price is ethical in the specific case of MAPFRE. (One of the things he did was to 
make the amount of the policies independent of the increase in the cost of living, as 
measured in official spheres; he commissioned actuaries hired by MAPFRE to carry out 
these calculations using simply realistic criteria) 
However, even this last way of “setting a price” still does not seem to be sufficient 
to define the economy (among other things, because the vast majority of businessmen 
do not do it as just said, through actuaries, and therefore they should be excluded 
from the more strictly economic field). 
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FROM HUMAN ACTION TO THE NO LESS HUMAN WORLD-VIEW 
I have sounded out another path whose relationship with what we know about 
Larramendi I can only outline; it would require more space and more time. That is: as 
one enters into the business world as a human action developed over time, that is: 
lasting and prolonged, of long duration, one reaches the conclusion that, strictly 
speaking, not only is any human action creative when converted into a process, but 
that the value of every action can be weighed from the four areas of Scheler's axiology: 
economic, ethical, aesthetic, and religious. And, in this sense, one must lose the fear 
(whoever has it) of affirming that all human action is economic in the measure that it 
“serves” or produces something that “serves”, that is, it can be in itself a “service”.  
This is because, in a perspective that we would say cosmological, human or not, all 
changes form an inextricable complex, given that each of the innumerable processes 
that constitute it has its own time and—also as a whole—its effects are the result of a 
mutual influence between the processes and their effects that is completely 
unavailable to human knowledge. 
But this also means that any “procedural” human action involves the whole human 
being who carries it out, his different concerns and his environment, and all this in its 
temporal dimension. And that has another consequence, which is that uncertainty 
becomes an essential element in any long-term creative action and, therefore, the 
technologies, institutions and people involved in all human action are not enough to 
understand a creative process; its effects do not depend only on its technology, its 
institutions and the people who carry it out; they depend on everything else that all 
other human beings do, each at their own pace, in their own time and in their very 
different circumstances. 
Now, here we enter the world-view and, at the same time, we place the economic 
within the framework of an interdisciplinary anthropology that includes it from the 
three points of view expressed in the third and last table that I insert: as a vital activity 
(Economical life), as a value (Economical) and as an inter-relational link (Economy). 
The table has been expanded by this study;47 it was not created with it. For years, I 
thought over the matter of “culture”; this led me to understand it as a set of shared 
habits that have the double effect of promoting the innovative capacity (and also the 
regressive one, take care) at the same time that they give continuity to the human 
group formed by those who behave according to those habits; finally, the reading of 
the historicist anthropology of Jacinto Choza (1990) surprised me with the seed of 
what constitutes that table: almost without stopping there—neither in that nor in any 
of his later works, as far as I know—he observed the correspondence, twenty-four 
centuries apart, between the enumeration and analysis of the Dianoethical habits 
carried out by Aristotle and the “sciences of the spirit” (today called “of the mind” or 
“human and social” or simply “humanities”) identified by Dilthey in an unfinished work 
of 1911. 
In the quarter of a century that followed the reading of Choza, I pulled that thread, 
and now, in situating Ignacio Larramendi, I would explain it graphically as follows: 
 
47 I have also expanded it, with different columns that I do not include here, in “Liberal arts and mixing methods: Good 
reasons to educate citizens and poor pilgrims as free men”: Arbor, cxcv (2019) 9. 
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Aristotle Hartmann Scheler Fromm Dilthey 
Dianoethical Habits Intentional values 










Religious Symbiosis in Community Religion 
Worldview 
  
Aesthetical Meeting Art [Aesthetics] 
  
Intellect 









Art [Technique]  
Pedagogy 
Customs, Ethos, Ideal of 
Life 
 







Civil Organization  
Bonds in Group 
Religious Organization  
Courage 






Greatness of soul  
 Mixture in Herd Individual Units of Life  
       
The mere possibility that such a table can be composed is enormously revealing, in 
my opinion. Now he would have to prove that this has to do with Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi and that, in addition, it can help to better situate his business contribution 
and to value it more accurately, outside of all apologetics. 
First and foremost, the interesting thing is that it is possible to find five people who 
have studied the human in as many perspectives, in a period of time of about two and 
a half millennia (which is the time from Aristotle to Dilthey), and each one of them in 
his field of knowledge has proposed an improvement process that implies a gradation 
comparable to the other four). Here, by “comparable”, I mean the correspondence 
that the ten proposals seem to show in each of those degrees (a correspondence, for 
the moment, that is graphically “horizontal”).  
That so many correspondences can be given, in short, is empirical proof—without 
theoretical mediation of any kind—that the human being—every human being—is like 
that. Although the chain of relationships makes this paragraph long, it must be said 
that, potentially, every man and woman can reach the higher stage, that of true 
wisdom—as a gift and as a virtue; wisdom that not only coexists with the necessary 
psychophysical endowment, but is inextricably incarnated in it, and therefore implies 
the awareness of time and space, in relation to which it can foresee and project even 
on a “supralogical” level, associated with sublime experiences, radically valuable in 
themselves, including religious ones, and in perfect adaptation to the community of 
which it forms part, given that all this implies a true world-view shared in the minimum 
necessary for cohabitation to be possible.  
It is not a question of asking ourselves now what Larramendi's personality 
framework was like in the light of that table. What we are trying to say is that 
Larramendi's world-view—whatever it was—is situated within that framework and 
that we can “conceptualize” his own life with elements taken from there. 
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I ask myself, however, a question: the five represented in the table spoke different 
languages, and Leibniz raised this question some centuries ago: whether all humans 
think the same way—in the functional sense that the action of reasoning implies—and 
this means that he doubted it.48 Today, any answer to that question would have to 
pass through the neuroscience sieve and I can assure you that the findings already 
made are extremely interesting and radically insufficient. I will give an example: a 
professor from Queen's University (Li—Jun Ji), another from Beijing University (Zhiyong 
Zhang) and a third from the University of Michigan (Richard E. Nisbell) in 2004 released 
the results of a study on the effects of language precisely on categorization in “cross-
cultural” research; they had found that East Asians and especially Chinese tend to 
reason in a holistic and relational way while Westerners—Europeans and Americans 
above all—reason in an analytical way rather than being as concerned with context as 
the former. But they also realised that the results changed—at least, from degree—
depending on which language was used to study and express the results of the 
research, and that the changes in question were, however, smaller for Chinese 
studying English than for Anglo-Saxons studying Chinese. In short, the problem was still 
Leibniz's, only restated like this: does each language lead to thinking in a specific way 
that is different from others, to the extent that “learning languages” can change the 
way reason works? 
I am afraid so, but in a different sense than the German philosopher had. I am 
referring to the surprising fact that experts who use a particular language discover 
Mediterranean people with the confidence of those who achieve something new and 
without knowing that, in another language, this has already been expressed years 
(sometimes centuries) ago. In 2012, years after the death of Ignacio Hernando de 
Larramendi and, therefore, in the days when he had contributed decisively to building 
MAPFRE's institutional framework, Stephen Brammer, Gregory Jackson and Dirk 
Matter showed their surprise at the fact that scholars of Corporate Social 
Responsibility did not take institutional theory into account. They referred to 
“informal” institutions, that is, the set of habits that every community shares, and 
needs to share, that is, what Cicero metaphorically called “culture” before our era 
began and made Balthasar Gracian say, seventeen centuries later, that thanks to its 
greater “culture”, Greece was able to overcome other peoples.  
By then (2010), Mike Valente and Andrew Cane had come much closer to Ignacio 
Larramendi's “institutional” idea by emphasizing the public responsibility of private 
companies in developing countries. Can we therefore sing victory and deduce that 
Spain was not a developing country in 1952 and saw visions on England? 
Of course, a good part of Ignacio Larramendi's success was based on his ability to 
know and stir up all the people who depended on him. Will it have to do with the 
importance that Perry and Wise in 1990, Naff and Crum in 1999 would give to the 
effect of motivation in public service? You would have to ask Juan Huarte de San Juan; 
he lived in the 16th century, but fortunately this has already been written. 
 
48 I addressed it in “Are Humanism and Mixed Methods Related? Leibniz’s Universal (Chinese) Dream”: Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research, xxix, no. 2 (2015), 118-132. 
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The very public service role that Larramendi attributed to the large Spanish 
companies we are talking about and the differences between them—for example, 
between El Corte Inglés and the Savings Banks—means that there are many 
institutional logics that Vickers and others were talking about (2017). 
It goes further—it is closer to Ignacio Larramendi's proposal—the re-reading by 
Bazzoli and Dutraive (2002) of the institutionalism of Commons and their vision of the 
company as an organisation and as an institution and everything they deduce from it. I 
think that this would be a good starting point to “find a place” in the theory of the 
company for Larramendi. But perhaps progress can also be made if—in addition to all 
that, which seems to me to be unavoidable—the thread is followed that allows the 
third table I have inserted. Note that the idea of “institution” proposed by Larramendi 
when he spoke of “institutional companies” not only implies the formal and informal 
institution, but also places “Economical life” as one of the “constituent elements of the 
community”, according to Dilthey's conceptualization (1910). It is precisely these latter 
elements that the German philosopher considered to be constitutive of the community 
and, therefore, it is they—the “economic life” and the others in the table—that require 
the greatest attention in terms of “formal institutions” which, consequently, not only 
form, but also give stability to every community.  
In the “Economical life” understood in this way, it is necessary to place—I deduce—
the service that a “policyholder” expects and the one offered by the insurance 
company. The link that creates the confluence of both is what “Economy” would 
consist of as “effective link” of what Fromm (1965, 1966) considered “Coexistence” 
relationship.  
At this point, it is decisive that the English language only has that word—I mean, of 
course, in the usual lexicon, including the scientific one—to express, without the need 
for circumlocutions, what, in ours, we call “coexistence” and “cohabitation” as 
different realities, at least in a gradual sense, given that one thing is “coexisting” (only) 
and another is to coexist in such a way that one “cohabits”. And now we must 
remember that it is the latter, that of cohabitation, that is the desirable sphere and 
that any “institutional company” can really contribute to its existence.  
Economics would be, in my opinion, the word that would express the bundle of 
“contributing” actions to the stability and progress of the community, that is, to 
“cohabitation”. Only that other concept—economics—will be better served if the 
“Singular effective link” that is the “Economy” of the institutional company is expanded 
to the other links (Singular effective links) that coexistence requires: politics and law on 
one side; pedagogy, science, and philosophy on the other. Perhaps it will seem 
disproportionate—and perhaps it is—but I believe that this last territory—the one that 
encompasses politics to philosophy—is the one that Larramendi pursued with the 
formation of the specific Foundations that we have talked about. Only that he did not 
go so far as to conceptualize more than that—what generates the “formal institutions” 
that are those foundations—and included “informal institutions”—perhaps without 
realising that they really came first—when he said that the day should come when 
politicians would ask for the advice of the managers of institutional companies to 
define and decide the policy to be followed.  
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It is almost funny—but we will take it very seriously—that he chose to respect the 
autonomy of the Fundación MAPFRE Vida and its dedication to the arts. Look now, in 
that third table, where “art” remains as “Aesthetics”: “it leaves” the “Singular effective 
links”. But it leaves by being elevated, and, seen in this way, one can ask oneself if 
Fundación MAPFRE Vida was “leaving” the sphere necessary for “Coexistence” or 
rather if it dared to help that “Coexistence” open up and allow the “Meeting” of which 
Fromm and so many others speak; a “Meeting” that has such a strong sense that it 
ensures permanence in the interrelations of the community and, here, one cannot 
ignore that “coexistence” becomes “cohabitation”. 
From an axiological point of view, this is an eminently ethical conception of the 
company; there is no need to prove it. If I underline it now, it is for two reasons: the 
first one is the title of a book by Alfonso López Quintás: La ética, o es transfiguración o 
no es nada (2016) that focuses precisely on that higher degree of “Meeting”. The other 
reason is to recall Hartmann's distinction between the ethical nature of intent and the 
ethical nature of what is attempted in some cases. The distinction is subtle, but clear: 
all those we carry out “with intention” are ethical, but there are things—among those 
we carry out “with intention”—that are “intentional” in themselves.  
And here, in the third table included in these pages, that last nuance—that of being 
“intentional” in themselves—is given precisely in the seven “Singular effective links” 
that underlie “Coexistence”: politics, law, economics, pedagogy, science and 
philosophy. 
Now let us add that all this is implicit in all human business action even without the 
need to be aware of it (that is, without it being included in that action “with 
intention”); perhaps there are many businessmen who seek, with their company, their 
own survival and that of their loved ones, and nothing more. But that does not mean 
that the result of their business action does not generate ethical, aesthetic, or religious 
value. I have said before that, clearly, all human action seems to me to be financial, 
ethical, aesthetic, and religious at the same time, whatever the measure of each value 
and the intention of the subject in each case. Now I could qualify it more if, from 
axiology, I move to ethics itself and, for that, I go to the intellectual virtues that 
Aristotle admirably analysed and Aquinas systematized (I refer to the corresponding 
column of the third table); if I do so, a business action such as the one proposed by 
Ignacio Larramendi will require, first of all, prudence, but, in addition, a sense of 
justice, “art” (that is, know—how), specific knowledge (“Sciences”) and intelligence. If 
you go back over the third table, you will see that I am referring to dianoethical habits. 
Notice that, in a few years ago, experts in management and in all types of 
leadership insist in a special way on the importance of the virtue that Aristotle called 
“phronesis” (Eikeland, 2006; Oancea & Furlong, 2007; Fariñas, 2015). They are right, in 
my opinion, to use the Greek expression, because if they were to say “prudence”, 
which is what “phronesis” is, we can consider it purely obvious. And it is not like this; it 
goes further than what we normally call “prudence” or at least puts it in its place: 
phronesis is prudence understood as practical wisdom. 
This is definitely just a sketch. In the first two parts of this study, I have let Ignacio 
Larramendi speak, often in his literal words when some nuance could be missed if he 
did not. Fortunately, the Spanish copyright law of 1996 allows the inclusion of 
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fragments of other people's works for research purposes, of course recognising the 
authorship, and fortunately Larramendi tried to express his thoughts in writing mainly 
from 1977 until the same year of his death (2001). The enormous gap that remains 
from that point onwards, the Anglo-Saxon legislation—by preventing it—has created 
an international standard that has made a virtue of necessity. And that has 
impoverished the work of historians insofar as they assume it.  
The third and final part of this study could be situated in this last group, and not 
only because I rely on bibliography that does not precisely exclude the Anglo-Saxon 
one—quite the opposite—but because I have tried to get Ignacio Larramendi to speak 
freely for himself in the two initial parts. 
In any case, I have only promised an outline; these pages of mine are part of a book 
where all those things belonging to business and economics I have talked about are 
seen in a different light. I hope that the whole thing gives a satisfactory answer to what 
we wanted to know: how Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi contributed to moving 
towards the ideal way of creating and running a business.  
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LARRAMENDI’S PEARLS OF WISDOM 
 
From the article “LA NUEVA DIRECCIÓN” (The New Management). “RIESGO Y 
SEGURO” magazine, Doctrinal Journal of the Directorate General for Insurance 
no. 15 and 16. 1966 
 
“The Company’s philosophy must be something else: a spirit that distinguishes 
each company from its competitors and motivates the pride of belonging to it. 
The philosophy must be the justification of a company’s policy and it must be 
transferred to all its members, imbuing them with it, not just so that they 
understand the policy at a given time, but so that they can see when it must be 
changed and be prepared for when it is changed. Only in this way can business 
policy become a collective endeavour; a basic form that can be shared by 
everyone. 
 
.... But there is something else that is really indispensable for the lasting success 
of a management: the confidence that it knows how to arouse in the people it 
manages or who relate to it. No matter how right a manager is in his decisions, 
these will lose their value if the people who have to carry out the orders do not 
have confidence in two things: 
- That the number of his wise choices is high. 
- That, even if he is wrong, he acts for objective reasons and without any 
personal motive or contrary to the general interest entrusted to him”. 
 
From the article “LA EMPRESA COMO CUERPO SOCIAL INTERMEDIO” 
(Companies as Social Intermediate Bodies). October 1967 
 
“Within the social framework, the company has a dual purpose, an instrument 
of economic service to the community and group of people to which its members 
are linked, even more than any other institution. 
Perhaps for this reason, the relationship of the worker or employee with his 
company is an important field of sociological research; what this represents for 
their professional life, how it influences and conditions them, how it contributes 
to their education, how it protects them in their difficulties and how, in short, it 
contracts responsibilities to them that cannot be included in any contract that is 
merely bilateral such as that of salary or employment. 
 
For class struggle theorists, the company and its workplaces are centres of 
exploitation to which people resort to due to the urgent pressure of need, a 
permanent testimony to the injustice of our society. This is false, except in 
certain situations of occasional work of maximum harshness typical of unskilled 
labour or agricultural “temporary labourer”, sectors that are rapidly being lost. 
 
In any case, it must be recognised that this possibility is sometimes justified by 
the attitude of many businessmen who ignore their responsibilities and treat men 
in their service as a mere financial object. But generally most companies are not 
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hated by their workers, who, on the contrary, work with enthusiasm and feel 
deeply connected to its problems and successes, even though their performance 
may be high and they sometimes vigorously defend their rights. This happens 
because the company becomes more than a workplace and becomes a centre of 
relations and social ties of greater importance among those that are within 
normal reach of the average employee or worker for most of their life. 
 
This factor of the company’s integration into the community structure must be 
promoted and may have an important future sociological function, although this 
may be made difficult by a confrontation with trade union actions that generally 
try to detach the worker from their company in order to horizontally define and 
dominate them, creating a mystique of their problems even to the detriment of 
specific interests. The great modern company tends to achieve the adhesion and 
sentimental bonding of those who work in it, as an almost indispensable fact for 
its success. 
 More important than financial incentives are sincerity and human warmth, 
which cannot be faked. When this is achieved, workers are disengaged from 
trade unions, which seek to isolate them from a direct relationship with their 
employer. 
 
By linking workers to their company, they are integrated into a community that 
protects them above and beyond their strict rights and obligations”. 
 
From the conference “BALANCE SOCIAL EN LA EMPRESA ACTUAL” (Social 
Balance in Present Companies). Instituto Social Empresarial of Valencia. 
February 1980 
 
“Companies, that enjoy financial and, therefore, social power, cannot be 
satisfied with an objective of profit, or even of creation of wealth, but have 
other obligations resulting from their transcendence and public responsibility. 
 
The social balance serves to measure the extent to which a company is meeting 
its social responsibility and coordinating it with its basic objective of creating 
wealth within a technical-financial balance. It is therefore a complement to the 
financial balance or part of an integral balance, which must reflect the results of 
financial and social management, both of which are indispensable in a dynamic 
consideration and stable projection of the future of companies. 
It should be stressed that companies cannot exist without a good financial 
balance which implies technical equilibrium. If this does not happen, the 
company ceases to be, unless it is supported by collective financing which, with 
some exceptions, means the displacement, probably abusive, of the collective 
effort for the benefit of a few. If a company is not capable of making a profit and 
therefore of surviving, it is not possible to analyse its social responsibility, or to 
prepare a social balance, since it will have failed in its most immediate 
obligation, which is to be a productive community for the benefit of its 
participants and the group. 
 
.... This social balance should serve to assess how progress is being made in the 
real application of a philosophy of action based on the principle that “it is not 
enough for the wealth produced to reach a high level and be distributed 
331 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
 
according to criteria of justice and equity, if the productive system endangers 
the human dignity of those who work in it or weakens their sense of 
responsibility”. The phrase is not mine, but from Pope John XXIII's Encyclical 
Mater et Magistra and I think it retains all its relevance”. 
 
From the closing speech of “LA SEMANA DE SEGURIDAD MAPFRE” 
(Mapfre’s Safety Week) (50TH Anniversary). 1982 
 
“...There are many general and particular characteristics of a company that 
influence its improvement, but I will only dwell on ‘information’. 
 
A permanently efficient company is not possible without vast and correct 
‘information to the outside’, which allow it to be valued by those who are part 
of it and by strangers, so that it represents an effective brake that is difficult to 
avoid by its leaders, who frequently look for formulas to hide what interests us, 
with the excuse that this way it interests the company. The information allows 
the viability of a company to be effectively judged together with the success or 
abuse of its leaders, and above all prevents them from deceiving themselves, 
confusing their dreams with reality and knowing their mistakes only when they 
reach irremediable consequences.  
 
Transparent information is an irreplaceable element in stable, constructive 
business life, whether public or private. A specific expression of this external 
information, even if it is not the only one, is external auditing, which certifies the 
information and avoids state interventions or individual misgivings and 
constitutes an effective legal instrument so that financial life can be oriented 
towards general benefit and private initiative can have a public sense”.  
 
From the closing speech of “LA SEMANA DE SEGURIDAD MAPFRE” 
(Mapfre’s Safety Week) (50th Anniversary). 1982 
 
MAPFRE is possible today because it has achieved a business culture that 
prides itself on the act of creating, as the most important of human endeavours, 
and has been able to isolate itself from the world of “standards” without 
ambition and strictly material considerations. 
 
MAPFRE wants to be a human company, and believes it is achieving it. A 
company that believes in men, relies on them, respects them as they are, not as 
we would like them to be, and does not reduce them to puppets of a bureaucracy, 
but encourages them as motors that “drive” and promote the area that each one 
has been assigned and collaborate in the total area, within a positive act of 
creation. 
 
MAPFRE is a dynamic institution with a permanent tension for improvement, 
not for growth, but as a concern for perfection, for me of basic Christian roots. 
Those who know our internal mechanics will see that we are never satisfied with 
our products, nor with the speed of our claims settlement, nor with the quality of 
our service, and we always want much more than is possible, or at least possible 
for us. 
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But MAPFRE, above all, is an independent company, which has known how to 
live isolated from the various social, factual or pressure forces that influence 
any human, socialist, liberal, or conservative society and very specifically that 
of our country. Perhaps the origin of our independence is that in 1955 and 1956 
no one believed we would survive and this isolated us and made us understand 
the advantages of this independence that forces us to rely only on ourselves, to 
sharpen our imagination and initiative and to dispense with having a complex 
that professional work is a “lottery”. I believe that if MAPFRE has been 
successful it has been precisely because it has been independent and that it will 
continue to be successful as long as it continues to be so. 
 
From the closing speech of “LA SEMANA DE SEGURIDAD MAPFRE” 
(Mapfre’s Safety Week) (50th Anniversary). 1982 
 
“...I would like our fiftieth anniversary and these words of mine to be a song of 
hope, at a time when there is little hope for many companies, people and 
countries. 
There is no shortage of hope for those who are convinced that the future 
comes from ourselves and our actions, and who are ready to carve out their 
own future, to create it and improve it, to make a way and not just live at the 
expense of others. 
We have confidence and hope in the future, because it is indispensable in the 
current social structure and because, if we insurers act with prudence, energy 
and disinterest, our influence on the socio-political structure will be ever 
greater. As leaders in the industry, it is incumbent upon us to make insurance 
more than just a profit or economic interest centre for just a few, owners or even 
employees, and to deeply feel the responsibility it bears to the society around it. 
 
We have confidence and hope in the company, which is responsible for 
promoting the creation of wealth and maintaining the purchasing power of 
citizens, even if there is a paradox in that it is repudiated or denigrated by those 
who claim this with more insistence and even violence. The entrepreneurship 
must be identified with the creative and inventive initiative of man and his 
capacity as an engine of individual and collective improvement. Even with 
obstacles, misunderstandings and hostility, the company will overcome this 
because it is indispensable. Those of us who feel that we are businessmen, 
because we dare to take risks, have an obligation to instil confidence and to not 
allow ourselves to be influenced by those who sometimes mix their negative 
attitudes with their own insecurity and their concern to hide untenable actions. 
The businessman is irreplaceable in the solution of financial problems and, if we 
are respected without helping or protecting ourselves, as no true businessman 
needs to, our actions will be socially recognised and we will be considered as 
first-class interlocutors in the struggle for national improvement. This, I must 
say, does not only refer to the typically private company, with risk from its 
instigators and shareholders, but to the non-capitalist association, owned by a 
community, such as MAPFRE, and to the public one, which operates with 
autonomous assets, accepting risks and submitting its results to the public every 
year. 
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Finally, we have confidence and hope in the Hispanic people, full of defects but 
also of virtues, who will overcome their difficulties and achieve that dignified, 
noble independence that has characterised us and must continue to characterise 
us in the future. This people comprises everyone who participates in it, from the 
top to the bottom, friend, or foe. For reasons of its own merit and for reasons 
unconnected to it, it has much to offer for that new universal humanity, for the 
first time made up of people who are completely interrelated with each other and 
in which, as I said before, the countries that use our language will have a great 
relative presence. 
 
From the conference “CONCORDIA SOCIAL Y RIESGO EMPRESARIAL” (Social 
Harmony and Business Risk). Acción Social Empresarial. Santiago de Compostela, 
21 June 1983 
 
“The businessman justifies himself by risk, by adopting financial decisions, 
which affect the work of the people who support him, to promote the creation of 
wealth. Humanity is constantly calling for an increase in the goods at its 
disposal to improve the lot of millions of men who lack what is essential; the 
dignity of a country is largely measured by its relative financial position among 
all peoples; and all this requires economic leaders who accept responsibility 
and failure and drive progress. This corresponds to businessmen who cannot be 
cowards, although they can be prudent, avoiding ill-considered or irresponsible 
decisions”. 
 
“In a very special way I would like to refer to harmony and its necessity in 
social, economic and business life. Apparently the world we live in is based on 
friction, which is no longer considered inevitable but desirable; on class 
struggle, commercial competitiveness, electoral life, and ideological conflicts. In 
the face of this belief, partly the result of the error of identifying harmony with 
tolerating pressure on the weak or with the cowardice of businessmen, the 
reality is that only peoples and companies with a high degree of harmony will 
prosper”. 
 
“The businessman must create wealth, but he must also create employment and 
today we are all, in one way or another, dedicated to creating unemployment, 
although it is true that the Government and Trade Unions also collaborate in 
this, even if they say otherwise. This situation must be resolved. Employment is 
basic for men, our brothers and our children, to have the dignity of sufficient 
remuneration and active participation in national work. In this task we, the 
businessmen, must play the leading role”. 
 
From the comments of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi to the presentation A 
QUEL TYPE DE CRISE APPARTIENT LA NOTRE? By PROF. VITTORIO 
HATHIEU. Palma de Mallorca, October 1983 
 
“The analysis and interpretation of history through the relations of man with 
God in its different phases and alternatives is extraordinarily important to get to 
really know the history of mankind”. 
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“The crisis is a consequence of man abandoning God; man wants to use and 
abuse his possibilities of freedom to the full, unique in history, which have been 
due to his possibilities of wealth, also unique in history. The acceptance of 
restrictive rules ends up being intolerable to those who have everything and at 
times as now it is considered an inalienable right by the left (and a very 
comfortable practice by the right) to justify ‘consumerism’ in its various 
orientations”. 
 
From the speech made to the General Shareholders’ Meeting of the mutual society. 
1983 
 
“I must refer to the challenge that the adequate use of the means provided by 
computers and office automation represents for our future. The future success 
of any company and especially of any insurance company, even more so if it 
aspires to an international presence depends to a large extent on the success of 
the IT policy. MAPFRE understood this a long time ago and is aware of how 
difficult it is to get it right in this field. Very soon, in this year, we are going to 
start using the future basic communication line in international computing. We 
are one of the first Spanish companies to use it. We are also starting to use one 
of the most advanced databases and implementing teleprocessing systems. 
At the same time, we are interconnecting our growing word processing and telex 
equipment, in order to achieve an integrated system, with different forms of 
email. 
If we are successful in all this, we will have taken a great step towards 
improving our competitive position and turning CORPORACION MAPFRE into 
an internationally established entity”. 
 
From the conference “CONCORDIA SOCIAL Y RIESGO EMPRESARIAL” (Social 
Harmony and Business Risk) as chairman of Acción Social Empresarial. Seville, 13 
June 1983 
 
I am the Chairman of ACCION SOCIAL EMPRESARIAL, a group, perhaps not 
very numerous and with little influence, of business leaders with Christian 
concern and desire to do everything possible so that the company is human, 
feels responsible for a part of social life and for the people who participate in 
it, and submits to ethical principles and not only to general and particular 
legal regulations. This obliges us to disseminate it to all the geographical areas 
of our country and especially in a city like Seville where ASE became so deeply 
rooted that I sincerely wish this were to make a recovery. We do not expect 
excessive success in our attempt, we know that our line is not attractive , but we 
do not want to deviate from it because we are sure that in any case it is the right 
way, the difficult way that everyone wants to avoid but that it is the only one that 
leads to permanent success and in our case, to the reconstruction that our 
country and our economy need. 
 
All companies are different, with different problems in terms of their social 
function, their way of acting, their responsibilities and the impact of their 
problems; therefore any generalisation usually has errors. Personally, I am 
linked to what in the dimension of our country is called large companies, to 
which an outstanding social responsibility and leadership corresponds at times 
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of difficulty. Others, instead, participate in smaller companies whose own action 
is limited and which receive more influence than they can radiate. In any case, I 
sincerely believe that there is no conflict between large and small businesses, 
and in a country like ours, and practically throughout the West, small, medium-
sized, and large businesses complement and depend on each other. 
 
There is undoubtedly a difference between the “businessman” who directly takes 
decisions with risk and responsibility for their income or assets, and the 
“manager” who participates with a limited area of action. 
 
As businessmen, we must accept that we are not politicians and must “know how 
to be” only businessmen and concentrate as much as possible on our own area 
of business, even though for many decisions we need to know the tensions, 
strength and action of politicians and rulers that will influence our expectations 
for the future. On the other hand, it does seem socially positive that we use our 
power to draw attention to general problems and that we collaborate loyally 
with politicians and those governing us and with those who have parallel 
responsibility in specific areas. 
 
From the conference “LA EMPRESA, MOTOR DE RECUPERACIÓN 
ECONÓMICA” (Companies, Drivers of Economic Recovery). Assembly of Acción 
Social Empresarial. 17 December 1983 
 
“I think that the social-institutional balance and peaceful coexistence require 
stable rules of law, necessarily maturing slowly. Without them it is not possible 
to get out of a permanent state of rupture as happens in Spain. 
 
In Spain, where it has been said that “everything is unconstitutional even the 
Constitution”, until we fully recover a true state of law we cannot eliminate 
our problems. 
 
Roman and Anglo-Saxon civilizations, the most enduring and stable in Western 
history, have been accompanied by the most perfect legal systems ever known, 
with rules of law and custom and highly efficient judicial systems. Without an 
effective instrument of coexistence and sociological stability, that is, a system of 
law accepted by the social whole, it is inevitable that a society will be torn apart 
by internal and external upheavals that lead to formulas of violence, even the 
most serious of all, the social slavery characteristic of the countries of the East. 
It may even be thought that this social slavery offers the only future path of 
human coexistence, going back to times when the supreme value of man was not 
recognised, the “sociological” contribution of our Christian religion. 
 
Society’s current crisis is basically a crisis of the concept and possibilities of 
freedom, which we thought was automatically recognised from birth and could 
not be taken away from us”. 
 
From the comments of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi to the presentation A 
QUEL TYPE DE CRISE APPARTIENT LA NOTRE? By PROF. VITTORIO 
HATHIEU. Palma de Mallorca, October 1983 
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“We are faced with a crisis of substance and not just transitory or superficial. 
Our society is trying to escape from reality in order not to be forced to act 
accordingly, and it seems that we are in the low wave of a normal cycle of 
economic or sociological development. In Spain we all know examples of 
business situations “managed” as transitory in order not to bravely face them 
and that have led to irremediable and clamorous “cracks”. I hope that this is 
not the case. 
 
This crisis is characterised by the fact that it affects the world's sociological, 
economic and even legal structure and because it can also be a crisis of the 
concept and in any case of the unlimited freedom that many have believed 
possible and some consider an individual objective, even though to achieve it, it 
is necessary to “destroy the temple” with all the citizens inside”. 
 
From the conference “LA EMPRESA, MOTOR DE RECUPERACIÓN 
ECONÓMICA” (Companies, Drivers of Economic Recovery). Assembly of Acción 
Social Empresarial. Chapel of Colegio El Pilar, Madrid, 17 December 1983 
 
“Small businesses are a symbol of the love of freedom and risk, typical of our 
western society, which should not aspire to “beds of roses” and that when they 
dream that these are possible, they find people or groups from another country, 
another social class or another civilization, which deprive them and corner them 
, as has unfailingly happened throughout history. That is why we should 
encourage, rather than protect, small businesses, without which our social life 
and large businesses would not be viable. Leading companies are not harmed by 
the existence of strong governing bodies if they are efficient, but on the contrary, 
they receive benefit from it; in the same way, small companies are not harmed 
by the existence of a set of strong entities, if they are efficient, and they also 
receive benefit from it. 
 
I do not know if I have expressed the importance of small businesses in social 
life properly. In any case, I would like to add that it will also be a key part, as it 
already is in the United States, of that future world of information-related 
services, the only area of foreseeable employment growth, and, furthermore, that 
the new information technology favours the development of small and even 
micro-enterprises, to the point that this topic alone would justify a Seminar from 
our beloved Acción Social Empresarial”. 
 
From the conference “LA NUEVA EMPRESA DE SEGUROS. 
CONSIDERACIONES DE UN ASEGURADOR PARA EL AÑO 2000” (The New 
Insurance Companies. Thoughts of an Insurer for the year 2000.) Sao Paulo, 
November 1983. 
 
I describe a “new company” as a leading company that a country needs in each 
area of activity, to achieve, if it does so with amplitude and together, the internal 
economic balance and the international influential presence. 
Below I offer some characteristics to describe a “leading company”, that is “the 
one that shares a function of influence within a competitive market with others, 
but with effective concern for the general interest of the community”: 
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• High penetration. Size is an important and stabilising factor, even if in some 
activities the purely internal or domestic dimension is not sufficient, but a high 
relative national dimension is always indispensable to allow its decisions to 
exert general influence and be taken into account in the market. 
• Vocation for growth and, if necessary, foreign expansion to participate in 
the objective of international presence.  
• Competitive costs with regards to its colleagues, allowing them to offer 
reduced prices that contribute to lowering market averages and force other 
entities to follow the same line. 
• Operational agility to permanently adapt to a changing society, and with very 
rapid changes, which require preparation to support and face any unexpected 
changes in the market or in the country, even those that may affect its survival. 
• Anti-bureaucratic tension to avoid the internal creation of particular 
influences and interests. 
• Internal equity among the various personal elements that make it up so that 
there is a balanced relationship between remuneration and work conditions 
based on objective and justified reasons, without favouritism or pressure of 
interest unrelated to its social purpose. 
• Wide transparency with frequent, reliable, and understandable information of 
its static and dynamic situation, which allows all those legitimately interested 
in its equity evolution and results to appreciate the deviations, completing this 
with an independent, objective audit system. 
• An efficient IT structure, which provides complete, automatic and immediate 
information on results; assists in relations with all its internal territorial and 
sales services, including customers; makes it possible to have constant 
knowledge of the financial situation; allows the creation of new products or 
innovative commercial formulas and, above all, supports sophisticated 
budgeting systems, in order to foresee results and immediately detect 
deviations so that those responsible, even in small units, acquire a managerial 
sense of action. 
• Business technology, as “the art of bringing together in harmony the wills of 
all those involved in the company”. 
 
But there are also other aspects of a different nature, in a certain sociological 
way, which are indispensable for internal success and for adequate insertion of 
the company in its socio-political community: 
 
• Ethical concern, in the certainty that the undisputed application of 
moral principles is an essential piece for the recognition of its own 
employees, suppliers, customers, the public in general, and that of other 
public or private institutions with which a company relates. Within a 
market regime and free rule of law, actions that border on the individual 
ethics of managers, or that of business, or affect relations of coexistence, 
cannot be tolerated in leading companies. 
 
• Sense of social responsibility, understanding that large companies are 
not only obliged to efficiently provide their own service, but are also 
subject to institutional obligations derived from their influence on social 
life and their participation in national heritage. This social responsibility 
obliges it to be concerned about the impact of its actions on the general 
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interests of the country, about the personal and professional 
improvement of those who provide its services, and about the interests, 
rights and needs of the public and especially of its customers with whom 
it has a more direct relationship. 
 
• Own culture, that is, a way of being, existence and external presence 
that impregnates all its activity, that makes its workers feel proud of their 
company and that the public recognises it easily and not only by massive 
advertising campaigns with an idealised image that does not match 
reality. One's own culture implies a special distinction with respect to 
competitors and is an instrument for customer loyalty and, above all, a 
sign of collective respect. Although there are many other factors, this one 
provides the recognition of what I call a “leading company”, as it was 
given to former knights to recognise them as such; in both cases, it is a 




From the conference “LA NUEVA EMPRESA DE SEGUROS. 
CONSIDERACIONES DE UN ASEGURADOR PARA EL AÑO 2000” (The New 
Insurance Companies. Thoughts of an Insurer for the year 2000). Sao Paulo, 23 
November 1983 
 
“The application of principles: ethical and social responsibility is not a burden 
or obstacle for companies, but precisely the opposite.  
 
That is why I can say that the NEW COMPANY must be made, as part of the 
professional responsibility of insurers, but it can also be made, each one with its 
own characteristics and different goals since the major consequence of the 
magic world of freedom is that the free man knows and can promote his 
institutions with very different solutions within the same objective of effective 
service”. 
 
From the conference “EMPRESA Y RECUPERACIÓN ECONÓMICA” 
(Companies and Economic Recovery). Acción Social Empresarial. Valencia, 1984 
 
“...Our country and the world are immersed in a deep crisis of substance and 
not simply transitory and superficial. One of the causes of this crisis is the 
phenomenon of change, and rapid change, in science and technology. These 
last sixty years, so momentous in human history, have produced “brutal” 
changes in social and economic life. 
 
Over the last 200 years, man has learned to progress and to direct progress at 
least in part. This means that he has “opened Pandora's box” and cannot 
master its effects nor does it seem easy to do so in the future; drama of modern 
man, whose creative capacity is the main weapon of self-destruction. 
 
Moreover, the speed of change opens up the question of whether our social 
structures will be able to adapt or whether we will feel more and more 
powerless and displaced in both public and private spheres, until we are 
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overtaken by a civilization different from the white, western one to which we 
belong and which, moving forward, without ties, prejudices or selfishness, 
comes to destroy or dominate us, overwhelmed by a human tide with ideals 
almost incomprehensible to our western society, accustomed to demanding 
everything without offering anything in return”. 
 
From the interview “MAPFRE ES SU VIDA” (MAPFRE is His Life). 3 May 1984 
 
“This concern for the individual is not reduced to those who could be important 
by hierarchy; it affects everyone. In this sense, personal relationships within the 
company are essential, and although I cannot say so now because of the growth 
experienced in recent years, not long ago I boasted to know all MAPFRE 
employees personally.  
 
This concern for the selection, education and recycling of the people who work 
at MAPFRE has left its mark on the way all the people who have gone through 
this group and who are now at the head of other companies have left a mark in 
how to deal with insurance activity. To a certain extent, it can be said that 
MAPFRE has been a school for managers, not only in insurance, but in other 
sectors of the economy and politics”. 
 
From the interview “MAPFRE ES SU VIDA” (MAPFRE is His Life). 3 May 1984 
 
“The company plays a very important financial and social role and has to be an 
instrument of harmony and social responsibility. Insurance is an institution with 
many social roots that can and should have greater economic importance, but I 
believe that the spirit of service should prevail in the company, which is often 
lost due to the obsession with profits”. 
 
“MAPFRE has never applied rigid methods, but pragmatic ones to achieve the 
objective of an adequate dimension, always taking the best measures even if this 
meant rectifying more than once. On the other hand, at MAPFRE there has 
never been a concern for theory or planning, but for man. Only with good 
professional teams could this growth be achieved and in this - even this may 
sound immodest - there has been great skill in the selection of people, in their 
education in managerial life and in permanent recycling”. 
 
Last speech as Chief Executive Officer of MAPFRE. Majadahonda, 11 May 1985 
 
“I have linked my business life to transparency, to the risk involved in making a 
commitment, and moreover in writing, and this is a sign of that spirit, which 
seems to me to be indispensable in order to be recognised as a “boss” in the 
human community that constitutes a company. 
This is for me a moment of nostalgia, but in my thoughts are many friends who 
have created their professional and family life in the orbit of MAPFRE, and who 
in turn have built it, with so many good times and few bad, that this “limited 
goodbye” is an act of joy. In some cases I have had to hurt people, sometimes 
unjustly, never in a premeditated way, but there are many times in which I have 
seen the transformation of an apprentice, sometimes a child, into a mature, 
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responsible and always loyal professional; the presence here of many of them 
fills me with pride and inner satisfaction”. 
 
“A senior business leader needs two basic qualities to “create a future”: 
“imaginative fearlessness” and “executive tenacity”. The latter is the origin of 
the intense work that characterises all of MAPFRE, mine would only have a 
negligible effect, which in thirty years has led us to be the leader in the 
insurance activity in Spain, both in private insurance and in Work Accident 
insurance, as our sister MAPFRE MUTUA PATRONAL has also achieved first 
place in its own sector. 
The “MAPFRE galaxy”, which is being prepared, will need tenacity to be 
maintained by all its directors and in the different Autonomous Units. If this is 
forgotten and the tension relaxes or one's comfort is prioritized, the plans to 
which I have devoted these years will just be a “piece of paper”. 
 
From the conference “INVESTIGACIÓN, SEGURIDAD Y SEGURO” (Research, 
Security, and Insurance). Academic event on research, university, and insurance; 
meetings for a responsible society. Ávila (Spain), 9 October 1986. 
 
“Corporate social responsibility focuses on several different areas: 
 
The relationship with our own personnel exceeds legal contractual obligations, 
with two aspects of special advantages: the workers are considered as 
participants in the company and in some decisions, and equity is improved in 
favour of those with lower incomes. They reflect these many “social balances” 
of companies as well as French legislation on this subject. 
 
Equity in social relations, reflected for example in the U.S. favouring the 
employment of ethnic or social groups subject to discrimination and limited in 
their capacity. 
 
Ethics of investments, with respect to some activity or country that does not 
recognise the equality of men or because they can create dangers to direct or 
general health. 
 
Protection of the civic environment, mainly in places where the company has a 
prominent position, to cultural areas or other types of investments that are 
difficult to be profitable. 
 
Joint action with colleagues in “professional civic action” 
 
In all these cases, responsibility is manifested in non-profit actions, the logical 
consequence of participation in national wealth which, with or without laws, 
with or without direct reflection, appears in “institutional companies” which, 
due to their size or high market share, reach a de facto oligopoly, naturally with 
a social price. 
 
Another declaration of “corporate social responsibility” of a more specific 
nature is the participation and assistance to customers in non-direct technical 
areas, exceeding contractual obligations and projecting corporate action to the 
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final resolution of problems. This appears in various business sectors as a 
logical reflection of the activity itself, in the case of insurance and security. We 
insurers are in the “risk business”, not only in the financial compensation of 
claims, and therefore some of us consider “safety” in its different forms and 
areas as “ours”, benefiting our customers, whose risks we take on without 
waiting for them to be affected by their consequences. Being in the safety area, 
we must investigate, not only in the improvement of measures and applications, 
but also in the very nature of the risks, fire, vehicle, traffic or work accident, 
environmental impairment, etc. 
 
It must be taken into account that insurers, due to their own mechanics of action, 
are financed by their customers, since, in the first place, they receive the price of 
their services, which only materialize after some time, years in life insurance, 
leaving those funds “retained” for that reason; the social obligation of insurers 
is not limited to their action in safety but also implies “national financial 
responsibility”, which coordinates the strict and unwaivable defence of the long 
term interests of the insured with a collaboration in financial defence as an 
institution that manages a substantial part of national wealth”. 
 
From the conference “ESTRATEGIA DE ALTA DIRECCIÓN, SUPERVlSIÓN Y 
CONTROL” (Senior Management, Supervisory and Control Strategy). 
International Seminar on Risk Management and Solvency of Insurance 
Companies. Ávila (Spain), October 1987. 
 
“Ethical risks affect the increasing responsibility of Boards of Directors, and 
are an important area of responsibility for the CEO, who has to take measures 
to avoid them. 
 
Ethical risks, for actions that do not go as far as criminal, are significant and 
exceed what is now disparagingly called “moralising”. There is no such thing as 
a stable institutional company, as insurance companies must be, without a high 
ethical content which, even if it harms some short-term profits, contributes to the 
image of seriousness and trust that is essential to insurance. The credit and 
image of a serious, solvent company can be lost due to unethical actions”. 
 
From the conference “ESTRATEGIA DE ALTA DIRECCIÓN, SUPERVlSIÓN Y 
CONTROL” (Senior Management, Supervisory and Control Strategy). 
International Seminar on Risk Management and Solvency of Insurance 
Companies. Ávila (Spain), October 1987. 
 
“Ethical risks are increasingly being posed in the company, where actions that 
contravene legal regulations are possible; fraud or abuse of customers; 
prohibited investments and special life insurance investments by management of 
third-party funds owned by or with special rights of the insured. There must be a 
special sensitivity to this risk, which is exacerbated by recent financial 
manipulation scandals, which border on crime and may occur in areas of 
autonomous company operations or in subsidiary companies. 
 
Ethics in a service company is part of its “operational quality” and if it does not 
exist or is insufficient, the company is subject to increasing financial losses. 
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“Ethical risks affect the increasing responsibility of Boards of Directors, and 
are an important area of responsibility for the CEO, who has to take measures 
to avoid them. 
 
Ethical risks, for actions that do not go as far as criminal, are significant and 
exceed what is now disparagingly called “moralising”. There is no such thing as 
a stable institutional company, as insurance companies must be, without a high 
ethical content which, even if it harms some short-term profits, contributes to the 
image of seriousness and trust that is essential to insurance. The credit and 
image of a serious, solvent company can be lost due to unethical actions”. 
 
Article concerning the basics of MAPFRE's policy. “MERCADO” magazine. 
December 1987 
 
“.... I would like to highlight several aspects in MAPFRE’s policy, apart from 
the two basic ones: concern for good deeds, and the human relationship with 
customers and employees, for which reason we have often been called a 
“humanist company”, a principle that has influenced all our actions and should 
be considered just way of being: 
1. Decentralization at any cost, in the idea that with it more people make 
decisions, which increases the operational capacity of the company and the 
service becomes more efficient. 
 
2. Technical specialisation in each sector, in the idea that, by “mastering” a 
class of activity in depth, one ends up offering better service to customers and 
obtaining the favour of the public, from which quantitative and qualitative 
“leadership” is created. 
 
3. The scope of decentralisation and specialisation is unlimited; more can 
always be achieved, but a third factor is necessary: IT. MAPFRE has been 
fortunate in that its evolution has coincided with the great development of 
distributed IT, which still has a long way to go, opening up enormous 
possibilities for decentralised and specialised action, as it allows for ongoing 
strategic training, absolute control of costs and immediate monitoring of 
deviations. 
4. Real, not cosmetic transparency This makes speculative decisions for internal 
stability impossible, even if they sometimes allow for stunning successes. 
 
MAPFRE so far. What will its future be? No one knows. We began the 
preparation of a structure that would make the most of our position, further 
extending the application of the aforementioned principles, but history shows 
that we men cannot leave the future “tied up and well bound” and that it will 
continue to depend on God who governs us”. 
 
From the article “ESTRATEGIA DE ALTA DIRECCIÓN, SUPERVlSIÓN Y 
CONTROL” (Senior Management, Supervisory and Control Strategy). 
“GERENCIA DE RIESGOS Y SOLVENCIA DE ENTIDADES ASEGURADORAS” 
magazine. 1988 
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“Ethical risks are increasingly being posed in the company, where actions that 
contravene legal regulations are possible: fraud or abuse of clients: prohibited 
investments and special life insurance investments by management of third-party 
funds owned by or with special rights of the insured. There must be a special 
sensitivity to this risk, which is exacerbated by recent financial manipulation 
scandals, which border on crime and may occur in areas of autonomous 
company operations or in subsidiary companies.  
 
Ethics in a service company is part of its “operational quality” and if it does not 
exist or is insufficient, the company is subject to increasing financial losses. 
Ethical risks affect the increasing responsibility of Boards of Directors, and are 
an important area of responsibility for the CEO, who has to take measures to 
avoid them. 
 
Ethical risks, for actions that do not go as far as criminal, are significant and 
exceed what is now disparagingly called “moralising”. There is no such thing as 
a stable institutional company, as insurance companies must be, without a high 
ethical content which, even if it harms some short-term results, contributes to the 
image of seriousness and trust that is essential to insurance. The credit and 
image of a serious, solvent company can be lost due to unethical actions”. 
 
From the conference “SEGURO Y EQUILIBRIO SOCIAL EN IBEROÁMERICA” 
(Insurance and Social Equilibrium in Ibero-America). Mexico, 21 November 1989 
 
“What is Ibero-America? ....your identity, mine, it is important because it takes 
into account the human soul, it is less impregnated with selfishness, and it has 
allowed a civilisation that is not of “purely me”, but of the you, of brotherhood 
and solidarity because it has not in vain managed to maintain its Christian 
roots. 
 
 ....Multi-racialism seems to be a weakness, but it is your strength, a symbol of 
the brotherhood of men. Spain and Portugal created or allowed a multi-racial 
culture: Anglo-Saxons did not. This unhistorical fact exalts my homeland. In the 
21st century, Ibero-America will be better prepared than mono-racial countries 
that will lose their own defence of their material conquests and unlimited rights, 
where the “I” annihilates the “you” and the right to duty. 
 
 
...For an “acceptable balance”, a level of equity and solidarity among citizens 
is needed. Without this, a nation will lose its independence, at least morally, and 
will fall into the hands of dictatorships, even with the election of governments 
and parliaments, since a “legal-political” framework is not enough if there is no 
satisfactory social structure. This unavoidable objective is opposed by the 
resistance of those who have, and the radicalism of those who ask the impossible 
to use the “needy” in their strategy of conquering power. Intellectuals who use 
the poor in this way are “exploiting” them, even if it seems otherwise. The real 
direct aid that many religious orders have carried out with abnegation, without 
pride or being in the limelight, demands strength and sacrifice and therefore is 
gradually disappearing among the rich peoples where solidarity cannot be 
understood”. 
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From the conference “MAPFRE: PRINCIPIOS Y ESTRATEGIA 
INTERNACIONAL” (MAPFRE: Principles and International Strategy). 
Association of European Cooperative Insurers. Milan, March 1989 
 
“If, in the next century, those who succeed us as a whole and each of our 
“operating units”, maintain the same spirit, of course with efficiency in their 
management, MAPFRE will become a galaxy of “autonomous coordinated 
operating units”, the “MAPFRE 2000 SYSTEM”, in different sectors of Spanish, 
European and Ibero-American activity, and it will succeed if it continues to be 
concerned about three factors: 
 
-institutionalisation as a basic piece of coordinated action. 
 
-ethical principles, not only for “ideological” reasons but also as a 
guarantee of stability. 
 
-sense of social responsibility, since great financial power without social 
responsibility leads to formulas of savage, antisocial capitalism, such as 
that which appears and can dominate the Western economic world. 
 
I would like this to be my personal message and for MAPFRE to contribute to 
passing it on to new generations, not only in Spain, but in countries of our 
culture and ethnic and ideological origin and in Europe itself, of which Spain 
has been and must be a basic integral part”. 
 
From the farewell speech as Chairman of Fundación MAPFRE and MAPFRE 
Corporation and of the Control Committee of the MAPFRE System. 16 June 1990 
 
MAPFRE's action is based on offering in other countries management systems, 
sense of social responsibility and effectiveness in management, with their own 
technology in several areas, especially in operational computing, mass 
insurance and industrial and environmental prevention methods; but above all, 
it offers bonds of friendship, friendship between peoples and nations, friendship 
between colleagues and employees of different nationalities and deep 
institutional friendship. This is MAPFRE's expansion method; it used to be 
national and now it is international. 
 
I would like to tell you - not everything has to seem transcendental - some small 
satisfaction and vanity of my activity in MAPFRE: 
 
- At the General Meetings of the Corporation that I chaired since 1978, with 
enormous initial difficulties and where I had to appear before shareholders who 
unexpectedly stopped receiving high dividends, and whose shares were 
drastically reduced in price, from then until today, in thirteen Meetings, I have 
not had a single intervention by a shareholder. How did this happen? Maybe I 
think because I “stood up” with the truth. 
 
- I have never used “bodyguards”; I do not know what I would have done if 
circumstances had made this indispensable, but I managed to avoid it. It seemed 
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to me to be something against my own dignity, much closer to transport by taxi, 
bus or underground than to the pomp and status of bodyguards watching over 
my life, which on the other hand I have always been able to do for myself and 
without avoiding risks on many occasions. 
 
- We have never had an image consultant. Some people said to me: “If you had 
an image consultant, how far would you go!” I have always thought that 
MAPFRE's success has been precisely not having one. In any case, why would 
we need a consultant? MAPFRE has an extraordinary image throughout the 
world, without the need to use the assets of the members of the mutual society or 
shareholders with cosmetic measures of economic impact. 
 
From the farewell speech as Chairman of Fundación MAPFRE and MAPFRE 
Corporation and of the Control Committee of the MAPFRE System. 16 June 1990 
 
.... You all know my Christian and specifically Carlist background. In my almost 
35 years at MAPFRE, I have tried to create a company inspired by Christian 
principles, which has nothing to do with making ideological politics or 
discriminating against those who think differently, which has never been done at 
MAPFRE. MAPFRE has been, in everything that has depended on me, a 
company that has emerged from the application of those principles; and, as a 
company director, I have always acted as I have believed that those who call 
themselves Christians should act. One of the satisfactions of this 16 June is to 
proclaim this without blushing or with “shifted shame” that some who think like 
me have; in saying this I am not harming “my cause”, since I have demonstrated 
with the facts that with those principles one can accomplish things and perhaps 
only with them can one have permanent success. In any case, without what I 
have just said MAPFRE and my performance in it cannot be understood. 
 
….Leaving is a bit like dying. I will really leave MAPFRE poor, fairly deaf and 
half blind, but with the “pride of Don Rodrigo at the gallows”. Pride is an anti-
Christian quality, but we all have some defect and my Christianity, in spite of 
will and faith, has many, excessive defects; this is one of them. But pride is 
Spanish; and if I have given my professional life and the other life to the service 
of my country, for as long as I can remember, so the fact that I show you today a 
Spanish defect, does not cease to satisfy me”. 
 
From the book “UTOPÍA DE LA NUEVA AMÉRICA. REFLEXIONES PARA LA 
EDAD UNIVERSAL” (The New American Utopia. Reflections for the Universal 
Age). Editorial MAPFRE, 1992 
 
“Around 1948, I thought (I did not get any further) about writing a book about 
the Public Administration, in which I was working then, pointing out defects and 
realities of the Spanish public life, not the circumstantial of a period. I thought 
its motto might be a well-known poem by Quevedo, which began: 
 
I don't have to keep quiet no matter how much you use your finger, 
touching your mouth or your forehead, 
warning me to be quiet or threatening me. 
Don’t we need a courageous spirit? 
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Do we always have to feel what we say? 
Do we never have to say what we feel? 
 
It was my naive intention to speak clearly of what I saw and noticed at that time. 
Now, such a long time after, with personal independence and absence of future 
ambition, I could have used that poem for the book, but I do not because I do not 
deserve it. The book does not say everything I think, it discreetly disguises 
something of what I think and refers to aspects of the future that I do not believe 
in. Unfortunately, it is a polite and “civilized” sample of social life, with human 
respect and even Pharisaism, even written with “good intentions” and perhaps 
less selfish concern than usual. But even with this, it is a manifestation of the 
lack of freedom and fear in human beings. 
My father, a whole, incorruptible man, to whom I should have made the 
dedication, would not have accepted it, but that is why he had less material 
success, and even with everything, he said: “I know not the conscience of a 
fiend, but I know my own, which I pass for an honest man, and it is very 
unedifying”. 
 
While expressing the above, I believe in what I am commenting on and 
anticipating, even if it is with a 1,000-year gap. It seems paradoxical, but it is a 
manifestation of the mystery of humanity and a constant contradiction in which 
men and women find ourselves, the main reason why I am a submissive member 
of the Catholic Church, without ceasing to see defects and limitations which, like 
those of everyone else, only God can know and judge”. 
 
“What is predictable is that in the 21st century two tendencies will be 
consolidated: that of those who think that man is a supreme being who must not 
subordinate his action, his rights, and interests to any principle and therefore 
the history of civilization depends on him; and that of those who think that man 
is the work of God, who plays under his signals and guidance. This chapter does 
not try to convince of any position; only to point out facts or possibilities that 
allow individual or collective reflection, but indicating that a society that is not 
humble enough to recognise that it is not omnipotent has less chance of long 
survival than those who know how to suffer, sacrifice, and recognise their 
limitations, which offers hope for a distant future”. 
 
Speech at the event “DÍA DE HONOR DE MAPFRE”. Universal Exhibition in 
Seville. 24 September 1992 
 
“At this moment I cannot resist the temptation to warn you of a danger: that of 
triumphalism. The Olympic Tower, the results for Motor, an act as brilliant as 
this one, the Colecciones... all great and well done, all triumphant; and 
triumphalism always ends badly. I will not continue because today is a day of 
joy and not for a sermon, but you all understand me well. 
And to conclude, I tell you that today is not the day of the Colecciones MAPFRE 
1492, nor of the Fundación MAPFRE AMERICA, it is the Day of MAPFRE, of 
the great MAPFRE of Spanish insurance, which with great solidity resists the 
attacks from the competition, thanks to a territorial structure almost unique in 
the world insurance, rooted in Spanish society, which must follow in the next 
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years its victorious path, which in addition serves to finance the flowering of the 
Foundations and obtain a wide implantation in all Ibero-America” 
 
From the book “UTOPÍA DE LA NUEVA AMÉRICA. REFLEXIONES PARA LA 
EDAD UNIVERSAL” (The New American Utopia. Reflections for the Universal 
Age). Editorial MAPFRE, 1992 
 
“The 21st century will witness the acceptable continuity of Western society only 
if it can find a permanent balance in the universal society, with the New Europe 
and the New America. In any case, it will begin its decline as a centre of power 
and example for other societies and its share in the computing of humanity will 
gradually decrease. With the century begins a millennium that will offer 
surprises and in which the coloured or mixed-race man will acquire 
prominence, which Westerners have an obligation to respect. But even in this 
millennium, situations will arise that are beyond man's control and that can 
change the course of human history in ways that are very difficult to predict”. 
 
From the book “UTOPÍA DE LA NUEVA AMÉRICA. REFLEXIONES PARA LA 
EDAD UNIVERSAL” (The New American Utopia. Reflections for the Universal 
Age). Editorial MAPFRE, 1992 
 
“...The future of humanity must be established on new foundations that 
guarantee solidarity among the living, based on the brotherhood of sentiments 
and a profound humanistic feeling. That is, to recover the Christian, ethical 
background of existence, at the beginning of the third millennium of our 
civilization. Otherwise, humanity will not see a decided project of existence that 
will take it away from the current fever of progress, which does not lead to a 
happiness of absolute value. Technical inventions are discoveries of intelligence, 
but without heart; therefore, they do not lead to spiritual peace. I believe it is 
urgent to change the course towards which man has launched himself in order to 
find the true quality of life on Earth. 
 
.... We must re-establish understanding and solidarity among peoples in the 
universe, in politics and in daily life, leaving behind the game of the powers, 
opening up the possibility of living in freedom for every human being”. 
 
From the book “UTOPÍA DE LA NUEVA AMÉRICA. REFLEXIONES PARA LA 
EDAD UNIVERSAL” (The New American Utopia. Reflections for the Universal 
Age). Editorial MAPFRE, 1992 
 
“The great tragedy of today's society is that it is structured for a “sectorial 
egoism,” sad to say, mainly of the white race, with centripetal movements in 
which excesses of individual rights and the primacy of personal interests are 
promoted, which immediately spread to those who lack everything, considering 
envy as the supreme basis of social construction, which may be tolerable and 
even useful for a limited area or people insofar as it stimulates the acquisition of 
material goods, but is intolerable in the whole of humanity or for a large part of 
it, which under no circumstances can “come close” to what is shown to it every 
day and from what is seen to be more distant at each moment. 
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There is a vicious circle, once again mysterious and unknown, and the question 
arises as to whether humanity will resolve this conflict by itself, between the 
destitution of some and the unlimited rights of others, not in small nuclei, as was 
the case in the Middle and Modern Ages, but as a whole. I know of no precise 
solution or panacea, but there is no doubt that in order to approach it some men 
should stop believing themselves to be superior and recognise that unjust 
inequality cannot be resolved by itself, as today's society seems to suppose”. 
 
From the epilogue of the book “UTOPÍA DE LA NUEVA AMÉRICA. 
REFLEXIONES PARA LA EDAD UNIVERSAL” (The New American Utopia. 
Reflections for the Universal Age). Editorial MAPFRE, 1992 
 
“.... I cannot resist quoting at this moment the reactionary, forgotten and 
ridiculed Carlism, still respected, if not shared in its principles, in a society 
hostile to its deep religious feeling. 
 
Therefore, I dare, with the informality of this epilogue, to transcribe an article 
written by my father in 1942 for a clandestine publication by a group of young 
Carlists, who met at my home in Velázquez, 100, and at the Mella Academy, in 
calle Barquillo, and who did not accept, nor ever did, the authority of General 
Franco, nor his Régimen. 
 
A country where no one feels attached to the past is not a Fatherland, it is a 
foundling home. The unfortunate foundlings are a testament to being born, but 
how can they give what their parents gave? [...] 
 
That is why even modern policies have long since systematically refused to call 
themselves fatherlands; and they fill their mouths all the time calling themselves 
nations. Which is not the same thing. Nation is a thing of birth. Human beings 
are born, but beasts are also born. In other words, beasts have a nation. What 
beasts do not have is a fatherland. 
 
What do they care about the past? As soon as they are born, the irrational 
become independent, lose all relationship with their parents, do not recognise 
them, and are not recognised by them. Parents and children are dispersed, 
without any affection or lasting bond. They do not care about the future either. 
They live brutally, for the momentary satisfaction of their most elemental 
instincts: eating, procreating, defending themselves and standing out 
individually. They have nothing rational to convey. 
 
But humans do. A language, and with the language, the faith of its origin and of 
its purpose, the divine revelations, the wisdom accumulated by the efforts of the 
preceding generations, the history of so much abnegation and, with them, the 
veneration of parents, and of the parents of their parents, and of their ancestors, 
of whom, by blood, they preserve so many goods that distinguish them in their 
superior dignity from the irrational and oblige them to the duty and the honour 
of deserving, due to their own love and abnegation, to be worthy of the 
admiration of future generations. 
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All that Tradition is a spiritual, rational, and political current, which runs 
through natural channels from the past to the future, over bonds of family origin, 
in the common and lasting interest of the Homeland. 
 
And that is natural political life, by inviolable law. When it seems to be violated, 
people suffer or perish, proof that the law is inviolable or unfailing. Like it is the 
legitimacy of divine origin. Miserable foundling politicians, who deny or ignore 
their parents. They want to ignore them, imitating the irrational ones. And with 
this merely animalistic tendency, they do not care about the fatherland, but only 
about the nation. They do not revere the tradition of their parents, but allow 
themselves to be domesticated or run over by any master, or ruined or debased 
by any stepfather or any adventurous pimp. Since they do not bring with them 
the spirit of the fatherland, they would like to have been born French, or 
English, or German, or Russian, or to be thirty-blood hybrids, according to 
fashion. 
 
These inclusive policies are the ruin of civilization; with their animalistic 
tendency, humanity returns again to the fierceness of the jungles, they return to 
barbarism, but not to innocent and primitive barbarism, but the regressive one 
by corruption. And what will become of the foundlings? If in the charity 
foundling homes, mortality sometimes exceeds fifty per cent, in the political 
foundling homes all the miserable foundlings die. 
 
What is left in Spain of more than five hundred anti-traditionalist political 
parties that have appeared in a century? Who remembers who the Ayacuchos, 
the Fusionistas, or the Idoneos were? There were those who seemed to 
overwhelm and dominate everything for a moment: power, opinion, triumphs, 
and gains...; but they were never saved from the common fate; as soon as they 
were born, they perished without leaving any honour of memory, the same as the 
foundlings or hybrids who lived without honouring their parents. 
 
Meanwhile, exonerated, outlawed, confiscated, in prisons, fought, shot, 
murdered, persecuted, betrayed, slandered, silenced, and sold for more than a 
century. taken for dead a thousand times, only Carlism has not died because it is 
the natural political life of Spain of divine origin, the inaccessible tradition of 
eternal Spain”. 
 
From the book “UTOPÍA DE LA NUEVA AMÉRICA. REFLEXIONES PARA LA 
EDAD UNIVERSAL” (The New American Utopia. Reflections for the Universal 
Age). Editorial MAPFRE, 1992 
 
“Universality is an aspiration of man, even if he did not believe it possible; it 
was already perceptible in the 15th century when it was supposed, but without 
certainty, what later became America. That reality will be a source of friction 
and problems, as has been the unity of Germany despite the unanimous will with 
which it has been created. The transformation of the former Soviet Union is 
another example of this nature, the final results of which cannot yet be fully 
predicted. 
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Utopia has become a reality, but it is not known if man is prepared to face the 
consequences of universality or if it will be the main cause of difficulties, wars, 
and tensions, greater than those we have known so far. It is easy to manage a 
small village; rural relations are comfortable and humane, more so than those 
of a large population or country. It is hard to imagine what universality will 
require. International institutions, current or historical, such as the League of 
Nations, UN, UNESCO, etc., are forums for relations between “strangers”, with 
advantages for reciprocal knowledge, but without conditions for the governance 
of the world.  
Universality leads to superior command, to effective government that demands 
real power. How to achieve this is the great challenge of humanity, difficult to 
overcome if it wants to solve everything through markets (and wars) in which 
only the strong will triumph. 
The question for the future of Western society is whether in universal humanity 
there will be lordly peoples and slave peoples or at least serfs and whether all 
countries will agree to give up part of their sovereignty in favour of a world 
government and regional governments”. 
 
From the conference “COMENTARIOS SOBRE LA CRISIS DE LA SOCIEDAD 
OCCIDENTAL” (Comments on the Crisis of Western Society) Graduation event for 
the Master's Degree in Insurance Management. 1993 
 
“One of the causes or consequences, I do not know which, of the crisis in 
Western Society is the disappearance of family or semi-family protection 
institutions.  
 
A little over a century ago, the family was particularly important and provided 
social security for each individual, who was directly covered by it. The situation 
is now different, the change has taken place and man has become isolated and 
has had to create, for his protection, public or private institutions, one of them 
being Insurance. Its importance is being and will be great, and of this as future 
protagonists you should rejoice, but it will require relentless reduction of costs.  
 
A company only fulfils its social objective and retains its ability to survive when 
its management costs are passed on internally “less than to its competitors”. 
Every company, and even insurance as an institution, will only survive 
effectively if it avoids becoming an expensive bureaucracy, a dinosaur to its own 
selfishness at the expense of the whole population, which will become more and 
more sensitive to it every day. Insurance must be effective, it is an indispensable 
institution, but only if it directs its structure to the general benefit of society and 
not to the comfort of its leaders”. 
 
From the conference “COMENTARIOS SOBRE LA CRISIS DE LA SOCIEDAD 
OCCIDENTAL” (Comments on the Crisis of Western Society). Graduation 
ceremony of the third year of students for the Master’s Degree in Insurance 
Management. Madrid, 2 December 1993 
 
“One effect of globalization is that everything can be known and everywhere can 
be reached, with constant and growing osmosis, technological, informational, 
labour, ethnic and cultural. Osmosis at work is perhaps the most direct effect for 
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structural transformation. Until now, in a more or less Autark way, peoples, 
nations and even limited geographical areas protected themselves and made 
different standards of living possible.  
 
In the future we will all form the “community of men”, with billions from Africa, 
Asia and poor areas of Ibero-America participating at the western table, to 
which they bring cheap labour, which moreover does not always require 
displacement of people as rich people, in order to compete and survive, tend to 
use “on the spot” labour of citizens from poor countries. KLM Airline maintains 
its accounting department in India, and similar actions will be frequent, 
facilitating the revolution in communications and data transmission, whose costs 
will be dramatically reduced. You also have to think about the possibilities this 
can bring to Insurance, about what you are going to work on over the next four 
decades, which can be very different, even the most “progressive” now. 
 
Western civilization creates needs in many countries that cannot be financed in 
a universal competitive framework; this simple factor will serve to understand 
the general situation we are going through. It seems that the logical thing to do 
to resolve this contradiction is to lower the bar on needs that are considered 
essential, eliminating the superfluous ones, but I fear that this will not be 
pleasant. 
 
On the other hand, it incorporates women into the “labour market”, reducing 
their participation in the family, which loses even more social importance, a 
sociological fact that, due to various types of prejudices, has not yet been 
properly studied. But in addition to this effect it offers that of an increase in the 
supply in distinguished areas, not simply of unskilled labour, which inevitably 
increases the number of those seeking employment and, like any change in this 
dimension, produces a disturbance in the balance, until a new kind of balance is 
reached. “ 
 
From the conference “EL MECENAZGO EN LA DIFUSION DE LIBROS 
CLÁSICOS Y MODERNOS” (Patronage in the Dissemination of Classic and 
Modern Books). Summer course of the Complutense University of Madrid. El 
Escorial, 5 August 1994 
 
“I have always had, even before visiting it, an Americanist vocation; my 
professional life has given me the possibility of applying it. I encouraged 
MAPFRE to set up in America. Many years ago, I thought that MAPFRE needed 
- and I perhaps needed - America. I do not hide the fact that, together with the 
sentimental factor, there was another factor: this objective forced me to travel, 
to get to know new lands and new people, since perhaps my vocation has been 
more to make history than to study it, and the one I liked was created from 
personal and direct contact with new friends from other countries”. 
 
“In the activities of Fundación MAPFRE I have used the business technique of 
marketing, which is not the one that is taught in courses and seminars, generally 
cosmetic and not very useful, except for those who live from it. True marketing 
of any kind and in any area consists of putting yourself on a level of 
superiority in something that competitors do not have and will have a hard 
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time achieving. MAPFRE Motor achieved this, after 20 years of constant 
attempts, when it managed to run at a cost of 10 to 15 points less than its 
competitors. Hence its latest results. The Foundation has played that very game 
by acting in areas that no one was interested in (you know, no votes nor profits), 
achieving a pre-eminent position that, in some way, we hope to maintain its 
commercial nature in the new field of electronic publishing, in the dissemination 
of digital information on Ibero-America and its historical evolution”. 
 
“...Today's world, with its great possibilities, also dangers, has been partly the 
result of the action of businessmen who have known how to accept risks, 
forgetting the security of routine and the comfort of contracts with a golden 
parachute clause, contrary to the interest of humanity and their own 
companies”. 
 
From the conference and research work “EMPRESA Y DIRECTIVOS EN LA 
ESPAÑA ACTUAL” (Companies and Management in Present Spain). University of 
Alcalá de Henares, 1995 
 
Life is risk, 
that is why it is beautiful, 
but it's not a bed of roses. 
 
Keep this in mind and forget easy and quick objectives, those of convenience and 
speculation, which do not serve to create effective companies of sufficient size 
for external expansion”. 
 
About his principles of action in MAPFRE: 
 
“Maximum operational decentralization, in the idea expressed by me on many 
occasions that a fool “in situ” decides better than a clever person four hundred 
kilometres away, among other aspects because the clever person decides with 
the information from the fool, who knows what to do in view of the facts, but 
perhaps does not always know how to explain them precisely”. 
 
“MAPFRE was never ideologically linked to any group or trend. Although most 
of us leaders considered ourselves to be actively Catholic, it introduced into its 
articles of association a prohibition on any contribution for political, 
ideological, or religious purposes, thanks to which no social or political group 
requested its help at the time of the Spanish transition, and of course it was not 
involved in any of the subsequent scandals”. 
 
From the prologue of the book “CRISIS DE SOCIEDAD” (Crisis of the Society). 
EDITORIAL ACTAS, 1995 
 
“I'd like to be considered an independent man above everything else, like my 
father was. Independence makes one proud, even excessively so, but it demands 
sacrifices, the least important of which is the financial one. It is hard and often 
misunderstood even by those close, but it is still the greatest of all luxuries, the 
only one that is really worthwhile, except for holiness”. 
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“My performance comes from my father’s example and teaching, from a family 
tradition that goes back to the War of Independence, which was passed on to me, 
and I hope that through my children it will be passed on to the future. What 
greater honour can one aspire to, and even more so if one has succeeded 
without ever giving in to any injustice?” 
 
“Business success is compatible with the application of principles and values 
that limit abuse and defend the dignity of all men. I am proud to have succeeded 
in making this known to those who honestly think differently”. 
 
From the article “LA ÉTICA COMO ELEMENTO DETERMINANTE DEL ÉXITO 
EMPRESARIAL” (Ethics as a Key Factor in Business Success). Published in the 
“SITUACIÓN” magazine. 1996 
 
“With ethics, not only is the success of a great company possible, but it is 
indispensable, in the face of systems of anything goes and get rich quick, 
enrichment and abuse of the managerial function. 
 
In my opinion any business design that does not take ethics into account will 
lead to failure”. 
 
“I spent many years hearing that I was “stupid” because I did not take 
advantage of some benefits I could have achieved, and because I put too much 
emphasis on defending the company and not enough on my own. Of course they 
were not right and I continued to act according to the principles of my family 
and my religious upbringing, and above all, with common sense [in this case, I 
admit, without worrying whether I was Christian or ethical]. I could not act 
otherwise, I would have been internally unbalanced and also would have lost 
face in front of those around me. But the result, in my own selfish way, has not 
gone badly for me, nor am I dissatisfied, nor are my family, and yet none of 
those who advised me otherwise have managed to get ahead..”. 
 
From his last institutional speech at MAPFRE. Extracted from the article 
published in the “SITUACIÓN” magazine, 1996 
 
“I have not lied, except in cosmetic aspects, nor have I harmed any person with 
false information, either internally or externally; I have not gone back on my 
word, and because of this I have had problems and difficulties, even with 
personal financial outlays; I have not made a decision to select, promote or 
dismiss personnel or other types of decisions influenced by my direct interest, or 
that of my family, or by ideological criteria, nor that caused, to my knowledge, 
harm to employees, partners or customers; I have not stopped accepting risks. I 
have not consciously failed to be fair in any of my decisions; I have not made 
any public proposal that was actually favourable to what I was managing, but 
always what I thought was good for everyone, nor have I induced actions that 
were in the interest of the company but dangerous for those who had to carry 
them out”. Some will say that I was successful despite these limitations; I think, 
on the contrary, that only in this way can there be lasting business, institutional 
or political success, and that, therefore, such action is socially effective”. 
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From the conference “REFLEXIONES HETERODOXAS SOBRE DOS FINALES 
DE SIGLO” (Heterodox Thoughts on the End of Two Centuries). Casa de 
America, cycle of conferences “EL 98 DESDE ESPAÑA” (The Year 1898 seen 
from Spain) . 27 January 1998 
 
“After an examination of my long, hectic, varied, and successful life, there are 
two facts that I feel especially proud of, apart from having created a great 
family, which remains united and having had independent professional success. 
These facts are: 
 
- My participation in the Civil War, in the Carlist army of Navarre; I have never 
again felt more dignity, which was that of those around me. 
 
- No one from the “Larramendi” family, directly or indirectly, has participated 
after the war in the politics and management of Franco, which we would have 
considered treasonous to the line of our family history”. 
 
….When analysing the 20th century it is necessary to emphasize that in these 
last decades institutions have appeared that I consider of Carlist spirit, 
although with varied origin, useful for our balance in the next century and with 
the common denominator of “corporate sense” and “great business success”, 
which their monopoly has led each to be a leader in their sector. In any case, 
MAPFRE cannot be denied this character, since this 
was my conscious decision all the time that I promoted it and managed it. 
 
- MONDRAGON group created by a priest of very nationalist ranks, Father 
José Maria Aizmendiarrieta, with whom I had a good friendship. It started with 
an industrial school and had a vision of overcoming local barriers, integrating 
across the nation, and extending to other countries. 
Its cooperative spirit, adapted to the situations and needs of each moment, has 
led to this international triumph from a small town in Guipúzcoa. 
 
-Cooperativa ACOR, has been an important part of the associative life of 
Castile and I believe it will be an outstanding factor and reference for the sugar 
development of Spain in the 21st century. 
 
-MAPFRE, to which I have been linked for most of my life. It is a mutual society 
that, against all odds, after a situation of absolute insolvency in 1955, has 
become the largest Spanish insurance group, the only one capable of facing 
foreign “invasions” and with a prominent international presence. At the end of 
the 1950s, it was proposed that it be transformed into a public limited company, 
but I opposed this, losing the opportunity to enrich myself, but making possible 
the bases of its later development, which were mostly the result of this 
“institutional” and “non-commercial” decision. 
 
-EL CORTE INGLÉS, a purely individual initiative of Ramón Areces, who 
created the largest company of its kind in Spain and perhaps in Europe, and 
who before his death contributed almost all of his shares to a foundation 
bearing his name, making it an institution with the Carlist spirit that I attribute 
to it, although my statement would surprise its creator. 
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It is a glory of Spain; it has never depended on financial institutions and has 
created its own and become the main example of patronage in Spain. 
 
-LA ONCE, Organización Nacional de Ciegos, an original Spanish institution 
that has served to resolve the difficulties and inferiority of a wide range of 
disabled people; it is a unique example in the world, which has been able to find 
its basic social function and which should be exported in some way to the 
countries of Ibero-America. It is a fundamental part of Spanish social life. 
 
-LA COPE, the radio station promoted by the Catholic hierarchy, even in the 
form of a limited company, which is the only “media” in Spain that is really 
oriented towards the independent defence of citizens. Without almost knowing of 
its existence, I noticed that I was the only one who was absolutely opposed to the 
deification of Mario Conde, driven by all the other “means” of some dimension. 
Apart from small publications, almost “parish pages”, it is the only one with an 
effective Christian concern, not only ecclesiastical, to defend principles and 
values, and has also achieved economic success and general recognition. 
 
-I must also comment that Banco de Santander, created by the historical effort 
of a family's management, without origin in monopolistic public services or in 
“concentration” of entities, is in my opinion the only example similar to the 
previous ones in the non-institutional business world. 
 
With other characteristics, we must also include the Savings Banks, with a 
social spirit from their origin. They will probably constitute the main future 
financial base of our nation, especially if they are not instrumentalized by 
parties and autonomous governments and if they know how to preserve a non-
market and non-partisan associative spirit”. 
 
 
Speech on receiving the Great Cross of the Order of Civil Merit. Madrid, 9 
September 1998 
 
“My life has been one of work, of service to companies and institutions and, as 
far as possible, of being unnoticed”. 
 
From Mr. Larramendi's words at the presentation of the book “BIENESTAR 
SOLIDARIO (CEMENTERIO DE BUENAS INTENCIONES)” (The Common 
Good, Graveyard of Good Intentions). Spanish National Research Council, 28 May 
1998 
 
“One aspect that I would like to highlight is that I am perplexed by not knowing 
whether I am left or right-wing. I have never been concerned about this, but now 
I fear that any proposal will immediately be qualified in this way. I am telling 
you that I don't want to be on the left at all, nor on the right, but something less. 
My proposals are not ideological, but seek to improve the internal balance of 
society and its citizens, their internal balance, equity in the relationships of all 
and the protection of those who need it most. Let everyone qualify it as they see 
fit, although I fear that some think it is right-wing “to believe that two plus two 
can only be four” and thus disqualify everything I say, for I always refer 
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correctly or not to principles and measures inspired by reality and not by vague 
ideologies and reality is varied and contradictory. What I propose can be done 
and should be done, although I doubt it will ever be done. 
 
...The only system to achieve maximum benefits for all citizens, that is, common 
good, is the austerity of the rulers. The cost of solidarity is almost inevitably 
increasing and creating imbalances. In order to finance it, what is important is 
not only to increase public revenue, that is, taxes, but also to reduce 
expenditure. With the elimination of corruption, of the waste of measures of 
political sectarian interest. 
 
Only with this will citizens be able to obtain greater solidarity rights, but when 
the politicians who propose them are not austere they act with hypocrisy that 
must be persecuted, and it is not only a question of corruption but of many kinds 
of waste, for unnecessary works to favour friends or to obtain popularity; I cite 
in the book the creation of an international airport in a population of 4,000 
inhabitants on the island of La Gomera almost an hour away from the nearest 
one. It is a very striking example that has been and I do not know if it is still a 
target of a political party, even if it lacks the slightest common sense and of 
course I suppose it is already paralysed”. 
 
From the speech at the awards ceremony for the Great Cross of the Civil Merit 
Order, on 9 September 1998, in the MAPFRE Mutualidad de Seguros Hall. 
Majadajonda, Madrid 
 
“I have believed and still believe in corporate social responsibility A great 
company, and more an institution like I wanted MAPFRE to be, has obligations, 
not only to its employees, not only to its customers, but to the social whole; it 
acquires a very wide power, and everyone who has power has social 
responsibility, regardless of the operation. The Church, rulers, politicians, trade 
unions, and a nation have a social responsibility of this kind.  
 
This attitude has been the principle of my work at MAPFRE since my first 
moments; it has also been explicitly stated, in phrases similar to mine, by Ramón 
Areces in El Corte Inglés, who at the end of his days gave his property to a 
Foundation.  
 
I recognise that in many cases this responsibility is undertaken without 
mentioning it, it is spoken in prose without realising it, but those who make an 
institutional or business objective are more successful. 
 
This responsibility exceeds the contributions to Foundations, but these are its 
distinguished symbol, and MAPFRE has been allocating regular amounts to 
foundational purposes for decades, which I believe in the last year have been 
close to 1,600 million pesetas. I consider immodestly that these contributions 
can be considered my life's contribution to our society as a whole, which is 
perhaps related to my modest home. I admit that I feel like a patron, even if 
someone says I'm “the poorest patron in the world”. I hope that MAPFRE will 
continue in this way and that its spirit will not be distorted. (I must also say that 
357 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
 
I consider that I have been the businessman who has made the most mistakes 
and has made them the most times, although rectifying them very quickly.) 
 
From the conference “COMENTARIOS PARA LA GESTION ADMINISTRATIVA 
PÚBLICA EN EL SIGLO XXI” (Comments for Public Administrative 
Management in the 21st Century). Directorate General of Insurance, 27 April 1998 
 
“In the 21st century, it will be essential to process all transactions of official 
expenditure and payments in a logical computerized way, integrating them 
into databases, and thus provide immediate, accurate, reliable, and 
comparable information, which is the best protection for citizens against 
official abuse and reciprocal tolerances. 
 
With the current computer methods all political and social authorities and 
citizens will be able to know the reality without complicated analysis; this will 
be the most effective instrument, both for freedom and for the authentic 
participation of citizens in public life of any kind and any geographical area, 
avoiding interested interference. It would be a very important step for our 
nation, which would contribute to balance and tranquillity in the next 21st 
century. Could anyone openly oppose this? Will it upset the managers of public 
spending units? Will it offend autonomous communities and town councils? Will 
permanent knowledge of the expenditure of the Community of La Rioja be 
considered offensive? Will it be considered incorrect that these data could be 
known by the Community of Murcia or the Town Council of Logroño? 
 
This “operational transparency” requires the complete “accounting 
standardisation” I am referring to, which must be at national, autonomous and 
municipal level, which is already used by large companies, in medium-sized 
companies and even in some small companies to get ahead in a free market, 
where only those who take the necessary measures more quickly will be in a 
position to deal with the problems”. 
 
Words spoken at the presentation of the book “BIENESTAR SOLIDARIO. 
(CEMENTERIO DE BUENAS INTENCIONES)” (The Common Good, 
Graveyard of Good Intentions). Spanish National Research Council, 28 May 1998 
 
“Today's Western society will face basic problems in the 21st century in two 
main ways: 
 
1.- It needs to increase, companies want to earn more than in the previous year. 
Employees want to increase their purchasing power, citizens want ever higher 
levels of welfare. This mechanism seems to be dangerous to me because there 
must inevitably be a brake and with it a crisis or a great crisis. Is this 
inevitable? Is this the great threat of the century? Let everyone judge what they 
should and can do to avoid it. 
 
2.-Globalization has an impact on every country, and it is good that it is 
happening. Let the citizens of the poorest nations increase their welfare and 
decrease the welfare of those who have more. But they are trying to rebel and 
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they will blame the rulers of the moment, inducing the citizens not to consider it 
inevitable, such as rain or drought are considered. 
 
The only possibility to increase the development and welfare of a nation or not is 
the transparency of public management, of accounting data, of information 
technology; if there is transparency, the possibility of social balance and 
improvement of citizens will increase. 
 
This is the objective I am seeking in this book and in other publications; if I 
succeed, if its transcendence is recognised, social balance will be easier for the 
benefit of nations and above all their citizens. That is why I am convinced that 
the antidote to increasing possible well-being is transparency in public 
management, in accounting data, in information technology. Only if there is 
transparency will the probability of social balance and improvement for citizens 
increase. 
 
That is the goal I am looking for in this book and other publications”. 
 
 
From the conference “ACTUALIDAD DE LA DOCTRINA SOCIAL DE LA 
IGLESIA PARA LA VIDA PÚBLICA” (Relevance of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church for Public Life) . Catholics and Public Life Congress. Fundación 
Universitaria San Pablo C.E.U. Madrid, 6 November 1999 
 
“The de-Christianisation of our era comes much more from the hedonism and 
selfishness of men and women, even Catholics, than from official or sectarian 
influence of any kind; it has more right-wing than left-wing origins, it may be 
sad but it is a fact”- 
 
“For me personally the only hope for the betterment of humanity is in the 
Catholic Church (and within it in those who maintain “blind faith”), in Spain 
and especially in America”. 
 
“To give an example, words are not enough, of what it means to be Catholic, as 
in the time of the first Christians or as for a long time in England, when being a 
Catholic was something different that was admired even if not shared. Catholics 
in general, and the most representative ones in particular, must take this into 
account, and understand that in social life they have a personality that 
distinguishes them from those who are only dominated by hedonism and 
selfishness”. 
 
From the book “IRREFLEXIONES PROVOCADORAS” (Inflammatory 
Irreflections). 2001 
 
“Crises in companies make them improve or disappear; it is dangerous to avoid 
them, hide them or lie about them instead of facing them”. 
 
“Unpredictable sociological repercussions will appear when the economic 
imbalance forces in one way or another to reduce by half or to a lot less the 
359 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
 
average income of Western citizens, something catastrophic for those used to 
being at the top”. 
 
From the interview with a successful businessman. “LA RAZÓN” newspaper. 4 
February 2001 
 
“The secret of my success as a businessman is based on a certain 
entrepreneurial instinct. Treat people well; be truthful and serious. When I 
joined MAPFRE the company was bankrupt and had 200 employees, I had to 
fire 100. There was no choice. And I always faced the consequences before those 
that were fired... You have to face the consequences in these difficult situations 
and not try to make the middlemen play that role”. 
 
“The MAPFRE culture is based on defending the truth against lies and 
deception, because only the truth dignifies and saves. Also respect for men, 
demanding them to love the truth, which a company needs, even if some believe 
it is inconvenient; in the long run I believe that not only is it not, but it is the 
only possibility of success”. 
 
“I point out with pride that I have stood by my religious beliefs, with “blind 
faith”, as I learned from my elders and I leave this to my descendants, this is an 
honour. My actions also show that success is possible without political and 
financial dependence, when this seems to be an obstacle in the society we live in. 
Just for the end, a word to Lourdes, my wife: thank you”. 
 
 
The Larramendi Decalogue for success: 
 
1. It is essential to be ethical to be profitable. 
2. Austere in expenditure 
3. Tell the truth. 
4. No cheating... not even with the Tax Agency. 
5. Be serious at work. 
6. Equity in decision-making. 
7. Transparency before employees and customers. 
8. Objective in playing. 
9. Face the consequences in adversity. 
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1. EL RIESGO CATASTRÓFICO EN LOS SEGUROS PERSONALES. Publications of the 
Insurance Compensation Consortiums, 1947 
 
Summary of Contents: This work, which received the First Marín Lázaro 
Insurance Prize in 1947, awarded by the Directorate General of Insurance, 
begins with an explanation of the general theory of risk in order to situate the 
so-called catastrophic risk within it. It then establishes a series of reasons that 
justify the need for the cover of extraordinary risks, developing the evolution of 
these risks in the international field, while analysing in detail the convenience 
of resolving the consequences that the risk of catastrophe brings with it. The 





2. TRES CLAVES DE LA VIDA INGLESA. Editorial  Cálamo,  1952.  Esplandián Collection, 
189 p 
 
Summary of Contents: This work brings together the experience of 
Larramendi's stays in London, where he lived to broaden his professional 
knowledge. In it he studies the English social structure and in particular the 
general aspects of English justice and the legal profession, the roots of its 





3. ANOTACIONES DE SOCIOPOLÍTICA INDEPENDIENTE. Plaza & Janés, 1977 
 
Summary of Contents: In this book, written in 1976, which appears at a time 
when Spain was going through a stage of profound change, Larramendi reflects 
that not only political professionals should express their ideas of what they 
believe is best for the country, but that all those who have a useful experience 
to communicate should do so. With this 
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aim he writes this book, in which he contributes his opinions about the path 





4. MANUAL BÁSICO DE SEGUROS. Editorial MAPFRE, 1st reed. – Madrid, 1982. 186 p. 
 
Summary of Contents: A complete handbook on Insurance which deals with 
the origin of insurance, Insurance as an institution, Insurance Contract and its 
types, Insurance Techniques, the Insurance Company: its functions and services. 
Its structure and organisation, the distribution of insurance, the Agent, 




5. ‐ UTOPÍA DE LA NUEVA AMÉRICA: REFLEXIONES PARA LA EDAD UNIVERSAL. 
Editorial MAPFRE, 1992, Madrid 
 
Summary of Contents: It contains geographical information about Ibero-
America and Anglo-America, which systematically describes them, with 
statistical data, prepared and coordinated to facilitate the knowledge of what 
they represent. It is followed by ten “reflections” on aspects related to the 
book’s aim: “the future of America in the next millennium” commenting on 
Western society; Spain and Europe, from where the current America comes 
from; relations between and with the two subcontinents, to reach a perspective 
of the New America, from Tierra del Fuego to Alaska and Canada, and the legal 




6. ‐ CRISIS DE SOCIEDAD. REFLEXIONES PARA EL SIGLO XXI. Madrid, Actas, 1995. 
 
Summary of Contents: In this work, Larramendi applies his extensive business 
and life experience to comment on some aspects of Spanish society in the 21st 
century, issues of which he has knowledge and on which he believes he can 
contribute useful opinions. The work therefore includes reflections on issues 
such as power, corruption, employment or solidarity, which could have key 
impacts for the future of Spain. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/i18n/consulta/registro.do?id=936 
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7. ‐ PANORAMA PARA UNA REFORMA DEL ESTADO. Madrid, Actas, 1996 
 
Summary of Contents: In this book the author gathers the immediate needs or 
advantages of undertaking a State reform to face the general crisis, not only 
Spanish, in the face of problems from the year 2000 onwards. Its purpose is to 
demand that the Public Administration be transparent and comprehensible, 
both for those who have to manage them and for those who have to use them. 
In this work Larramendi reflects on the change, improvement and operative 




8. ‐ BIENESTAR SOLIDARIO, CEMENTERIO DE BUENAS INTENCIONES. Madrid, Editorial 
Actas, 1998 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflections on the Welfare State, public spending, 
education, health, pensions and unemployment in Spain. In this book, 
Larramendi points out a series of ideas and suggestions to help public officials 
get a better understanding of their obligations to promote a more effective 
society, with decisive participation of citizens and social institutions and less 
prominence of the official. The work only deals with the areas of Spanish 
society that the author considers supportive, such as education, health, 




9. ‐ ASÍ SE HIZO MAPFRE: MI TIEMPO. Madrid, Actas, 2000 
 
Summary of Contents: Larramendi writes about MAPFRE's history in relation to 
him, highlighting where he played a decisive role. The book is divided into two 
parts: the non-operational part, in which the author recounts his family 
background and deals with institutional aspects and principles that explain 
what MAPFRE has been, why things have been done and how they have been 
done. In the second part, the operational part, he explains chronologically and 
by decades, how MAPFRE was built from the 1950s to the beginning of the 
1990s and after a title dedicated to the territorial aspect, he deals with three 
areas: international, financial and real estate. 
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10. ‐ IRREFLEXIONES PROVOCADORAS. Madrid, Actas, 2001 
 
Summary of Contents: In this last book, Larramendi shows his will to reveal the 
convictions that have guided him both in his personal and professional life, 
especially his firm Catholicism. He also deals with social and antisocial values, 








1.‐ LA EMPRESA ASEGURADORA ESPAÑOLA ANTE EL MERCADO COMÚN. Madrid : [s.n.], 
1961 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the conditions, impact and expectations of 




2. ‐ MAPFRE COMO GRUPO ORGANICO. Madrid : [s.n.], 1962 
 
Summary of Contents: Article in which MAPFRE is analysed as an institutional 
group formed by several companies for insurance, financing and 
complementary activities, which carry out their activities according to the 




3.‐ EL RETIRO EN LA SOCIEDAD FUTURA [Written about the 1st Meeting in Avila for a 
Responsible Society, promoted by MAPFRE, 29-30 October 1984] Written by MAPFRE. It 
includes a card indicating that the document is the first draft of a project to be 
discussed with the Association des Ages, an institution promoted by the Caisse 
Générale de Depots de France, or another institution linked to it, which, if necessary, 
would collaborate in carrying out and promoting it in a wide range of French socio-
economic institutions. Both the document and the card are dated 29 June 1984 
 
Summary of Contents: This summarises the objectives of these Meetings, 
promoted annually by MAPFRE, FUNDACION MAPFRE and other Spanish or 
European institutions to monographically deal with a transcendental subject for 
our current society. In this 1st Meeting, retirement in the future society. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/i18n/consulta/registro.do?id=12415 









1. ‐ ESPAÑA, VANGUARDIA EN EL SEGURO. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, 
Dirección General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, Directorate 
General of Insurance), Ministry of Finance. Extraordinary No. 14-5-1947, No. 116; p. 
707-709 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the profound importance and the 
extensive radius of social and individual interest of Insurance in the history of 





2. ‐ EL SEGURO EN LA CRISIS ECONÓMICA INGLESA. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, 
Dirección General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, Directorate 
General of Insurance), no. 116; 9-1947, p. 1841-1844. 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the situation of the English insurance market 




3. ‐ EL CHARTERED INSURANCE INSTITUTE. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, 
Dirección General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, Directorate 
General of Insurance), Ministry of Finance. No. 121; 10-1947, pp. 2,209-2,214 
 
Summary of Contents: Chronicle analysing the main objectives of the activities 
of the Chartered Insurance Institute, an instrument of cooperation and 




4. ‐ ORGANIZACIÓN DEL SEGURO INGLÉS. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, Dirección 
General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, Directorate General of 
Insurance), Ministry of Finance. No. 123; 12-1947, pp. 2,809 to 2,814 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the most peculiar characteristics of the 
organisation of Insurance in England, inherent to its system and organisation 
based on freedom, tradition and seriousness 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/i18n/consulta/registro.do?id=12493 




5. ‐ HACIA UNA POLÍTICA EN LA AGENCIA DE SEGUROS. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y 
Ahorro, Dirección General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, 
Directorate General of Insurance), Ministry of Finance. No 124; 1-1948, Pg 75 to 80 
 
Summary of Contents Reflection on the importance of the regulation of the 
insurance industry, with special attention to the agents, as well as the 
aspiration not only for a perfect regulation but also for a policy that, 





6. ‐ LOS AGENTES PRODUCTORES DE SEGUROS. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, 
Dirección General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, Directorate 
General of Insurance), Ministry of Finance. No.126; 3-1948, P. 255 to 262 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the reasons for the special characteristics of 
English Insurance and why it is not possible to transplant much of what is good 
about the organisation of English Insurance to other countries, including Spain, 




7. ‐ EL SEGURO DE VIDA BRITÁNICO EN 1947. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, 
Dirección General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, Directorate 
General of Insurance), Ministry of Finance. No 127; 4-1948, Pg  349 to 356 
 
Summary of Contents: Study of the two types of English life insurance: ordinary 
insurance and industrial insurance. Includes new business figures for Insurance 




8. ‐ EL SEGURO DE INCENDIOS EN LA GRAN BRETAÑA. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y 
Ahorro, Dirección General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, 
Directorate General of Insurance), Ministry of Finance. No 128; 5‐1948, Pg 535 to 540 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the high worldwide accident rate in this 
branch of insurance during 1947 and earlier and study of the technical situation 
of the branch up to that date in Great Britain. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/i18n/consulta/registro.do?id=12451 




9. ‐ SEGURO BRITÁNICO DE ACCIDENTES. Boletín Oficial de Seguros y Ahorro, Dirección 
General de Seguros (Official Insurance and Savings Gazette, Directorate General of 
Insurance), Ministry of Finance. No 135; 12‐1948, PG 2117 to 2124 
 
Summary of Contents: Reasons for the difficulties in analysing accident 
insurance through the accounts of British Insurance Companies and 




10. ‐ LLOYD’S. Revista de Derecho Mercantil No. 16. 1948 
 
Summary of Contents: Study of the originality and influence in the insurance 
activity of Lloyd's Underwriters Corporation, analysing its psychology, its history 





11. ‐ SITUAZIONE DEL MERCATTO ASSICURATIVO INGLESE. Rivistta de Diritto, 
Economia e Finanza delle Assecurazioni Private. Anno XVI, Fasc.6 1949 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of Insurance in England as a national industry 
par excellence, with more in-depth analysis of life insurance, fire insurance and 




12. ‐ EL SEGURO ESPAÑOL EN 1949. Revista de Derecho Mercantil. No.25; January-
February 1950; Pages 89-98 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the important changes operated by the 





13. ‐ NOTAS PARA UNA TEORÍA DE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL. Revista de Derecho 
Mercantil ARBOR No. 65. May 1951 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of Social Security as an institution of social 
policy and its purpose of distributing the national income of consumption partly 
in a regime of equality and partly in a regime of freedom, addressing its social, 
economic and political aspects. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12362 





14. ‐ CLASES DE REASEGURO. Publicaciones del Boletín Oficial de  Seguros  y  
Ahorro(Publications of the Official Insurance and Savings Gazette). 194‐ 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of various reinsurance rating systems with a 




15. ‐ EL SEGURO ESPAÑOL EN 1952. Revista de Derecho Mercantil; No. 43; January-
February 1953, pages 53 to 82 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis and legislative summary of 1952, considered by 
the author as one of the most important in the quantitative and qualitative 




16. ‐ EL SEGURO ESPAÑOL EN 1953. Revista de Derecho Mercantil; No. 49; January-
February 1954. Pages 79 to 106 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis and legislative summary in the field of Spanish 




17. ‐ ÁMBITO DEL DERECHO DE SEGUROS. Revista de Derecho Mercantil; No. 52; July-
August 1954, pages 43 to 70 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of modern trends in the creation of insurance 
law: doctrinal, legislative, Anglo-Saxon and North American jurisprudence and 




18. ‐ EL SEGURO ESPAÑOL EN 1954. Revista de Derecho Mercantil; No. 56; April-June 
1955. Pages 349 to 374 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis and legislative summary in the field of Spanish 
insurance in 1954. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12476 
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19. ‐ NOTAS SOBRE LA IMPLANTACIÓN DEL SEGURO OBLIGATORIO DE AUTOMÓVILES 
EN ESPAÑA. “Riesgo y Seguro”, First Quarter 1963. Directorate General for Insurance 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the Law that Compulsory Motor Liability 





20. ‐ OBSERVACIONES SOBRE EL FUTURO DEL SEGURO PRIVADO. Revista Doctrinal de 
la Dirección General de Seguros “Riesgo y Seguro”, Nos. 13 and 14 First and Second 
Quarter 1966. Pg 75‐92 
 
Summary of Contents: Review of the situation and future perspective of 
insurance in order to adapt it to the new social conditions that were arising in 




21. ‐ LA NUEVA DIRECCIÓN. Revista Doctrinal de la Dirección General de Seguros 
“Riesgo y Seguro”. Nos. 13 and 14 First and Second Quarter 1966. Pg 75‐93 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on company managers, personnel policies 
and management skills in insurance companies in Spain. This article is based on 
the paper presented by the author at the Study Seminars for General 
Managers, held in Palma de Mallorca on 9, 10 and 11 November 1966 and 




22. ‐ EL MOMENTO DEL SEGURO ESPAÑOL. Article published in El  Europeo,  14  May 
1967 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the Insurance Market and Insurance 




23. ‐ CRISIS IN SPANISH INSURANCE Insurance Monitor, no. 5 May 1974; pg 170‐ 174. 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the insurance market in Spain and the 
crisis of the insurance sector in the 1970s. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12391 
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24. ‐ MADRID. [THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES WHITCH BEGAN AFTER THE 
DEATH OF FRANCO ARE STILL THE PROTAGONIST OF SPANISH LIFE] Best's review. ‐ 
Rensselaer, N.Y. : A.M. Best, Co., December 1976, p. 53‐54 
 
Summary of Contents: The political and social changes which began after 
Franco’s death still play a leading role in Spanish life. Day‐to‐day business and 
economic considerations are forgotten as each political group tries to prepare 
for the new situation and seeks to place itself in the most advantageous 




25. ‐ FOREWORD TO “MANUAL DE PREVENCION DE ACCIDENTES PARA OPERACIONES 
INDUSTRIALES”. Editorial MAPFRE, 1977 
 
Summary of Contents  Analysis of the characteristics and purpose of FREMAP, 
the Mutual Society for Occupational Accidents and Occupational Diseases of 
the Social Security; and notes on occupational health and safety and the 




26. ‐ FOREWORD TO THE “MANUAL DE PROTECCIÓN CONTRA INCENDIOS” Editorial 
MAPFRE, 1978 
 
Summary of Contents: Foreword to the Fire Protection Manual in which the 





26. ‐ MADRID Best's Review: World Insurance Forum, August 1981, p. 53 
 
Summary of Contents: Although some reports mainly refer to insurance 
activities, it is sometimes impossible to avoid mentioning politics. The mass 
media enable our "putsch" of 23 February to be followed by millions of people  
around  the world, who were better informed than myself. I was working about 
400 meters from the scene of the attempted coup, and although I heard the 
sirens of the police cars, I continued working in my office for another three 
hours. When I finished, I took a taxi in an apparently quiet and normal town in 
which the traffic was not very different from any other day 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12491 




27. ‐ SPAIN Best's Review: World Insurance Forum, January 1981, p. 64‐65 
 
Summary of Contents: To further better understand the Spanish insurance 
market, I want to discuss some comparative studies on five markets which 





28. ‐ “MAPFRE : UN LIDERAZGO GANADO A PULSO”: INTERVIEW BY JOSÉ ANTONIO 
ROCA TO IGNACIO HERNADO DE LARRAMENDI Article published in: Actualidad 
Económica, 1 April 1982 
 
Summary of Contents Interview with Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi on how, 
after twenty-five years at the helm of MAPFRE, he turned it from a small 





29. ‐ EL SEGURO EN EL MUNDO Article published in ABC newspaper, 1982 
 
Summary of Contents: On insurance as a universal activity, an overview of 
insurance in the world and its global premium income in 1979. Basic 




30. ‐ MAPFRE: HACIA EL FUTURO. Epilogue of the book Cincuenta años: MAPFRE hacia 
el futuro, May 1983. Editorial MAPFRE, D.L. 1983. 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on MAPFRE's history and past, what MAPFRE 
has been and what it is as of the date this book was published, the good and 
the bad, without image cosmetics and forecasting the future of the MAPFRE 




31. ‐  IGNACIO  HERNANDO  DE  LARRAMENDI.  Interview by journalist Rosa del Río 
published in Dinero magazine in April 1983 
 
Summary of Contents: Interview on Ignacio Larramendi's professional career at 
MAPFRE, from which we can extract Mr. Larramendi's role in the construction 
of the Corporación MAPFRE and the importance of his leadership in achieving 
it. 





32. - INTERVIEW IN "LA CHILENA" NEWS PROGRAMME Interview with Mr. Larramendi, 
published in the La Chilena News Programme in Santiago de Chile, on 5 August 1983 
 
Summary of Contents: Interview with Ignacio Larramendi as chairman of 
MAPFRE about how he managed to position himself at the head of Spanish 
Insurance with a very peculiar policy, fleeing from the traditional moulds and 




33. ‐ LA EMPRESA EN LA ENCRUCIJADA Editorial Revista ASE, 28 March 1983 
 
Summary of Contents: On two issues that shook the lives of businessmen at 
that time: Social Security fraud in Catalonia and the imprisonment of some 




34. ‐ UNE EXPÉRIENCE Article published in the magazine Profesions et Entreprises. May-
June 1983 
 
Summary of Contents: Article in French in which Mr. Larramendi pronounces 




35. - ANTE LA REINDUSTRIALIZACIÓN Article published in the “Acción Empresarial” 
magazine. Madrid, April‐June 1984 
 
Summary of Contents: On re-industrialisation and the recovery of jobs lost as a 
result of various kinds of industrial re-conversions, the protection of trade 
unions for workers with better incomes and the abandonment of small 
companies without instruments of pressure, in an unsocial attitude of 




36. ‐ “MAPFRE ES SU VIDA” INTERVIEW  An interview published in the Actualidad 
Económica magazine in May 1984 
373 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
 
 
Summary of Contents: On Ignacio H de Larramendi's contribution to MAPFRE, 
its organisation and its business culture to transform it from a small mutual 
society that was going bankrupt to the second largest group and natural leader 




37. ‐ LA NUEVA ETAPA DEL SEGURO ESPAÑOL Article for "Best” Magazine, July 1984. 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflections on the new Insurance Law of 1984, in the 
pipeline after almost 20 years with various vicissitudes. He reflects on the fact 
that with this new Law and the problems that were posed by generally small 
entities in difficult situations, which were being liquidated by the Directorate 




38. ‐ EL FUTURO DE LAS MUTUAS DE SEGURO DE ESPAÑA Article published in the 
Riesgo Magazine, November 1984 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the prospects for mutual insurance 
companies in Spain following the publication of the Private Insurance Law on 
the threshold of Spain's accession to the European Economic Community, a 




39. ‐ CAPITAL RIESGO Y SEGURO Article published in  “ESIC” Magazine,  November 
1984 
Summary of Contents: On the importance of Life Insurance and Pension Funds 
in the “risk-capital” market, being a national objective to strengthen it, since 
this reinforces the capital market that industrial and technological companies 
need for their development for the benefit of the general interests of our 




40. - INTERVIEW IN THE "ACTUALIDAD ASEGURADORA" MAGAZINE Interview in the 
Actualidad aseguradora magazine. Madrid. January 1985 
 
Summary of Contents: Article-interview on Larramendi's decisive role and 
leadership in MAPFRE's success, and the importance of his leadership and 
vision of the future in achieving it. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=994 
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41. - INTERVIEW IN DIARIO YA, DECEMBER 1985: LOS ESPAÑOLES GASTAMOS UNA 
MEDIA DE 11.500 PESETAS EN PRIMAS DE SEGURO AL AÑO: EN 
EUROPA SE INVIERTE 15 VECES MÁS Interview in the newspaper  Diario Ya, December 
1985 
 
Summary of Contents: Interview in which Mr. Larramendi analyses the fact that 
Spaniards spend on average less than the rest of Europe on insurance 




42. - FOREWORD "PREVIDÊNCIA PRIVADA: FILOSOFÍA, FUNDAMENTOS TÉCNICOS, 
CONCEITUAÇAO JURÍDICA" DE MANUEL S. SOARES PÓVOAS Fundaçao Escola Nacional 
de Seguros, 1985. São Paulo; 
 
Summary of Contents: Prologue to the book by Manuel Soares Povoas on 




43. ‐ EL SEGURO ESPAÑOL Y LA COMUNIDAD ECONÓMICA EUROPEA. Draft of the 
article published in the "Reactions” magazine, Madrid, 23 May 1985. 
 
Summary of Contents: On the foreseeable consequences of Spain's entry into 
the EEC for the Spanish insurance market and general reflections on what this 




44. ‐ MADRID. ‐ NEW JERSEY: A.M.BEST COMPANY, 1985 Article published in Best's 
Review: World Insurance Forum, November 1985, p. 106‐108 
 
Summary of Contents: The Spanish insurance industry is at present awaiting 
the repercussions from the country's entry into the European Common Market 
and from the new insurance law. These two circumstances may be the 
beginning of a new phase for Spanish insurance, once it adapts to EEC 
standards and after the extreme liberalization that the Reglamento de la Ley de 




45. ‐ MADRID. ‐ NEW JERSEY: A.M.BEST COMPANY, 1985 Article published in Best's 
Review: World Insurance Forum, April 1985, p. 86‐88 
 
Summary of Contents: For many years, Spanish insurance was "waiting for 
Godot" as personified in the new insurance law. The delay seemed to interrupt 
all the reorganization, merger or coordination decisions companies had to 
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make. As I mentioned in my previous report, the law was enacted on 2 August 




46. ‐ EL GRAN HETERODOXO DEL SEGURO: DESCENTRALIZACIÓN  Y  PRAGMATISMO. 
LAS DOS FÓRMULAS PARA LLEVAR A MAPFRE DE LA RUINA AL PRIMER PUESTO DEL 
SECTOR Article by Bernardo González published in Revista  Mercado, (Madrid), April 
1986 
 
Summary of Contents: Article-interview on Larramendi's decisive role and 
leadership in MAPFRE's success, in which he alludes to the strategy and 
principles in management and organisation that allowed MAPFRE to evolve 




47. ‐ EL FUTURO DEL SEGURO ESPAÑOL Article published under the title "Años para 
afianzarse", in the Actualidad Económica Magazine, March 1987 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflections on the fact that the future is not predictable. 
However, within uncertainty, it is possible to foresee a greater weight of 
insurance in employment and national income, dominated by large companies 
that will have to compete with banks, with the author considering that the 




48. ‐ NO SOMOS COMPRABLES Interview published in Dinero magazine, 2 June 1987 
 
Summary of Contents: Interview on the history of MAPFRE, its evolution and 
market forecasts for the coming years, extending into life insurance as the best 




49. ‐ HISTORIA DE MAPFRE Article published in Mercado Magazine, December 1987. 
 
Summary of Contents: On several aspects of MAPFRE's policy: concern for the 
good work and the human relationship with customers and employees, 
decentralization, technical specialization in each sector and real transparency. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12369 
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50. ‐ SEGURO Y CATÁSTROFE: SU DEFINICIÓN JURÍDICA  Offprint of Revista Española 
de Seguros, no. 51 Madrid, 1987. This article contains the lecture given by Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi on 30 April 1986 at the Spanish Directorate General of 
Insurance, due to a meeting held by the Ibero-American Cooperation Committee of 
AIDA, which took place taking advantage of the fact that a large number of Ibero-
American congressmen were travelling to Europe to attend the 7th World Congress of 
Insurance Law in Budapest, a few days later. 
 
Summary of Contents: On the legal aspect of catastrophic risk and its coverage. 
Suggesting definitions of both this risk and each of its main manifestations, in 





51. ‐ SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE SICKNESS INSURANCE IN SPAIN In Geneva 
papers on risk and insurance: issues and practice. ‐ Geneva: The Geneva Association . 
01/10/1987 Volume 12 Number 4 -1987 
 
Summary of Contents: FUNDACION MAPFRE is very concerned about this 
problem as one of the most serious of our society and has started some studies 
on Medical Assistance in Cuba, Venezuela and other countries and it will hold a 




52. ‐ FOREWORD. Diccionario MAPFRE de seguros by Julio Castelo Matrán Foreword by 
Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE, D.L.1988 
 
Summary of Contents: Prologue of the book Diccionario MAPFRE de seguros 
(MAPFRE Insurance Dictionary), whose purpose is to explain the meaning of the 





53. ‐ LA RECESIÓN VA A SER MUY LARGA Interview conducted by the journalist Javier 
Arce in the newspaper Cinco Días, 12 May 1995 
 
Summary of Contents: Interview due to the publication of the book “Crisis de 
sociedad. Reflexiones para el siglo XXI” 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12333 




54. ‐ NO SE PUEDE DIRIGIR UNA EMPRESA SOMETIDO A CHANTAJE Interview 
by Joaquín Madina Loidi published in El Mundo. 1995 
 
Summary of Contents: Interview carried out due to the publication of the book 
“Reflexiones para el siglo XXI”. Answers on corruption issues in general and on 




55. ‐ LA ÉTICA COMO ELEMENTO DETERMINANTE DEL ÉXITO EMPRESARIAL Article 
published in the Situación magazine, no. 3, 1996 
 
Summary of Contents: In this article, the author shows, with the practical 
example of his experience, how with ethical concern it is possible to get ahead 
and that it is even possible to defend that in big companies only with it - 
although in addition to other factors -  is it possible to achieve an acceptably 
long-lasting success and at the same time useful to the national community and 




56. ‐ INTERVIEW IN THE LA RAZÓN NEWSPAPER:”HE RENUNCIADO A MI PATRIMONIO 
PARA NO DEJAR HIJOS DE RICO” Interview in La Razón: independent mainstream daily 
newspaper. Madrid, 4 July 2001, Fe y Razón section, p. 36. Interview by Luján Artola 
and Alex Rosal 
 
Summary of Contents: Interview on how he built MAPFRE with the "tools" of the 







1. ‐ CARACTERÍSTICAS ESENCIALES DE LA INDUSTRIA DEL SEGURO PRIVADO [Article, 
unpublished] 1948 
 
Summary of Contents: Study on the main characteristics of the private 
insurance industry: willingness, freedom, private initiative, proportionality 




2. ‐ LA CONFERENCIA HEMISFERICA DE SEGUROS. [Article, unpublished] 1948 
 
Summary of Contents: Summary of the first Hemispheric Insurance 
Conference, held in New York in May 1946 with representatives from 15  
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American nations convened by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to discuss their 




3. ‐ SEGURO POPULAR DE VIDA  [Unpublished article] 1950 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the growing importance of popular life 
insurance with special reference to the figures for life insurance in Switzerland 
and Great Britain since 1946 and their comparison with the corresponding 





TOPICS OF STUDY 
 
1. ‐ LA INFLACION Y EL SEGURO. Study topics, 22 pages] 1948 
 
Summary of Contents: Study of the effects of inflation on life insurance and 





2. ‐ TASA DEL RIESGO, TARIFA DE PRIMAS [Study topic, unpublished]. 1948 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the elements that make up the premium 





3. ‐ NORMAS PARA UN EXÁMEN JURIDICO CONTABLE ECONOMICO FINANCIERO DE 
UN BALANCE DE UNA COMPAÑÍA DE SEGUROS [Incomplete study topic, unpublished] 
1949 
 
Summary of Contents: Legal and accounting analysis of an insurance company's 
own balance sheets, offering a series of rules to carry out a correct legal-




4. ‐ CONCEPTO DEL SEGURO [Study topic, unpublished] 1949 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the legal concept of the insurance 
contract and insurance theory. 






5. ‐ PRODUCTIVIDAD Y RELACIONES PÚBLICAS EN EL SEGURO [Study topic,  
Unpublished] 1953. 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the fact that in insurance, productivity 
must necessarily rely on the public, part of which is the receptiveness with 
which the public welcomes insurance salespeople, which is why public relations 




6. ‐ SEGURIDAD SOCIAL Y SEGURO PRIVADO [Study topic, unpublished] 1956 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the close relationship and points of 




7. ‐ PRESUPUESTOS TÉCNICOS DE LOS SEGUROS SOCIALES[Study topic,  
Unpublished] Madrid 1961. 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the basic technical principles of social 
insurance, on which its legal structure must be configured:  public nature, 




8. ‐ LA EMPRESA COMO CUERPO SOCIAL INTERMEDIO [Study topic,  
unpublished]. October 1967 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the origin of the economic undertaking and 
its dual function as an instrument of public service and as a social centre to 




9. ‐ INSTITUCIONES FINANCIERAS Y MERCADO DE VALORES[Study topic,  
unpublished]. May 1968. Offprint of the Collection donated by Mr. Ernesto 
Caballero 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the main financial and credit institutions and, 
in general, of the elements that participate in a securities market and their 
specific role in the financial market. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12485 




10. ‐ ORIENTACIONES PRÁCTICAS PARA LA REFORMA DE LA EMPRESA CAPITALISTA 
ESPAÑOLA  [Unpublished study topic]. May, 1970 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the constructive action of the company in 
order to collaborate effectively in economic progress and so that it can serve 




11. ‐ LA EDUCACIÓN PROFESIONAL EN LA EMPRESA ASEGURADORA  [Study topic, 
unpublished] 1971 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the important mission of the company in 
the education and training of its staff and the relationship of its success with 




12. ‐ LA RENTA FIJA PRIVADA EN LA INVERSION DE LAS ENTIDADES DE SEGUROS 
[Study topic, unpublished]. 1978 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the general features of the role of the 
insurance sector in the Spanish private fixed income market and the financial 







1. ‐ VIGILANCIA ESTATAL Y REGIMEN DEL MERCADO DE SEGUROS. [Conference 
delivered on 17 November 1949] 
 
Summary of Contents: A discussion of some characteristics of the insurance 
industry, the problem of state supervision of insurance, the most important 
aspects of supervision systems and what the supervision system should aim for, 




2. ‐ NOTAS PARA LA ESTRUCTURACIÓN Y REFORMA DE LA GRAN EMPRESA [Speech 
given at the COURSE on "Company Reform" organised by Acción Social Patronal de 
Madrid, 26-27 January 1965] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on companies and their organisation, the 
importance of business ethics and the participation of workers in the 
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3. ‐ NOTA SOBRE LA FORMACIÓN DE INSPECTORES Y AGENTES [Conference 
delivered at ICEA: “Coloquio sobre Formación de Inspectores”, October 1965] 
 
Summary of Contents: A presentation on the extraordinary importance of 




4. ‐ LAS INVERSIONES MOBILIARIAS  [Conference in Cursillo de Vitoria on the Stock 
Exchange.1968] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the justification of real estate 
investment within the set of institutional activities that make up the Securites 




5. ‐ SEGURO E INFLACIÓN[2nd Pan-American Conference on Insurance Law. November 
1969] 
 
Summary of Contents   Dissertation on the importance the adequate legal 
processing has for the insurance company regarding the economic 





6. ‐ EL PROYECTO DE LEY SOBRE USO Y CIRCULACION DE VEHICULOS A MOTOR 
Paper presented at the Colloquium organised by the Madrid Bar Association on the 
Draft Law on the use and circulation of motor vehicles in 1970] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on compulsory motor insurance due to the 





7. ‐ PERSPECTIVA DEL SEGURO ESPAÑOL HASTA EL AÑO 80 [Lecture delivered at the 
Study Seminars for General Managers. Santiago de Compostela, 23-25 March 1971] 




Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the most significant positive and 
negative facts of Spanish insurance and comments on world insurance in the 




8. ‐ EL SEGURO Y LA VIOLENCIA [4th World Congress of Insurance Law. 1972. Lecture 
by the Spanish Section of the A.I.DA] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on insurance and acts of violence 





9. - SOME EXAMPLES OF MANAGEMENT POLICY [Lecture delivered at the International 
Insurance Seminar, Mexico, July 1972] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the characteristics of insurance 
companies, management, personnel policies in the company and the 




10. ‐ COOPERACION ENTRE LAS EMPRESAS Y POSIBILIDADES DE VINCULACIÓN A 
TRAVÉS DEL REASEGURO [Lecture delivered at the 4th FIDES Conference: San Salvador, 
15-21 November 1975] 
 
Summary of Contents: Lecture on insurance companies and their organisation, 
the importance and functions of reinsurance as well as cooperation and the 





11. -EMPRESA 1978 [Conference delivered at the cycle organised in Madrid by the Club 
de Aseguradores Internacionales on 29 November 1977] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the common characteristics of Spanish 
companies and their business structure. Reflection on different political, social 
and economic issues that have an impact on the company as well as the 
importance of a good business strategy. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12445 
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12. ‐ CONFERENCIA PARA LA XXVII JORNADAS DE ESTUDIO PARA DIRECTORES 
GENERALES Y ALTOS EJECUTIVOS  [Conference for the 27th study seminars for general 
managers and senior executives organised by ICEA in Santiago de Compostela in March 
1982] 
 
Summary of Contents Presentation on the "spinning off" business technique 
followed in  Corporación MAPFRE, which consists of giving business autonomy 




13. ‐ COMERCIALISMO ESTRUCTURAL. LA EXPERIENCIA DEL GRUPO ASEGURADOR 
MAPFRE Paper presented at the IVème Colloque International des dirigeants 
déntreprises d'Assurance, organised by the Comité d'action pour la productivité dans 
l'Assurance (C.A.P.A.).1977] - Offprint of the Collection donated by Ernesto Caballero 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the MAPFRE system: its corporate 





14. -  NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS DEL SEGURO EN LA EMPRESA [Conference delivered at 
the Technical Seminar organised by the Higher School of Business Sciences held on 11 
May 1979]  
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the various aspects that affect the types 
of insurance and the risks that the company bears in its activities. Joint vision 




15. ‐ BALANCE SOCIAL EN ESPAÑA [Lecture delivered at the Conference at A.P.D., held 
on 23 May 1979] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the social balance in the company as an 
instrument to measure how it fulfils its social responsibility obligations and 





16. ‐ COMENTARIOS SOBRE LAS EXPERIENCIAS DE PLANIFICACIÓN DEL GRUPO 
ASEGURADOR MAPFRE [Lecture delivered at the Study Seminars on Insurance 
Planning, held by the CAPA and ICEA Associations in Port Bacares (Pyrénées-
Orientales), France, on 18 and 19 October 1979] 
384 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on MAPFRE's experience and planning for 




17. ‐ EL SEGURO EN LOS OCHENTA: UNA FUERZA SOCIAL [Lecture delivered at the 11th 
Conferencia Brasileira de Seguros Privados, Bela Horizonte (Brazil), October 1980]. 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the social responsibility of insurers, the 
development of life insurance with the contribution of macroeconomic data 
with special reference to MAPFRE Vida, Sociedad Anónima de Seguros y 




18. ‐ BALANCE SOCIAL EN LA EMPRESA ACTUAL  [Speech given at the Seminar 
organised by the Instituto Social Empresarial, Valencia, February 1980] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on why social balance has become an 
indispensable technical tool for company management and the growing 




19. ‐ INSURANCE IN THE EIGHTIES: A SOCIAL FORCE [Conference at the 11th Brazilian 
Conference on Private Insurance, Belo Horizonte (Brazil), October 1980] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the insurance market with 
macroeconomic data, also addressing the relationship between geopolitics and 
insurance companies, the importance of business ethics and the future 




20. ‐ ASPECTOS GENERALES DEL FUTURO DEL DESEMPLEO [Speech given at the Study 
Seminars on Social Security, organised by Acción Social Empresarial, Madrid, 22-26 
June 1981] 
 
Summary of Contents: Considerations and different proposals for an 
unemployment policy, focusing on different areas of action to reduce this 
serious social problem as well as the relations between employment policies, 
trade unionism and employers. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12377 
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21. ‐ QUÉ QUEREMOS LOS ASEGURADORES[Lecture delivered  at the Club de 
Aseguradores Internacionales, Madrid, 29 January 1981] 
 
Summary of Contents: Presentation on the expectations of international 
insurers proposing a decalogue for the market with free competition. Analysis 
of rates, solvency and insurance associations, the role of the Directorate 





22. ‐ THE ROLE OF THE BROKER IN INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE [lecture 
delivered at Rendez-vous, Monte Carlo, September 1981. This lecture was also 
published in Spanish in the Revista española de seguros, no. 31, July-September 1982, 
p. 427-432] 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the influence of brokers on the international 




23. ‐ ASPECTOS GENERALES DEL FUTURO DEL DESEMPLEO [Speech given at the Study 
Seminars on Social Security organised by Acción Social Empresarial from 22 to 26 June 
1981 in Madrid]. 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on some necessary issues for greater 
efficiency in employment policies in Spain and different proposals for an 




24. ‐ UNIAPAC EN EL MUNDO E IMPLANTACIÓN EN EUROPA  [Conference organised by 
UNIAPAC in Valladolid on 21 April 1982] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the meaning and objectives of the Unión 
Internacional Cristiana de Dirigentes de Empresa y de Acción Social Empresarial 




25. ‐ XVII JORNADAS DE ESTUDIO PARA DIRECTORES GENERALES Y NUEVOS 
EJECUTIVOS. [Conference in Santiago de Compostela 10 -12 March 1982]  
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on how MAPFRE arrived at its structure and 
the mechanisms for coordinating the Company's common goals with the 
operational autonomy of each of its entities: individual responsibility, 
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26. ‐ COLLOQUE SUR L´ENCYCLIQUE “LABOREM EXERCENS [Presentation at the 
Colloquium organised by UNIAPAC in Paris on the Encyclical "ABOREM EXERCENS", in 
Paris, March 1982] 
 
Summary of Contents: As Chairman of UNIAPAC and coinciding with the 50th 
anniversary of its foundation, he reflects on the repercussions of the Encyclical 




27. ‐ CONCORDIA SOCIAL Y RIESGO EMPRESARIAL [Lecture delivered in Madrid 
Valladolid, on 7 and 20 June 1983 as Chairman of Acción Social Empresarial] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on harmony and its necessity in social, 
economic and business life, since only those companies that know how to 
create a real climate of internal harmony will develop with a stable balance, 





28. ‐ POLÍTICA Y ESTRATEGIA DE CRECIMIENTO DE UN GRUPO ASEGURADOR 
[Lecture delivered on 2 february 1983 at the Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions of 
MEXICO] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the methods followed to ensure that for 
twenty-seven years MAPFRE companies have regularly maintained a higher 
growth rate than the Spanish insurance market, solely through internal 




29. ‐ EL SEGURO EN EL AÑO 2000 [Lecture delivered on 27 January 1983 at 
the Assembly Hall of the COMPAÑIA LATINOAMERICANA DE SEGUROS in the city of of Caracas] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the insurance outlook for the year 
29.00 and concerning companies that withstand times of crisis are not those 
that specialise in theoretical planning for the future, but those that have a very 
deep understanding of the present and react more quickly than others to 
different situations. 





30. ‐ LA NUEVA EMPRESA DE SEGUROS: CONSIDERACIONES DE UN ASEGURADOR 
PARA EL AÑO DOS MIL  [Lecture delivered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on 23 November 1983] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the changes and new situations for 
which it is essential to prepare oneself, where it is necessary that there is 
knowledge of different points of view about our future of interest for the whole 





31. ‐ LA EMPRESA MOTOR DE RECUPERACIÓN ECONÓMICA [Lecture delivered at the 
Acción Social Empresarial Assembly organised at the Colegio del Pilar in Madrid on 17 
December 1983] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on how economic recovery can take place: 
when, on the one hand, representative or leading companies enter 
international competition and, on the other hand, when there is a group of 
small companies that know how to take advantage of the possibilities opened 
up by crises and structural changes and act in an effective and active way to 




32. ‐ COMMENTS BY IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI TO THE LECTURE  "A 
QUEL TYPE DE CRISE APPARTIENT LA NOTRE?" BY PROF. VITTORIO MATHIEU. 
[Lecture delivered in Palma de Mallorca, October 1983] 
 
Summary of Contents: Mr. Larramendi's comments on the deep philosophical vision 
of Professor Vittorio Mathieu on the type of crisis that our society is going through, in 




33. ‐ EL SEGURO DE COSECHAS EN LOS PAÍSES DEL TERCER MUNDO [Lecture 
delivered to the 4th International Congress of Third World Insurers in Casablanca on 15 
May 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the different forms of crop insurance in developing 
countries and the importance of agricultural insurance in these countries. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12364 
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34. ‐ A SIMPLE INSURANCE STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE [The International Insurance 
and Risk Management Conference. Barcelona. October 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the importance of strategic planning, risk 




35. ‐ EL SEGURO EN EL MUNDO Y EN ESPAÑA  [Lecture delivered at the Official Act of 
the Directorate General of Insurance, Madrid 10 May 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the state of insurance in the world and 
in Spain and to what extent its crisis may resemble the one that exists in 
Spanish insurance at a time when the world is at a crossroads, not only 
technologically but also sociologically and with profound structural changes. 




36. ‐ MARKETING ESTRUCTURAL. [Lecture delivered at the 5th International Insurance 
Marketing Week, organised by C.A.P.A., Paris, June 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on structural marketing in the MAPFRE 
system, organisational changes, decentralisation and corporate structure. 
Includes table of the volume of premiums and effective equity and investment 




37. ‐ PUNTO DE EQUILIBRIO DEL REASEGURO  [Lecture delivered at the 5th 
International Reinsurance Forum, Panama, 1-4 July 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on how reinsurance is fundamentally a 
balancing instrument of the insurance institution, and therefore influences the 




38. ‐ UNA ESTRATEGIA SIMPLE DEL SEGURO ANTE EL FUTURO [Lecture delivered 
at "the International Insurance and Risk Management Conference", Barcelona, 26 
October 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the “strategic responses” that insurance 
must offer facing the future: simplicity of its products, maximum cutting of red 
tape and relentless pursuit of useless costs so as to offer 
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39. ‐ FORMACIÓN EN EL SEGURO ESPAÑOL[Speech delivered at the Closing Ceremony 
of the ICEA Meeting, 30 November 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on training as a fundamental issue for the 
activity of insurance companies. The author shows his conviction that an 
insurance company needs trained personnel and that this requires “learning to 




40. ‐ EL RETO DE LA NUEVA EMPRESA: EXPERIENCIAS DE UN ASEGURADOR [Lecture 
delivered at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Alcalá de Henares, 23 
February 1984. Includes another copy that was published as an offprint of the 
International Journal of Economics and Business, ESIC Market, no. 44] 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the need for change in the business world, 
and that change is what he calls the challenge of the new company, which is 
offered mainly to leading companies that have to win over the national 




41. ‐ EMPRESA Y RECUPERACIÓN ECONÓMICA [Lecture delivered at the Instituto Social 
Empresarial of Valencia, 12 April 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the social necessity of business in all its forms and 
the importance of governance, workers and businessmen together seeking, in 
deep harmony, the path of economic recovery and maximum job creation 




42. ‐ L' ASSURANCE RECOLTE DANS LES PAYS DU TIERS MONDE [Lecture delivered at 
the 4th 
Congres d'Assurances du Tiers Monde. Casablanca, 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: On crop insurance in developing countries and the 








43. - CROP INSURANCE IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES [Presentation at 4th Congress 
d'Assurances du Tiers Monde. Casablanca, 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on crop insurance and developing countries. 





44. ‐ DESEMPLEO Y MODELO DE SOCIEDAD[Lecture given at the Seminars organised by 
Acción Social Empresarial, in Montserrat on 2 April 1982]. 
 
Summary of Contents: On the problem of unemployment and the responsibility 




45. ‐ EVOLUCIÓN DEL GRUPO MAPFRE Y COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL ORDENAMIENTO 
LEGAL DEL SEGURO EN ESPAÑA [Lecture given at the Insurance Seminar held in 
Bogota on 6 March 1985] 
 
Summary of Contents: About how MAPFRE, also created on an associative 
basis, has reached a leading position in Spanish insurance: and about insurance 




46. ‐ EL SEGURO DE COSECHAS EN LOS PAÍSES DEL TERCER MUNDO [Lecture 
presented at the 4th Congress of Third World Insurance, 2nd ed. Spain 1985] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the different forms of crop insurance, developing 





47. ‐ DEREGULATION: PUNTO DE VISTA DE UN ASEGURADOR CONTINENTAL  [Lecture 
delivered at the British Law Insurance Association, London 16 January 1985] 
 
Summary of Contents: On how Administrative Law is the cause of the evils of 
modern society, this being what beats in the entire 'deregulation' current that 
is making its way in Western society. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=996 
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48. ‐ COMENTARIOS SOBRE DESCENTRALIZACIÓN Y SEGURO DE AUTOMÓVILES 
[Lecture delivered at La Seguridad Company, Caracas, 27 February 1985] 
 
Summary of Contents  Comments on how MAPFRE has carried out 
decentralisation in the field of motor insurance and the advantages of a 




49. ‐ ALGUNOS COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL SEGURO EN EL AÑO 2000 [Lecture 
delivered at the Caribbean Insurance Meeting, Bogota 5 March 1985] 
 
Summary of Contents: Mr Larramendi's insurance forecasts for  
2000 are that it will not depend on electronic machines, books, theories, laws, 
strategies or training plans, believing that it will depend on men, on their 





50. ‐ EMPRESAS LÍDERES EN UN MERCADO ASEGURADOR  [Lecture delivered at the 
20th Anniversary of the Club de Aseguradores Internacionales, Madrid 25 March 1985] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the insurance market that cannot be achieved 
without a set of leaders with an overall vision and a sense of responsibility for 
their mission, guiding the market in the best service to policyholders. It includes 




51. ‐ HACIA UN NUEVO REASEGURO [Lecture given at the 3rd European Reinsurance 
Meeting, Madrid, October 1985] 
 
Summary of Contents: Overview of reinsurance and the importance that the 
collaboration of the Public Administration can have with private insurers and 
large international re-insurers in order to provide effective protection in major 





52. ‐ EVOLUCIÓN DEL GRUPO MAPFRE Y COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL ORDENAMIENTO 
LEGAL DEL SEGURO EN ESPAÑA [Lecture delivered at the Caribbean Insurance 
Meeting, Bogota 6 March 1985]. 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation in a first part about the training of the 
MAPFRE Group and in a second part about decentralization and the 
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53. ‐ EL SEGURO EN EL CAMBIO: LA ESTRATEGIA MAPFRE [Lecture delivered at the 
21st Study Seminars for General Managers and Senior Executives, organised by ICEA, 
Zaragoza, 6 and 7 March 1986. Two copies, one in Spanish and one in English] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the strategy and management guiding principles that 
have enabled MAPFRE to achieve a very positive evolution in Spanish insurance 




54. ‐ AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: PRESENT AND FUTURE 
[Lecture at the Third World Insurance Congress (5th. 1986. Beijing). Crop insurance 
experience in the world. ‐ Madrid: Corporación MAPFRE, D.L. 1986.] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the importance of agricultural insurance 
and economic development, mainly in developing countries in the Third World, 
addressing different agricultural insurance programmes that should be included 




55. ‐ INVESTIGACIÓN, SEGURIDAD Y SEGURO: RESEARCH, SAFETY AND INSURANCE 
[Lecture at an Academic Event on Research, University and Insurance, In: Avila Forum 
for a Responsible Society. Ávila, 9 October 1986. 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on insurance as an institution that has the 
ethical obligation and social responsibility to contribute to the security of the 




56. ‐ SEGURO Y DESARROLLO AGRÍCOLA: PRESENTE Y FUTURO  [Lecture delivered 
at the 5th Third World Insurance Congress held in Beijing, 23-27 June 1986. Two 
copies, one in English and one in Spanish. Includes lecture delivered in Estoril, 12-15 
May 1986 on the same subject] 
 
Summary of Contents: On agriculture as a factor of economic independence 
and social balance, which must be included in government programmes and 
especially in the actions of the sectors involved in agriculture, including 
insurance. 





57. ‐ RIESGOS CATASTRÓFICOS Y SU DEFINICIÓN JURÍDICA [Lecture delivered in 
Madrid, 30 April 1986] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the coverage of catastrophic risks as an unavoidable 
requirement for insurance to carry out the social function that justifies it and 
the appropriate treatment of these risks for the balance of insurance 




58. ‐ POURQUOI MAPFRE A RÉUSSI ET COMMENT MAPFRE TRAVAILLE [Lecture 
delivered at the meeting convened by the insurance company SCOR, Paris, 1 October 
1986] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the strategy and guiding principles in 
MAPFRE's management and organisation that allowed it to evolve very 




59. ‐ENCUENTROS DE AVILA PARA UNA SOCIEDAD RESPONSABLE: ACTO ACADÉMICO 
SOBRE "INVESTIGACIÓN, UNIVERSIDAD Y SEGURO  [Lecture at the Avila Forum for a 
Responsible Society: academic event on "research, university and insurance" (Avila 
Forum for a Responsible Society): Academic Session on "Research, University and 
Insurance" ) 9 Oct. 1986, Avila / ITSEMAP, Fundación MAPFRE.] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the relationship between a responsible 





60. ‐ EL SEGURO EN EL CAMBIO: LA ESTRATEGIA MAPFRE [Lecture delivered at the 
21st Study Seminars for General Managers and Senior Executives, organised by ICEA, 
Zaragoza, 6 and 7 March 1986. 
 
Summary of Contents: On the principles that have allowed MAPFRE to evolve 
positively in the Spanish insurance sector thanks to a performance that has 
eliminated bureaucracy, maintaining ethical principles and social responsibility, 
always ready to adapt to changes and take advantage of opportunities. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12404 
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61. ‐ EMPRESA Y LA ENCÍCLICA LABOREM EXERCENS [Conference organised by Acción 
Social Empresarial on 28 September 1987 in Madrid] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the importance of the social doctrine of 
the Church for the life of the company and how "Laborem Exercens" asks that 




62. ‐ SPEECH BY MR. IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI AT THE MEETING HELD IN 
SAO PAULO FOR THE  ASOCIACIÓN BRASILEÑA PARA LA CIENCIA DEL 
SEGURO Y LA SECCIÓN BRASILEÑA DE LA AIDA[Meeting held in Sao Paulo by the 
Brazilian Association for the Science of Insurance. The meeting was held in July 1987] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on extraordinary risks and extraordinary risk 




63. ‐ SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE SICKNESS INSURANCE IN SPAIN [Lecture 
delivered in Berlin, July 1987] 
 
Summary of Contents: FUNDACION MAPFRE is very concerned about this 
problem as one of the most serious of our society and has started some studies 
on Medical Assistance in Cuba, Venezuela and other countries and it will hold a 




64. ‐ ESTRATEGIA DE ALTA DIRECCIÓN, SUPERVISIÓN Y CONTROL [Lecture 
delivered at the International Seminar on Risk Management and Solvency of Insurance 
Companies, Ávila 5-9 October 1987] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the risks of the top management (CEO, CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE OFFlCER), who, under this or any other name, makes the final 
decisions of a company or of an autonomous group of companies or at least of 




65. ‐ SEGURO Y CATÁSTROFE : SU DEFINICIÓN JURÍDICA Lecture delivered on 30 April 
1986 at the Spanish Directorate General of Insurance on the occasion of a meeting of 
the Ibero-American Cooperation Committee of AIDA] 
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Summary of Contents: On the legal aspect of catastrophic risk and its coverage, 
suggesting definitions of both catastrophic risk and each of its main 
manifestations, in order to distinguish them from each other and isolate them 




66. ‐ EL SEGURO AGRARIO EN EL TERCER MUNDO [Lecture delivered at the 6th TWIC 
Conference, Quito, 22 June 1988] 
 
Summary of Contents: On crop insurance as an instrument of agricultural 
development in Latin America, and for the creation of a new bond of solidarity 




67. ‐REPERCUSIONES EN EL SECTOR DE SEGUROS DEL NUEVO MARCO DEL MERCADO 
ÚNICO EUROPEO [Lecture delivered in May 1988] 
 
Summary of Contents: On Spanish Insurance at a time of profound change, 
which coincides with the incorporation of Spain into the E.E.C., with the key 
date of 1992 and its Single Act and forecasts for Spanish insurance at the 




68. ‐ COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL FUTURO DEL REASEGURO [Lecture delivered in London, 
April 1988] 
 
Summary of Contents  On three aspects that are commonly referred to as 
reinsurance:  "reinsurance activity", "reinsurance market" and "reinsurance 




69. ‐ MAPFRE: PRINCIPIOS Y ESTRATEGIA INTERNACIONAL  [Lecture delivered at AECI-
Seminar on European Collaboration, Milan, 8-9 March 1989] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the legal means that MAPFRE uses to preserve its 
nature of mutual society and achieve effective “internal democracy”, while at 
the same time preparing itself independently to be an effective player in the 
“universal insurance financial market of the 21st century” 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12440 
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70. ‐ SEGURO Y EQUILIBRIO SOCIAL EN IBEROAMÉRICA [Lecture delivered at the 
Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions (AMIS), Mexico, 21 November 1989] 
 
Summary of contents: It offers a vision of Ibero-America and issues in which 
the reality of insurance can be improved: formulas, laws, privatisations, 
agreements and grants are not enough; to improve a market we need: leaders, 





71. ‐ RIESGOS ESTRATÉGICOS DE ALTA DIRECCIÓN  [Lecture delivered at the 3rd 
International Seminar on Risk Management and Solvency of Insurance Companies, 
Santiago de Chile, 18-20 April 1989] 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the risk landscape of senior management, 
which by whatever name it may be called, makes the final decisions of an 
autonomous company or group of companies, or at least of its important units 




72. ‐ ESTRATEGIA INTERNACIONAL DE MAPFRE [Lecture delivered at the 24th Study 
Seminars for General Managers and Senior Executives organised by ICEA, Palma de 
Mallorca, 12-13-14 March 1989]. 
 
Summary of Contents: On the situation of the insurance market in Spain and 
the difficulties in maintaining independent insurance companies and how 
MAPFRE can become an organic multinational, rooted in several countries, in 




73. ‐ INVESTIGACIÓN, DESARROLLO Y SEGURO [Lecture given at the International 
Forum on Private Insurance, organised by the Instituto Superior Tecnológico de 
Seguros, in Lima on 2 May 1989] 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflections on research and development linked to the 
insurance profession, since research in itself, and in the context of a “society of 
growing risks”, must be the basic driving force for balanced development. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12414 
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74. ‐ MAPFRE: PRINCIPIOS Y ESTRATEGIA INTERNACIONAL  [Lecture delivered at AECI-
Seminar on European Collaboration, Milan, 8-9 March 1989] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the legal means that MAPFRE uses to preserve its 
nature of mutual society and achieve effective “internal democracy”, while at 
the same time preparing itself independently to be an effective player in the 




75. - MANUEL DE MONTIANO Y SOPELANA, GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA 
[Conference, La Gran Peña. Madrid, 1990] 
 
Summary of Contents: About the life of Manuel de Montiano Sopelana and his 
management as governor in La Florida, valuing his vigorous performance in the 
defence of San Agustín and the fort of San Marcos during the Anglo-Spanish 
military conflict of the Nine Years' War, which had the American colonies as its 
main scenario, and which brought about the rupture of the political and 
economic balance of the Treaty of Utrecht. 
 
76. ‐ LA DIRECCIÓN ESTRATÉGICA DE LA EMPRESA DE SEGUROS  [Lecture 
delivered at the 4th International Seminar on Risk Management and Solvency of 
Insurance Companies: Summer School, Segovia July 2-5, 1991] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the growing need for reflection in insurance business 
life in order to achieve institutionalised companies that participate positively in 




77. ‐ COMENTARIOS SOBRE LA CRISIS DE LA SOCIEDAD OCCIDENTAL[Lecture 
delivered at the graduation ceremony of the third year of the Master's Degree in 
Insurance Management. ICEA and the Directorate General of Insurance on 2 December 
1993] 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection on the two different crises that, on that date, 
were simultaneous with reciprocal influence, but of a different nature: an 
economic crisis and a structural crisis. And how one of the causes or 
consequences of the crisis in Western society is the disappearance of family or 
semi-family protection institutions. Every company, and even Insurance as an 
institution, shall only survive effectively if it avoids becoming a costly 
bureaucracy. Insurance must be efficient, it is an indispensable institution, but 
only if it orients its structure to the general benefit of society and not to the 
comfort of its leaders. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12409 




78. ‐ ¿POR QUÉ CARECE ESPAÑA DE EMPRESAS LÍDERES? Opening Lecture of the 1993-
1994 academic year, at ESADE. Barcelona, 4 October 1993 
 
Summary of Contents: On the reasons why our “big” national companies with 
theoretical leadership capacity are disappearing or end up depending on other 





79. ‐ EL MECENAZGO EN LA DIFUSIÓN DE LIBROS CLÁSICOS Y MODERNOS 
[Lecture given at the closing ceremony of the Course "El mundo del libro antiguo: 
investigadores, bibliotecarios, mecenas y bibliofilos", held as part of the Summer 
Courses of the Complutense University of Madrid (El Escorial, 5 August 1994)] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the contribution of Fundación MAPFRE: the 
Colecciones 1492, the Colección Documental del  Descubrimiento (Documentary 
Collection of the Discovery) (1479-1506), the works related to Ferdinand 
Columbus and the Columbus library and the actions are managed through the 
Instituto Histórico TAVERA, which is mainly dedicated to the collection and 




80. ‐ COMENTARIOS SOBRE LA CRISIS DE LA SOCIEDAD OCCIDENTAL. INTRODUCCIÓN 
DEL LIBRO EL RIESGO CATASTRÓFICO EN LOS SEGUROS PERSONALES [(First Prize 
“Marín Lázaro”, 1947) Annex to the Conference “Comentarios sobre la crisis de la 
sociedad occidental”, given on 2 December 1993, on the occasion of the awards 
ceremony for the Master's Degree in Insurance Management, 3rd year, 1991-1993] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the social crisis in Western Europe 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12418 
81. ‐ EMPRESA Y CRISIS ACTUAL  [Lecture delivered at the University of Albacete, 23 
May 1994. - Included is an article published in the newspaper Expansión on 11 March 
1994, “MAPFRE Mutualidad se convierte en la primera aseguradora por primas” and 
where the 1993 ranking by volume of premiums of the large insurance companies in 
Spain appears] 
 
Summary of Contents: Reflection from experience on the remedies to the 
crisis: common sense, business integrity, ethical concern, conviction that the 
company is a part of the economy at the service of the community, 
transparency in the static and dynamic reality without evading responsibilities. 
In addition, it must be accepted that a large company must be socially 
responsible (apart from being contractually responsible) and must allocate 
surpluses for 
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this purpose. It does not detract but adds. Without it, there is no company 





82. ‐ EMPRESA Y DIRECTIVOS EN LA ESPAÑA ACTUAL [Conference and research papers 
from Instituto de Dirección y Organización de Empresas; 1st quarter 1995. University of 
Alcalá de Henares. Conference and written research paper. Edited by I.D.O.E. 
University of Alcalá] 
 
Summary of Contents: General considerations of and about the crisis of the 
Spanish company, the causes of the change (global, technological, national), the 
role of the manager in the company and the MAPFRE experience, its 




83. ‐ EXPOSICIÓN EN LA APERTURA DEL PRIMER ENCUENTRO DEL SECTOR 
ASEGURADOR  [Lecture given at IESE, at the First Meeting of the Insurance Sector in 
Barcelona, on 27 February 1997] [Lecture given at IESE, at the First Meeting of the 
Insurance Sector in Barcelona, on 27 February 1997] 
 
Summary of Contents: In this conference, in addition to recounting aspects of 
his experience, he stresses on pointing out that neither the company nor any 
other activity is exhausted with regards to its profit and loss account or its 
growth; that is why throughout his life he was concerned about social 
institutions and the general structure of society. 
 
Social and corporate concern is necessary in the company. A company lives in 
an environment, in a nation, and cannot play alone against everyone. Its action 





84. ‐ ÉTICA Y ÉXITO EMPRESARIAL [Lecture delivered at the 5th Course on Human 
Values on 24 April 1998] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on ethics, business culture and business 
managers. Larramendi reflects on the importance of ethics and how he applied 
it in practice and how sometimes success and ethics are opposed, hence his 
conclusion that not only ethics is not inconvenient for success but it is essential 
for it, in the company and personally. 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12456 
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85. - EMPRESA Y HUMANIDADES [Lecture given at the  "Humanities and Business” 
Seminars organised by the Spanish National Research Council in October 1998] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on the social responsibility of the company, 
the Foundations and Fundación MAPFRE and how the area of humanities and 
cultural dissemination should be stimulated in companies, as they are 
important for the life of men, to build society, and especially for its inhabitants, 





86. ‐ COMENTARIOS PARA LA GESTIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA PÚBLICA EN EL SIGLO XXI 
[Lecture delivered at the Directorate General of Insurance in April 1998] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on Public Entities and the decisive 





87. ‐ REFLEXIONES HETERODOXAS SOBRE DOS FINALES DE SIGLO [Lecture 
delivered at the Cycle of Conferences "el 98 desde España" at Casa de América in 
January 1998] 
 
Summary of Contents: Lecture on two ends of the century and the 21st 
century, the change of century and millennium: from the 19th to the 20th 
century and why a “moral regeneration” is necessary in Spain, as well as the 




88. ‐ ACTUALIDAD DE LA DOCTRINA SOCIAL DE LA IGLESIA PARA LA VIDA PÚBLICA 
[Lecture delivered at the “Catholics and Public Life” Congress organised by Fundación 
San Pablo CEU in November 1999] 
 
Summary of Contents: Analysis of the social doctrine of the Church, the doctrine 
of solidarity and how to finance it, charity and Catholics in public life 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12469 





1. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS  
IN 1972. Collection of speeches given by Mr. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at the 
General Meetings of Mutual members (1973-1985) 
 
Summary of Contents: In this speech, and after analysing the group's financial 
situation, he sets out the fundamental lines of the strategy: Absolute and 
overriding concern for reduction of costs. Maximum professionalisation of our 
activity, basing our expansion on an efficient service and a high degree of 
technical advice, a personal relationship as far as possible with our 
policyholders to meet their needs and create a direct link, not only as a 
customer but also as a true partner and participant in the Group’s work. 
Strengthening of assets and special concern for financial policy. Maintenance of 
a wide range of information, not only for the organisation's own members but 
also for the public.  Coordination with other entities or institutions with a social 
orientation similar to MAPFRE, in order to obtain in this way the basis that may 





2. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1973. Collection of speeches given by Mr. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at the 
General Meetings of Mutual members (1973-1985) 
 
Summary of Contents: In 1973 the Group broke all growth records: 406 million, 
30% over 1972, collecting over 1,760 million. To this end, he summarises how 
they carried out an extraordinary improvement of the administrative and 
managerial services in 1973, which would allow them to adapt to any kind of 
structural and economic changes in a very short time. 
The significant increase in market penetration must be based on three factors, 
which he sets out in his speech:   the quality of the services, the maximum 
possible coordination with the entities that MAPFRE has initiated or promoted 





3. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1974 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: He describes 1974 as a fairly satisfactory year; although 
the Motor results were not as good as expected, there was nevertheless a 
technical profit in the Mutual Society for the first time since the establishment 
of compulsory insurance. Growth was high, higher than 
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the budget estimates. The coverage of technical reserves was completely 
resolved, and the surplus of assets suitable for it was very substantial, in spite 
of a difficult year for the stock market. All non-insurance companies linked to 
the Group had excellent results without exception. 
He also stated that in addition to “internal problems”, there are other more 
important ones, which are the general problems that social development offers 




4. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1975 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: First speech as CEO of the three Group companies. He 
says that 1975 was a good year and in some respects the Group's best year, 
with premiums exceeding 3 billion. The loss ratio was acceptable, although in 
the last quarter the effects of the country's acute inflation were felt in the 
Motor Branch. 
He warned that the Group still had, in his opinion, an excessive rate of 
expenditure and did not see any easy way to reduce it. But he did not limit 
himself to talking about internal aspects because 1975 was crucial for the 
history of Spain and opened up a future with very important responsibilities for 
everyone and also for MAPFRE, given the institutional nature that it has always 
pursued. 
In this speech, he expounded the following principles: 
• Professional reliability, which leads to respecting the interests of 
customers and employees and keeping the commitments made. 
• Independence from any group or sector. MAPFRE has grown in a 
balanced way through the sole effort of those who participate in it, 
without outside help, when influences and alliances of all kinds have 
dominated excessively in the country. 
• Respect for the independence of those who participate in MAPFRE. 
• Maximum internal and external information clarity. 
• Concern for service to the public 
http://www.larramendi.es/es/consulta/registro.do?id=23092 
5. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1976 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: He considers that 1976 was a year of partisan 
politicisation but MAPFRE, always proud of its independence, needs to reaffirm 
it. It wishes to continue to be an institution at the service of all the regions and 
citizens of Spain. At MAPFRE, very different 
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personal opinions coexisted, but this should not affect their objective line of 
action for the benefit of the Spanish community. 
Independently of the political vicissitudes, economic difficulties dominated in 
1976. 
In MAPFRE's business, these difficulties had a particular impact on the Motor 
sector, more subject  to the effects of cost increases. He made no secret of his 
concern about these results, which worsened more than they had anticipated. 
In order to maintain the technical balance, an increase in Voluntary Insurance 




6. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1977 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: In 1977, the Group had greater growth and better 
results in each of its sectors. Written premiums increased by 
1,433 million pesetas and they even made a profit in Motors, a sector that was 
of great concern, where they achieved a technical surplus, which is not 
unrelated to the increase in rates. 
In this speech, he believes that those who are fortunate enough to be in 
companies with a sound position such as MAPFRE should think of those who 
are in a more disadvantaged position and increase our efforts and dedication to 
socially justify this preferential situation. 
In this line of solidarity is inscribed what he considered the most important 
sociological fact of 1978: the tax reform and, above all, the speed with which 
large layers of Spanish society have accepted the obligation of a clear, complete 
taxation, which will undoubtedly harm them economically. If the Government 
maintains the line initiated in this area, it will achieve, in a seemingly 
miraculous way, a social change that is more important than any other in Spain 
in recent years. Fiscal seriousness is the only way to a just society. Higher tax 
revenues should allow the unemployment traumas resulting from the economic 




7. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1978 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
Summary of Contents: This year, special emphasis is placed on Fundación 
MAPFRE, whose Annual Report is included in print for the first time.  The 
Foundation has become an indispensable and, in a way, key part of the Group: 
it is the owner of the name “MAPFRE” and in the future should receive an 
annual donation from each of the entities that use it in their names, which 
undoubtedly benefit from its prestige; it is the coordination centre of the 
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MAPFRE companies, even if they are of a different legal nature, and to monitor 
the maintenance of its principles; it is also a vehicle for channelling part of each 
year's profit to safety activities and the prevention of personal or material 
accidents without any other kind of intentionality. The Foundation acts in areas 
that serve as a lever for important improvements in social life. An outstanding 
example of this action is the scholarships for vocational training for the 
handicapped 
1978 was an excellent year for the Group. In a problematic social economic 
period, in which so many companies were experiencing difficulties, MAPFRE 
was able to overcome them and obtain a high rate of growth and, above all, a 
clear technical balance. 
As a result, the Group's financial position was also satisfactory and improved 




8. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1979 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: He stated that 1979 had been a good year for the 
Group, although less so than 1978. He considered that they have had a high 
growth, higher than the market and a significant consolidation of assets, partly 
as a result of inflation and rising real estate prices. In particular, he highlighted 
some important facts: 
• Collections, including accepted reinsurance, exceeded 10,000 million 
pesetas. 
• The issue had been increased by more than 2,000 million pesetas. 
• The number of insured vehicles had exceeded 400,000. 
• For the first time in the Group, a company labour agreement was 
negotiated and approved, which affected MAPFRE MUTUALIDAD AND 
MAPFRE INDUSTRIAL employees. 
Also noteworthy events were the installation of a large part of the services in 
the new building in Majadahonda and the inauguration of the Fire Laboratory, 
practically the only joint training and research centre in this sector in Spain, 
which would be a major factor in MAPFRE's image for many years to come 
He considered that MAPFRE had a basic objective for the 1980s, on which great 
attention must be devoted: to consolidate its structure, still weak as a result of 
its rapid growth, in order to achieve full maturity and become a highly cohesive 
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9. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1980 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: At a time when the country was in trouble, when so 
many companies were going through difficult times and so many workers were 
subjected to the deep trauma of unemployment, Mr. Larramendi considered 
that to speak of success was almost offensive, but 1980 was an excellent year 
for MAPFRE, which had significantly strengthened its soundness. 
This possibility of overcoming the crisis in better conditions than other business 
nuclei constituted a serious responsibility and obliged us to underline the 
institutional nature and to contribute with the maximum effort to the socio-
economic balance of the country. 
He referred to the new Insurance Contract Law, which had already come into 
force, and the draft Law for the Regulation and Promotion of Insurance, which 
had been awaited for so many years.  The Contract Law marked an important 
milestone in the history of Spanish insurance. 
Finally,he highlighted three characteristic aspects of MAPFRE, which should 




10. - SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL MEETINGS OF THE MUTUAL SOCIETY AND 
CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE ON 29 MAY 1982. [CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE 1982] 
 
Summary of Contents: Speech at the General Meetings of the Mutual Society 
and Corporación MAPFRE (CORMAP) held together for the first time, which 





11. ‐ DESEMPLEO Y MODELO DE SOCIEDAD [Lecture delivered at the Conference 
organised by Acción Social Empresarial, in Montserrat on 2 April 1982].  
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on unemployment and employment 
policies, the relationship between the model of society, the level of 
unemployment and to wait and see how the indispensable actions to combat 




12. ‐ UNIAPAC EN EL MUNDO E IMPLANTACIÓN EN EUROPA  [Lecture delivered in 
Valladolid on 21 April 1982] 
Summary of Contents: On the fundamental features of Asociación UNIAPAC in 
the world and in Spain as a business association with a great tradition in the 
study of ethical and socio-business issues as well as the meaning of the Spanish 
ASE. 






13. ‐ LA LEGISLACIÓN DE SEGUROS Y EL ORGANO DE CONTROL [Lecture 
delivered at the Insurance Executive's Club, 1982] 
 
Summary of Contents: On Insurance Law and Insurance Companies and their 
control. Analysis of the Insurance Contract Law and the Law Regulating the 




14. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1981 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: For the first time, the General Meetings of the Mutual 
Society and CORPORACION MAPFRE CORMAP (in the group's internal 
terminology) are held on the same day. This will allow all the issues of the 
business as a whole to be addressed in a single speech. 
The creation of CORMAP is a key element in an institutional structure similar to 
that of the world's large insurance groups and an indispensable logistical basis 
for the future balanced growth of the group, which is expected to continue at 
the previous rate, and which should no longer depend exclusively on the free 
investment capacity of a Mutual Society for Motor Insurance. With this, 
MAPFRE becomes a socio-economic institution prepared to compete in other 
markets, in the great challenge represented by the strengthening of relations 
with Ibero-American countries and the European Community. 
 
At the same time, CORMAP offers two important contributions to MAPFRE: 
• The full coordination of its Financing Entities with our territorial 
network, which strengthens their position, but for the insurance 
activities this also means an institutional complement due to the greater 
territorial presence, the stronger roots in local life and the wider range 
of services for customers and friends. 
• The incorporation into MAPFRE of external shareholders, for the first 
time, especially the three institutions mentioned in the Annual Report: 
CAIXA DE AHORROS DE MADRID, PRUDENTIAL RE and SOCIETE 
ANONYME FRANCAISE DE REASSURANCES 
He is convinced that the external audit is an important step in the policy of 
information transparency; but it is also the most effective means of verifying 
the solvency of insurance companies and that MAPFRE, through its principles 
and way of acting, has achieved a reasonable level of internal harmony and can 
contribute to some extent to the harmony in Spanish society, which is 
necessary at this time in our world 






15. ‐ EXPOSICIÓN EN EL ACTO DE CLAUSURA DE LA SEMANA DE LA SEGURIDAD 
[Speech given at the closing ceremony of the safety week organised by Fundación 
MAPFRE in Madrid, May 1983]  
 
Summary of Contents: Speech on the MAPFRE system, its organisation and its 
corporate culture to transform itself from a small bankrupt mutual society to 




16. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1982. [Collection of speeches given by Mr. Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at the 
General Meetings of Members (1973-1985) 
 
Summary of Contents At the closing ceremony of the "MAPFRE Safety Week" 
(50th Anniversary). This speech focuses on answering the following questions: 
What is MAPFRE? Why does it act? Who guides or protects it? Why is it 
concerned about things that are not directly related to profit, or even the 
growth of its operations? 
And he focused on highlighting the following aspects of corporate policy that 
have had a particular impact on MAPFRE's performance in recent years: 
• Special service, with emphasis on offering product quality, 
improvement, simplification, adaptation to real needs and reduced cost, 
and quality of service, fair and prompt payment of claims at all times 
• Specialisation, essential for a high growth rate 
• Decentralisation, which has existed at MAPFRE since its creation and has 
remained one of the keys to its positive evolution 
• Legality, giving special importance at all times to strict compliance with 
labour, tax and administrative obligations 
• Transparency, achieved with massive, frequent and increasing 
distribution of results, a peculiar characteristic of MAPFRE, an effective 
method for technical-financial balance, which keeps all the autonomous 
operating units informed of everything that is important, on a monthly 
or quarterly basis, depending on the case. 
• Mechanisation, promoted to the maximum for more than twenty years 
• Continuous training, which is encouraged by the existence of numerous 
areas of autonomous decision making, and consists of frequent periods 
of specialised training, short courses, correspondence courses and 
informal meetings for study and resolution of problems and systems. 
• Pragmatism, with performance that accepts changes at any time and 
any line, even if it is considered very stable. Pragmatism 
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is the magnification of common sense so that no rigid rules, except 
ethical ones, prevent the application of logic. 
• Commercial opportunism, which is a consequence of pragmatism, but 
also something more, a permanent predisposition to be attentive to 
some new technical and geographical route of entry and to take 
advantage of it, concentrating all the attention and possible operative 
strength on it, so that whoever finds an opportunity has the power to 
take advantage of it. 
• Capillary structure, a consequence of our desire to get closer to the 
insured with professional representation capable of providing an 
effective technical response in every population centre, even very 
forgotten and abandoned ones, and in urban neighbourhoods with 
some characteristic of homogeneity. 
• Internal promotion, in which MAPFRE has set an outstanding example, 





17. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1983 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: The results for 1983 were a magnificent end to 
MAPFRE's fiftieth anniversary, with very significant growth, double that of the 
market as a whole, and excellent profits in all companies. 
He highlighted some figures: the income for all items of the insurance entities 
The group's total assets, also consolidated and audited, now exceeded 27,500 
million pesetas; and its total assets, also consolidated and audited, exceeded 
34,000 million pesetas. These figures are indicative of MAPFRE's solid equity 
position, and MAPFRE was beginning to transform itself into a relatively 
significant player in the Spanish economy. 
He also highlighted the importance for business soundness of the real estate 
investment policy carried out in these years in two different areas: what they 
called operational, purchases of premises for their own use coordinated with 
the needs of their territorial expansion; and pure investment in office buildings 
but operating them on a rental basis. 
When talking about the future, he wanted to refer to three heterogeneous 
aspects that are part of MAPFRE's philosophy of action and are important parts 
of the SISTEMA MAPFRE 85 plan: 
• Firstly, he spoke of the importance of the Instituto Tecnológico de 
Seguridad MAPFRE (ITSEMAP). Secondly, he commented on the decision 
to set up a Insured Party Defence Counsel  in 1984, whose new 
regulations were approved at the Extraordinary General Meeting of that 
year. Thirdly, he referred to the challenge that the  
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appropriate use of the means provided by IT and office automation 




18. - WORDS DELIVERED BY IGNACIO H DE LARRAMENDI ON THE OCCASION OF 
THE PRESENTATION OF THE VINAGRE PRIZE [Words delivered by Ignacio H de 
Larramendi on the occasion of the presentation of the Vinagre prize granted by the 
Barcelona Insurance Agents' Association on 24 October 1984 in that city] 
 
Summary of Contents: Concerning the training work, the training and study 
centre that insurance agents have as an extremely important factor. There can 
only be true professionalism when there is a high level of training, and 
everything that Spanish insurance, in all states, at all levels, does for the 





19. - WORDS DELIVERED BY IGNACIO H. DE LARRAMENDI, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE 
INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE SEGURIDAD MAPFRE, ON THE OCCASION OF THE 1ST 
IBERO-AMERICAN MEETING ON OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 
[Words delivered by Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, as Chairman of the Instituto 
Tecnológico de Seguridad MAPFRE, on the occasion of the 1st Ibero-American Meeting 
on Occupational Health and Safety held in Ávila, 1 December 1984] 
 
Summary of Contents: Concerning Fundación MAPFRE's projects: promotional 
seminars to make known the people and institutions that are dealing with 
safety; Making MAPFRE's services and information available to the 
organisations that exist and act in this field; Publishing a lot, at a reduced price, 
avoiding speculation; Offering training scholarships and instructing people with 
possibilities and vocation to provide a useful service to  Spanish and Ibero-
American society. And reference to the most ambitious project: to create its 
own safety technology, partly by recycling that of other countries (United States 
and Europe) to make it available to the Ibero-American community and export 




20. - SPEECH GIVEN AT THE GENERAL MEETING OF MAPFRE'S MEMBERS 
IN 1984 [Collection of speeches delivered by Mr Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at 
the General Meetings of Members (1973-1985)]. 
 
Summary of Contents: Last speech as Chief Executive Officer, a position he was 
leaving that day. For this reason, he wanted to prepare a collection of his speeches to 
the General Meetings held since 1972, which were given to the attendees. 






21. - SPEECHES DELIVERED BY IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI Y MONTIANO 
AT THE GENERAL MEETINGS OF MUTUAL MEMBERS: (1973-1985) -MADRID: 
MAPFRE MUTUALIDAD DE SEGUROS, 1985  [Compilation of the speeches delivered by 
Ignacio H. de Larramendi at the General Meetings of MAPFRE Members from 1973 to 
1985]. 
 
Summary of Contents: Collection of the speeches delivered by Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi at MAPFRE's General Meetings, which reflect the 
evolution of MAPFRE until his retirement as Chief Executive Officer in strict 
application of the statutory regulations that he himself promoted. They reflect 
the living history of MAPFRE and also constitute an informal but very eloquent 
catalogue of MAPFRE's business principles to whose defence Don Ignacio 




22. - WORDS FROM IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI AT THE PRESENTATION OF 
THE GOLD MEDAL OF THE "FOUNDER OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE SEMINARS", 
ORLANDO, FLORIDA, 16 JUNE 1986. Speech by Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi at the 
presentation of the Gold Medal of the "Founder of International Insurance Seminars", 
Orlando (Florida), 16 June 1986] 
 
Summary of Contents: Words of thanks in which Larramendi offered the 
“strategic answers” that a good insurer must offer in the face of the future: 
simplicity of its products, maximum cutting out red tape and relentless pursuit 
of useless costs to offer customers “good, cheap products” with efficient 




23. ‐ LA SEGURIDAD COMO PROFESIÓN  [Speech by Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi 
at the Graduation of students of the 8th Year of the Technological University Institute 
of Industrial Safety of Valencia (Venezuela), 19 March 1987] 
 
Summary of Contents: On the importance of collaboration between brother 
countries in the field of safety as a real and effective instrument for the 
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24. - FAREWELLING SPEECH BY IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI AS CHAIRMAN 
OF FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE AND CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE AND OF THE CONTROL 
COMMITTEE OF THE MAPFRE SYSTEM GENERAL MEETINGS OF MAPFRE 
MUTUALIDAD AND CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE [MAPFRE, 16 June 1990] 
 
Summary of Contents: Farewell speech to the Mutual Society and the 
Corporación MAPFRE at the 1990 General Meeting, after 35 years at the helm 
of this company. In addition to acknowledgements, he focuseD on some on some 
specific aspects of his decision to take early retirement. 
 
25. - SPEECH BY IGNACIO HERNANDO DE LARRAMENDI AT THE “MAPFRE DAY OF 
HONOUR” EVENT AT THE SEVILLE UNIVERSAL EXHIBITION: 24  
SEPTEMBER 1992 [Speech given at the MAPFRE Day of Honour event at the 1992 
Seville Universal Exhibition] 
 
Summary of Contents: Dissertation on what the FUNDACION MAPFRE 
AMERICA is and what it wants to be, the protagonist in 1992 of the Colecciones 
MAPFRE 1492, which was presented that day and which constituted an 
enormous editorial effort:  283 titles, grouped organically by subject, which 
dealt with various aspects of history since 1492, and which also analysed 




26. - SPEECH AT THE CEREMONY FOR THE AWARDING OF THE GRAND CROSS OF THE 
ORDER OF THE 
CIVIL MERIT ON 9/9/1998 Speech delivered on the occasion of the awarding of the 
Grand Cross of the Order of Civil Merit, in the auditorium of MAPFRE Mutualidad de 
Seguros in Madrid, 1998] 
 
Summary of Contents: In his speech, Larramendi thanked his family for having 
made his dedication to MAPFRE possible, which was made as a result of his own 
individual efforts and sacrifices and those of all his associates, without any 
external support, neither political nor financial, nor of course religious, through 
hard work and inspiration. In his speech, he commented on the three points 
that allowed MAPFRE to go from being absolutely nothing in 1955 to the 
situation of 1998 
 
http://www.larramendi.es/ihl/es/consulta/registro.do?id=12349 





CORPORATE AND FOUNDATION REPORTS 
 
 
REPORTS TO THE BOARD OF MAPFRE 1972-1990 
 
1. - REPORTS TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS. 1972‐1985. 
 
2. - SPEECHES AT GENERAL MEETINGS OF MEMBERS 1973‐1985. 
 
3. - FINAL SPEECH BY IGNACIO DE LARRAMENDI Y MONTIANO, OUTGOING CHAIRMAN OF 
FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE AND CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE AND OF THE CONTROL COMMITTEE OF THE 
MAPFRE SYSTEM. 16 June 1990. 
 
 
FOUNDING REPORTS 1988-1998 
 
1. - REPORTS FROM THE CHAIRMAN TO THE FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE AMERICA (BOTH TO THE 
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND THE DELEGATED COMMITTEE). [Includes report in which Ignacio 
Hernando de Larramendi announces his resignation and a note to the members of the Fundación 
MAPFRE America committee at the Instituto Histórico Tavera]  1990‐ 1995. 
 
2. - REPORTS AND LETTERS TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE AMÉRICA 
AND THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE INSTITUTO HISTÓRICO TAVERA.. 1988‐1995. 
 
3. - REPORTS (AND SPEECHES) ON THE INSTITUTO HISTÓRICO TAVERA AND ITS TRANSFORMATION 
INTO THE FUNDACIÓN HISTÓRICA TAVERA. 1994‐1995. 
 
4. - REPORTS AS EXECUTIVE VICE-CHAIRMAN TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FUNDACIÓN 
HISTÓRICA TAVERA. 1996‐1997 
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS CARRIED OUT ON THE OCCASION OF THE CENTENARY OF IGNACIO HERNANDO DELARRAMENDI 
 






























































JOSÉ MARÍA SERRA 
 JOSÉ ANTONIO 
PÉREZ ESPAÑA 






MARIANO DE DIEGO 
  LUIS VALIENTE 
VALLEJO 





MARIA LUISA GARCIA 
MANSILLA 
  ALEXANDRA 
WILHEMSEIN 




JOSE LUIS CATALINAS 





       





       
ALBERTO MANZANO  CARMEN LARRAMENDI        
CARLOS ALVAREZ  ANA PLANET        
DANIEL RESTREPO  ADORACION SANZ        





       





       
ALBERTO ELZABURU  LUIS ZUBIAUR        
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ANTONIO BRIONES 
 EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ 
ROVIRA 





       
RAFAEL BENJUMEA  ANDRES GAMBRA        
SEBASTIAN HOMET  MIGUEL LARRAMENDI        
BENITO TAMAYO  MERCEDES VARELA        




       
LUIS GONZALEZ LLANO  JUAN ANTONIO LABAT        
MANUEL LAGARES  JOSE MATEU        
SANTIAGO GAYARRE  ALFONSO BULLON        
TOMAS PEREZ  MANUEL OCON      
JULIO CASTELO  JULIO CAUBIN     
  FRANCISO MONTIANO     
  ALFREDRO PEREZ 
ARMINAN 
    
  ALFONSO REBUELTA     
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TOMAS PEREZ  MANUEL OCON      
JULIO CASTELO  JULIO CAUBIN     
  FRANCISO 
MONTIANO 
    
  ALFREDRO PEREZ 
ARMINAN 
    
  ALFONSO 
REBUELTA 
    
  IRENE PRADA     
 
417 Fundación Ignacio Larramendi / Fundación MAPFRE
 
 
CV DE LOS PARTICIPANTES EN EL LIBRO 
 
Javier Morillas Gómez. Professor of Applied Economics. Director of the Centre for Political 
Economy and Regulation-IED of the CEU San Pablo University. Member of the Editorial Board 
of El Economista and of the Jury for the "Tu Economía" Awards of A3 Media. He participates 
in the writing up of “Consenso Económico” for PriceWaterhouseCooper, PwC, which analyses 
the Spanish and world economy on a quarterly basis. Professor at the Diplomatic School 
(1995-2005). Former Spokesman Advisor to the Department of Employment of the 
Community of Madrid and the Official Chamber of Commerce and Industry, COCIM. He has 
been a Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley, visiting professor at 
various universities and business schools in Europe and America, as well as at CESEDEN and 
Escuela Superior del Ejército. He has directed several research projects related to the labour 
market, entrepreneurship, the Spanish economy and international cooperation, and has been 
invited to speak at the United Nations (New York, 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008). He has held 
managerial responsibilities in chemical and banking sectors, whist being the Chairman of the 
Association of Foreign Banking Representatives in Spain. His most recent books: De Isabel II a 
Felipe VI. El Economista, más de 165 años de la economía de España, Naturaleza y Causas de 
la Pobreza de las Naciones. Los diez determinantes del desarrollo económico. Estructura y 
Mercados Internacionales. External provider for ABC, he collaborates with the COPE Group 
and other media.  
Gonzalo Sanz-Magallón Rezusta. PhD in Economics from the CEU San Pablo University (1998), 
where he is currently Professor of the Economics Department. He has been the Principal 
Researcher of several research projects, among which should be highlighted ELEDUCA, Study 
on the convenience and possibilities of extending freedom of choice in education in the 
Community of Madrid by strengthening private sources of funding, CUNEMAD, Contribution 
of Universities to the Economy of the Community of Madrid, and AER Indicators, funded by 
the Association of Entrepreneurs of the Ribera de Navarra for the development of studies on 
the competitiveness of this region. He has taught courses as a visiting Professor and has 
carried out residencies and courses in different foreign universities such as St. Louis 
University, Oxford, Charles De Gaulle, Lessius deAmberes, or Boston University. He is 
Academic Secretary of the Centre for Political Economy and Regulation of the Institute for the 
Study of Democracy. 
Manuel M. Molina López is Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Business 
Studies at the CEU San Pablo University where he obtained his PhD with International 
Mention. Associate Professor of Business Organisation, accredited as Temporary Lecturer by 
ANECA. Master’s Degree in Research in Economics and Business at Pontificia Comillas 
University. He has been a visiting researcher at American University and Columbia University 
(USA), as well as a guest on several occasions in his capacity as an expert in economics and 
finance by the European Commission (2017, 2018 and 2019). His main lines of research cover 
the field of corporate governance, as well as competition and management in educational 
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markets and centres. He is a Researcher of the Centre for Political Economy and Regulation 
of the Institute for the Study of Democracy. 
Mercedes Rubio Andrés is Director of the Degree in Business Administration and responsible 
for the Management of Human Resources subject at CEU San Pablo University, where she 
obtained her PhD. Master's Degree in Business Management from the Autonomous 
University of Madrid. She has been Professor of Business Organisation in different Universities 
and Postgraduate Schools. She has participated in various funded research projects, such as 
the "Proyecto Informe Pyme España 2018", of Fundación FAEDPYME, or "La Formación de los 
enfermeros" of the "Fundación Enfermería Castilla y León"; she has co-directed 8 PhD Theses 
(one of them with Extraordinary Prize) and presented communications in congresses such as 
those of ACIEK, ACEDE or IFERA, among others. Researcher at the Centre for Political Economy 
and Regulation-IED. Her publications in the Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management and Sustainability journal should be highlighted 
José Manuel Muñoz Puigcerver. Extraordinary Prize of the Degree in Economics from the 
CEU-San Pablo University and PhD in Economics with "outstanding cum laude" from the 
aforementioned University. Master’s Degree in International Relations and Strategy 
Consultant at Capgemini Consulting. Researcher in the Economic Environment Department of 
the Instituto de Empresa. Director of the Master's Degree in International Trade at EUDE 
Business School. He currently teaches International Economics at Nebrija University and EAE 
Business School. He is a Researcher of the Centre for Political Economy and Regulation of the 
Institute for the Study of Democracy. Speaker at several international conferences and author 
of several articles published in scientific journals. He collaborates in El Debate de Hoy and 
different media. 
Manuel R. Tejeiro Koller is PhD Professor of Strategy at the CEU San Pablo University and at 
the Hult International Business School, London. His professional background is in banking, 
having worked as an internal auditor for Banco Santander, and ten years as an academic in 
different universities before joining his current institution. His research work focus on 
corporate culture for business innovation and transformation, as well as innovative 
entrepreneurship and technology start-ups. He is a Researcher of the Centre for Political 
Economy and Regulation of the Institute for the Study of Democracy. The study of 
organisations, their ability to adapt through transformation and the creation of new ventures, 
have been the subject of his various publications and presentations at international 
conferences. He has also collaborated in several consultancy projects in Spain and for 
international development in Equatorial Guinea and Central America. 
José Andrés-Gallego. Extraordinary Professor Emeritus of Contemporary History, CEU 
San Pablo University. Professor at the UNED and the University of Cadiz (1977-1986). Scientific 
researcher and Research Professor at CSIC (1986-1997 and 1998-2014). Rector of the Catholic 
University of Avila (1997-1998). Member of the Editorial Board of the Historia general de 
España y América (1979-1992). Trustee of Fundación Mapfre América (1992-1996). Trustee (1996-
2001) and member of the Board of Trustees (1998-2002) of the Fundación Histórica Tavera. General 
coordinator of Colecciones Mapfre 1492. Member of the Scientific Board (1996-2002) and Director 
(1999-2002) of Clásicos Tavera. Director of the Mapfre Historical Projects (Afroamérica, tercera raíz; 
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Impacto de la expulsión de los jesuitas en América and Derecho y justicia en América), of Fundación 
MAPFRE América (1993-1996) and of Fundación Larramendi (1996-2005). Co-editor of the Archivo 
Gomá 1936-1939 (2001-2010). Director (2002-2007) and Co-Director (2007-2011) of the Master’s 
Degree in History of the Hispanic World (CSIC and Fundación Carolina). Director of the Ideas collection 
(Ideas y Libros Editorial, 2015-2021. Member of the Board of Directors and Founders of AEDOS 
(Association for the Study of Social Doctrine) since 1989. Main publications of interdisciplinary 
method: New History, nouvelle histoire: Hacia una nueva historia (1993), Recreación del humanismo, 
desde la Historia (1994), Relativismo y convivencia, paradigma cultural de nuestro tiempo (2005), Diez 
años de reflexión sobre el nacionalismo, el estado, la nación, la soberanía y lo hispánico (2008), Historia 
de la gente: Europa y América entre la Edad Moderna y la Contemporánea (2016). 
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